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Decision makers often present military researchers with a most daunting 
challenge: to pursue, with some level of prophetic certainty, innovative concepts that will 
yield increased capabilities during future wars against forecasted threats in not-yet- 
determined locations. This conundrum is complicated further with the requirement that 
the proposed technology yield benefit throughout the various strata of military operations. 
In the maturation of an advanced capability enabled by a technological advancement, a 
groundbreaking design should simultaneously demonstrate performance overmatch 
against an envisioned foe while showing that the costs associated with development, 
procurement, and operation outweigh reverting to an incremental advancement in the 
conventional means of delivering combat power.  
viii 
This manuscript focuses on the construction and utilization of decision support 
tools for use by scientists and engineers charged with providing a quantitative evaluation 
of an advanced ground combat system. The concepts presented focus on the effects and 
synergy regarding the combat vehicle principal attributes of survivability, lethality, and 
mobility. Additionally, this study provides a framework for analysis of these attributes 
when screened at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. These concepts are 
presented and demonstrated from both the candidate selection (or choice) perspective, 
and the concept development (or design) perspective. As an example of this approach, 
this study includes a comparison of conventional powder gun cannonry versus a specific 
type of electromagnetic launch device known as the railgun. 
The decision support tools formulated in this dissertation allow the user to distill, 
at a coarse level of fidelity, the parametric relationships between system survivability, 
lethality, and mobility for advanced weapon system concepts. The proposed methods are 
suited for evaluation at the nascent stages of development, when the information 
normally applied in standard methods is sparse. This general approach may also be 
valuable in contemporary acquisition strategies employed in urgent fielding efforts, 
where the immediacy of the problem can benefit from an expedient and efficient method 
of analyzing the coupled and synergistic effects of implementing a proposed technology. 
While advantage is typically measured in terms of performance overmatch at the platform 
level, the broadening of this consideration vertically to higher levels of military command 
can aid in identifying the competing issues and complementary relationships related to a 
technical approach. Finally, given the backdrop demonstration for the framework, this 
manuscript may serve as a brief summary of system fundamentals and design theory for 
direct fire powder gun cannonry and electromagnetic railguns. 
ix 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
No good decision was ever made in a swivel chair. 
  —General George S. Patton Jr. 
 
There are over two thousand years of experience to 
tell us that the only thing harder than getting a new 
idea into the military mind is to get the old one out. 
 —Basil H. Liddell Hart 
1.1 Overview 
For nearly a century, the U.S. Army, with well-defined peer threats and a focus on 
major combat operations, has steadily pursued ground combat vehicles designed to afford 
future mounted warriors with advanced levels of survivability, lethality, and mobility. 
However, the contemporary transformation in warfare, coupled with the increasing rate 
of change in functional requirements, has challenged fighting platform design and 
selection processes previously built for the Cold War environment. This chapter presents 
relevant observations regarding ground combat vehicle design successes as well as 
opportunities for improvement. Based largely on the opportunities for improvement 
identified from the last decade, a hypothesis and set of research questions was developed, 
the answers to which are aimed at improving future ground combat vehicle design and 
selection efforts. In order to contribute to an improvement in the field of fighting vehicle 
advancement, a literature review was conducted on both decision analysis and ground 
combat vehicle design theory. This review yielded insight as to how decision support 
tools might best be constructed in order to facilitate future efforts involving the future 
pursuit of advanced ground combat vehicles.  
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1.2 Background 
Behind the development or adoption of any revolutionary military technology 
resides a moment when, in a challenging and contentious environment, a decision is 
made to pursue a novel concept to fruition. Historical examples include incorporating 
steam power over sail for naval ships, mounting ground forces on vehicles driven by 
internal combustion engines instead of riding horses and mules, and harnessing gas 
turbine power plants in place of piston engines and spinning propellers on fixed-wing 
military aircraft (Figure 1). While there was an eventual positive outcome for each of 
these pursuits, contemporary accounts of nearly every example of military technology 
development or adoption illustrate that considerable time was spent deliberating about, 
entrenching against, and even overtly delaying the implementation of a disruptive 
technology.1 In hindsight, the prescience and courage associated with the decision to 
mature these revolutionary, disruptive technologies might seem trivial, but at the time, 
these were controversial topics fraught with significant monetary risk, large uncertainty 
about system performance, and, perhaps most saliently, real threat to human life.  
 
1 Peter W. Singer, “How the U.S. Military Can Win The Robotic Revolution” Popular Mechanics (May 
2010) 36-39.  He is Senior Fellow Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings 
Institution.  Singer is widely considered one of the world's leading experts on 21st century warfare, 
particularly with respect to military technology.  
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Figure 1: Historical examples of transitioned revolutionary U.S. military technologies in 
projecting sea, land, and air power. Examples on the left are the precursors, 
and examples on the right are successors several generations after adoption 
of the disruptive technology.  From top left to bottom right, these include the 
USS Constitution, the Aegis Cruiser, the horse cavalryman, the M38 Willys 
Jeep, the P-51 Mustang, and the F-15 Strike Eagle.2   
The decision to develop and field ground combat vehicles falls into the category 
of revolutionary military technologies. Born from very humble origins and under the 
incredible duress of World War I, the first ground combat vehicles were essentially 
armored motorcars and tractors equipped with basic weapons mounted in simple turrets. 
Even in this rudimentary and primitive form, the earliest fighting vehicles provided 
crewmembers with the constitutive elements necessary for a ground combat platform, 
i.e., protection, firepower, and freedom to move. While the functional requirements and 
 
2 Sources for graphics include the USS Constitution: (www.bestscalemodels.com), Aegis Cruiser: 
(www.photobucket.com/AegisCruiserEvolution.gif), Horse Cavalryman: 
(www.virtualhorses.com/graphics/civilwar.htm), M38 Willys Jeep: 
(www.carblueprints.info/eng/view/willys/willys-jeep-1), P-51 Mustang: (www.shipbucket.com), and the F-
15 Strike Eagle: (www.amazingpaperairplanes.com/Eagle_F-15/AboutF-15_Eagle.html). 
from sail to steam
from horse to vehicle
from propeller to jet
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performance capabilities of modern fighting vehicles far exceed the early examples of 
mounted combat platforms, combat vehicles, both past and present, all share the 
possession of an inherent capacity to provide some level of survivability, lethality, and 
mobility to the crewmembers that ride and fight them in battle. 
 
   
 
   
Figure 2: Historical and modern examples of fighting vehicles. The photo in the upper 
left is one of the first armored cars, the Russian developed and French built 
Nakashidze-Charon, circa 1912. The photo in the upper right is of the 
modern U.S. M1126 Stryker fighting vehicle. The photo in the bottom left is 
one of the first tanks, the British Mark I, circa 1916. The photo in the 
bottom right is of the modern U.S. M1 Abrams tank.3  
 
 
3 Sources for photos include the Nakashidze-Charon: (commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nakashidze-
Charon.jpg), the U.S. Stryker: (www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stryker), the Mark I tank 
(http://wa8.wikispaces.com/Tank), and the U.S. M1 Abrams tank (www.fprado.com/armorsite/abrams.htm) 
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Regarding the future of mounted combat and the decisions associated with 
advancing fighting vehicle performance, the abundance of dilemmas facing current U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) leadership in the Contemporary Operating Environment 
(COE) is as great today as when those historic decisions were made to field the first 
ground combat vehicles. The COE is defined as “a composite of the conditions, 
circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the 
decisions of the commander.”4 Presently, the COE can be classified as a veritable squall 
line of competing resources for research and development activities.5 A list of these 
burdens includes the continued transformation of military forces from a Cold War, peer-
threat focus to the present-day efforts with counter-insurgency (COIN) and stability 
operations; base realignment and closure (BRAC) proceedings; ongoing overseas 
contingency operations (OCO) including Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring 
Freedom (OIF and OEF) in Iraq and Afghanistan; and decades of life-cycle management 
(LCM) involving tens of billions of dollars for fielded systems. To safeguard future 
forces and sustain global military superiority in the most efficient and effective manner, 
technologists working in defense-related research are asked to forecast a tall order, 
namely to predict—with some level of prophetic certainty—which innovative concepts 
will provide increased capabilities in future conflicts against anticipated threats in 
unknown locations.6  
 
4 Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 13 June 
2007.  
5 David A. Fulghum, “Competing Demands on Defense Budget Produce Desperate Crisis” Aviation Week 
and Space Technology (November 2005) 2-3.  
6 Douglas A. Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century.  











Figure 3:  Competing demands and paradigm shifts for the U.S. military in the COE. 
 
In addressing the critical issues dominating the COE, an advanced ground combat 
vehicle design should provide net worth at the various echelons of the military. 
Moreover, performance advantages in one area must be in concert with capabilities in 
others. In the pursuit of a technological advantage, the developer of a novel concept must 
simultaneously demonstrate capability overmatch against perceived threats while 
showing that the anticipated performance gains in maturing such a technology outweigh 
investing in an incremental advancement in the conventional means of delivering combat 
power. More simply stated, and especially apropo when dealing with an advanced 
weapon concept, the “bang for the buck” must be explicitly defined and clearly illustrated 
to the decision maker over several levels in analysis. 
 
1.2.1 Generational Warfare Construct 
When evaluating the COE, it is important to identify the significant changes in the 
nature of modern warfare. A paradigm shift that has spurred transformation in the armed 
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forces of the 21st century is a movement from third-generation (3GW) to fourth-
generation warfare (4GW).7 The generational warfare construct helps organize the 
evolution of military affairs over time through identification of dominant themes in 
tactics, means, and weaponry. The four generations are collectively referred to as the 
manpower (first), firepower (second), maneuver (third), and information (fourth) 
generations of warfare. 4GW is typified by observations of combat in OIF and OEF. The 
main characteristic of this type of warfare is engagement with asymmetrical threats. 
These threats are networked and often operate on a noncontiguous, nonlinear battlefield, 
while representing some deeply rooted ideology.8 Table 1 includes a brief categorization 
of the generational warfare construct to include the general characteristic, prevailing 
historical period, and notable examples for each generation.9  
  








First 1GW Manpower 1000―1800 Waterloo 
Second 2GW Firepower 1800―1920 Maginot Line 
Third 3GW Maneuver 1920―1990 Blitzkrieg 
Fourth 4GW Information 1990―2040 9/11 
 
 
7 Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21st Century (Saint Paul, Minnesota: 
Zenith Press, 2004) 288-290.  
8 Harold A. Gould and Frank C. Spinney, “Fourth Generation Warfare” Journal of Strategic Affairs 
(September 2004) 7-12.  
9 The dates provided are to simply give the reader a reference in time for when that generation of warfare 
prevailed and are not intended to denote start and finish.  Italicized entries are forecasted, e.g., the end of 
4GW.  
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There are several important considerations to make for combat vehicle design 
with respect to the shift toward 4GW. First, the pace of change from generation to 
generation appears to be quickening. Figure 4 depicts a curve fit of this progressive trend 
for the generations of warfare represented by an exponential of the form in Equation 1 for 
the variable t in years. Second, the inherent uncertainty associated with operating in 4GW 
is, in many ways, greater than that seen in the previous generations. This operational 
ambiguity demands more robust design solutions that can adapt to the rapid evolutions in 
threat capabilities. Third, where ground vehicles once served as the virtual hubs for 
operations in maneuver warfare (3GW), in an information warfare domain (4GW) the 
platform fulfills a role within a larger and more integrated network of systems. Fourth, 
the compatibility between vehicle capabilities and requirements for 3GW versus 4GW is, 
in many ways, incongruent. In other words, the materiel requirements and definitions for 
military operation success in 3GW may not translate directly to 4GW. 
 
  55 5.8 101 3.2 10 tGW t e     Equation 1
 






















Figure 4:  Generations of warfare progression during the last two centuries. 
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To build on this last point, the combat platforms or fighting vehicles designed for 
major combat operations (MCO), i.e., offensive and defensive operations in 3GW, were 
chiefly focused on decisively defeating a peer-threat on the battlefield. It remains to be 
seen what a satisfactory vehicle candidate embodies for the counterinsurgency (COIN) 
fights that dominate 4GW. Current platforms like the U.S. Stryker and Mine Resistant 
Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles have had mixed success in OIF and OEF due to a 
lack of protection and mobility, respectively. The U.S. Stryker and MRAP family of 
vehicles are also ill-suited for MCO for similar reasons.  As will be further discussed, the 
evolution of these platforms over time has appeared to validate, or at least reaffirm, the 
need for sustenance of the three core characteristics of fighting vehicles, i.e., 
survivability, lethality, and mobility. 
 
1.2.2 Puzzles and Mysteries 
An additional shift related to the transition from 3GW to 4GW generation warfare 
deals with the notion of puzzles and mysteries. Puzzles are described as well-defined or 
well-structured problems where a solution is presumed to exist, whereas mysteries are 
described as ill-defined or ill-structured problems laden with high uncertainty and 
ambiguity. By these descriptions, the events surrounding a mystery have not played out 
through their entirety. The concept of puzzles and mysteries is well established in the 
national security arena, and recognition of the impact is understood in the defense 
materiel enterprise as well.10 Puzzles typically have a definitive answer, the 
determination of which is dependent on the amount of information collected and 
 
10 Gregory F. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information  (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) 11-13.  
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processed. The classic example of a monumental puzzle tackled by a large organization is 
the Manhattan Project, the U.S. effort to develop an atom bomb during World War II.  
On the other hand, a mystery can further be described as a problem to which there 
is no clear-cut resolution. Militarily, mysteries are often intertwined with the actions and 
reactions of the threat, and addressing them is more dependent on judgment and 
experience than the process-oriented methods that are employed to solve puzzles. The 
archetypal mystery from military history was how the U.S. could best deal with the 
scourge of German U-boats prowling the Atlantic during World War II. Acknowledging 
that this problem required a different approach, the War Department created the Tenth 
Fleet to mitigate the U-boat threat.11 The tactics and procedures employed by the Tenth 
Fleet, though entirely different from that of the Manhattan Project, were eventually 
successful. More recently, this mystery-focused approach inspired the counter-
improvised explosive device (C-IED) efforts in OIF and OEF led by the U.S. Joint IED 
Defeat Organization (JIEDDO).12  
In the spirit of Newton’s third law, but paramount to dealing with a mystery 
versus a puzzle, is simple acknowledgment that for every action there will be a reaction 
from the threat. From a technology perspective, recognizing where on the puzzle–
mystery spectrum a problem rests is critical to developing a sound approach. When 
considering the generational warfare construct, military technologists in the COE often 
find themselves making decisions higher on the notional mystery axis on the puzzle-
mystery spectrum.  
 
11 Montgomery C. Meigs, Slide Rules and Submarines: American Scientists and Subsurface Warfare in 
World War II.  (Washington, D.C.; National Defense University Press, 1990) 112-114, 116.  General 
(Retired) Meigs served as the director of JIEDDO.  
12 Adam Higginbotham, “U.S. Military Learns to Fight Deadliest Weapons” Wired Magazine (July 28, 
2010).  For a review of the decade of C-IED efforts led by the U.S., as well as an illustration of the 
iterative, dynamic nature of operating in a domain defined by mystery, see Noah Shachtman, “The Secret 
History of Iraq’s Invisible War” Wired Magazine (June 14, 2011). 
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Table 2 provides a comparative overview of the qualities and characteristics 
defining puzzles and mysteries.13  
 
Table 2: Qualities and Characteristics of Puzzles and Mysteries14 
 Puzzle Mystery 
Conflict Era Cold War War on Terror 
Generation of Warfare third fourth 
Definitive Answer yes no 
Value of Intelligence high moderate 
Information Amount high moderate 
Tense of Problem past future 
Timescale moderate long 
Influenceable no yes 
Extent of Effort solving framing 
Approach process, procedure judging, assessing 
Dependent Upon transmitter receiver 
Utility of Effort  detection prevention 
Use of Metrics effective  elusive 
 
 
13 Gregory F. Treverton, “Risks and Riddles… Why We Need to Know the Difference” Smithsonian 
Magazine (June 2007) 72-78. 
14 Gregory F. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information  (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). The information presented in this table is based on Treverton’s text, as 
well as commentary from Gladwell in his article from the New Yorker, “Open Secrets Enron, intelligence, 
and the perils of too much information:  (January 8, 2007) and Treverton’s Smithsonian Magazine article 
titled “Risks and Riddles The Soviet Union was a puzzle. Al Qaeda is a mystery. Why we need to know the 




Table 2 presents the information in an exclusionary fashion, but in practice, 
technological problems appear somewhere on a puzzle–mystery continuum. Few puzzle 
problems lack an element of mystery to them. Likewise, few mysteries fail to present the 
investigator with puzzles to solve. The effectiveness of a materiel solution strategy starts 
with careful consideration for this matter.15 Contemporary threats present problems deep 
in the mystery region of the puzzle-mystery spectrum. This has challenged systems, 
processes, and procedures well suited to function against former threats predominately 
defined by puzzles. 
Military technology researchers, like members of other industries evolving under 
the effects of globalization, are not simply conducting business as usual. The fiscal and 
operational demands on our armed forces have never been higher. Meanwhile, 
forecasting efforts anticipate even tighter budgets and continued operational demands. 
The change in focus from conventional, peer-threat, MCO in 3GW to a directed effort 
against asymmetrical threats, COIN operations, and 4GW has forced materiel developers 
to change the way they mature and field new technologies. Add to this an increase in the 
complexity and interconnectedness of modern ground combat systems, as well as the 
convergence and overall shrinkage of materiel developers in the commercial base of the 
military-industrial complex, and the scale of these challenges can be fully appreciated.16  
 
 
15 Malcolm Gladwell, “Open Secrets” New Yorker Magazine (January 8, 2007) 47-52, 117-119.   
16 Transcription of President Dwight Eisenhower’s farewell address by Michael E. Eidenmuller.  This 




A review of the contemporary DoD acquisition methods, as well as an assessment 
of combat vehicle successes and opportunities for improvement during the first decade of 
combat operations in OIF and OEF served as the motivation for this research. In 
consideration for the huge sums of money involved as well as the severity of the stakes—
national security—defense acquisition is directed by a set of regulatory processes and 
procedures known collectively as the DoD 5000 Series.17 Inspired by a succession of 
groundbreaking defense reform laws, most notably the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, 
the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, and the Levin-McCain Act of 2009, the modern DoD 
5000 Series would seemingly guarantee that technology endeavors produce capabilities 
on time, on budget, and with achievement of stated performance objectives. 
 The systems engineering rigor, political oversight, and voluminous technical 
requirements should predictably yield superior capability assessments and the pursuit of 
meaningful technologies. An assessment of the past 30 years shows an alarming trend; 
specifically, longer schedules and higher costs for acquisition projects to attain stated 
objectives (Figure 5). The reasons for this growth trend include the increased complexity 
of combat system designs, the changing nature of warfare, shifting requirements, and the 
budgetary intricacies of the acquisition process.  
 
 
17 Christopher H. Hanks, Elliot I. Axelband, Shuna Lindsay, Mohammed Rehan Malik, Brett D. Steele, 
Reexamining Military Acquisition: Reform Are We There Yet? (California: Rand Corporation, 2005) 28-35. 
14 
 
Figure 5: Development times: past, present, and future, with goals. General 
classifications for this data are from the automotive, commercial aircraft, 
and combat vehicle industries (source: DARPA AVM Information Briefing, 
October 7, 2010, Arlington, VA). 
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The trend for ground combat vehicle design in Figure 5 is also indicative of a 
shrinking military industrial base. Additionally, the reduced players in this industry are 
involved in endeavors that are not typically conducive with leveraging off commercial 
technology. This is in contrast with the automotive industry that gets to draw from the 
innovations of its competitors in both design and manufacturing practices. The 
accompanying discussion to this figure, led by the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) Program Manager for the Adaptive Vehicle Make (AVM) program, 
included observation of increased program delay with increased system complexity. 
While discussing Figure 5, Paul Eremenko, the AVM Program Manager at DARPA, 
explained that the term used to denote complexity, i.e., the number of source lines of 
code (SLOC) plus the part count, was a first attempt to quantify the growing trend 
complexity by combining two dimensionless terms, i.e., SLOC plus part count. This 
complexity term was created to depict the voluminous software code incorporated into 
the operation of sophisticated electromechanical systems typical of most advanced 
military systems.18  
Specifically for the U.S. Army and its acquisition community, the decade 
following 9/11 has been defined by a commendable record of breakthroughs and 
achievements for light infantry forces and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), yet muted 
by a litany of major combat system cancellations and no-starts. The notable successes 
include more substantial and progressively lighter body armor, advanced personal 
weapon optics, the RQ-7A/B Shadow UAVs, and the M777 improved, lightweight towed 
155 mm artillery piece.19 On the downside, a partial list of cancellations includes Future 
 
18 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “DARPA Aims to Revolutionize Defense Manufacturing” 
(Arlington, Virginia: DARPA,  September 14, 2010). 
19 Peter W. Singer, Wired for War:  The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century.  (New York, 
New York:  Penguin Press, 2009) 11-14.   
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Combat Systems (FCS), the Crusader self-propelled artillery vehicle, the RAH-66 
Comanche stealth helicopter, and the Army Railgun Program.20,21 
 The pursuit of technology for the U.S. Army in the post 9/11 period has also been 
heavily focused on Counter-IED efforts ranging from detection to surviving an attack. 
Meanwhile, ground combat system capabilities have progressed incrementally atop aged 
legacy systems. The interim vehicle intended to bridge this legacy force with FCS, i.e., 
the Stryker, has incorporated protection-related modifications to address the threats 
persistent in 4GW. To fill the theater-specific survivability gap in OIF and OEF, the $20 
billion MRAP program has clearly reduced casualties by dramatically increasing the crew 
survival rate from catastrophic IED incidents.22 These MRAP vehicles, however, offer 
little to no inherent lethality or firepower capability. Moreover, the immense size of some 
variants limits their tactical mobility, particularly in areas with complex terrain, e.g. the 
types encountered with the topography in Afghanistan.23  
 Ten years of war focused predominantly on COIN, along with a decade of 
cancelled programs intended to fulfill future requirements, necessitate that the decisions 
made in the next opportunity cycle are cogent, comprehensive, and decisive. In 
acknowledgment to the originators and the proverbial “length of the teeth” in our ground-
combat vehicle fleet, it should be noted that the Abrams M1 main battle tank and Bradley 
M2 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) were fielded to the U.S. Army in the early 1980s after 
decades of research, design, testing, and eventual production. Modularity, programmed 
modernization activities, and unscheduled upgrades have extended the service life of 
 
20 Kris Osborn, “FCS Is Dead; Programs Live on U.S. Army to Dissolve Flagship Acquisition Effort” 
Defense News  (May 2009).  
21 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Enrolled Bill [Final as Passed Both House and 
Senate, H. R. 2647—568 Title XLII—Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Sec. 201.   
22 Tom Donnelly, “Why Gates Is Wrong” Armed Forces Journal (June 2009).  
23 The range associated with these already subjective ratings is attributed to the fact that there are greater 
than 10 vehicles carrying the MRAP classification with variants for each, bringing the total even higher. 
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these battle-proven, and, in many respects, revolutionary designs. While these systems 
still reign supreme among peer threats—“tactical virtuosities” if you will— 
advancements in the succession of replacements appears modest, especially when 
measured against the leap in performance that both the Abrams and Bradley provided 
with respect to the  platforms they supplanted in the force.24  
On the same topic of ground combat vehicle progression, after the cancellation of 
the FCS program, the follow-on effort was halted over concerns about requirements, 
anticipated platform performance challenges, and the perennial concerns related to 
system cost and development schedule. Following this setback, the U.S. Army’s restart 
for a combat vehicle replacement, known simply as the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV), 
is currently being explored by a parallel and complementary, if not competing, effort by 
DARPA under the AVM program.25 The AVM program has as a stated objective of, not 
only producing an advanced ground combat vehicle but at a higher level, demonstrating 
an acquisition design strategy of superior capacity and robustness that can handle the 
complexities inherent in engineering a ground combat system in a compressed and 
responsive timeline necessitated by the current operational demands and requirements.26 
 In short summary, all recent efforts by the U.S. Army acquisition community to 
produce the next-generation ground combat system have been cancelled outright or 
postponed successively. The defense industry trend for large programs of increasing 
complexity, lengthening schedules, and higher costs continues on an upward slope. This 
is truly a technological paradox. General understanding for the physical sciences in all 
disciplines of engineering is much higher today than during the combat vehicle design 
 
24 Bruce I. Gudmundsson, On Armor (London: Praeger, 2004) 174-176. Gundmundsson uses the term 
“tactical virtuosities”. 
25 Paul Eremenko,  Program Manager, Adaptive Vehicle Make (AVM), Tactical Technology Office 
Proposers’ Day Briefing,  07 October 2010.  
26 Ibid. 
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heydays of the 1970s. The automation and efficiency afforded by computer aided design, 
rapid prototyping, and multi-physics modeling and simulation should at least enable 
projects today to match what looks in hindsight to be record pace for development.27 
Stated another way, what was impossible technologically in the past may be possible 
today, but what used to be possible programmatically (cost, schedule, and performance) 
is drifting further from reach in future design endeavors. Reasons for this trend may 
include more oversight and “players” in the decision loop, risk aversion, unstable 
funding, and perpetual shift in program requirements.  
 
 
Figure 6: Photo of a U.S. T-28 Super Heavy Tank. Built as a prototype during World War 
II,  this vehicle weighed over 86,000 kg (nearly 100 tons), was 11.1 m long 
and 4.39 m wide. Covered in a nearly complete shell of 30 cm armor, and 
sporting a 6.8 m long cannon, it required four sets of tracks (two on each 
side) to carry the immense load. The concept was abandoned for an 
inadequate level of mobility, as well as the immense logistical challenges 
associated with such a design.28  
 
27 Richard Chait, John Lyons, and Duncan Long, “Critical Technology Events in the Development of the 
Abrams Tank: Project Hindsight Revisited” (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2005) 39-48. 
28 Source for photo is www. freeweapons-mod/images/t28-super-heavy-tank.   
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At their core, ground combat vehicles provide crewmembers with a mobile, 
protected source of firepower. A successor platform should provide advanced levels of 
those functional capabilities for future forces. In order to make the best decisions possible 
in the design and selection of the next ground combat vehicle, a focus on the attributes 
that make a ground combat system effective on the modern battlefield will serve to 
produce improved designs and better choices. With respect to these attributes, current 
practices may not be generating appropriately allocated designs. Additionally, a decade 
of focus on COIN has contributed to an imbalanced, possibly distorted, view on what 
attributes, traits, and metrics comprise a potent ground combat system. Over 10 years 
after fielding, the highly mobile, albeit lightly armed and inadequately protected, Stryker 
required upgrades to address its survivability on the battlefield (Figure 7).29 On the other 
hand, the family of MRAP vehicles provided increased protection to the crew at the 
expense of mobility and lethality (Figure 8).  
 
29 Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army, and General Eric K. Shinseki, (Joint Statement Before the 
Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense on the Fiscal Year 2002 Army Budget, 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Senate, June 13, 2001) 3. Secretary White and General Shinseki were very clear in 
their testimony that the Stryker Brigade would lack sufficient lethality and survivability.  As a bridge 




Figure 7:  U.S. M1126 Stryker as initially fielded (left) and after survivability 
improvements were instituted (right). Upgrades include appliqué armor, 
slat armor, gunner's protective shield, and C-IED jammers and emitters 
like the Rhino and counter-passive infrared and the Counter Radio-






Figure 8:  U.S. Armored High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) (left) and 
the U.S. MaxxPro Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle 
(right).  The MRAP weighs 32,000 lbs, nearly three times that of the 
HMMWV.  It stands over 12 feet tall, twice as high as the HMMWV.31   
 
30 Source for photos is www.military-today.com/apc/stryker.htm 
31 Source for the MRAP photo HMMWV photo is www.olive- 
drab.com/idphoto/id_photos_mrap_maxxpro.php and www.baesystems.com/m1114.html respectively. 
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1.4 Research Objectives 
The design of a combat vehicle arguably represents the highest level of 
engineering difficulty and overall complexity that can be pursued in the defense materiel 
acquisition enterprise. Ground combat systems provide mounted warriors with 
movement, protection, and firepower. Moreover, modern fighting vehicles do so in 
spades, especially when compared to their World War II predecessors. From an 
automotive perspective, combat vehicles possess the off-road mobility of a high 
performance recreation vehicle, the operational range of a well-equipped family sedan, 
and some aspects of maneuverability akin to a sports car.32 With respect to the protection 
afforded by these systems, combat vehicles shield crews with effective armor 
approximating that of a battleship, fire suppression systems rivaling those on racing 
vehicles, and redundant design of critical functions similar to what is done in aerospace 
design. On the armament or weapon aspect, combat vehicles shoulder an extensive quiver 
of weaponry ranging from 10 MJ direct fire cannons effective out to 5 km range, laser-
guided missiles, fire control systems like those found in fighter aircraft, and optics with 
resolution comparable to a small reconnaissance UAV. These impressive performance 
specifications are made more so by how commonplace they have become in the 
international community of fighting vehicles and how durable and robust the designs 
must be to withstand the rigors of combat as demanded by the users and environment.  
The purpose of this research was to explore the novel application of 
analytical and experimental methods that may improve the level of understanding 
concerning fighting vehicle design and selection. These proposed techniques may lend 
themselves to improved decision support tools that can contribute to better design efforts 
 
32 Tony Assenza, “M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank” Car and Driver, (May 2001). The U.S. M1 Abrams 
tank has pivot steering, allowing it to spin in place. It also has immense braking power.  
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and higher quality candidate vehicle selection processes. The face of warfare is changing 
at an increasing rate, and the future requirements for full spectrum operations will likely 
surpass those seen in the early part of the 21st century.33  
The fundamental hypothesis of this manuscript is that decision support tools 
formulated around the principal attributes of survivability, lethality, and mobility, 
can enhance the design and subsequent selection of ground combat vehicles. By 
steadfastly focusing on the attributes that matter most, and adding a dimension to the 
analysis with screening at the various levels of war, the current processes may be 
improved. Critical to this study is appreciating the competing demands between and 
within the principal attributes while investigating the interactions and performance effects 
related to system survivability, lethality, and mobility.  
In order to explore this hypothesis, a series of related research questions was 
investigated. Question 1: What effect does the use of decision support tools built 
around the principal attributes of survivability, lethality, and mobility, have on 
combat vehicle selection? Question 2: What are the relative contributions and 
interactions of survivability, lethality, and mobility to ground combat vehicle 
performance?34 Question 3: How does this methodology lend itself to the 
comparison of the evolutionary development of conventional powder gun cannonry 
versus a revolutionary weapon concept  like the railgun?   
Chapter 2 establishes the conceptual framework for this manuscript by defining 
the principal attributes, secondary traits, and tertiary metrics associated with 
survivability, lethality, and mobility. Sources for this foundation include applicable 
 
33 Paul H. Deitz, Harry L. Reed Jr., J. Terrence Klopcic, James N. Walbert, Fundamentals of Ground 
Combat System Ballistic Vulnerability and Survivability (Reston, Virginia: American Institute of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2009) 2-4.  
34 R.M. Ogorkiewicz, Design and Development of Fighting Vehicles (New York: Doubleday and 
Company, 1968) 132-140.  
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literature, previous work, military doctrine, and analogous design efforts. This chapter 
also explores the layering of these attributes at the three levels of war: tactical, 
operational, and strategic. This exploration includes scaling analysis of mass, length, and 
time for the principal attributes at the three levels. The scaling analysis is presented from 
the notional deployment and subsequent engagement of a combat vehicle against a peer 
threat system. Chapter 2 concludes with a comparison of the merits of a group of fielded 
platforms using the survivability, lethality, and mobility attributes at the various levels of 
war. This was done in order to qualify both the complementary and the competing 
demands between attributes. The qualification of these relationships is displayed using 
the top portion of the quality function deployment (QFD) chart. The scaling and QFD 
analysis for the principal attributes at the levels of war are presented as a point of 
departure to qualitatively demonstrate the competing demands and inherent conflicts 
between design considerations horizontally (among attributes) and vertically (throughout 
the levels of war). 
Chapter 3 addresses the first research question with the development and 
subsequent use of an attribute-based network to apply weightings to prototypic ground 
combat vehicles. The results of an attribute weighting and candidate vehicle selection 
survey exercise using two distinct groups of U.S. Army officers are discussed. This 
chapter provides insight regarding the individual prioritization and relative subjective 
weighting assessments of fighting vehicle attributes. The data presented is a direct 
reflection of a representative population of mid-career U.S. Army officers, the vast 
majority of which have served in combat and are working in related fields within the 
Acquisition Corps, the technical procurement field of the U.S. Army. The information 
presented depicts the value that contemporary warfighters place on fighting vehicle 
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attributes, and how decision support tools can assist (or interfere) with presentation of 
specification data for decision making.  
Chapter 4 explores the effects and interactions of the principal attributes using 
both design of experiment (DOE) and analysis of variance (ANOVA) methods. This 
chapter focuses on the second research question by rendering and testing an experimental 
set of prototypic vehicles in a multifactorial, multilevel DOE/ANOVA test matrix. The 
relative performance of these vehicles as fought in the JRATS (Joint Reconnaissance and 
Targeting System) simulation—a virtual reality, physics-based, robotic combat vehicle 
prototyping environment, are reported and discussed.35 The mean performance for each 
vehicle variant from a series of 1,600 independent simulated combat missions 
(approximately 100 missions per platform variant) is presented. The attribute interactions 
are classified using a residual analysis statistical method commonly used in ANOVA 
methods. Military vehicle screening criteria are often based on spatial, mass, schedule, 
and financial limits. Chapter 4 includes insights gleaned from the preceding work to 
better utilize the physical weight and financial constraints placed upon developmental 
systems. When a program is presented with a budgetary surplus, or more likely, if a 
reduction is imposed, knowledge of the relative attribute effects and their interactions has 
the potential to direct where to make cuts, as well as those system attributes that must be 
defended in order to sustain effective performance. 
Chapter 5 builds on the previous findings regarding combat vehicle attribute net 
effects to formulate a trade study comparing conventional powder gun cannonry and the 
railgun class of electromagnetic weapons. When faced with a notional advanced tank and 
infantry fighting vehicle threat, direct fire concepts were prototypically designed and 
 
35 JRATS is used within the U.S. Defense Acquisition University (DAU) for the capstone design exercise 
in the Level III Program Management Course, PMT 352.  Derived from the Cognitoy LLC Mindrover 
1.108 space-based autonomous robotic vehicle design program, the military version enables the user to 
expediently create and fight notional robotic vehicles in an urban environment. 
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subsequently analyzed to answer the third research question regarding conventional 
cannonry and electromagnetic launch. Conventional systems were developed in parallel 
with the advanced concepts in order to highlight the costs associated with improving 
upon mature technologies versus pursuing a new frontier in weaponry. This chapter 
concludes with the technical requirements and performance objectives for a future direct 
fire railgun system.  
Chapter 6 provides a general summary for this manuscript highlighting the main 
points from the preceding chapters. This chapter attempts to underscore the central theme 
of principal attribute significance in fighting vehicle analysis, as well as to unify early 
subjective observations with the objective analysis of the experimental data sets. It 
includes references to the motivations for this research as well as the most salient 
learning points gleaned from this pursuit. Chapter 7 includes a list of future work 
opportunities representing areas of interest not able to be addressed within the limits of 
this research program. This list corresponds to work areas referenced within each of the 
main chapters.  
26 
 
1.4  Literature Review 
The literature review for this dissertation included an investigation of two main 
subjects: multicriteria decision making (MCDM) analysis and the engineering 
considerations for ground combat vehicle design. Supporting work in the decision 
making arena fell into both the multiobjective and multiattribute decision analysis 
categories. Multiobjective decision making (MODM) analysis deals with design and 
formulation efforts and the subsequent choosing of a strategy from a virtually infinite set, 
while the multiattribute (MADM) version deals with candidate selection from a finite set. 
Both MODM and MADM contribute to the military decision making process and the 
analysis of alternatives methods used in the operational U.S. Army and Acquisition Corps 
respectively. Additionally, many areas of the Operations Research and Systems Analysis 
(ORSA) military career field rely on these approaches to guide strategic and operational 
decision making.36 
 
36 The Military Applications Society (MAS) is a technical society within the Institute for Operations 
Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). 
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Criteria Defined By attributes objectives 
Objectives implicit explicit 
Attributes explicit implicit 
Constraint inactive active 
Alternatives finite infinite 
Decision Maker Interaction moderate high 
Usage selection design 
 
With respect to fighting platforms, the theory, design, and selection of ground 
combat vehicles is largely focused on the automotive/heavy equipment considerations for 
mobility, coupled with military considerations for survivability and lethality analysis. The 
topic of mobility was well represented in both military and academic literature. For 
example, the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) produce an annual journal edition 
dedicated solely to military mobility and transportation research. Works on lethality 
research are limited somewhat to conference proceedings on ballistics, impact physics, 
and weapon analysis. For security and proprietary reasons, only general aspects of 
survivability advancements are available in open sources.  
 
37 Table derived from K. Paul Yoon and Ching-Lai Hwang, Multiple Objective Decision Making 
(California: Sage Publications, 1995) as well as Ching-Lai Hwang and Kwangsun Yoon, Multiple Attribute 
Decision Making, Methods and Applications (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1981). 
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The literature review focused on these two broad subjects, MCDM analysis and 
combat vehicle design, especially on works that addressed the intersection of these two 
areas, i.e., MCDM analysis dealing with the design and/or selection of ground combat 
vehicles. Defense-related surrogate case studies, e.g., military aircraft design and 
selection efforts, were also analyzed. 
 
1.4.1 Multicriteria Decision Making Analysis 
The pioneering work of Ronald Howard, one of the founding fathers of the 
decision analysis field, was reviewed from the aptly titled Principles and Applications of 
Decision Analysis. His efforts were among the first to define the emerging field of 
decision analysis as one that can “focus logical power to reduce confusing and worrisome 
problems to their elemental form.”38 In his manuscript, the decision analysis process is 
described as being iterative in nature and comprising deterministic, probabilistic, 
informational, and decision making phases, with a recursive loop for gathering new 
information and reentering the process (Figure 9).39  
 
 
Figure 9: Howard's decision analysis cycle diagram. 
 
38 Ronald A. Howard,  James E. Matheson,  The Principles and Applications of Decision Analysis  
(California: Strategic Decisions Press, 1989) 21.  










Howard also developed the useful decision analysis hierarchy along with the 
concept of how critical a role uncertainty plays in the process. Most helpful for this study 
was the collection of MCDM texts, published as compilations of journal papers. The 
MADM version codified the noncompensatory and compensatory models used to 
distinguish between those systems that do not permit tradeoffs between attributes and 
those that do, respectively.40 This work also provided a methodology for transformation 
of attributes, accepting quantitative and qualitative (fuzzy) data with ordinal, interval, and 
ratio scales.41 Within this MADM journal collection is a valuable discussion about 
conjunctive (or satisficing methods) versus disjunctive (or the quest for the candidate of 
greatest perceived value) methods.42  
Of particular value to this research was a review of the seminal works of Thomas 
Saaty and the analytic hierarchy process (AHP). AHP endures to this day in practice as a 
method of formalizing complex systems and relationships using a hierarchical structure. 
The essence of AHP is to enable the decision maker to visually structure a MADM 
problem.43 Saaty’s AHP has served as the basis for adding value to numerous military 
projects, to include fighter aircraft selection, theater-level logistical processes, and 
improved use of resources for military recruiting.44 Numerous methods and 
accompanying software programs have been developed in the MADM field, including 
DECMAT, ELECTRE, Expert Choice®, LDW®, TOPSIS, TreeAge®, and Squidmat. Of 
special note, Richard Stikkers’ DECMAT (which was used here) was developed for the 
 
40 Ching-Lai Hwang, Kwangsun Yoon, Multiple Attribute Decision Making, Methods and Applications 
(New York: Springer-Verlag, 1981) 24-28.   
41 S. Stevens, Measurement- Definitions and Theories (New York: Wiley, 1959) 18-63.  
42 Hwang, 71.  
43 K. Paul Yoon, Ching-Lai Hwang, Multiple Objective Decision Making (California: Sage Publications, 
1995) 59-65. 
44 T. L. Saaty, The Analytic Hierarchy Process (New York: McGraw Hill, 1980).  
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U.S. Army and played a role within the analysis of alternatives process taught at the 
Command and General Staff College.45 Joe Stauffer later developed the complementary 
Squidmat tool that addressed some of the DECMAT limitations by conversion of all 
values to a z-ranking; it also avoids the pairwise rating scheme for attribute weightings.  
While methods and software abound in the field of MCDM, Yoon and Hwang 
surveyed a range of titles and concluded that “the choice of a [specific] method is not 
crucial enough for many [decision makers] to be overly concerned about it.”46 
Comparative studies considering collections of methods and computational aids produced 
similar decision analysis results, confirming their collective recommendation to establish 
a “goal hierarchy approach to generate attributes and sub-attributes.”47  
The MODM publication version focused on the use of objective and utility 
functions in conjunction with linear and nonlinear goal programming to converge on an 
optimal or satisficing candidate course of action. Among the concepts presented were 
those dealing with optimal solutions, where the vector maximum problem is one “which 
results in the maximum value of each of the objective functions simultaneously.”48 This, 
as opposed to the nondominated solution, or one in which “no one objective function can 
be improved without a simultaneous detriment to at least one of the other objectives of 
the [vector maximum problem].” These are also known as Pareto-optimal solutions, 
noninferior solutions, or efficient solutions. Four classes of MODM methods were 
presented in this work; they are clearly defined by the state at which information is 
 
45 Richard B. Stikkers DECMAT.  Stikkers wrote this program as a captain in the U.S. Army; he is now a 
defense contractor at Raytheon.  His expertise was very helpful, particularly the information shared through 
a series of emails in which he described the mathematical basis and supporting documentation for the 
pairwise rating, attribute weighting generation, and consistency ratio calculations.  
46 K. Paul Yoon, Ching-Lai Hwang, Multiple Objective Decision Making (California: Sage Publications, 
1995) 68-72.  
47 Yoon, 72.  
48 Ching-Lai Hwang, Kwangsun Yoon, Multiple Attribute Decision Making, Methods and Applications 
(New York: Springer-Verlag, 1981)16. 
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needed. These include: no preference articulation, a priori preference articulation, 
progressive (running-iterative) preference articulation, an a posteriori preference 
articulation.  
In most processes, the creators begin by identifying the problem, and 
subsequently drafting the appropriate objectives to be used in addressing it.49 Ralph 
Keeney, another highly respected figure in the field of MCDM, argued that it is best to 
first codify the organization’s central values and objectives, and then look for ways to 
achieve them.50, 51 In his book Value Focused Thinking, he argues that too often, decision 
making processes center on choosing among alternatives, when in fact the focus should 
be on the organization’s values and principles. In other words, Keeney’s methods focus 
on deciding what end state is desired, then working backward to design a solution and 
framework conducive with achieving that objective. In reviewing the various methods, 
Jonathan Bard showcased the two prominent multicriteria methodologies as applied to 
the U.S. Army’s selection process for rough terrain cargo handling equipment.52 This 
reference demonstrated several approaches for deconstructing a choice problem using 12 
attributes, as well as the opportunities and challenges of the different techniques. The 
comparative case studies as well as the notable references for the analytic hierarchy 
process (AHP) and multiattribute utility theory (MAUT) were used to build Table 4, a list 





49 Robert T. Clemen, Making Hard Decisions: An Introduction to Decision Analysis, Second Edition 
(Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1996) 6-15.  
50 R. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992).  
51 R. Keeney and H. Raiffa, Decisions with Multiple Objectives (New York: Wiley, 1976). 
52 Jonathan F. Bard, “A Comparison of the Analytic Hierarchy Process with Multiattribute Utility Theory: 
A Case Study” IIE Transactions, Volume 24, Issue 5, 1992, 111-121. 
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Table 4:  Comparison of the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Multiattribute Utility 
Theory (MAUT) 
 AHP MAUT 
Scaling ratio; priorities interval; utilities 
Preference Elicitation 
pairwise comparison, 




normalized ratio via 
eigenvalues 
assigned values, specified 
intervals 
Synthesis additive, eigenvectors additive, multiplicative 
Structure hierarchical matrixes or tree 
Built-in Feedback consistency synthesis 
Ease of Use simple complex 
Level of Abstraction low high 
Outcomes Measured subjective scale objective value 
Number of Attributes (limit) moderate (7) high (10+) 
Number of Alternatives (limit) moderate (7) high (10+) 





General Public Use yes no 
Theory and Rules minimal demanding 
Credited To Saaty Keeney and Raiffa 
The comparative case studies as well as the notable references for the analytic hierarchy 
process (AHP) and multiattribute utility theory (MAUT) were used to compile the 
information found in Table 4. 
 
33 
1.4.2 Ground Combat Vehicle Theory and Design 
The foundation of the literature review on ground combat vehicle theory and 
design was provided by the pioneering work of Richard Ogorkiewicz. While there are 
numerous historical works on the topic of combat vehicles and the military utility of 
employing them, Ogorkiewicz is one of the few to formally codify the theory and design 
of combat vehicles into a reference book. His first work, Design and Development of 
Fighting Vehicles, provided an overview of ground combat system fundamentals to 
include weapons, turret and hull construction, and the automotive aspects of both 
wheeled and tracked platforms.53 Around the same time of the publication of this work, 
the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) produced an extensive library of Engineering 
Design Handbooks. Available through the U.S. Defense Technical Information Center 
(DTIC), these important reference manuals contain an expansive, albeit somewhat dated, 
collection of the scientific underpinnings for an assortment of military vehicle design 
specialties. A partial list of relevant handbooks is provided in Table 5. Even at the 
present, Ogorkiewicz and others repeatedly reference these works. If the handbook series 
has since been modernized, it has taken a form not linked to DTIC and elusive to research 









53 R.M. Ogorkiewicz, Design and Development of Fighting Vehicles (New York: Doubleday, 1968).  
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Table 5: Pertinent U.S. Army Materiel Command Engineering Design Handbooks 
Number Title 
AMCP 706-106—108 Elements of Armament Engineering, Parts I, II and III 
AMCP 706-170 Armor and Its Application to Vehicles 
AMCP 706-250, 252 Guns – General and Gun Tubes 
AMCP 706-355 Automotive Assembly and Design 
AMCP 706-342 Recoil Systems 
AMCP 706-140 Trajectories, Differential Effects, and Projectiles 
AMCP 706-150  Interior Ballistics of Guns 
AMCP 706-331 Fire Control Systems 
AMCP 706-340 Carriages and Mounts 
 
Ogorkiewicz later produced a much more detailed, two-volume set that provided 
the defense community with an even richer engineering and scientific discussion related 
to the technology and design of fighting vehicles.54 In his text, Ogorkiewicz built upon 
the seminal works of M.G. Bekker and his research on land locomotion and terrain-
vehicle systems.55 Bekker’s works are credited with providing the U.S. Army with 
foundational theories on land locomotion and terramechanics. Ogorkiewicz also 
referenced the works of Manfred Held with respect to armor design and development. 
Held was one of the originators of explosive reactive armor (ERA), as well as a pioneer 
in the design and theory of shape charge munitions.  
From the nested relationship of vulnerability and lethality, Paul Deitz co-authored 
the AIAA book titled Fundamentals of Ground Combat System Ballistic Vulnerability 
 
54 R.M. Ogorkiewicz, Technology of Tanks (United Kingdom: Jane’s Information Group, 1991).  
55 Mieczyslaw Gregory Bekker, Introduction to Terrain-Vehicle Systems (Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 1969).  
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and Lethality.56  This book may be the only contemporary work solely dedicated to the 
topic of fighting vehicle protection and firepower, particularly with respect to research 
and engineering. Deitz and his coauthors collaborated extensively for this work, and the 
list of contributors illustrates the breadth and depth of defense-related research reviewed 
to develop this resource. Within this title is a description of the “means and missions 
framework”—an iterative process for evaluating system lethality and vulnerability in the 
context of an engagement scenario.  
Finally, the respected handbook on weaponry by the German arms manufacturer 
Rhienmetall (arms manufacturer name, not author), as well as Don Carlucci’s three-
volume set on ballistics, was reviewed in detail. Carlucci covered the main areas of 
internal, external, and terminal ballistics in his book, expanding on the general 
framework provided in the Rhienmetall version. Carlucci’s work is a stand alone 
reference well suited for the study of conventional, powder gun cannonry. 
 
1.4.3 Ongoing Complementary Work 
As of this writing, there are two contemporary efforts related to the work 
described in this manuscript. William Nanry of Lockheed Martin has developed and 
presented a decision support tool called Econometric Frontier Analysis.57 Nanry’s focus 
was to provide corporate leadership with a way of quantifying and visualizing the 
potential gains (business and military) and underlying risks (again, business and military) 
associated with novel military technologies and concepts. His technique derives future 
capabilities and operational requirements from strategic documents like the Quadrennial 
 
56 Paul H. Deitz, Harry L. Reed Jr., J. Terrence Klopcic, and James N. Walbert, Fundamentals of Ground 
Combat System Ballistic Vulnerability/Lethality (Reston, Virginia: AIAA, 2009).  
57 William Nanry, formerly a colonel in the U.S. Army, is now a research scientist at Lockheed Martin. 
Several informal discussions following a seminar he presented at the University of Texas in Austin in 
September 2010 indicated areas of inclusiveness and novelty in  respective efforts. 
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Defense Review and Joint Vision statements. The information divined from these 
documents serves as the entry point for investigating novel technologies conducive with 
those strategic objectives.58 In other words, it is a top-down method that screens 
candidate concepts based on merit at the highest echelon of command. Value and risk are 
then visually depicted on a planar surface, with one axis representing the commercial 
worth of a pursuit, and the other representing military value for employment of the 
technology. The main focus of this method is on the civilian and military decision makers 
at the highest levels of the authority. 
 Solely related to the U.S. Army GCV project, DARPA formed the Adaptive 
Vehicle Make (AVM) program in late 2009. The anticipated product from the AVM 
project is the Fast Adaptable Next-Generation combat vehicle (FANG). Broad and 
ambitious in virtually every way, one of the stated goals of the program is “to make a 
dramatic improvement on the existing systems engineering, integration, and testing 
process for defense systems.” Paul Eremenko, the AVM program manager, attributes the 
systemic problems in defense development enterprises as related to an inability to handle 
the increasing complexity associated with modern combat systems (Figure 5). He bases 
this assessment on an observation that, while other industries, e.g., commercial 
aerospace, automotive, computer processor, have embraced and leveraged design 
automation and sophisticated modeling techniques, the military and its associated design 
efforts have not pursued these areas with the same sense of urgency. 
With respect to the assessment of risk and technological maturity, the DoD has an 
established technology readiness level (TRL) matrix (Appendix 1). Based on an earlier 
version developed by NASA, this matrix helps position an emerging concept along a 
scale commensurate with the level of development. Missed opportunities to or failure to 
 
58 R. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992) 72. 
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properly mature new technologies in the science and technology (S&T), or laboratory 
environment almost invariably leads to cost and schedule over-runs in acquisition 
weapons system programs.59 The TRL methodology helps identify areas of risk by 
converting subjective assessments of maturity into an objective score used to quantify the 




59 Government Accounting Office, “Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve 




1.5 Lessons Learned 
 The U.S. Army legacy systems, e.g., the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, are a 
tribute to the tremendous technical effort made during the Cold War. However, 
vehicle design pursuits in the post Cold War era have been challenged to rapidly 
evolve based on emerging threats, in many cases demonstrating a need to refocus on 
and include deeper consideration for the essential, core characteristics of a fighting 
vehicle, i.e., survivability, lethality, and mobility.  
 The rate of change with respect to the evolution of warfare seems to be increasing. 
The threats faced by the U.S., operating within a global network and aided by a 
massive exchange of information, have pushed the speed of development and 
challenged traditional processes for military technology developers. 
 Contemporary requirements appear to be defined more by mysteries than puzzles. 
Related to the rapid pace of evolving needs, materiel solutions need more inherent 
robustness to help underwrite the high uncertainty associated with future pursuits. 
 Contemporary efforts in the arena of ground combat vehicle design are focused on 
decision makers, return on investment, and the manufacturing and design process 
rather than on a defined threat (puzzle) or addressing the inherent operational 
uncertainties (mystery).  
 The field of decision analysis has been exercised in previous military efforts to good 
effect. This multi-disciplinary field offers an array of techniques and approaches 
designed to enrich the quality of decision making efforts. 
 There is a rich and comprehensive history of combat vehicle design theory and 




The tools and techniques available in support of multiattribute decision making 
are plentiful and well developed, with some applicable learning curve associated with 
each. The volume of literature associated with the theory of fighting vehicles appears to 
have peaked with the end of the Cold War. Progress in this field was made during the 
developmental phases of the U.S. Future Combat Systems (FCS) program, but its 
cancellation may have halted any significant momentum in this field. With this 
understanding, it is unclear how much progress has truly been made with respect to 
conceiving replacement platforms possessing a revolutionary, versus evolutionary, scale 
of performance advantage over existing legacy ground combat systems. The urgent 
demands of current overseas contingency operations has encouraged the pursuit of 
candidate systems that are focused on dealing with an asymmetrical threat, e.g., MRAP, 
for protecting against IEDs. 
In conclusion, the literature review conducted for this work was focused on the 
development of decision support tools aimed at improving the state of the art with respect 
to future ground combat vehicles. The two main areas investigated, decision analysis and 
ground combat vehicle design, provided a deep appreciation for the extensive and lasting 
contributions from respected pioneers in the fields of decision analysis and the theory of 
fighting vehicles. The scarcity of information linking the ground combat vehicle design 
and decision analysis was used to develop research questions that could contribute to the 
base of knowledge in combat vehicle design theory. In other words, the research 
questions were created in a focused effort to form assistive and meaningful conceptual 
bridges between decision analysis and ground combat vehicle design.  
40 
Chapter 2:  Ground Combat Vehicle Design Characteristics and 
Operational Considerations 
We see…that the theory of probability is no more than a 
calculus based on good sense…The theory leaves nothing 
arbitrary in choosing opinions or in making decisions, and 
we can always select, with the help of this theory, the most 
advantageous choice on our own. It is a refreshing 
supplement to the ignorance and feebleness of the human 
mind. 
 
…the theory gives the surest insight which can guide us in 
our judgment and teaches us to keep ourselves from the 
illusions that often mislead us, …there is no other science 
that is more worthy of our meditation. 
—Marquis de Laplace, The Analytical Theory of 
Probability, 1812 60 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the organizational framework for the decision support tools 
developed in this manuscript. This framework was created by thoroughly defining, 
exploring, and evaluating the core characteristics of a ground combat vehicle horizontally 
in the context of various operational demands and vertically throughout the levels of war. 
As a point of departure, the critical characteristics of combat vehicle, i.e., survivability, 
lethality, and mobility, were fully defined and parsed to secondary traits and tertiary 
metrics. At a qualitative level of analysis, competing demands and complementary 
relationships were identified. The review of the operational considerations for full 
spectrum operations reinforced the enduring value of ground combat vehicles in future 
warfare. More importantly, the identified conflictions and synergisms for ground combat 
vehicle considerations provided the focal points for further investigation with respect to 
the selection and design of fighting vehicles. 
 
60 Dr. Eric Bickel of the University of Texas at Austin, presented this Laplace quote during a January 2011 
ORI397 Decision Analysis class lecture. 
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2.2 General Approach 
At the core of their functional capability requirements, well-equipped ground 
combat vehicles provide the crews that fight them with a highly mobile, well-protected, 
decidedly lethal weapon system. In this chapter, a decision support framework for ground 
combat vehicles was developed with a deliberate appreciation, as well as a steadfast focus 
on, these critical capabilities. This framework has as its foundation the combat vehicle 
principal attributes of survivability, lethality, and mobility. Since most multiattribute 
decision making processes adopt a hierarchy or branched network to scope the problem, a 
similar approach was used here concerning these important fighting vehicle capabilities. 
In recognition of Keeney’s emphasis on first articulating values and identifying 
organizational principles, this process began with a survey of the doctrinal basis for 
military operations, focused on those instances where ground combat vehicles add utility. 
If the traditional approach is to build a hierarchy resembling a tree, where the trunk 
represents the objective and the main branches represent the first level attributes, 
Keeney’s approach would recommend beginning with the soil and roots, where the main 
roots feeding the trunk would represent the guiding principles.  
Continuing with this analogy, the foundational analysis, or creation of the root 
system if you will, focused on the considerations involved in the four major types of 
combat force employment encompassing what is known as full spectrum operations 
(FSO). These four types are referred to as offensive, defensive, stability, and civil support 
operations. Foundational analysis also included a review of the doctrinal elements of 
combat power. These initial investigative efforts helped codify the utility of a ground 
combat vehicle in the contemporary operating environment. To aid in the refinement of 
this concept, the framework incorporated consideration of these attributes at the tactical, 
operational, and strategic levels of war. This chapter is intended to serve as an initial step 
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in developing a basis for framing the incredibly complex problem of designing and 
selecting advanced ground combat vehicle successors to the current legacy systems.  
 
Guiding Principles:
(combat power, full spectrum operations, 
principles of war)
Objective:




Figure 10: Graphical analogy of a decision attribute hierarchy to include foundational 
considerations.61  
 
2.2.1 Decision Theory 
A decision can be simply described as the irrevocable allocation of resources.62 
Within the constraints of a complex problem, there are many aspects of decision making 
that create dilemmas for the decision maker. For example, issues of scale, information 
quantity versus quality, and parameter uncertainty all create general angst for designers 
 
61 Source for tree graphic is www.comminit.com; text by the author. 
62 Ronald A. Howard,  James E. Matheson,  The Principles and Applications of Decision Analysis  
(California: Strategic Decisions Press, 1989) 23. 
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and decision makers. Good decisions often pass the proverbial test of time; that is, the 
merit of the decision withstands the inherent unknown of the future, i.e., accounts for a 
certain level of uncertainty. Upon inspection of the decision analysis flowchart (Figure 
11), this success can be attributed to prudent and thorough sensitivity analysis.63 In other 
words, the war gaming and hypothetical “what if” questioning exercises are vigorously 
engaged and fully explored.64 A robust decision, which is necessarily less sensitive to the 
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Figure 11: Decision-analysis process flowchart. 
 
2.2.2 Background on Fighting Vehicles 
The creation of the framework began with a review of those aspects of combat 
vehicle design most conducive with creating the conditions for a good decision in the 
eventual selection of a successor to the current legacy system, i.e., the U.S. M2 Bradley 
infantry fighting vehicle (IFV). The contemporary operating environment, previously 
 
63 Robert T. Clemen, Making Hard Decisions: An Introduction to Decision Analysis, Second Edition 
(Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1996) 6-15.  
64 Ibid., 156. 
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defined as the “composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the 
employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander” is laden with 
competing demands and enduring challenges. An assessment of both the role of the 
combat platform in full spectrum operations, as well as the elements of combat power, 
served to catalog what functionality a ground combat vehicle brings to the battlefield. 
This step aided in creating the foundation for the decision analysis process, i.e., 
identifying the situation and understanding the purpose and objectives.65  
The U.S. DoD dictionary of terms defines a ground combat vehicle as a “means of 
ground transportation, with or without armor, designed for a specific fighting function.”66 
Jane’s Armour and Artillery, a respected source of defense related information, classifies 
these functions by categorizing platforms into five main types with accompanying 
subtypes as needed (Figure 12).67 Combat vehicles, especially those equipped with 
capable weapon systems, are also commonly referred to as fighting vehicles.68 Within the 
defense community, the term armored personnel carriers (APCs) includes the more 
heavily armed IFVs like the U.S.  M2 Bradley and Russian BMP-3 Kurgan. Concepts for 
the U.S. Army’s current ground combat vehicle (GCV) program embody performance 
requirements akin to an IFV. Therefore, in the context of this manuscript, the term 
ground combat vehicle refers to a vehicle, either tracked or wheeled, performing the role 
of an IFV or heavily armed APC. At its core, the ground combat vehicle provides 
crewmembers with a mobile, protected, weapon system with overall performance 
 
65 R. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992) 72. 
66 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. U.S. Department of Defense 2005.  The 2010 version of 
this reference, Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 
does not include a definition for the following terms: combat vehicle, fighting vehicle, or armored vehicle. 
67 Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s Armor and Artillery, 2006-2007 (Alexandria, Virginia: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). Jane’s Information Group is recognized as the world leader in military reference 
materials. 
68 R.M. Ogorkiewicz, Design and Development of Fighting Vehicles (New York: Doubleday, 1968). 
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commensurate with fielded IFVs. In other words, the expansive list of ground combat 






















Figure 12: Five fighting vehicle categories as organized by Jane’s Armour and 
Artillery.69 
To aid in a contextual understanding of what type of performance requirements 
one should expect in a fighting vehicle, the technical specifications for two fielded IFVs 
were reviewed (Table 6). The specific requirements for the U.S. Army’s current (as of the 
publication of this manuscript) GCV program remain under review, and, as such, the final 
specifications for the future GCV program will deviate from these values. The program 
has publicly stated that in order to achieve the required survivability performance, gross 
vehicle weight could extend into the 50 ton (45,000 kg) range. Mobility requirements 
have been informally described as at the level currently (again, as of the publication of 
 
69 Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s Armor and Artillery, 2006-2007 (Alexandria, Virginia: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006).  
 
46 
this manuscript) attained by the M2 Bradley. However, for a general understanding of 
mission profile and system function, these fielded system specifications were considered 
to be within an acceptable range of the performance requirements one should expect from 
the next generation IFV in the GCV program. For visual reference, a drawing of a 
commercial GCV concept presented in 2010 is provided in Figure 13.   
 










Gross Vehicle Weight 
[tonne] 
27.6 18.7 
Crew / Dismounts 3/6 3/7 
Protection [mm armor] ≈ 30 (all around) ≈ 30 (frontal) 
Armament  
25 mm Bushmaster 
TOW missile 
30 mm 2A72 
100 mm cannon 
Top Speed [km/hr] 66 72 
Range [km] 483 600 
Power to Weight [kw/tonne] 16.2 20.1 
 
70 Foss, Christopher F. Jane’s Armor and Artillery, 2006-2007. (Virginia: Cambridge University Press, 
2006). These performance specifications are for currently fielded systems. 
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Figure 13: Concept image of the BAE submission for the GCV (source, BAE 2010).  
 
2.2.3 Full Spectrum Operations 
With a working description for the ground combat vehicle and some 
representative examples of currently fielded systems, the next step was identification of 
the role this platform fills in the maneuver brigades that fight them in combat. The U.S. 
Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0 Army Operations states the goal of full spectrum 
operations in the following way: 
 
The goal of full spectrum operations is to apply landpower as part of unified 
action to defeat the enemy on land and establish the conditions that achieve the 
joint force commander’s end state. The complexity of today’s operational 
environments requires commanders to combine offensive, defensive, stability, and 
civil support tasks to do this. 
The last sentence of this passage lists the four main types of full spectrum operations: 
offensive, defensive, stability, and civil support operations (Figure 14). Graphically, these 
are presented as quadrants in the continuum of full spectrum operations. Looking at the 
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four quadrants, it appears that fighting vehicles, particularly GCV type platforms, will 
continue to play a major role in accomplishing the primary tasks listed for offensive, 
defensive, and stability operations.71  
For offensive operations, fighting vehicles remain crucial components in 
completing tasks such as movement to contact, attacks, exploitation, and pursuits. For 
defensive operations, combat vehicles enable commanders to conduct mobile defense, 
area defense, and retrograde tasks. In support of stability operations, combat vehicles can 
enhance the establishment and enforcement of civil security and civil control, the 




71 U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Army Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, 
D.C., 2008, 3-7. 
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Figure 14: Four quadrants of full spectrum operations for the U.S. Army, including 
offensive, defensive, stability, and civil support operations (from U.S. Army 
Field Manual 3-0, Army Operations).  
The physical movement afforded by these platforms, combined with the firepower 
delivered with the weapons they possess, join to form a vital capacity called maneuver. 
Maneuver is defined as the employment of forces in battlespace to achieve a position of 
advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.72 As a military 
term, maneuver also serves as a principle of war. Moreover, fighting vehicles are the U.S. 
Army’s foundation for effective and decisive maneuver warfare in the prosecution of 
major combat operations (offense and defense) within full spectrum operations. 
 
72 U.S. Army Field Manual 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, Washington, D.C., 2006, 1-117. 
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When reviewing the balance between participation in major combat versus 
stability operations, “contrary to popular belief, the military history of the United States 
is one characterized by stability operations, interrupted by distinct episodes of major 
combat.”73 Since its inception over two centuries ago, the U.S. Army has fought in 11 
wars, but participated in hundreds, if not thousands, of operations that can be classified as 
stability operations, such as Joint Endeavor (Bosnia) in 1995 and Restore Hope  
(Somalia) in 1992. In contrast to these examples of stability operations, the major combat 
operations comprising wars were “the wars for which the military traditionally prepared; 
these were the wars that endangered America’s very way of life.”74 Looking forward, if 
history is any guide, it is likely that the demands and requirements for the U.S. Army will 
revolve around the preparation for and execution of stability operations (most likely 
course of action). However, the greatest risks to both national security and national 
interest may focus around the challenges associated with facing a peer threat in a future 
war (most dangerous course of action). Generating requirements and developing materiel 
solutions that consider both the most likely and most dangerous course of action for 
future forces is paramount to properly equipping future forces. 
The concept of full spectrum operations can be overlaid atop the previously 
presented spectrum of puzzles and mysteries. In accordance with U.S. Army Field 
Manual 3-0, each of the components of full spectrum operations is a composite of 
subjective fractions of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. If the prosecution of 
major combat operations (offensive and defensive) is characterized primarily by puzzles, 
and if the conduct of stability operations is characterized primarily by mysteries, then full 
spectrum operations can be viewed as a continuous region on an x-y plot, with puzzle and 
 
73 U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
Washington, D.C., 2008, paragraphs 1–1 through 1–9.  
74 Ibid. 
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mystery as the x- and y-axes respectively (Figure 15). Note that civil support operations 












Figure 15: Full spectrum operations depicted as a continuum in the puzzle-mystery space. 
(Representative blocks for Offense, Defense, and Stability operations are 
based on depictions from U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Army Operations.)75 
The representative blocks in Figure 15 mesh with the notion of full spectrum 
operations in that each major type of operations, i.e., offensive, defensive, or stability, is 
a composite of all three. This is true in a static sense or from a point of departure for an 
operation. Dynamically, operations evolve over time and can shift quite rapidly from one 
focused type to another. At the tactical level, U.S. Marine Corps General Charles C. 
 
75 U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Army Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, 
D.C., 2008, 3-1. 
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Krulak famously coined the term three block war to describe how a small unit operating 
in a city could simultaneously be battling an insurgent force, conducting stability 
operations, and defending against an attack.76 Krulak’s article dealt mostly with the 
requirements of contemporary, small-unit leaders, i.e., that they must be prepared to 
operate with agility in light of the rapid transitions that can take place on the modern 
battlefield. That said, the points made in his article reinforce the notion of a continuum 
for full spectrum operations. The concept of a three block war also illustrates the dynamic 
and transitive nature of modern warfare, and the inherent necessity that the warfighter be 
equipped with an array of hardware that can contribute toward success across the entire 
spectrum of operations. 
 
2.2.4 The Eight Elements of Combat Power 
When considering the U.S. Army’s eight elements of combat power (Figure 16), 
the recognized value of a fighting vehicle possessing some level of battlefield 
survivability, lethality, and mobility translates directly to three elements of combat 
power, namely, the protection, fires, and movement/maneuver terms. As mobile and 
armored information hub or node, the combat vehicle can also enable the command and 
control and intelligence elements. Finally, a combat vehicle can serve as a modern-day 
mule, carrying provisions (food, water, ammunition, supplies) far exceeding what any 




76 Charles Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marine Corps Gazette 
Vol. 83, Issue 1 (January 1999), 18-23. 
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Figure 16: Eight elements of combat power (based on figure from U.S. Army Field 
Manual 3-0, Army Operations). Note that leadership resides at the hub of 
employing these elements, and all elements are further enabled by a network 
that provides timely and accurate information to commanders. As stated in 
U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Army Operations, “leadership and information 
are applied through, and multiply the effects of, the other six elements of 
combat power.” The element of protection is shaded blue, denoting its 
relationship to survivability. Fires and movement are shaded red and green, 
respectively, to signify their affinity with lethality and mobility. 
Intelligence, command and control, and sustainment are not shaded, but the 
subjective contributions of a combat vehicle toward these elements was 
mentioned previously.77 
U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0 defines combat power as the “total means of 
destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit/formation can 
 
77 U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Army Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, 











apply at a given time.”78 U.S. Army forces generate combat power by converting 
potential into effective action.79 In providing capabilities specified by these 
aforementioned primary tasks in full spectrum operations, and by directly complementing 
three elements of combat power, ground combat vehicles fulfill a vital role for forces 
conducting full spectrum operations.   
 
2.2.5 Principles of War 
A final doctrinal consideration that aided in establishing the foundational basis for 
combat vehicle design was a review of the U.S. Army’s principles of war. Based largely 
on the work of Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz in the 1800s, and first 
published by the U.S. Army after World War I, these principles are the enduring bedrock 
of U.S. Army doctrine.80 The principles of war summarize the characteristics of 
successful operations; remaining mindful of them can help reinforce those aspects of 
materiel pursuits in harmony with these principles. 
When considering the principles of war, the broad applicability of a mobile, 
protected, weapon system is directly applicable to six (highlighted in Table 7) of these 
nine principles. If the ultimate objective is to destroy an enemy’s ability (or will) to fight, 
then projecting combat power via a fighting vehicle is an asset to conducting operations. 
For offensive actions, the speed and firepower provided by these systems yields superior 
maneuver capability that can be employed to put the enemy at a position of disadvantage. 
This capacity also lends itself to massing of weapon system effects on the enemy. Finally, 
the protection afforded by a ground combat system can enhance both local and platform 
 
78 U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Army Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, 
D.C., 2008, 4-1. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., paragraphs 4-11 through 4-15. 
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security, while the mobility and firepower create opportunities for surprise, which can be 
generated by moving faster across terrain that is seemingly impassible. 
 
Table 7: U.S. Army Principles of War 81 
Principle Short Definition 
Objective 
Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, 
decisive, and attainable objective. 
Offensive 
Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.  
 
Mass 
Concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive 
place and time. 
Economy of Force 
Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary 
efforts. 
Maneuver 
Place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the 
flexible application of combat power. 
Unity of Command 
For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one 
responsible commander. 
Security  
Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. 
  
Surprise 
Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which 
he is unprepared. 
Simplicity 
Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders 
to ensure thorough understanding. 
 
Before decomposing the combat vehicle performance into the principal attributes, 
secondary traits, and tertiary (engineering) metrics that directly contribute to the 
successful generation of combat power, it was necessary to first examine the stratified 
configuration of the military organization, also known as the “levels of war”.82   
 
81 U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Army Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, 
D.C., 2008, paragraphs 4-11 through 4-15. 
82 Ibid., paragraphs 6-1 through 6-4. 
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2.3 Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Levels of War 
With over 1.5 million service members, a similar number of government civilians 
and contractors, and a 2010 operating budget of over $500 billion, the U.S. DoD 
represents one of the largest bureaucracies on earth. The established levels of war define 
the coarse framework for the hierarchical structure that exists in both U.S. DoD and the 
U.S. Department of the Army. The levels of war clarify the relationship between strategic 
decisions, operational approach, and tactical actions.83 There is a perhaps necessarily 
contentious relationship between the various levels of war, best captured with the 
following quote from U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0.  
 
A natural tension exists between the levels of war and echelons of command. This 
tension stems from different perspectives, requirements, and constraints 
associated with command at each level of war. 84 
Figure 17 depicts the three levels of war with their respective areas of emphasis 
listed to their right. From the commercial materiel enterprise perspective, the tactical 
level of war equates to the customer or end user at the retail level. The operational level 
can be likened to the distribution network connecting the wholesale to the retail level. 
The strategic is akin to the highest level of corporate management and leadership, where 
production and manufacturing might occur; this level also controls the conversion of 
resources, along with the introduction of assets into the “exchange process”. It may be 
interesting to note that the gross generalizations presented for the focus of each level does 
not explicitly include mention of survivability.  
 
83 U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Army Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, 




Figure 17: Three levels of war with highlighted areas of responsibility.85 
This exchange process operates on both a “push” and “pull” system based on both 
anticipated requirements and stated demand. As such, it is highly coupled, and each level 
retains resources for discretionary use (or non-use). For example, some of the MRAPs 
that were expedited into the OEF theater via strategic and operational level transport units 
went underutilized by tactical units given their (tactical level) assessment that the size 
and weight of these platforms was not conducive with operations in the mountainous 
terrain defining much of Afghanistan.86 In response to this, subsequent variants, which 
are smaller and more maneuverable, have seen greater tactical employment.  
 
85 Figure from U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Army Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
Washington, D.C., 2008, 7-2. 
86 Andrew Feickert, Specialist in Military Ground Forces, “Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) 
Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress” Congressional Research Service, RS22707, January 18, 
2011. This report has a dedicated section on the status of unused MRAPs in Afghanistan. 
58 
 A fighting vehicle, as a pertinent and illustrative example, is employed for use at 
the tactical level (customer/retail), is delivered to theater and sustained there by the 
operational level (distribution/wholesale), and is originated into service and released for 
combat via the strategic level (manufacturing and production/corporate). This notion 
complements the military definition for combat power and the levels of war from U.S. 
Army Field Manual 3-0, where the conversion process through the levels is described as 
the transformation of “potential power into action.” Take, for example, fuel used to 
power a combat platform. It enters the system (theater of battle) via an exchange of 
resources at the strategic level. The volume of fuel flows through an operational-level 
exchange network to the tactical level, where it is then transformed into power for the 
user. A more concrete demonstration of this concept can be made from Operation Desert 
Storm. In the six-month buildup to combat operations, tens of millions of gallons of 
diesel fuel was stockpiled in the vicinity of the theater of battle. Once combat operations 
commenced, this vast supply was distributed from the operational to the tactical level.87  
At the macroscale, strategic interest is focused on gaining the most capability 
from the resources exchanged. As the end-user, the tactical level also wants the most 
capability. However, the tactical level, operating at the microscale of operations, 
understandably has less consideration for the assets involved in providing that combat 
power. The operational level, working in a mesoscale between the tactical and strategic 
levels, desires an efficient conversion at the eventual transformer, one that minimizes 
demands placed on the distribution network and that can be transported easily,  




87 William G. Pagonis, Jeffrey L. Cruikshank, Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics 
from the Gulf War (Massachusetts: Harvard Business Press, 1992) 70. 
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One point of confusion may arise when trying to distinguish between actions and 
effects at a specific level versus acting at that level. FM 3-0 explains that: 
 
at times, their [tactical] actions may produce strategic or operational effects. 
However, this does not mean these elements are acting at the strategic or 
operational level. Actions are not strategic unless they contribute directly to 
achieving the strategic end state. Similarly, actions are considered operational 
only if they are directly related to operational movement or the sequencing of 
battles and engagements. The level at which an action occurs is determined by the 
perspective of the echelon in terms of planning, preparation, and execution. 
 
Table 8: Levels of War with Commercial Analogues 
























The strategic level of war provides military forces and other related capabilities in 
accordance with strategic plans. The operational level of war links employing tactical 
forces to achieving the strategic end state. Actions at the operational level usually involve 
broader dimensions of time and space than the tactical level actions do. The tactical level 
focuses on the use of combat power in battles, engagements, and unit actions. 
Individuals, crews, and small units act at the tactical level.88 But, these comments may 
 
88 U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Army Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, 
D.C., 2008, paragraphs 7-9 through 7-16. 
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unfairly “flatten” or oversimplify the dynamic interactions vertically between levels and 
horizontally at each level. For example, tactical operators clearly consider the objectives 
and effects of their actions on parent organizations, and operational level planners 
forecast needs in order to respond in an anticipatory manner to the needs of their 
subordinate level. However, the main focus for each level can still be generally 
summarized as being maximum power at the tactical level, high efficiency at the 
operational level, and overall effectiveness at the strategic level. While, survivability 
contributes to the preservation of those assets over time, the lack of mention in the 
generalized focus for each level is not intended to connote that the operational or strategic 
level is not primarily focused on protecting crewmembers, which is tacitly assumed. 
However, discussions dealing with strategically and operationally mobile platforms 
typically revolve around the benefits of rapid deployment for strike purposes; they do not 
highlight the secondary effects of quickly emplacing more vulnerable platforms, versus 
taking more time to move better protected vehicles.  
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2.4 Principal Attributes in the Survivability, Lethality, and Mobility Framework 
With an appreciation for the competing interests at the various levels of war, 
recognition for the contribution ground combat vehicles can make in the execution of full 
spectrum operations, and the involvement of these platforms in the generation of combat 
power, the last step was to fully explore the ground combat vehicle principal attributes of 
survivability, lethality, and mobility. For the present work, this began at the tactical level 
of war.  
As previously mentioned, fighting vehicles provide operators with a mobile and 
protected source of firepower that can be utilized in an array of missions including 
offensive, defensive, and security operations. These key and essential platform attributes 
are known doctrinally as survivability, lethality, and mobility. Survivability provides 
protection to both the crew and combat system; lethality supplies the necessary firepower 
to destroy or neutralize battlefield threats; and mobility yields movement and freedom to 
maneuver across the combat zone. These three principal attributes will later be 
deconstructed further into secondary traits and tertiary metrics. Figure 18 provides a 
graphical depiction of how a combat platform notionally presents concentrated areas for 






Figure 18: U.S. M1 Abrams tank with notional areas representing regions of system 
survivability, lethality, and mobility components. 89 
Used interchangeably with protection (survivability), firepower (lethality), and 
movement (mobility), survivability, lethality, and mobility were chosen because these 
particular attribute titles are universally recognized and fairly well defined in the 
literature. To establish a baseline for this taxonomy as it is used throughout this 
dissertation, the principal attributes were first formally defined and referenced; then, 
distinctions for each were made at the various levels of war. The main reference was 
from the previously introduced AIAA text by Deitz et al. As mentioned, this timely 
publication appears to be the only work solely dedicated to the topic of ground combat 
system survivability and lethality. In addition to the text by Deitz et al., where available, 
applicable, and necessary, this taxonomy was complemented with the service doctrinal 
 




working definitions like those found in U.S. Army Field Manuals, e.g., FM 3-0 
Operations,  FM 1-02 Operational Terms and Graphics, and FM 3-90 Tactics. 
 
2.4.1 Survivability 
The first tanks fielded during World War I spawned from a requirement to 
provide a protected means of navigating the no-mans land on a battlefield typified by 
trench warfare. The inclusion of armor protection enabled these mobile weapon platforms 
to traverse the non-permissive environment laying between opposing forces and their 
trench lines. It may, therefore, be fitting to begin deconstruction of the principal attributes 
with an investigation of survivability. Deitz et al. define  the attribute of survivability as: 
 
the total capability of a system (resulting from the synergism among personnel, 
materiel, design, tactics, and doctrine) to avoid, withstand, or recover from 
damage to a system or crew in a hostile (man-made or natural) environments 
without suffering an abortive impairment of its ability to accomplish its 
designated mission.90  
This holistic definition includes consideration for the crew as well as the platform. It is 
also consistent with the version provided by U.S. Army Field Manual 1-02, Operational 
Terms and Graphics. Using the tank example, survivability is passively provided by the 
protective armor shielding the crew and actively provided through sensing efforts, 
communication with others, countermeasures, evasive maneuvers initiated by 
crewmembers, and safety equipment, e.g., fire suppression, system monitoring, and 




90 Deitz, Paul H., Harry L. Reed Jr., J. Terrence Klopcic, James N. Walbert. Fundamentals of Ground 
Combat System Ballistic Vulnerability and Survivability (Virginia: American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics, 2009) 15-18. 
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2.3.1.1 Survivability Secondary Traits of Vulnerability, Susceptibility, and 
Repairability 
According to Deitz et al., ground combat system survivability is a function of its 
vulnerability, susceptibility, and repairability.91   
 
 
Survivability = f(Susceptibility, Vulnerability, Repairability) 
 
Susceptibility comprises the “characteristics of a system that make it unable to 
avoid being engaged by threats on the battlefield. This includes being detected, tracked, 
targeted, and engaged up to the point of being hit.”92  
Vulnerability refers to the “characteristics of a system that cause it to suffer 
degradation as a result of having been subjected to a hostile environment on the 
battlefield.”93 The hostile environment includes an insult, or “an external, munition-
produced physical agent capable of producing injury.”94 This agent can take multiple 
forms, for example, incident pressure, heat flux, kinetic energy, or radiation. 
 Repairability is the capacity for the system to regain function following an insult. 
The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) glossary defines it as “the restoration or 
replacement of parts or components of real property or equipment as necessitated by wear 
and tear, damage, failure of parts or the like, in order to maintain it in efficient operating 
condition.”95  
 
91 Deitz, Paul H., Harry L. Reed Jr., J. Terrence Klopcic, James N. Walbert. Fundamentals of Ground 
Combat System Ballistic Vulnerability and Survivability (Virginia: American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics, 2009) 2-9. 
92 Ibid., 2. 
93 Ibid., 2-3.  
94 Ibid., 54. 
95 Defense Acquisition Univeristy Glossary of Terms, Defense Acquisition University Press, Fort Belvoir, 
Virginia; available for download at: https://dap.dau.mil/glossary/Pages/Default.aspx. 
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Considering the notional engagement of a fighting vehicle, these traits can be 
presented sequentially: the susceptibility characterizes the ease of detection and 
subsequent insult, the vulnerability describes the reaction or effect of an insult, and the 
repairability portrays how quickly the system can recover. To use a boxing analogy, these 
three traits can be used to describe: how well one can avoid being hit (susceptibility), 
how much damage is done if one takes a punch (vulnerability), and how quickly one can 
get back to his feet after a knock-down blow (repairability).   
 
2.3.1.2  Survivability Tertiary Metrics 
With the principal attribute of survivability defined, and the three secondary traits 
of susceptibility, vulnerability, and repairability described, the collection of tertiary 
(engineering) metrics that relate to survivability were organized in a subordinate fashion. 
This list of metrics is obviously not all inclusive, but represents a substantial group of 
terms typically used to generate performance requirements or describe vehicle 
specifications. These tertiary metrics were organized subordinate to a relevant secondary 
trait. For each metric, a short definition is provided, as well as the units of measurement. 
Traits are presented sequentially for a notional engagement between threat and friendly 
vehicle, and the corresponding metrics are ordered alphabetically. Comments are 
provided regarding the select metrics with identified design conflict with another metric, 
trait, or attribute. The process of considering the contributory and conflicting effects was 
done in a “crosswalk” method. This means the metric was virtually walked across each 
other metric, trait, and attribute to subjectively assess the measured effect, either in 
contribution or reduction to the term of interest.   
 
66 
Table 9: Survivability Secondary Traits and Tertiary Metrics  
ATTRIBUTE 
    Trait  
         metric 
Short Definition Unit 
Desired 
Trend 
SURVIVABILITY ability to withstand hostile environment n/a ↑ 
    Susceptibility prevent detection n/a ↓ 
        Apresented area presented to threat m
2 ↓, ↔ 
        envelope  volume occupied by platform m3 ↓, ↔ 
        es ratio of target thickness along shot line # ↓ 
        footprint area occupied by platform m2 ↓, ↔ 
         Pground ground pressure kPa ↓ 
        signatureacoustic acoustic signature dB ↓ 
        signatureem electromagnetic signature T ca Bamb 
        signaturethermal thermal signature K ca Tamb 
        signaturevisual visual signature nm ca λamb 
    Vulnerability tolerate an insult  ↓ 
         BPR blast protection rating, yield corresponding  # ↑, ↔ 
         Ecombustible energy yield of combustibles (fuels, propellant)  kJ ↓, ↔ 
         em areal density ratio of RHAe and complex armor  # ↓ 
         facet angular orientation of exterior ° ca 45° 
         mass vehicle mass kg ↑,↔ 
         mexposed fraction mass fraction of gross vehicle weight unarmored # ↓,↔ 
         Poverpressure peak overpressure in crew area kPa ↓ 
         RHAequivalent equivalent armor protection of MIL-A-12560       mm ↑ 
         vee-hull beneficial shape for hull for blast deflection ° ca 45° 
    Repairability recover from insult  ↑ 
        exposure components exposed to environment # ↓ 
        modularity number of main components, plug and play # ↑ 
        trepair time to repair or replace critical components hr ↓ 
The last column indicates the notionally desired direction for utility, that is, to either increase or 
decrease that metric.  
↑: An upward facing arrow indicates this metric should be as great as possible.  
↓: A downward facing arrow indicates this metric should be as small as possible.  
ca: The abbreviation “ca” stands for “centered about”, as several metrics are measured as 
absolutes from a desired value.  
↔: The left-right arrow bar indicates there is a competition with another attribute and its traits.  
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2.4.2 Lethality  
The potency of a combat vehicle weapon system is captured with the attribute, 
lethality. Deitz et al. define lethality as “the ability of a weapon system to cause the loss 
of, or degradation in, the ability of a target system to complete its designated mission.” 
He goes on to explain that “often for direct fire weapons, the delivery of the threat from 
launch to target impact is integral to the lethality analysis.” This definition is target-
centric, meaning that this term is reserved or qualified for a specific threat system under 
specific conditions.  
The firepower carried aboard a combat vehicle is the distinguishing feature that 
sets it apart from another type of platform colloquially referred to as a “battlefield taxi”. 
The weapon system, and the optics that accompany it, provide the fighting vehicle with 
the tools necessary to identify and subsequently destroy threat targets. Euphemisms used 
to describe the capabilities of these weapons (target effects, destroy, attrit, etc.) are all 
references to the destructive power carried aboard a fighting vehicle.  
Interestingly, there appears to be no doctrinal definition for lethality, despite the 
fact that this term is mentioned repeatedly throughout the literature as an element of 
combat power and is clearly an essential quality possessed by an effective fighting 
platform. The DAU definition is simply “the probability that a weapon will destroy or 
neutralize a target.”96 Again, this is a weapon and target-centric definition. More broadly, 
lethality is a function of the likelihood that the threat was acquired, that munitions hit the 
target, and that the damage incurred from the insult is debilitating enough to render 
incapacitation or negation of a threat. The target acquisition portion is a function of 
several factors, most of which deal with human performance (target identification 
 
96 Defense Acquisition Univeristy Glossary of Terms, Defense Acquisition University Press, Fort Belvoir, 
Virginia; available for download at: https://dap.dau.mil/glossary/Pages/Default.aspx. 
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training, level of alertness, mission readiness, weather, etc.). Again, harkening back to the 
tank example, the lethality can be considered as the effective firepower afforded to the 
crew from the cannon and adjoining weapons, fire control system, and target acquiring 
devices.  
 
2.3.2.1  Lethality Secondary Traits of Acquisition, Engagement, and Effects 
When discussing the attribute of lethality, it can also be broken down into three 
traits that follow a sequential ordering similar to that of survivability: lethality is a 
function of the ability to detect and acquire a threat, to engage the threat with a weapon 
system, and to create the desired effect on the target, that is, to induce an insult 
commensurate with a level of incapacitation.  
 
Lethality = f (Acquisition, Engagement, Target Effects) 
 
Conventional books on weaponry typically parse lethality in terms of internal 
ballistics, external ballistics, and terminal ballistics.97,98 The terminology of internal, 
external, and terminal ballistics is restricted to weapons that deploy a projectile of some 
sort. Although this is a valuable framework, this manuscript will use traits termed as 
acquisition, engagement, and effects to cover a broader class of weapons, while still 
observing a sequence corresponding to the same periods and events involved in an 
engagement. More specifically,  
Acquisition covers the time from target acquisition to the commission of launch.  
Engagement includes the time from launch to target—from muzzle to impact. 
Effects covers the event from impact incidence to rest.  
 
97 Donald E.  Carlucci,  Sidney S. Jacobson, Ballistics: Theory and Design of Guns and Ammunition (New 
York: CRC Press, 2007) sections I, II and III. 
98 Rheinmetall Handbook on Weaponry (Düsseldorf: Rheinmetall GmbH, 1992). 
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In the literature, these respective traits converge to produce various probabilities 
associated with successful engagement of a threat. For example, a given weapon system 
facing a specific threat in a defined situation will have probabilities of detection Pdetect, 
hitting the threat Phit, damaging the threat Pdamage, system availability Pavailability, the 
product of these determine the probability of kill Pkill.99 This kill can even be further 
parsed as a mobility kill, firepower kill, or catastrophic kill.100 These probabilities 
combine to form a total probability of kill. 
 
Pkill = PdetectPhitPdamagePavailability Equation 2
 
2.3.2.2  Lethality Tertiary Metrics 
In a similar fashion previously presented for survivability, the tertiary metrics 
corresponding to the three secondary traits for lethality, i.e., acquisition, engagement, and 
effects, are presented in Table 10. The same arrow convention is used throughout. Again, 
the metrics presented are those consistently referenced as being key and essential to the 
design and analysis of a weapon system. 
 
99 Deitz, Paul H., Harry L. Reed Jr., J. Terrence Klopcic, James N. Walbert. Fundamentals of Ground 
Combat System Ballistic Vulnerability and Survivability (Virginia: American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics, 2009) 64-70. 
100 Ibid.  
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Table 10: Lethality Secondary Traits and Tertiary Metrics  
ATTRIBUTE 
    Trait  
         metric 
Short Definition Unit 
Desired 
Trend 
LETHALITY ability to destroy a threat  ↑ 
    Acquisition target detection to launch  ↑ 
        CAL combat ammunition load # ↑, ↔ 
        Pdetection probability of detection % ↑ 
        rangePID range to positively identify [m] ↑ 
        tuneability ability to tune to target specificity # ↑ 
    Engagement commission to target insult  ↑ 
        CEP circular error probability cm ↓ 
        lcannon cannon length m ↑, ↔ 
        Emuzzle muzzle energy [MJ] ↑ 
        Frecoil recoil force kN ↓ 
        mlauncher launcher mass kg ↑, ↔ 
        MER maximum effective range m ↑ 
        Phit probability of hit % ↑ 
        treload reload time s ↓ 
        ηballistic ballistic efficiency % ↑ 
        ηparasitic parasitic mass ratio # ↓ 
        ηpiezometric piezometric efficiency % ↑ 
    Target Effects terminal ballistic event  ↑ 
        BAD behind-armor debris N·s ↑ 
        dpenetration penetration channel diameter mm ↑ 
        Eresidual residual energy after penetration kJ ↑ 
        Etarget energy imparted to target [MJ] ↑ 
        KE kinetic energy on target kJ ↑ 
        Pkill probability of kill % ↑ 
        P/L ratio of penetration to penetrator length # ↑ 
        tflight flight time s ↓ 
        Vcrater crater volume induced into target cm
3 ↑ 
The last column indicates the notionally desired direction for utility, that is, to either increase or 
decrease that metric.  
↑: An upward facing arrow indicates this metric should be as great as possible.  
↓: A downward facing arrow indicates this metric should be as small as possible.  
ca: The abbreviation “ca” stands for “centered about”, as several metrics are measured as 
absolutes from a desired value.  




When considering the attribute of mobility, U.S. Army Field Manual 101-5-1 
Operational Terms and Graphics defines it as “a quality or capability of military forces 
which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their 
primary mission.”101 Those activities enable a force to move personnel and equipment on 
the battlefield without delays due to terrain or obstacles. One can consider the functional 
rolling chassis of a notional fighting vehicle as providing the system with its inherent 
mobility. Bekker, a pioneer in military mobility research who reviewed over one hundred 
papers, observed that “each containing a different idea of the meaning of mobility.”102 He 
even went so far as to suggest the word be struck from the engineering dictionary due to 
the inconsistency in meaning.103 Bekker later relented and classified two separate 
mobilities: one describing the delivery of the system to the point of use, and the other 
“limited to the manifestation of mechanical interaction between the terrain and the 
vehicle, and between the components of the vehicle itself.”104  
In his text on the theory of ground vehicles, Wong offers a more detailed 
definition in the following way. “Mobility in the broad sense refers to the performance of 
the vehicle in relation to soft terrain, obstacle negotiation and avoidance, ride quality over 
rough terrain, and water crossing.”105 Absent from his definition is mention of 
performance on improved surfaces or roads. Since all combat vehicles will, at some time, 
be required to navigate this type of terrain, consideration for roadworthiness was included 
as a trait in the following section regarding mobility. 
 
101 U.S. Army Field Manual 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, Washington, D.C., 2004, 1-127. 
102 Mieczyslaw Gregory Bekker,  Introduction to Terrain-Vehicle Systems. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 1969), 765-767. 
103 Ibid., 768. 
104 Ibid. 
105 J.Y. Wong, Theory of Ground Vehicles, Third Edition  (Wiley, New York: 2001) 295.   
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2.3.3.1 Mobility Secondary Traits of Roadworthiness, Cross Country Movement, 
and Robustness 
Mobility is an attribute expressed by the ability to navigate three types of terrain: 
improved surfaces or roads, unimproved surfaces like cross-country movement, and 
miscellaneous obstacles.106 Military vehicles are often required to traverse manmade and 
natural obstacles like horizontal gaps, vertical climbs, and water. The vehicle’s 
robustness gives it the ability to overcome these intermittent, but show-stopping obstacles 
that may be encountered during an excursion.   
 
2.3.3.2   Mobility Tertiary Metrics 
In similar fashion to survivability and lethality, the tertiary metrics related to 
mobility are presented in Table 11. These metrics share commonality with many used 
within the automotive industry.  
 
106 Mieczyslaw Gregory Bekker,  Introduction to Terrain-Vehicle Systems. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 1969). 
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Table 11: Mobility Secondary Traits and Tertiary Metrics  
ATTRIBUTE 
     Trait  
         metric 
Short Definition Unit Desired 
Trend 
MOBILITY movement IOT complete mission  ↑ 
    Prepared Surface  movement on roads  ↑ 
        a acceleration  s ↓ 
        -a deceleration, stopping  s ↓ 
        dstop stopping distance  m ↓ 
        h vehicle height m ↓ 
        l vehicle length m ↓ 
        m vehicle mass kg ↓, ↔ 
        range operating range km ↑ 
         rturn turning radius m ↓ 
         rturret turret radius m ↓ 
        V vehicle volume, external m3 ↓, ↔ 
        vpeak velocity, top speed km/hr ↑ 
        w vehicle width m ↓ 
        ηfuel fuel efficiency km/l ↑ 
    Cross Country movement off roads  ↑ 
        Pground ground pressure kPa ↓ 
        P/w power to weight ratio kW/kg ↑ 
        VCIn vehicle cone index # ↑ 
        %slopeclimb maximum slope climbing  % ↑, ↔ 
        %slopeside maximum side slope movement % ↑, ↔ 
    Robustness miscellaneous movement abilities  ↑ 
        costhotel stationary consumption rates for fuel l/hr ↓ 
        fordability ability to ford water, snorkel m ↑ 
        hclimb vertical obstacle climbing ability m ↑ 
        MTBF mean time between failure hr ↑ 
        OR operational readiness rate % ↑ 
        soilsensitivity sensitivity to soil types # ↑ 
        Tsensitivity sensitivity to temperature Tmax, Tmin ↑ 
        wgap gap crossing width m ↑ 
The last column indicates the notionally desired direction for utility, that is, to either increase or decrease 
that metric.  
↑: An upward facing arrow indicates this metric should be as great as possible.  
↓: A downward facing arrow indicates this metric should be as small as possible.  
ca: The abbreviation “ca” stands for “centered about”, as several metrics are measured as absolutes from a 
desired value.  
↔: The left-right arrow bar indicates there is a competition with another attribute and its traits.  
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2.3.4 Competing Demands Among Tertiary Metrics 
In designing a ground combat vehicle, there is invariably competition between 
these metrics, traits, and attributes. Survivability has at least seven identified metrics that 
compete with other traits and attributes. The area presented to the target (Apresented) should 
be as small as possible to minimize susceptibility, but this works against lethality in that 
it limits the weapon system and ammunition that can be carried. For the same reasons, 
while the envelope and footprint should be as small as possible to reduce exposure, this is 
counterproductive to designing a lethal, mobile platform as it increases the ground 
pressure and vehicle cone index for the same powertrain and weapon system mass. 
Susceptibility as a trait is also not conducive with several metrics for vulnerability. For 
example, when evaluating the vulnerability metrics, the blast protection rating (BPR) 
should be as high as possible to safeguard the crew from possible IED strikes. However, 
a high BPR works against traits of mobility, since the elevated weight and severe faceting 
of the vehicle exterior limit both on- and off-road mobility, as well as make achieving 
robust metrics like the vertical climbing height (hclimb) and maximum width gap that can 
be traversed (wgap) more problematic.  
 
2.3.4.1  Survivability 
A survivable platform should also have the smallest amount of combustible 
material on board as possible. A low amount of Ecombustible reduces the risk of sympathetic 
detonation or deflagration of these materials in the event of insult. However, traditionally 
this works against lethality and mobility in that it reduces the amount of ammunition or 
the combat ammunition load (CAL) as well as the driving range of the platform. Finally, 
it is generally desirable to reduce the vulnerability by limiting the amount of material not 
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under armor (mexposed fraction). This increases the hull mass, while also constraining the 
exoskeletal design configuration.  
With conventional technology and materials, platforms that are designed to be 
less susceptible tend to be more vulnerable. For example, in the military aircraft regime, 
this can be observed with the relative fragility of a stealth aircraft. A vehicle that has a 
low vulnerability is often very susceptible to detection and more likely to be subjected to 
insult. At a platform level, these traits are traded off against each other in an effort to 
obtain a desirable level of survivability performance. However, it is valuable to consider 
the sequence of events leading to insult, i.e. a susceptible platform can lead to insult and a 
test of vulnerability. For this reason, concerted efforts are being made to provide both 
traits in a complementary fashion, e.g., virtual cloaking technology layered atop 
advanced composite armors.107 
 
2.3.4.2  Lethality  
While the pursuit of high lethality is clearly challenging, very few metrics 
associated with increased lethality were found to subjectively contribute negatively to 
other traits or attributes, aside from its contribution to the overall mass contribution. 
Notable exceptions are combat ammunition load, cannon length, and weapon system 
mass. As previously stated, high CAL generally renders the vehicle less survivable. To 
achieve high muzzle velocity and acceptable accuracy, a long cannon (lcannon) is desired, 
but this limits mobility, especially in constricted terrain such as an urban area. Finally, if 
one desires a large amount of launch energy in the weapon system, the launcher mass 
(mlauncher) must be increased, which also penalizes mobility traits. In general, nearly any 
 
107 For a brief explanation on the science behind active camoflauge or cloaking technologies, to include 
metamaterials, see http://science.howstuffworks.com/invisibility-cloak.htm. 
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beneficial pursuit of a metric falling beneath survivability, lethality, and mobility will 
incur some form of a mass and cost penalty to the platform as a whole. 
 
2.3.4.3  Mobility 
At least four metrics under mobility, namely mass, volume, vertical slope and side 
slope, appeared to work against other attributes. To reduce encountering restrictions, e.g., 
bridges, tight turns, route constrictions, the vehicle characteristics, mass and volume, are 
desired to be as small as possible, but this works against the design space for both 
survivability and lethality. The ability to climb and traverse severe slopes (%slopeclimb 
and %slopeside) should be as great as possible. Vehicles capable of this generally have a 
low center of gravity and high power-to-weight ratio. Further, a low center of gravity 
translates to reduced ground clearance, reducing the BPR and often increasing the width 
and wheelbase of the vehicle in order to maintain rollover resistance and stability.108 
 
2.3.5 Tactical Principal Attribute Hierarchy 
Using Saaty’s Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) for a decision analysis 
framework, each of the three principal attributes at the tactical level was deconstructed 
into secondary traits and tertiary metrics.109 Figure 19 contains a diagram displaying the 
principal attributes at the tactical level expanded down to their secondary traits. The 
tertiary metrics were previously presented in tabular form in subordinate classification 
beneath respective traits.  
 
108 Several methods exist to test the vehicle rollover stability, to include  the tilt table, rotating table, and 
strap-pull techniques. Many MRAP variants, given their elevated chassis and high center of gravity, have 
been susceptible to rollover. In light of this risk, in September of 2010 the Marine Corps opened a 
solicitation (M6785410R5001) for an MRAP rollover warning device. 
109 This general technique is illustrated in James S. Dyer, Thomas Edmunds, John C. Butler, and Jianmin 
Jia, “A Multiattribute Utility Analysis of Alternatives for the Disposition of Surplus Weapons-Grade 
Plutonium” Operations Research, Volume 46, No 6, December 1998, 749-762.  
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Figure 19: Hierarchy for tactical level considerations for combat vehicle principal 
attributes and secondary traits. 
2.3.6 Operational and Strategic Principal Attribute Considerations 
With the exception of those related to mobility, doctrinal and literature definitions 
of the principal attributes at the operational and strategic levels are not available. Notably 
the literature and doctrinal definitions for the three principal attributes previously 
presented are for the tactical level. Mobility is defined at the operational and strategic 
level as the transportability of the systems intra and intertheater, respectively.110 That 
said, during transport, mobility is assumed to be for a mission-capable, but not mission-
ready, vehicle. For example, a vehicle may require prior disembarking of the crew, 
external provisions, and interior preparations to conduct an intratheater movement.  
 
110 R.M. Ogorkiewicz, Technology of Tanks (United Kingdom: Jane’s Information Group, 1991) 223-227. 
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The concepts of survivability and lethality for a tactical asset like a GCV are 
currently undefined at the operational and strategic levels of war. With respect to 
lethality, the operational level is required to support the ammunition requirements of the 
tactical assets within their domain. At the command of tactical leaders, the combat 
platforms transform the potential energy, transported through the system, and deliver it in 
different forms of combat power. As such, a platform that can sustain itself for long 
periods of time and a weapon system having a compact, efficient ammunition, necessarily 
places a smaller load on the operational lethality channels. In this context, operational 
lethality is enhanced by ground combat systems with relatively high ammunition 
densities, due to both large storage magazines and lighter transport requirements through 
the operational network. Likewise, a platform that presents high armor density normal to 
the threat is advantageous from an operational survivability perspective. Such vehicles 
are spatially efficient, providing greater protection for the same projected area, volume,  
or mass.  
Along a similar line of logic, a given platform will have relatively high strategic 
lethality if the ratio of weapon caliber to vehicle height is high. Muzzle energy for 
conventional weapons scales with the bore diameter; a vehicle with a high ratio of bore-
to-vehicle height packs more weapon energy into the confined volume of a combat 
platform. From a strategic lethality consideration, this means that deployed systems bring 
more weapon to bear on threat systems. With respect to strategic survivability, the 
vehicle mass density (gross vehicle weight divided by its volumetric dimensions) can 
serve as a first-order approximation for protection afforded to the crew. This is based on 
the premise that vehicle vulnerability reduces with mass, or that the protection afforded to 
the crew is a strong function of increased weight. Since intertheater lift capacity is limited 
by volume as well as mass, a system with high overall mass density provides a more 
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efficient protection capacity to the crews.  Table 12 summarizes the main sources of the 
definitions for the principal attributes at the three levels of war. It also depicts a labeling 
convention where the principal attribute is a capital letter and the level of war is a 
subscript letter, e.g. ST is tactical level survivability. This convention is subsequently 
used in two preliminary exercises intended to further explore the concept of survivability, 
lethality, and mobility at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. 
 
Table 12: Principal Attribute Nomenclature and Definition Sources at the Levels of War 
              Principal 












































It may simply be that these four concepts—operational survivability (SO), 
operational lethality (LO), strategic survivability (SS), strategic lethality (LS)—are not 
definable for a tactical asset. On the topic of problematic classifications, Carol Cleland, 
who has studied the history and philosophy of science, commented that “people tend to 
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make definitions when they lack theories and they want to understand something.”111 She 
offered additional guidance, stating that “you've got to start with the right concepts in 
order to formulate theories.”112 As others have observed, for terms such as these, one may 
only be able to, at best, “describe their characteristics, state how they act, and express 
their relation to other ideas, but when it comes to saying what they are, we [may have to] 
resort to vague generalities.”113  
  
 
111 Clara Moskowitz, “Life's Great Mystery: What, Exactly, Is Life?” Live Science  (December 2010) 
www.livescience.com/10862-life-great-mystery.htm. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ronald L. Panton, Incompressible Flow, Third edition  (New York, Wiley: 2006) 3-6. This quote comes 
from a section clarifying the differences between fundamental concepts, definitions, and laws. He later 
makes the analogy between words and their definitions, in that we use generally known and established 
terms to define less familiar words. 
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2.4 Exploratory Exercises for Principal Attributes at the Levels of War  
Having formed the basis and initial framework for parsing a ground combat 
vehicle among the principal attributes of survivability, lethality, and mobility at the 
tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war (§ 2.3.5 and § 2.3.6), two thought 
experiments (sometimes referred to by the German name, gedankenexperiment) were 
conducted as a means of demonstrating the competing demands and complementary 
relationships among the three principal attributes throughout the three levels of war 
described in doctrine.  
The first exercise (§ 2.4.1) was a scaling experiment in which the dimensions of 
mass, length, and time were explored for each attribute at each level. The purpose of this 
analysis was to survey and quantify the disparity in scale between each level with regards 
to the principal attributes.  
The second exercise (§ 2.4.2) involved the ranking of eight fielded systems 
among the principal attributes at each level of war. The intent of this ranking examination 
was to populate the top portion of a quality function deployment (QFD) matrix in order to 
analyze the complementary and competing relationships between principal attributes at 
the various levels of war. The top portion or “roof” of the QFD is used to illustrate 
competing and complementary relationships between engineering requirements. Using 
the attributes as surrogate requirements, the purpose of this second exercise was to 
explore the synergistic, as well as conflicting, associations between attributes. 
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2.4.1 Exercise I: Mass, Length, and Time Scaling of Survivability, Lethality, and 
Mobility at the Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Levels of War 
As briefly discussed, there are inherent differences in the objectives and pursuits 
of the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. While all three may share a 
common overarching objective, the means and motives employed at each echelon can 
present distinct differences in approach. The goal of Exercise I was to investigate these 
observed inherent conflicts in a measurable way. The approach taken in Exercise I was to 
quantify the approximate mass, length, and time scales between the principal attributes at 
the levels of war to determine whether there is an observable level of disproportion in 
these scales. This dimensional scaling experiment regarding the ground combat vehicle 
may aid in organizing the ranges of mass, length, and time associated with all three 
attributes at the levels of war. These ranges consider a nominal minimum and maximum 
estimated value required to generate and sustain that attribute in full spectrum operations 
in the idealized scenario below 
A ground combat vehicle is deployed strategically and emplaced operationally in 
a tactical mission environment (Figure 20). In the conduct of a prescribed mission, this 
combat vehicle encounters a threat. An arbitrary region is assumed with a control surface 
extending around the geographical areas for each echelon.114 The overlap of these regions 
serves as the exchange points between the levels of war as this tactical asset moves 
between inter and intratheater.  
In establishing the ranges of mass, length, and time associated with the principal 
attributes, both the potential success and possible failure of the platform in this simple 
engagement is considered. A success or failure will require an amount of energy to be 
used for an effect related to the platform survivability, lethality, and mobility. As such, 
 
114 Ronald L. Panton, Incompressible Flow, Third edition  (New York, Wiley: 2006) 5-9. Panton describes 
the concepts of control surfaces and control regions in this section of his text.  
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the conditions and associated mass, length, and time scales for success and failure are 
with respect to each attribute. For example, an inability to traverse terrain is regarded as a 














Figure 20: Notional IFV scenario with three levels of overlapping arbitrary regions and 
energy flows for survivability, lethality, and mobility (not to scale). This 
figure is intended to illustrate how after a platform is transported across 
regions of responsibility for each level of war, sustainment of combat power 
with regard to each attribute occurs along notional conduits of energy.  
 
2.4.1.1  Mass  
Mass at the tactical level is required to both defend against and to employ a range 
of munitions crossing the control surface. These include small-caliber bullets as slight as 
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100 g, large cannon projectiles weighing 5 kg, and even IED threats with yields greater 
than 100 kg. If survivability is compromised, then the system has been catastrophically 
insulted and a new system must be deployed through the control regions at the strategic 
and operational levels. The scaling of mass for tactical mobility includes low and high 
ranges for a fighting vehicle curb weight. The range for fighting vehicle mass extends 
from 5,000 kg upward to 40,000 kg. At both the operational and strategic level, the range 
of mass related to survivability matches that associated with mobility. Survivability, 
being integral to the platform, demands that these two levels transport this mass 
intertheater (strategic) and intratheater (operational). A nonsurvivable platform will 
require replacement of the same order of mass. The catastrophic destruction of a friendly 
vehicle is, by definition, a repair done via replacement. Lethality and mobility mass 
ranges are also similar at the operational and strategic levels. The lower limit represents 
the replenishment of ammunition and fuel stores onboard. For an IFV, this can amount to 
1000 kg of ordnance and 500 kg of fuel, respectively. The upper limit represents the mass 
associated with platform emplacement into and through the theater. Table 13 has the 
ranges of mass for the principal attributes at the three levels of war. This information is 
also depicted in Figure 21 using the same convention to delineate the attributes at the 
levels of war presented in Table 13. 
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Survivability Lethality Mobility 
Tactical 
100 g — 100 kg 
(bullet — shell) 
100 g — 100 kg 
(bullet — shell) 
5,000 kg — 40,000 kg 
(small — large 
vehicle) 
Operational 
5,000 kg — 40,000 kg 
(small — large vehicle) 
1000 kg — 40,000 kg 
(magazine — vehicle) 
500 kg — 40,000 kg 
(fuel cell — vehicle) 
Strategic 
5,000 kg — 40,000 kg 
(small — large vehicle) 
1000 kg — 40,000 kg 
(magazine — vehicle) 
500 kg — 40,000 kg 
(fuel cell — vehicle) 
 


































Figure 21: Mass scaling for survivability, lethality, and mobility at the three levels of 
war. Blue denotes survivability, red denotes lethality, and green denotes 
mobility. Triangles are for the tactical level, circles are for the operational 




2.4.1.2 Length and Time  
The length and time scaling for survivability at the tactical level of war represent 
the spatial and temporal ranges associated with defending against threat munitions. In 
other words, the minimum and maximum armor thickness one would expect to see on a 
fighting vehicle and the time inherent in retarding an incident threat. For survivability 
considerations, this only considers vulnerability and notably neglects the hypothetical 
opportunities that could afford the victim the ability to avoid insult, e.g., early warning, 
visual detection of imminent threat, etc. Likewise, the length and time scaling for 
lethality are the range of distances across which the ground combat vehicles engage. 
Finally, the length and time scales under the mobility heading cover the shortest dash to a 
three-day, relatively long-range mission. The length and time ranges for the operational 
and strategic levels are all the same across the three principal attributes. These ranges are 
approximates for how fast and far these levels typically operate globally.  
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Survivability Lethality Mobility 
Tactical 
 
10 mm — 1000 mm 
(thin — thick armor) 
 
10 m — 5 km 
(short — long 
engagement) 
100 m — 100 km 
(dash — excursion) 
Operational 
100 km — 1000 km 
(ranges of operation) 
 
100 km — 1000 km 
(ranges of operation) 
 
100 km — 1000 km 
(ranges of operation) 
Strategic 
1000 km — 10,000 km 
(ranges of operation) 
1000 km — 10,000 km 
(ranges of operation) 
 
1000 km — 10,000 km 
(ranges of operation) 
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Figure 22: Length scaling for survivability, lethality, and mobility at the three levels of 
war. Blue denotes survivability, red denotes lethality, and green denotes 
mobility. Triangles are for the tactical level, circles are for the operational 
level, and squares are for the strategic level. 
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Survivability     Lethality                    Mobility           
Tactical 
1 ms — 1 s 
(impact event range) 
 
10 ms — 10 s 
(launch event range) 
 
 
10 s — 3 days 
(dash — excursion) 
 
Operational 
3 days — 10 days 
(response time range) 
3 days — 10 days 
(response time range) 
 
3 days — 10 days 
(response time range) 
 
Strategic 
10 days — 1 year 
(response time range) 
10 days — 1 year 
(response time range) 
 
10 days — 1 year 
(response time range) 
 
 

































Figure 23: Time scaling for survivability, lethality, and mobility at the three levels of 
war. Blue denotes survivability, red denotes lethality, and green denotes 
mobility. Triangles are for the tactical level, circles are for the operational 
level, and squares are for the strategic level. 
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The brief scaling analysis demonstrates that, for an individual IFV depicted in a 
notional scenario (Figure 20), the tactical level experiences the greatest variations in 
mass, length, and time scales. By inspection, the operational and strategic length scales 
are fairly stable, but the tactical level operates over a length encompassing a brief dash all 
the way to a long distance expedition. If the entire conduit from strategic through 
operational to tactical level is considered a whip, then the end—the tactical level— 
experiences the greatest fluctuations. Additionally, each level experiences a unique range 
of mass, length, and time scales with respect to other levels. What this shows is that the 
tactical level requires large inherent robustness to operate across a wider range of mass, 
length, and time scales. Finally, a system optimized for the operational or strategic level 
may place constraints that limit the functional capacity and performance capabilities at 
the tactical level.  
Another observation from this scaling analysis was the huge penalty in mass 
associated with inadequate survivability. At each level, the upper and lower ranges of 
mass, length, and time are with consideration for failure to accomplish a mission. The 
minimum mass associated with a failed kinetic engagement might be a demand for more 
resupply of ammunition through the control regions. Alternatively, an unsuccessful 
movement could require extra fuel to support an alternate route. Thus, the minimum cost 
for failure with respect to survivability is at best extended engagements and combat 
vehicle overhaul. But, at the other extreme, the maximum cost for failure with respect to 
survivability lies the potential for total vehicle replacement and, more tragically, the 
complete loss of crew. In other words, the strategic and operational level always pay a 
hefty price to emplace a platform and its crew. Any benefit of reducing net survivability, 
e.g., to achieve strategic or operational mobility, can be quickly offset if that platform and 
crew are damaged—or worse—lost to enemy fire. 
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2.4.2 Exercise II: Fielded Combat System Performance Specification Analysis 
A generally accepted truism about combat vehicles is that superior protection and 
firepower normally come at the expense of transportability or the metrics associated with 
good operational and strategic mobility. The massive armor and heavy weapons 
associated with the apex predators of the battlefield come at the expense of high gross 
vehicle weights, which are not conducive with easy movement inter and intratheater. The 
purpose of Exercise II was to further explore the merits of this truism by looking at 
existing combat vehicles while employing the levels of war construct for the principal 
attributes. A set of currently fielded combat platforms, ranked by relative performance 
within the survivability, lethality, and mobility construct, elicited affinities between the 
principal attributes at the three levels of war. A matrix was populated with fielded 
candidate combat vehicle specifications representing two tanks, two IFVs, two tracked 
APCs and two wheeled APCs (Table 16). Principal attribute rankings at the tactical level 
were a function of two metrics selected for their universal merit. At the operational and 
strategic level, the principal attribute rankings were assumed to be a function of one 
metric consistent with the mass, length, and time scaling analysis done in a previous 
section. Table 16 contains the specification data for the eight fielded vehicles: M1A1 tank 
(U.S.), T-72 tank (Russian), M2A2 tracked IFV (U.S.), BMP-3 tracked IFV (Russian), 
M113 tracked APC (U.S.), YW531 tracked APC (Chinese), Stryker wheeled APC (U.S.), 
and the WZ551 wheeled APC (Chinese).115 Appendix 2 contains reference drawings and 
countries of origin for each vehicle used in this exercise. 
 
115 Foss, Christopher F. Jane’s Armor and Artillery, 2006-2007. Virginia: Cambridge University Press, 
2006. 
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5.35 1.83 8.89 4.36 6.57 2.25 6.54 7.94 
length 
[m] 7.14 7.92 4.86 6.55 6.95 6.95 6.65 5.48 
width 
[m] 
3.15 3.65 2.69 3.61 2.74 4.75 2.8 2.98 
height 
[m] 
2.3 2.38 1.85 2.57 2.62 2.37 2.5 1.89 
range 
[km] 600 498 480 483 500 480 600 500 
fuel 
[l] 
500 1907 360 662 246 1000 300 450 
volume 
[m3] 
52 69 24 61 50 78 47 31 
 
116 Christopher Foss, Jane’s Armor and Artillery, 2006-2007. Virginia: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
All dimensional values (length, width, and height) are reported as they are listed in Jane’s. All derived 
values have been rounded appropriately.  
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A few notes about the specification data are necessary before proceeding further. 
First, due to the sensitive nature (from a security perspective) of survivability metrics, the 
values for RHAeq are provided as good estimates. Second, the combat ammunition load 
value is a composite number for the various weapons onboard. For example, the M1A1 
Abrams tank carries no less than three sizes and several types of ammunition: 120 mm 
main gun , 0.50 caliber heavy machine gun, and 7.62 mm coaxially mounted machine 
gun. Third, the armor areal density value was found in a similar process for equating 
composite armor to RHAeq.  
To a first approximation, each metric was associated with a principal attribute and 
level of war. For example, the capital letter beneath the units denotes the principal 
attribute, and the subscript capital letter indicates the level of war.  For example ST is a 
metric contributing to survivability at the tactical level.  
Mathematical representations for operational and strategic metrics are provided as 
Equation 3–Equation 7. Equation 8 demonstrates how the presented area scales with 
vehicle mass, if the overall shape is assumed to be a rectangular prism with a 2:1 aspect 













































Using these preliminary metrics, the relative performance of the eight fielded 
vehicles based on the principal attributes of survivability, lethality, and mobility at the 
tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war were estimated as the average of their 
associated metrics. As a simple example, in the eight-vehicle set, if a candidate ranked 
second for RHAeq and fourth for mass, then the average ranking for tactical survivability 
(a simple function of armor thickness and vehicle mass) would be (2+4)/2 = 3.   
As a further explanation of how the calculations were conducted, the table below 
contains the basic algorithm followed to rank the candidate set. The tactical level 
attributes were functions of two metrics, while the operational and strategic attributes 
were functions of only one metric (Table 17). 
 
Table 17: Vehicle Ranking Metric Formulas For Candidate i  
Attribute Level Function of Units Calculation of Ranki 
ST RHAeq, mass kg, mm (rank(RHAeq,i) + rank(massi)) / 2 
LT caliber, CAL mm, # (rank(caliberi) + rank(CAL,i)) / 2 
MT vmax, P/w km/hr, hp/tonne (rank(vmax i) + rank(P/w,i)) / 2 
SO armor ρ′′ kg/m
2 rank(armor ρi′′) 
LO ammo ρ #/m
3 rank (ammo ρi) 
MO ηfuel km/l rank (ηfuel,i) 
SS vehicle ρ kg/m
3 rank (vehicle ρi) 
LS rammo mm/m rank (rammo,i) 
MS mass
-1




When the specification data was ranked by principal attribute at the three levels of 
war, interesting, but somewhat expected, outcomes were observed. The vehicles that 
scored best for strategic mobility (MS)—platforms that are light, compact, and easily 
transportable by air—scored poorly for survivability and lethality at nearly all the other 
levels. Conversely, a vehicle that ranked high in tactical lethality and survivability (LT 
and ST) fared poorly in the mobility rankings at both the operational and strategic levels 
of war.  
To exemplify this point in tabular form (Table 18), the best in class for each 
attribute (first and second place) are highlighted green and the worst in class (seventh and 
eighth place) are highlighted red. The M1 Abrams tank scored well in every area except 
operational and strategic mobility (MO and MS). However, the high performance of these 
battlefield apex predators comes at a steep price, namely extreme curb weight and a 
ravenous appetite for fuel. This penalized the ranking of the platform for operational and 
strategic mobility. Contrast the M1 Abrams platform with the Stryker APC, which was 
the top performer in operational and strategic mobility, but had a poor ranking in most of 
the other areas.  
It should be noted that this simple exercise was not intended to directly compare 
main battle tanks to wheeled APCs, as this is a veritable “apples to oranges” comparison 
in the fighting vehicle domain. Clearly, the design objectives for a tank and an APC are 
entirely different; by design, they bring unique benefits, as well as performance 
inadequacies, in specific areas. Rather, the intention here was to explore and illustrate the 
conduciveness and exclusiveness of the principal attributes at the various levels of war, at 






































ST 4 1 7 3 5 2 6 7 
LT 2 1 6 4 8 2 5 7 
MT 3 1 8 5 2 4 5 5 
SO 6 1 4 3 8 2 7 5 
LO 2 1 3 4 8 7 6 5 
MO 4 8 3 6 1 7 2 5 
SS 4 1 8 3 6 2 5 7 
LS 3 2 6 5 8 1 4 7 
MS 3 8 6 4 1 7 2 5 
The rankings in this table were calculated using Equations 3–8 and the formulas 
described in Table 17. 
These initial findings were further explored and visually depicted by comparing 
the absolute value of the difference for these best-in-class performers between the 
principal attributes at the levels of war. Platforms ranking in the top 2 or bottom 2 for an 
attribute at a specific level of war were analyzed by taking the absolute value of the 
principal attribute against each other recorded attribute. This data was then averaged and 
populated into the top portion of a quality function deployment (QFD) diagram, also 
known as the “roof” of a House of Quality (HOQ) in Figure 24.117 For example, if a 
vehicle ranked first in tactical lethality and eighth in strategic mobility, then the 
intersection of those two terms (LT and MS) would be the absolute value of the difference 
|1−8| = 7.  
 
117 Kevin Otto and Kristin Wood, Product Design: Techniques in Reverse Engineering and New Product 
Development (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001) 289-297. 
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A relatively low, average absolute value indicated a complementary relationship, 
while a high average absolute value pointed toward a negative correlation between the 
principal attribute at a particular level of war. The average range for absolute values was 
6, and a scale employing four colors was used to help visually depict the relationships.118 
Strength of correlations was based on: 0–2, strong positive; 2–3, positive; 3–4, negative, 








Figure 24: Correlation diagram for principal attributes at the three levels of war. This is 
essentially the roof of a house of quality (HOQ). 
From the correlations depicted in Figure 24, it is clear that strategic and 
operational mobility (MS and MO) conflict with nearly every attribute at every level of 
war. This is not all surprising, since the metrics that contribute to a vehicle possessing 
good strategic and operational mobility, i.e., being light for ease of intertheater transport 
 
118 Two of the vehicles produced scores ranges from 1-8, while the other two presented ranges from 2-7, 
making an average range of 6 for the subjective delineations between strong positive, positive, negative, 
and strong negative correlations.  
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and having long operational range for ease of demand on fuel consumption, are achieved 
(with conventional technologies and materials) at the expense of physically constraining 
the design (combat vehicle) and reducing performance capabilities at the tactical level. Of 
the 8 correlations for strategic mobility, 6 were strong negatives and 1 was negative. 
Likewise, of the 8 correlations for operational mobility, 6 of the correlations were strong 
negatives and 1 was a negative. In other words, vehicles that ranked high for strategic and 
operational mobility ranked low for virtually all attributes at the levels of war, and vice 
versa. With respect to the tactical level, the attributes apparently correlated positively. 
There was a strong positive correlation between tactical survivability (ST) and tactical 
lethality (LT), meaning a vehicle that possessed good tactical survivability generally 
possessed good tactical lethality, and vice versa. A similar relationship was observed for 
tactical mobility (MT), i.e., there was a strong positive correlation with both tactical 
survivability and tactical mobility. Combat vehicles designed to be the apex predators of 
the battlefield do so at the expense of operational and strategic mobility. Conversely, a 
vehicle design, constrained in mass and volume to achieve good operational and strategic 
mobility, appears intrinsically incongruent with the performance metrics contributing to 
tactical level attribute dominance. 
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2.5 Lessons Learned 
 Just as trees need roots, a sound approach to developing a decision support framework 
directed upward (with branches) from the design or selection objective (trunk) should include 
a corresponding investigation downward to illuminate the guiding principles and underlying 
doctrinal basis for the pursuit (roots). 
 The elements of combat power, the requirements for full spectrum operations, and a review 
of the principles of war, all strengthen the essentialness of advanced ground combat systems 
that provide soldiers with enhanced levels of protection, firepower, and mobility on future 
battlefields. 
 A decision support framework built around the principal attributes of survivability, lethality, 
and mobility, provides a doctrinally sound and logical basis in which to organize and classify 
engineering metrics. The soundness is based on the direct linkages between those attributes 
and the U.S. Army doctrinal concepts, i.e., full spectrum operations, elements of combat 
power, principles of war, and the levels of war. The logicality is defended based on the use of 
the best practices and demonstrated methodologies in decision analysis, i.e., the prior use of 
the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) in military pursuits requiring the employment of a 
decision analysis method. However, as will be seen in Chapter 3, AHP is not without pitfalls, 
and the dangers associated with these shortcomings can potentially misguide a pursuit. 
 A metric crosswalk qualitatively demonstrated the competing demands between principal 
attributes. Notably, the pursuit of higher survivability through conventional means suggested 
negative effects on platform lethality and mobility considerations.  
 The tactical level of war experiences the greatest range in mass, length, and time scales for 
combat actions related to survivability, lethality, and mobility. The operational and strategic 
levels enjoy greater stability and narrower ranges of mass, length, and time for these 
dimensional scaling considerations. 
 Parsing and discriminating the principal attributes at the three levels of war provided insight 
into the contrasting and complementary interests at each stratum. For a tactical asset like a 
ground combat vehicle, the concept of lethality and survivability at the operational and 
strategic levels of war remains elusive. 
 Ranking of existing vehicle performance specifications demonstrated that strategic and 




For over 100 years, fighting vehicles have played a critical role in the prosecution 
of ground warfare. As an integral component in the prosecution of full spectrum 
operations, and as a virtual generator/guardian of the elements of combat power, mobile 
and protected weapon systems are vital to the efficient and decisive execution of the U.S. 
Army’s mission. At the level at which these platforms conduct operations, a combat 
platform’s efficacy is a strong function of its core functional capabilities, i.e., its inherent 
survivability, lethality, and mobility.  
Expanding this concept to the three levels of war enabled this role to be qualified 
at each stratum. With the principal attributes formally defined with respect to platform 
efficacy, these three attributes were parsed at the various strata of military operations. As 
previously stated, the tactical level is primarily focused on possessing the greatest combat 
power. The operational level is charged with initially emplacing and then sustaining that 
power throughout; as such, the main interest for this level is in those systems that can be 
moved easily at the military intratheater scale and supported efficiently and effectively 
over the course of sustained operations. The strategic level shares the tactical level’s 
desire for the greatest capability, but balances those gains against the exchange of 
resources for that increased performance in order to accomplish a strategic mission. 
There are clear differences and intrinsic conflicts in the priorities and requirements at the 
microscale (tactical), mesoscale (operational) and macroscale (strategic) levels of war.  
The analytic hierarchy process (AHP), a distinct method in decision analysis, 
allowed for the organization of the numerous combat vehicle metrics used to describe a 
fighting platform, into an easily collapsible form. This organization qualitatively 
illustrated the competing demands among the hierarchy via a virtual metric crosswalk. In 
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this regard, survivability presented areas of confliction since at least seven metrics falling 
under this attribute were incongruent with other traits and principal attributes.  
From an engineering perspective, the creation of the survivability–lethality–
mobility framework itself may enable the designer to explore a larger region of design 
space. Instead of focusing on potentially insignificant specifications and design features, 
the abstraction of the problem into critical attributes (or sub-objectives) and 
corresponding traits could potentially aid in allowing singular efforts to observe the 
linkage in the design objective hierarchy. For the ground combat vehicle example, the 
classification of each metric beneath a principal attribute and secondary trait provides 
contextual understanding to the significance of the engineering effort within the global 
(system) pursuit of an advanced fighting vehicle.  
Scaling of the dimensions of mass, length, and time with respect to the three 
principal attributes demonstrated that the tactical level of war encounters the greatest 
ranges with these parameters. It also showed that the mass penalty imposed on the 
operational and strategic levels is greatest for a failure to adequately protect a platform. 
For example, failure in mobility might incur supplemental fuel to accommodate 
movement on an alternate route, and failure in lethality might necessitate extra 
ammunition to destroy a threat, but failure in survivability means the vehicle was subject 
to insult that produced damage commensurate with incapacitation for the platform, 
crewmembers, or both.  
The inherent competing demands with pursuing high survivability, along with 
high lethality and mobility, e.g., large mass and big size that work against 
transportability, hamper mobility, and consume weight and space from lethality systems, 
call for further innovation to break this conflict. For example, before composites were 
used, a machine design could rarely be both strong and lightweight. A similar innovation 
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or series of breakthroughs is required to pursue higher levels of fighting vehicle 
protection in concert with the other tactical attributes contributing to battlefield 
maneuver. At the higher levels of war, it is again essential to break this conflict in order 
to achieve desirable operational and strategic objectives like inter and intratheater 
transportability that demand relatively small mass and volumes. Without trivializing the 
interconnectedness and challenges associated with pursuing greater lethality, and 
recognizing that greater weapon potency will surely incur a mass and volume penalty to 
the platform, it appears from the metric crosswalk exercise that most metrics associated 
with lethality can generally be pursued without significantly negatively affecting others.  
When expanding this concept to the three levels of war, operational and strategic 
mobility are incongruent with nearly all other attributes at all levels of war. This matches 
historical combat vehicle performance in which an easily transportable platform was 
often not able to bring the protection and firepower commensurate with the demands of 
major combat operations. The Stryker vehicle fits this category; moreover, the required 
progression of armor upgrades is indicative of this initial survivability gap. Meanwhile, 
these upgrades significantly diminished the strategic mobility for which it was so rigidly 
initially designed. Survivability—the attribute that seems to incur the highest costs in 
scaling analysis, the greatest number of design conflicts in the metric crosswalk exercise, 
yet remains a high priority in the design and selection process—was the only attribute 
where the cost of failure can be terminal for both platform and crew. The high relative 
importance of survivability in contemporary efforts like the MRAP and GCV programs  
matches historical accounts of successful platforms, like the Abrams and Bradley.119  
However, the pursuit of high survivability cannot be accomplished in isolation. 
The collective contributions of lethality and mobility surely contribute at some level to 
 
119 Richard Chait, John Lyons, and Duncan Long, Critical Technology Events in the Development of the 
Abrams Tank: Project Hindsight Revisited (Washington DC: National Defense University, 2005) 22-27. 
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the overall performance of a ground combat vehicle. In the next two chapters, 
commensurate levels of these attributes are explored, by popular vote, then by simulation. 
First, collective weightings of these attributes were solicited from mid-career U.S. Army 
officers to get a sense of their priorities and judgments. Then, the interactions and relative 
effects of the principal attributes of survivability, lethality, and mobility on simulated 
fighting vehicle performance in an arena representative of the contemporary operating 
environment were analyzed to assess which attributes matter most and to what degree 
synergisms and conflicts exist.  
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Chapter 3:  Attribute Weighting and Candidate Vehicle Selection 
When those difficult cases occur, they are difficult, chiefly because while we have 
them under consideration, all the reasons pro and con are not present to the mind 
at the same time… I endeavor to estimate their respective weights… and thus 
proceeding I find at length where the balance lies. 
 
I have found great advantage from this kind of equation in what might be called 
moral or prudential algebra. 
—Benjamin Franklin in a  letter to the British scientist Joseph Priestly,      
1772 120 
3.1  Introduction 
In order to gain insight into the utility and functionality of a ground combat 
vehicle decision support framework built around the principal attributes of survivability, 
lethality, and mobility, an exercise typical of common practices used in a GCV selection 
process was conducted with a representative population of mid-career U.S. Army 
officers. This exercise included a solicitation to generate weighting values for the 
attributes representing critical functions for the vehicle design and selection, as well as an 
opportunity for respondents to overtly select a vehicle from a set of candidate designs. 
Several surprising results were observed: namely, the effect of information presentation 
methods on a decision maker’s choice, as well as the potential dangers of presenting 
candidate data using directly additive weighting methods. For a complex system like a 
ground combat vehicle—one characterized by a high degree of interaction between the 
environment, user, threat, and proximal systems— directly additive weighting methods 
may be wholly unsuited as the fundamental premises do not fully consider these critical 
intricacies and dynamics. The general difficulty in validating the weighting values, as 
well as performance inextricably linked to such complex interactions, further questions 
the utility of such methods. 
 




In the previous chapter, the generally accepted, functional requirements of a 
fighting vehicle were expressed via the principal attributes of survivability, lethality, and 
mobility. These attributes were subsequently broken down into associated secondary 
traits and contributory tertiary metrics. While this may be an acceptable framework to 
organize and compare raw data in an itemized fashion for engineering design purposes, it 
(as will be demonstrated) does not add much actionable information to a decision maker 
in the primitive form of a table or an attribute tree. Further synthesis of the information is 
required to refine it to an enriched, more immediately comprehensible, albeit potentially 
misleading, form. As Franklin pointed out in his letter to Priestly, appropriate weights 
must be incorporated into this “prudential algebra” to improve the decision making value 
of the information at hand, but the key question (as will be demonstrated) is which 
prudential algebra.  
A common motivation shared by decision support tools is a concerted effort to 
supplement an apparent limited capacity of the human mind to manage information, what 
has often been described as the “magical number seven”.121 George Miller documented 
that the number of objects the average person can hold in working memory is 7 ± 2.122 
Today, this observation is commonly referred to as Miller’s Law. In his influential paper, 
Miller offers three simple techniques to expand this capacity. He recommends that it is 
best to “(a) make relative rather than absolute judgments; (b) increase the number of 
dimensions along which the stimuli can differ; and (c) arrange the task in such a way that 
 
121 George A. Miller, The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for 
Processing Information, (The Psychological Review, 1956, vol. 63) 81-97.  
122 Ibid. 
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we make a sequence of several absolute judgments in a row.”123 Miller’s techniques 
reinforce the value of decision support tools that boost the limited working memory of 
the human mind by enhancing the quality of the information available at the time a 
decision is made. His recommendations for synthesizing data into relative comparisons 
(Figure 25) and to increase the number of dimensions for those relative (candidate) 
comparisons (Figure 26) were observed in the formation of the decision support tools 
developed in this chapter. 
 
Figure 25: Types of data comparisons and the relative worth as a function of processing. 
Normalizing engineering metrics with respect to the best value among 
alternatives can form relative comparisons among the candidates.  
Design and selection projects typically observe Miller’s recommendations. 
Making relative comparisons among candidates, bifurcating program objectives into sub-
criteria, i.e., increasing the number of dimensions that candidates can differ on, and 
explicitly stating go/no-go criteria, all aid the decision maker in the processing and 
utilization of information.  
 
 
123 George A. Miller, The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for 















Figure 26: The dimensions used to evaluate candidate combat vehicles are considered as 
survivability, lethality, and mobility. At the extremes of each of these axes 
are a block of armor (blue), rolling chassis (green) and simple cannon (red).  
When considering the additional dimensions or branches in a decision analysis 
framework, branches are typically weighted uniquely as not all attributes are deemed 
equally important. Decision makers can provide these weights either explicitly or 
implicitly through guidance. Given any individual’s differing experiences, judgments, 
and wisdom, the weights assessed on attributes can vary (sometimes widely) among 
decision makers. To illustrate the sensitivity of decision maker derived weights, this 
chapter describes several exercises in which attribute weights related to fighting vehicle 
design and selection criteria were solicited from a representative population of U.S. Army 
officers. It was conjectured that the collective experiences of a group of combat-veteran 
leaders, all with varying levels of expertise and interest in combat vehicle design, would 
be a representative and perhaps meaningful source of shared insight concerning the 
generation of weights for the various criteria for future combat vehicle design and 
selection.  
107 
Having collected and processed the weighting data, the first research question was 
explored using the aforementioned survey populations. From the introduction (and 
restated here for clarity), this question was: What effect does the use of decision 
support tools built around the principal attributes of survivability, lethality, and 
mobility, have on combat vehicle selection? To answer this question, the respondents 
participated in a candidate vehicle selection exercise constructed about the principal 
attribute framework introduced in Chapter 2. Consistency tests were done to evaluate 
respondent selection when compared to weighting-derived selections. Analysis was 
performed in order to assess the value, if any, that the decision support tools lent to the 
respondents making their selections from a set of fighting vehicle candidate designs.  
 
3.2.1 Methodology 
Two groups of U.S. Army officers were surveyed in order to collect weighting 
data on the principal attributes, secondary traits, and tertiary metrics related to ground 
combat vehicle design considerations. Groups also subjectively rated their preference for 
four decision support tools, two of which were visual depictions of specification data 
synthesis. The other two support tools were standard, numeric matrices in varying display 
formats, i.e., raw data and normalized with respect to best criteria performer in the 
candidate vehicle set.  
Subsequent to the portion of the survey dedicated to principal attribute, secondary 
trait, and tertiary metric weighting solicitation, the groups were asked to overtly rank 6 
ground combat vehicles in order from most to least preferred. The specification data for 
these platforms was representative of 6 notional vehicles created for this comparative 
study. In this set of candidates, 3 vehicles were tracked and 3 were wheeled. Furthermore, 
in each subset of either wheeled or tracked vehicles, one was a well-armed (high 
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lethality) candidate, one was a well-protected (high survivability) candidate, and one was 
a well-powered (high mobility) candidate. The archetypes within each set were designed 
to create competing demands among principal attributes as well as to compel the notional 
decision makers (respondents) to make trade-offs among candidate vehicle selection 
choices. Comparison tests were done to evaluate the consistency between vehicle ranking 







































Figure 27: Flow chart for methodology designed to investigate the effect of decision 
support tools, built around the principal attributes of survivability, lethality, 
and mobility, on ground combat vehicle selection. Group 1 made overt 
choices using raw data only, while Group 2 had the same raw data, in 
addition to it  normalized with respect to the top performer, and two 
graphical visualization tools. The terms IC, EC1, and EC2 are defined and 
discussed in § 3.6.3. 
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3.2.2 Weighting and Selection Survey 
As presented previously, the effort described in Chapter 2 simply decomposed the 
relative merit of a combat vehicle into 3 principal attributes, 9 secondary traits, and 
approximately 70 tertiary metrics. Notably absent from that effort was a meaningful 
assignment of weighting values for these criteria; without these weights, a matrix of 
specifications describing a set of candidate combat platforms does not lend much value to 
a decision maker. In other words, the decision maker must manually interpret the data, 
cuing in on performance metrics of personal interest or value, and possibly missing the 
significance of an elusive design aspect. 
To collect weighting data from the target U.S. Army officer population, a series of 
questionnaires were designed for a survey exercise. During a scheduled session, the 
proctor (author) issued these surveys for the purpose of gathering weighting data on the 
principal attributes, secondary traits, and tertiary metrics laid out in the previous chapter. 
A select set of soldiers serving in the U.S. Army’s Acquisition Corps was identified as 
being reasonable candidates to both provide weighting data and make notional combat 
vehicle selection decisions.  
For background, these officers were participating in a three-week functional area 
qualification course.124 Attendees to this course are officers, serving at the rank of major, 
who had just begun bridging their tactical-level, warfighting career with the operational-
level, materiel acquisition profession. The tactical-level experience was deemed helpful 
in providing insightful weights to the attributes, traits, and metrics that comprise the 
subjective significance of a combat vehicle. The operational-level experience was 
 
124 The U.S. Army Acquisition Corps is a specific functional area within the DoD. In the U.S. Army, this 
organization provides materiel development and life cycle management. Military positions in  the U.S. 
Army Acquisition Corps include research and development, test and evaluation, program management, and 
contracting.  
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considered representative of the key decision making actions that a materiel developer 
may participate in during an activity focused on prioritizing the competing demands and 
complementary interests associated with an ambitious project, such as combat vehicle 
selection.  
During the session, these heterogeneous groups of volunteer subjects were told 
that, given the theoretical requirement to design the next ground combat vehicle (GCV), 
they were being asked to provide input that could be used to generate the weighting 
values for the decision making process in the design and selection of the next generation 
fighting vehicle. It was made clear that this was a notional scenario and that the proctor 
(author) did not officially represent the U.S. Army GCV program. The weighting data 
solicited was with respect to the previously presented attributes, traits, and metrics used 
to describe a candidate combat vehicle. This was an individual survey, i.e., there was no 
collaboration among respondents. The proctor (author) addressed any points of 
clarification to the collective group during the survey administration.  
Respondents were also asked to rank, in the order of importance, the collection of 
vehicle descriptors or engineering metrics, e.g., top speed, maximum engagement range, 
blast protection rating, etc. Additionally, these officers were asked to qualitatively assess 
their preference for some decision support tools under development. Finally, given a 
tactical scenario resembling the contemporary operating environment (COE) and a 
challenge to pick a future GCV platform from a set of candidates, the officers ranked a 
set of candidates from most to least preferred based on their combined judgment and use 
of a collection of standard decision support tools. Subjective preference for the decision 
support tools provided was also collected in order to rate the population preference for 
the developed aids. 
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Based on previous work with group decision making, as well as contemporary 
efforts focused on crowdsourcing, it was believed that the synthesized data from a group 
of interested and experienced respondents would be of higher value than that generated 
from a single decision maker.125 The inclusion of a group of respondents, while 
complicating the conduct of the survey, may ensure that the weakness of a single decision 
maker’s logic would not send the selection pursuit along a fruitless path. 
3.2.3 Survey Process 
Since collection of data from these officers is categorized by academia as human- 
subject research, a human-subject research proposal, including all required 
documentation, was submitted to the University of Texas at Austin’s Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) in the Office of Research Support (ORS). “The IRB reviews human subject 
research projects according to 3 principles: first, minimize the risk to human subjects 
(beneficence); second, ensure all subjects consent and are fully informed about the 
research and any risks (autonomy); third, promote equity in human subjects research 
(justice).”126 The review of this work was done through a six-step process (outlined in 
Table 19) based on submission and evaluation of the pertinent documentation listed in 
Table 20. Items 1, 2, 3, 8, and 9 from Table 20 were submitted to the IRB. The 
 
125 In William Easterly’s 2006 book titled The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest 
Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good, (Penguin Press: New York), he uses the terms planners and 
searchers to describe the different approaches for gathering information. While a planner believes his 
knowledge and intuition provides him with the answer, a searcher “admits he doesn’t know the answers in 
advance.” Along this line of logic, given the complexity and uncertainty of assigning weighting values for 
the fighting vehicle attributes, a search method incorporating the weights of a group of respondents was 
preferred over a focus on a single decision maker. The concept of planner and searcher also corresponds to 
Treverton’s framework for puzzles and mysteries. 
126 The University of Texas at Austin IRB instructional website, 
http://www.utexas.edu/research/rsc/humansubjects/. 
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questionnaire (item 2) was included in the survey (item 9). These documents are 
incorporated into this dissertation as Appendix 3–Appendix 6. 127  
 
Table 19: IRB Approval Process 
Step 1 Submit title, type of review, and PI information. 
Step 2 Submit researcher information and conflict of interest disclosure. 
Step 3 Identify population of interest, outline consent methods, and state the 
location for which the research will be conducted. 
Step 4 If applicable, list medical procedures and considerations for this study. 
Step 5  List financial support and incentives for participation in this study. 
Step 6 Provide additional documentation (Table 20). 
 
Table 20: IRB Approval Documentation 
1) Research Proposal 8) Consent Form  
2) Questionnaire 9) Survey 
3) Cover Letter 10) Recruitment Flyer 
4) Email Recruitment Message 11) Telephone Script 
5) Site Letter (if off campus) 12) HIPPA Form 
6) Grant Proposal (DHHS) 13) Certificate of Consistency (DHHS) 
7) Prior IRB Review Letter 14) Other Documentation 
 
127 The reference number for this study is: 2010090027. The IRB granted approval in September 2010 and 
was subsequently closed in April of 2011. 
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Using a pairwise rating form of solicitation, respondents were asked to rate the 
principal attributes (survivability, lethality, and mobility), secondary traits (related to 
survivability, lethality and mobility), and tertiary metrics (related to survivability, 
lethality, and mobility). The secondary traits associated with survivability included 
susceptibility, vulnerability, and repairability. For lethality, the secondary traits in the 
survey were acquisition, engagement, and target effects. For mobility, the secondary 
traits in the survey were cross country performance, roadworthiness, and robustness. Note 
that all attributes, traits, and metrics were organized alphabetically in the surveys so as to 
minimize any bias associated with the order of appearance. Table 21 lists the 30 tertiary 
metrics referred to in this survey exercise.128 These were organized solely beneath the 
applicable principal attribute and not under a related trait.  
 
128 In order to make the survey more manageable, the original list of over 70 metrics was reduced to 30 (10 
for each principal attribute). 
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Table 21: 30 Tertiary Metrics Used in the U.S. Army Officer Attribute Survey 
Survivability Lethality Mobility 




















BPR force of recoil Frecoil 





















Pkill maximum speed vmax 





















3.2.4 Pairwise Ratings 
Pairwise ratings were used within the survey to solicit insight concerning the 
relative tradeoffs among the decision criteria used to evaluate candidate designs. The 
objective of this solicitation was to generate a priority or weighting vector which 
represented the apportioned affinity or preference for the criteria of interest. In addition to 
showing the relative value that a decision maker (or group of decision makers) places on 
each attribute, the weighting vector can be used in decision support tools to assist in 
conducting the “moral or prudential algebra” that Franklin described in his letter to 
Priestly. Developed by Saaty, this method asks respondents to rank the criteria in an 
ordinal fashion, then to express their affinity for a given criterion with respect to another 
using an arbitrary but predetermined scale.129 As such, for n criteria it requires the 
respondents to provide n(n-1)/2 judgments or assessments. Given the increased number 
of relative judgments required, pairwise comparisons are not recommended when more 
than 7 criteria are being evaluated at the same level.130 In addition to providing the 
investigator with greater insight on criteria affinity than that which is normally afforded 
by simply soliciting criteria rank or raw weighting values, the pairwise comparison 
method includes a means to check internal  consistency in the assessment of rank and 
preference.  
The group of pairwise comparisons comprising the decision maker’s assessment 
on the criteria of interest comprise a square pairwise comparison matrix. Consider square 
matrix A where Aij is the relative preference of criteria ci with respect to cj. The scale for 
preference, set by the investigator, should vary on some predetermined, graduated scale, 
 
129 Ching-Lai Hwang, Kwangsun Yoon, Multiple Attribute Decision Making, Methods and Applications 
(New York: Springer-Verlag, 1981) 41-53.  
130 T.L. Saaty, M.S. Ozdemir, Why the Magic Number Seven Plus or Minus Two (Mathematical and 
Computer Modelling, vol 38, 2003) 233–244.  
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e.g., 1–3 or 1–9, where a wider range provides finer resolution of the preference over the 
other, but at the added expense of increasing the deliberation of the respondent. A value 
of 1 indicates equal preference, while the high end of the scale, e.g., 9, indicates strong 
relative preference. In this study, a scale of 1–4 was used: 4 indicating “strongly 
favored”, 3 signifying “favored”, 2 meaning “slightly favored” and 1 meaning that the 
criteria were “equal” in preference to each other.131  
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As can be seen in A, this matrix necessarily has diagonal values equal to 1. 
Moreover, the lower diagonal of the matrix is composed of reciprocal values from the 
upper diagonal according to Aji = 1/Aij. For example, ci/cj = 1/( ci/cj). Once the matrix is 
populated, Morris showed that specific criteria weights can be found using the geometric 
mean of rows (Equation 9) for A, while Saaty used an eigenvector method.132 While both 
methods produce comparable results, it appears DECMAT uses the former geometric 
mean of rows, as calculations done to validate the method matched those produced by the 
software using Morris’ described technique.  
 
 
131 This is also the scale used in the DECMAT software title. 

















While both methods are described for completeness, Saaty’s method is described 
first. Saaty defines the n-dimensional weighting vector maxw

, such that it satisfies 
Equation 10 below, where λmax is the maximum eigenvalue from the pairwise comparison 













Alternatively, Morris defines this n-dimensional weighting vector maxw

, according 
to Equation 11 and Equation 12. Due to the property of Equation 12, Equation 13 is 
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w   Equation 13
 
For those individuals who provide pairwise comparisons, Saaty also provides a 
way to check for the consistency of the weighting logic through a three-step process 
which lends itself to the calculation of a consistency index (CI) (Equation 15). For an n×n 
pairwise comparison matrix A, this index measures the difference between the maximum 
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eigenvalue of A (λmax) and the maximum eigenvalue of a theoretically, perfectly 
consistent matrix (λpc = n).133 A perfectly consistent matrix is one in which the pairwise 










In Saaty’s method for checking decision maker’s logic, he subsequently defines 
the consistency ratio (CR) (Equation 16), which is the ratio of the consistency index and a 
random index (RI). The random index is the average CI that he obtained from 10,000 
random pairwise comparison matrices.134  As referenced in his 2008 paper, Xu argued 
that it may be an improper test for mistakes or instances of illogicalness with Saaty’s 
baseline. In other words, “the consistency test should check for mistakes, rather than for 
non-randomness.”135 Given the community’s acceptance of his method, as well as the 
widespread use in decision analysis software, Saaty’s 30-year old pairwise comparison 
method was employed here with an appreciation for the ongoing efforts being done to 
possibly develop an improved technique.  
In sequence, the check for consistency in Saaty’s method of pairwise comparisons 
is as follows. Step one is to identify the largest eigenvalue in the n×n pairwise 
comparison matrix A, followed by determining the value for λpc, which is assumed to be 
equal to n or the number of criteria. Step two is to calculate the consistency index CI 
using Equation 15, where n is the number of criteria. Step three is the final evaluation of 
the attribute weighting consistency ratio CR, calculated using Equation 16 with the 
 
133 Wei-Jun Xu, Yu-Cheng Dong, Wei-Lin Xiao, “Is It Reasonable for Saaty’s Consistency Test in the 
Pairwise Comparison Method?” International Colloquium on Computing, Communication, Control, and 
Management, IEEE 2008, 284-298.  
134 Ibid., 296. 
135 Ibid., 284. 
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random index values RI from Table 22. According to Saaty, pairwise rankings having 














  Equation 16
Table 22: Random Index for Pairwise Comparison Matrices Including n-Criteria 137 
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
RI 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.89 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49 
 
To illustrate application of this technique, a hypothetical military decision maker 
is asked to indicate preference between three major project considerations, namely cost, 
performance, and schedule, denoted C, P, and S respectively. Further, assume the 
decision maker ranks these criteria P, S, and C.  
According to this ordering, performance has a higher priority than schedule, 
which has a higher priority than cost. Given 3 criteria, the number of inter-criteria 
observations required to populate A is n(n-1)/2 = 3. The first question involves assigning 
preference for P with respect to S which for the purposes of this illustration is to be 
“favored” or 3 on a scale of 1–4. Likewise, the preference for P with respect to C is 
assumed to also be “favored” with a numerical value of 3. Finally, the preference for S 
with respect to C is assumed to be “slightly favored” at a numerical value of 2. Hence, A 
is found to be:  
 
136 Wei-Jun Xu, Yu-Cheng Dong, Wei-Lin Xiao, “Is It Reasonable for Saaty’s Consistency Test in the 
Pairwise Comparison Method?” International Colloquium on Computing, Communication, Control, and 
Management, IEEE 2008, 284-298.  
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whose eigenvalues are 3.054 and -0.027 ± 0.404i, with 3.054 being the greatest.  
 
Based on Morris’ method, Equation 11 and Equation 12, the weighting vector 
corresponding to the criteria weights for P, C, and S is presented below. Note this 
weighting vector corresponds to the largest eigenvalue found from the pairwise 
comparison matrix. Morris foregoes the introduction of the largest eigenvalue in 










Alternatively, Saaty’s eigenvector method produces a very similar weighting 
vector using Equation 10 and Equation 13. Again, this weighting vector corresponds to 












Finally, the consistency ratio (CR) can be found using Equation 15 and Equation 
16. In this example, solving for CR is found to equal 0.05 which is less than 0.1 and 
demonstrates consistent logic in criteria rank and preference.138  
 As mentioned briefly, this weighting vector tells decision makers the relative 
importance of each criteria based on the preference values collected. In a decision matrix 
with normalized values for each criterion, the weighting values serve as the coefficients 
for each criteria value, with the sum of those products equaling the candidate score. In a 
decision matrix with criteria represented by non-normalized or dimensional values, the 
values from the priority matrix serve as the exponents in the product sequence of values 
for the criteria. A further demonstration of this latter calculation is provided in §3.6.1. 
 
 
138 DECMAT, a decision support software tool that will be introduced in §3.6.1 presents a consistency 
ratio as a percent. In the example provided, the consistency ratio would be reported as 95%, versus 0.05.   
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3.3 Attribute Weighting and Candidate Vehicle Selection Data 
Two 75-minute survey sessions were scheduled with the Intermediate 
Qualification Course (IQC) coordinator. Officer groups attending the IQC at the IAT in 
September and November 2010 were surveyed in two separate exercises.139 Both sessions 
were held on Friday afternoons and volunteer respondents were released from duty by the 
IQC coordinator before the survey, encouraging those disinterested with the survey 
content or topic material to refrain from participating. Notably, several did in fact depart. 
 
3.3.1 Survey Group 1: September 2010 
For Group 1, there were three objectives for the first survey exercise conducted in 
two phases separated by about 10 days. The first objective (Phase I) was to collect a 
catalog of weights derived from an experienced population of officer leaders regarding 
the 3 principal attributes, 9 traits, and 30 metrics comprising major components of a 
ground combat vehicle system.140 The second objective (Phase I) was to obtain early 
feedback on several decision support tools intended to aid in visualizing candidate data. 
The third objective (Phase II) was to use this initial survey population as a control group, 
since their candidate vehicle selection process was done using only raw vehicle 
specification data.  
Group 1 consisted of 24 U.S. Army officers (N = 24; 21 male, 3 female), and 14 
and 10 hold degrees in the arts and sciences, respectively. In this group, 83% (20 of 24) 
 
139 Beginning in 2011, the Army moved the IQC course from the IAT in Austin, Texas to Redstone 
Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama. 
140 In order to make the survey more manageable, the original list of over 70 metrics was reduced to 30 (10 
for each principal attribute).  
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had graduate degrees. All respondents had combat experience, with 88% participating in 
more than one tour of duty in either OIF or OEF.  
In Phase I, the individuals in Group 1 were asked to complete the attribute survey 
and to subjectively rate their preferential ranking of a group of decision support tool 
concepts. These are described further in Part VI of the survey in Appendix 6. This was an 
individual, non-collaborative exercise. Aside from the proctor (author) entertaining any 
general questions to the entire group, all respondents worked alone.  
In Phase II, approximately 10 days after they completed the attribute survey and 
without being informed of the results, respondents in Group 1 were given a notional COE 
scenario to select a fighting vehicle for full spectrum operations and asked to rank order 6 
candidate GCVs based on raw vehicle specification data presented alphabetically as 
candidate performance specifications (Table 23).  The generation of the candidate vehicle 
data was done in a way to force tradeoffs and create intellectual angst for the decision 
makers since the candidate vehicle set was nondominated (see definition for 
nondominated on page 30). For example, the most survivable candidate was less capable 
with respect to its lethality and mobility. Even within a single attribute, there were 
tradeoffs. Considering survivability, the candidate vehicle with the thickest armor, 
candidate C, had the second best blast protection rating after behind candidate F. Table 
23 was the only data format provided to Group 1 when they were asked to make their 
















































































3 Al 150 205 2200 11 54 64 
B 
Track 
(steel) 4 Ti 160 17 1800 12 18 71 
C 
Track 












6 DU 195 12 1500 21 140 67 
 
3.3.2 Survey Group 2: November 2010 
For Group 2, there were two objectives for the second survey exercise conducted 
in a single phase. The first objective was again to collect a catalog of relative weights for 
the 3 principal attributes, 9 traits, and 30 metrics comprising major components of the 
GCV system. Based on the values derived from Group 1, ordinal rank was established for 
the principal attributes and secondary traits for Group 2’s attribute survey. The second 
objective was to solicit candidate vehicles selection data using alternative candidate 
vehicle decision support tools—actually alternative methods to visualize/present the same 
data—but all built about the principal attributes of survivability, lethality and mobility.  
Group 2 consisted of 21 U.S. Army officers (N = 21; 19 male, 2 female), and 13 
and 8 hold degrees in the arts and sciences, respectively. In this group, 76% (16 of 21) 
had graduate degrees. All but two respondents (19 of 21) had combat experience in either 
OIF or OEF.  
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Given the same notional COE scenario to select a fighting vehicle for full 
spectrum operations, respondents in Group 2 were given the same candidate vehicle raw 
data as Group 1 plus three additional forms of decision support tool information.  
One decision support tool was a normalized table of specification data with 
respect to top specification performance for each metric (Table 24). The next decision 
support tool was a bar chart depiction of normalized data organized beneath principal 
attributes with weighting values assigned and incorporated (Figure 28). Respondents 
were informed that a previous study had found survivability, lethality, and mobility to 
have weighting values of 0.45, 0.3, and 0.25, respectively, and that visual depictions of 
the data accounted for these weighting values. The final decision support tool was 
candidate comparisons of the principal attribute values from Figure 28 in two-
dimensional form, i.e., survivability versus lethality, lethality versus mobility, and 
survivability versus mobility (Figure 29).  In the same fashion as Group 1’s survey 
exercise, respondents in Group 2 worked independently. 
Equation 17 was used to calculate the lethality portion of the bar chart for 
candidate i (Figure 28). In this equation (as well as Equation 18 and Equation 19), 10 was 
a scaling factor used for aesthetic purposes, wL is the weighting value assigned to 
lethality by Group 1 (0.3), n is the number of metrics associated with lethality (2) from 
Table 23, and mL,j  are the metrics associated with lethality (kinetic energy and maximum 
effective range). Equation 18 was used to calculate the mobility portion of the bar chart 
for candidate i. In this equation, wM is the weighting value assigned to mobility by Group 
1  (0.25), n is the number of metrics associated with mobility (3) from Table 23, and mM,j  
are the metrics associated with mobility (acceleration, power-to-weight ration, and top 
speed). Equation 19 was used to calculate the survivability portion of the bar chart for 
candidate i. In this equation,  wS is the weighting value assigned to survivability by 
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Group 1 (0.5), n is the number of metrics associated with survivability (3) from Table 23, 
and mS,j  are the metrics associated with survivability (armor material density, blast 
protection rating, and armor thickness). (It was later discovered that this bar chart visual 
decision support tool is similar to those based on a method frequented in the commercial 






























   Equation 19 
Unlike Group 1 that experienced a 10-day interval between their weighting and 
selection exercises, Group 2 conducted candidate vehicle selection immediately 
following the attribute survey exercise. Moreover, for Group 2 the three alternative 
decision support tools—normalized specification data, bar chart depiction of performance 
data, two-dimensional representations of candidate attributes—were included in the 
survey materials. As will be discussed later, the bar chart (Figure 28) was most preferred 
by Group 2, and the two-dimensional depictions (Figure 29) were least preferred.  
 


















































































(steel) 0.30 0.14 0.77 1.00 0.88 0.46 0.22 0.70 
B 
Track 
(steel) 0.40 0.24 0.82 0.08 0.72 0.50 0.07 0.77 
C 
Track 
(band) 0.30 1.00 0.98 0.26 1.00 0.57 1.00 0.65 
D 
Wheel 
(4x4) 0.60 0.14 0.64 0.53 0.84 1.00 0.16 0.79 
E 
Wheel 
(6x6) 1.00 0.24 0.36 0.08 0.72 0.63 0.05 1.00 
F 
Wheel  
(6x6) 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.06 0.60 0.86 0.56 0.73 
One of three supplemental decision support tools provided to Group 2 (in addition to the 



































Figure 28: Bar chart depiction of relative survivability, lethality, and mobility for 
candidate vehicle set based on principal attribute weightings from Group 1 
(survivability, 0.45; lethality, 0.29; and mobility, 0.26) and calculated using 
Equation 17–Equation 19. One of three supplemental decision support tools 
provided to Group 2 (in addition to the raw data contained in Table 23) 




Figure 29: Two-dimensional depiction of relative survivability, lethality, and mobility for 
candidate vehicle set. The values for each candidate are taken from the bar 
chart values. For example, candidate A had a lethality value of 2.6, a 
mobility value of 1.2, and a survivability value of 1.7. The position of 
candidate A on each of the two-dimensional figures reflects these attribute 
scores. One of three supplemental decision support tools provided to Group 
2 (in addition to the raw data contained in Table 23) when they were asked 






3.4 Attribute, Trait, and Metric Weighting Survey Values 
Each group’s individual ratings were entered into the DECMAT software in order 
to generate pairwise-derived weightings using Morris’ geometric mean of rows 
method.142 These weighting scores were then transformed to a weighted mean summing 
to 1. (For example, if the weightings of two notional attributes were calculated to be 1 
and 3, then the weighted mean was found to be 1/(1+3) and 3/(1+3) or 0.25 and 0.75 
respectively.) A summary of the average weights for each independent survey (wavg,1 and 
wavg,2), as well as a population-weighted average (wavg) for the two surveys is provided in 
Table 25 (respondent raw data is tabulated in Appendix 7 and Appendix 8 for Group 1 
and Group 2 respectively). The principal attribute weighting values collected from the 45 
U.S. Army officers were fairly consistent with an average range of ±8% between the two 
groups. For the secondary traits, the average range was ±6% between the groups. In the 
tables provided, the colors correspond to the principal attribute (red for lethality, green 
for mobility, blue for survivability), and the highest weighted attribute and trait is in bold.  
Table 26 contains the weighting values for the 30 tertiary metrics. These metrics 
were originally scored on an ordinal scale of 1–10 (most to least preferred), which was 
then inverted and transformed into weights summing to 1. The top three most highly 
valued metrics for each attribute are in bold in the tables, although it should be noted that 
many metrics received effectively the same weightings, making preferences between 
metrics virtually indistinguishable. 
That said, these numbers can be interpreted as a representative set of relative 
value and numerical weights that a given group of military leaders assessed for the 
attributes, traits, and metrics for the selection of a ground combat vehicle. The collective 
combat experience of the group, as well as the variety of military functions performed by 
 
142 William T. Morris, The Analysis of Management Decisions (Illinois: Irwin, 1964).  
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these individuals, gives high subjective value but also perhaps lends robustness to the 
weights due to the different and unique perspectives each brought to the exercise (and 
likewise to the subsequent calculation of these weights).  
Visual comparisons of weightings for principal attributes and secondary traits for 
each survey population are provided in Figure 30–Figure 33. Survivability was the 
highest weighted attribute, perhaps not unexpectedly given the propensity for damage 
done by IED attacks during the past decade in OIF and OEF. With respect to lethality, the 
respondents were mainly focused on the net effect on target, as seen by the high relative 
weighting of this lethality related trait. Surprisingly, respondents rated the ability to 
navigate cross country as the top mobility trait; inability to traverse cross country can 
make a combat vehicle highly predictable and susceptible to attack. The high weight 
assessed by the respondents on cross country movement reflects the survey participants 
recognition of the need for this capability in vehicle design. For survivability, the 
respondents weighted vulnerability as the most dominant trait for the attribute dealing 
with protection, again perhaps reflecting their past decade’s experience in OIF and OEF.   
The respondent values for the tertiary metrics were fairly evenly distributed 
among metrics. The average weighting value for the 30 metrics for both Group 1 and 2 
was 0.10, with a standard deviation of 0.032 and 0.036 respectively.  As such, the 
weighting values assigned to tertiary metrics were largely inconclusive. The small 
relative values of the standard deviation with respect to the average indicate that the 




Table 25: Weighting Values for 3 Principal Attributes and 9 Secondary Traits143 
Principal Attributes 












lethality 0.29 0.30 0.29 
mobility 0.26 0.19 0.23 
survivability 0.45 0.51 0.48 
Lethality Traits    
acquire 0.25 0.20 0.23 
engage 0.28 0.28 0.28 
effects 0.47 0.52 0.49 
Mobility Traits    
cross country 0.43 0.49 0.46 
roadworthy 0.22 0.19 0.21 
robust 0.35 0.32 0.34 
Survivability Traits    
repairability 0.19 0.20 0.19 
susceptibility 0.25 0.27 0.26 
vulnerability 0.56 0.53 0.54 
 
143 Bold items are the maximum values in the respective category (group of attributes or traits). The 
average value for both groups was found using a weighted average of the two groups of similar but distinct 
population sizes.   
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BAD 0.06 0.04 0.05 
CAL 0.10 0.12 0.11 
Frecoil 0.05 0.06 0.06 
KE 0.09 0.11 0.10 
lcannon 0.05 0.03 0.04 
MER 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Pkill 0.17 0.18 0.18 
tflight 0.10 0.08 0.09 












tuneability 0.12 0.09 0.11 
cg 0.11 0.13 0.12 
hclimb 0.10 0.09 0.09 
P/w 0.09 0.12 0.10 
range 0.13 0.14 0.14 
rturn 0.09 0.09 0.09 
VCIn 0.10 0.07 0.09 
vmax 0.09 0.12 0.11 
wgap 0.09 0.06 0.07 











%slope 0.10 0.09 0.10 
Across 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Afoot 0.07 0.08 0.08 
BPR 0.18 0.16 0.17 
Ecombustible 0.10 0.08 0.09 
em 0.09 0.08 0.09 
hclearance 0.07 0.07 0.07 
mass 0.09 0.08 0.08 
modularity 0.06 0.06 0.06 













vee hull 0.09 0.13 0.11 
 
144 Bold items are the top three values in the respective category of tertiary metrics. The average value for 




















Figure 30: Attribute weighting values for lethality, mobility, and survivability for Groups 


















Figure 31: Lethality weighting values for target acquisition, engagement, and effects for 



















Figure 32: Mobility weighting values for cross country, roadworthiness, and robustness 



















Figure 33: Survivability weighting values for repairability, susceptibility, and 
vulnerability for Groups 1 and 2. The average is the population-weighted 
average weighting values. 
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3.5 Analysis of Weighting Values 
The raw data collected from the Groups 1 and 2 (Appendix 7 and Appendix 8) 
and further refined into the individual and group collective averages presented in Figure 
30-Figure 33, was analyzed to investigate the significance of the values. As previously 
presented, the population weighted average for the collective principal attribute 
weightings for the two groups for survivability, lethality, and mobility were 0.48, 0.29, 
and 0.23 respectively (Table 25). The resounding message from these surveys was that 
platform survivability was clearly more highly favored than either lethality or mobility, 
which were effectively equally favored. One may infer that combat veterans, having seen 
the aftermath of IED attacks and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), know the importance 
of ensuring that crew members, who are exposed to an array of types of hostile fire, are 
protected from attack and remain invulnerable to insult.  
As will be explained in the next chapter, heavy focus on the attribute of 
survivability to the exclusion of and/or without consideration for the impact on other 
attributes or on holistic vehicle performance, can produce an imbalanced platform that is 
actually less survivable on the battlefield. If the pursuit of survivability impedes mobility, 
then the platform can, in fact, be more susceptible to attack (larger target, restricted 
movement, slower rate of march, etc.). That said, the pursuit of greater survivability may 
be accomplished through alternative means not immediately obvious or conventionally 
considered when attempting to increase the protection, e.g., reducing footprint, increasing 
mobility, increasing stealthiness, etc.  
 
3.5.1 Survivability 
Focus on survivability was embraced decades ago during the conceptual creation 
of requirements for the Bradley IFV and Abrams tank. Historical accounts of the 
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engineering efforts dealing with these fighting vehicles consistently refer to the criticality  
of vehicle survivability in the design, testing, and manufacture of these two platforms. 
The Abrams tank may have enjoyed a smoother process than the Bradley IFV, but the 
end state performance achieved for both vehicles was a well-protected and highly mobile 
source of firepower.  
In similar fashion, the survey respondents prioritized survivability highest among 
the 3 principal attributes considered at this level of attribute hierarchy. However, the 
survivability shortcomings experienced by the respondents, which may have motivated 
such a strong response, may not have been due to intrinsic shortcomings in the 
survivability of the Abrams tank and Bradley IFV (a.k.a., legacy platforms) in combat 
operations conducted primarily in Iraq. While there have been combat losses associated 
with these two platforms (both from explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) and IEDs), 
most losses occurred on other types of platforms and transport vehicles. Both of these 
legacy platforms originated from a focused effort on achieving platform superiority in a 
peer-threat engagement. Products of an effort focused on achieving success in offensive 
and defensive operations, these legacy platforms demonstrated robustness and the ability 
to pivot from major combat operations into stability operations. Survivability metrics for 
both Abrams and Bradley were focused on conventional forms of protection like frontal 
armor and reduced silhouette. In reaction to the differences associated with fighting 
against an asymmetrical threat on a noncontiguous battlefield, both vehicles received 
armor upgrade packages to better protect the crews in the COE. For example, the tank 
urban survivability kit (TUSK) included such upgrades as a gun shield around the turrets 
and slat armor for the engine exhaust area. 
In the COE, the majority of combat losses associated with enemy action on 
vehicles was initially on less protected platforms like HMMWVs, unmodified Strykers, 
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and the array of transport vehicles not originally designed to protect crews against the 
insult vectors posed by threat operators in Iraq and Afghanistan. Likewise, while nearly 
every survey respondent was a combat veteran, the dominant priority in survivability’s 
weighting could be interpreted as being more indicative of observed deficiencies in ill-
conceived platforms that frequented operations in the early part of OIF and OEF and not 
specifically an indictment of legacy platforms. In recognition of this point, the respondent 
focus on survivability should be considered in the broad context of the large losses 
experienced in unprotected or poorly armored systems.  
 
3.5.1.1  Vulnerability, Susceptibility, and Repairability 
When analyzing the traits comprising survivability, well over half of the 
composite respondents’ weighting was assigned to vulnerability (0.54), followed by 
susceptibility (0.26) and repairability (0.19). For review and completeness, this taxonomy 
established by Deitz et al., refers to a platform’s ability to withstand insult (vulnerability), 
a platform’s ability to avoid insult (susceptibility), and a platform’s ability to recover 
from insult (repairability). 
Notably, the respondents’ weighting on vulnerability dominates the discussion on 
survivability. For example, the survivability shortcomings in fielded systems operating in 
Iraq and Afghanistan were addressed first via appliqué armor upgrades for existing 
platforms, and subsequently with the MRAP series of vehicles. As a result, these vehicles 
have impressive levels of (in)vulnerability; they are moderately armored in nearly every 
direction, possess thick, bullet resistant glass, have faceted bellies to reflect incident 
pressure, and ride high off the ground to improve their blast protection rating. But, and 
perhaps consequently, these vehicles are highly susceptible to attack. Retrofit designs like 
the MRAP present a large, distinct visual, acoustic, and pressure signatures, making them 
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more susceptible and easy targets for IED and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) attacks. In 
other words, the pursuit of performance with respect to metrics comprising an 
(in)vulnerable platform can and do work counter to the trait of susceptibility.  
In the survey, susceptibility received less than half the weighting of vulnerability 
(0.26 versus 0.54), although efforts to make the platform less susceptible work in a 
proactive fashion to avoid insult. This is in sharp contrast to reactively and passively 
dealing with a threat vector by reducing platform vulnerability. While being less 
vulnerable may be regarded as an “insurance policy” against the effects of threat insult, 
disregarding the benefits of being less susceptible to attack in the first place forsakes 
potential opportunities to pursue platforms having lower likelihoods of receiving an insult 
by reducing the enemy’s ability to acquire and engage the platform. This low rating may 
suggest a lack of appreciation for this connection or opportunity. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, repairability scored less than 0.2—the lowest weighting 
of any of the 9 secondary traits surveyed. Respondents are apparently less concerned with 
regaining combat power after insult, but are more focused on adequately preventing 
(susceptibility) and absorbing or deflecting (vulnerability) an insult. This could be due to 
an implicit assumption of short engagements, or perhaps due to historically superior 
levels of lethality and firepower. In observation of MRAPs struck by IEDs, it could also 
be due to the fact that real-time to repair catastrophically or critically damaged platforms 
in theater is not feasible, and most vehicles are simply repaired by replacement. 
 
3.5.1.2  Tertiary Metrics for Survivability 
 As mentioned previously in § 3.4, the data received for the weighting of metrics 
was generally inconclusive and may indicate the implausibility of asking such a 
heterogeneous group of mid-career U.S. Army officers to assess the relative importance 
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of specific engineering design details. Furthermore, the “flatness” of the tertiary metric 
weightings may also reflect lack of knowledge with the engineering terms, uncertainty 
about, or disagreement as to their relative contribution to platform efficacy. At best, 3 of 
10 metrics for each principal attribute were identified as being a consensus priority for 
the survey respondents.  
With respect to survivability, the relative weight assigned to the top three metrics 
most likely reflect the persistent threat in the COE, i.e., the proclivity for attacks 
associated with IED strikes on vehicles: blast protection rating or BPR (0.17), equivalent 
thickness of rolled homogeneous armor or RHAeq (0.14), and vee-shaped hull designed to 
reflect the incident pressure wave associated with the blast from an IED (0.11). These 
metrics are all related to the vehicle trait of (in)vulnerability.  Metrics which contribute to 
a less susceptible platform accounted for less than 30% of the residual weighting of 
metrics for survivability. This supports the low collective regard for susceptibility at the 
secondary level. 
 For example, high achievement of the metrics of mass efficiency (em) cross 
sectional area (Across), and platform footprint (Afoot) all contribute to a less susceptible 
platform, but these metrics received an average weighting of 0.09. Again, this raises the 
question of the viability of interpreting tertiary metric data, since all metrics possessed 
nearly identical weights. It demonstrates that at this level of engineering fidelity, the 
broad interpretation of respondent data may be of little use, and may be time better spent 
conferring with experts in respective fields, e.g., armor, ballistics, etc. Being less 
susceptible is not as valued to the group of respondents as being less vulnerable, both 
from the average weighting for these secondary traits and from the weightings collected 




The remaining half of principal attribute weighting was nearly equally shared by 
lethality (0.29) and mobility (0.23). By all accounts, legacy platforms achieved 
dominating results against the peer threat systems that frequented engagements during the 
early parts of OIF. It is conceivable that as these tactical incidents fade from memory, the 
intrinsic value and associated weighting priority on lethality has faded as well. In that 
way, these legacy systems may be a victim of their own success. The achievement of 
lethal superiority on the battlefield is the result of decades of concerted effort in weapon 
system research and engineering. Notably, survey respondents who gave lethality a 0.29 
weighting have typically only seen the overmatch of conventional systems engaging less 
potent threats. It is worth considering that without the means to deliver overwhelming 
firepower to a target, the role of a fighting vehicle in major combat operations is largely 
relegated to that of well-armored transport vehicle.  
 
3.5.2.1  Target Effects, Engagement, and Acquisition 
 For a notional engagement, target effects deal with the culmination of the insult, 
from incident strike to rest. Target engagement refers to all action from commission of a 
lethal payload until imminent target strike. Target acquisition includes all proceedings 
leading up to the moment of what can be considered pulling the trigger. Target effects 
received a weight value of 0.49, with engagement and acquisition scoring 0.28 and 0.23 
respectively. Similar to the pattern of ranking survivability’s traits in a fashion favoring 
reverse sequential order (vulnerability higher than susceptibility), the survey respondents 
rated the end state of a lethal engagement and associated traits with the largest weighting.  
 This is a reasonable weighting, because generating a lethal design begins with 
consideration of the target; without adequate delivery of a lethal effect, the successful 
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engagement and acquisition of a target are exercises in futility. That said, engagement 
and acquisition, can in their own respects, contribute to greater survivability. A threat 
system, once acquired, gives the friendly system’s crew the opportunity to assess and 
potentially take evasive actions. Likewise, an engaged friendly threat system, even if its 
payload turns out to be of an inadequate scale or improper form, can occupy and prevent, 
at least temporarily, the threat system’s ability to commit fires. Therefore, in the 
immediate context of lethality, the weightings appear to reflect a focus on design and 
commission of the potential payload commensurate with threat system incapacitation.  
 
3.5.2.2  Tertiary Metrics for Lethality 
 The top three tertiary metrics for lethality were reserved for two of the three 
secondary traits. The probability of kill (Pkill), received a weighting of 0.18, nearly twice 
its fractional share in the ten metrics presented for lethality; it deals with the entire lethal 
event culminating in target effects. The metric maximum effective range (MER) is 
associated with target engagement since it deals largely with the external ballistic event; 
respondents gave it a weighting value of 0.15. Time to reload (treload), a metric also 
associated with engagement, received a weighting value of 0.12; during engagement, the 
ability to reengage a persistent threat or to fire at an additional target, is enabled by a 
small dwell time between initiating a loading action and commissioning the round. 
 
3.5.3 Mobility 
Mobility ranked last in principal attribute weighting at 0.23. Mobility and 
lethality—the analogs of the constituent elements of maneuver, firepower and 
movement—were assessed by the respondents to be nearly equal in importance. These 
assessments are consistent with the doctrinal definition of maneuver that values both 
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equally as necessary elements in achieving performance overmatch against a foe. If 
maneuver is generated by both firepower and movement, then perhaps this weighting 
value appears appropriate in scale to lethality. Many vehicles operating in Iraq have 
operated in the relatively developed areas comprising the proximities and connecting 
routes of the forward operating bases. As such, contemporary mobility requirements deal 
mostly with roadworthiness. This is in sharp contrast to operations in Afghanistan where 
the extreme terrain limits all but the most capable vehicles from moving off established 
roads consisting of improved surfaces.  
As an attribute, mobility is often thought of as the “bill payer” for the combat 
vehicle mass and volume dedicated to providing survivability and generating lethality. 
Unlike survivability and lethality, mobility advancements benefit from commercial 
pursuits in civilian industries, e.g., automotive engineering, agricultural engineering, etc. 
The respondents, having moved about on capable platforms meeting all the required 
roadworthy automotive demands in the COE, may have seen no need to weight this 
attribute higher.  
 
3.5.3.1  Cross Country, Robustness, and Roadworthiness 
 The weighting values for mobility traits were a bit surprising. The ability to move 
cross country, i.e., the vehicle’s capacity to move about on unimproved surfaces, was the 
top ranked trait with a weighting of 0.46. Robustness, i.e., the ability to navigate 
unforeseen or unusual obstacles like gaps and climbs, was ranked next highest with a 
weighting of 0.34. Roadworthiness ranked last was with a weighting value of 0.21. The 
latter was an interesting assessment since most excursions in Iraq deal with navigating 
improved surfaces conducive with high roadworthiness. However, being limited 
exclusively to roads makes a platform susceptible to attack, as the constraint to solely 
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traverse established routes and improved surfaces increases the predictability of vehicular 
movement.  
 
3.5.3.2  Tertiary Metrics for Mobility 
 The top three metrics identified for mobility were vehicle range (0.14), height of 
the center of gravity (0.12), and vehicle’s  maximum speed (0.11). The ability to conduct 
a long excursion, without refueling, was of slight preference to the other nine metrics. 
The center of gravity rating was most likely a reflection of the high rates of vehicle 
rollover experienced by the top-heavy MRAPs fielded in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Achieving excellence in mobility benefits survivability (evasion during attack, 
unpredictable in movement). And as a shared partner with lethality in maneuver, the 
tertiary metrics related to the secondary traits of mobility can also contribute to lethality 
success as well. 
 
3.5.4 Synthesis of Weighting Data 
There was good agreement between the two survey groups for the weighting 
values at the first and second levels of the hierarchy. Survivability clearly ranked highest 
among respondents. Again, this is not surprising, given the heavy combat losses observed 
by the subjects in OIF and OEF as a result of IED attacks. Even in the absence of a 
defined peer threat, those surveyed still ranked lethality as a weighted priority, and the 
focus for this attribute was also echoed at the next level with high ranking for the trait 
related to generating effects on the target. Surprisingly, given the focus on urban 
operations, the population of officers questioned clearly saw cross country movement as 
a highly valued trait for mobility considerations.  
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Maneuver warfare experts approach an urban area with trepidation and typically 
classify it as highly constricted terrain. At a casual glance, it appears that a fight in an 
urban area provides the lowest requirements for mobility given that the surfaces are 
improved and the slope generally flat. Moreover, those that have fought in this 
environment often cite the propensity for canalization of equipment. The inherent spatial 
restrictions provide opportunities for the incorporation of obstacles that can demand 
bypassing movements and a requirement to sustain cross country movement. This also 
explains why robustness ranked close behind this trait.  
At the tertiary level, no clear distinction between metrics arose. At best, the values 
enabled labeling of several metrics as slightly preferred. But the relatively small variation 
between the two groups and generally flat average levels indicated that the distinctions in 
weighting were greatest at the first and second levels of the hierarchy. Nonetheless, the 
first two are the most valued from a respondent input perspective, as objective and utility 
functions can be created to link small groups of tertiary metrics with the secondary traits. 
As the weighting survey moved down from principal to secondary to tertiary levels, the 
distinction in weighting data dropped as well. Even at the principal level, lack of insight 
or even an appreciation for the synergism and confliction between the attributes of 
survivability, lethality, and mobility, could produce weighting values not conducive with 
an appropriate vehicle selection. As generalists bringing a wealth of tactical experiences, 
operational management responsibilities, and educational backgrounds, the collective 
population of U.S. Army officers potentially provided robust weighting values for the 
principal attributes. Values could differ from, say, dedicated platform operators, vehicle 
design engineers, or tactical and operational commanders charged with directing combat 
power in the COE. In other words, the engineering value of weighting data, even at the 
secondary level, is best used to simply provide insight into user preferences and should 
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not be interpreted as a direct quantitative measure of the relative merit of one trait or 
metric to another. Even to a practicing engineer, the assignment of a tertiary metric 
weighting would provide little or no guidance or information in the design endeavor of a 
combat vehicle without a prescriptive relationship as to how that metric contributed 
quantitatively or even qualitatively to vehicle efficacy. 
Considering the survey population and their potential lack of appreciation for the 
complexity of a combat vehicle system operating in the dynamic environment of full 
spectrum operations, the attribute weighting survey exercises provided some general 
insight into how the principal attribute could potentially be incorporated into both 
conventional and envisioned decision support tools. The weighting values for secondary 
traits and tertiary metrics would perhaps be best solicited from individuals more attune to 
the complexities and intricacies of combat vehicle design. Without full appreciation for 
the dynamic interactions at even the principal level, there is the very real potential to 
misdirect real resources and pursue insufficient strategies not conducive with 
appropriately considered fighting vehicles.  
Regarding decision making tools, respondents in both groups indicated a desire to 
see the progression of data distillation. In other words, they wanted to have the raw data 
of each candidate available, and see the successive operations done to normalize and 
subsequently weight and rank it accordingly. Efforts to make a two and three-
dimensional depiction of the candidates represented by axes for survivability, lethality, 
and mobility attributes were not well received. However, the one dimensional bar chart 
depiction illustrated in Figure 28, received higher affinity and appeared to add some 
value with respect to group consensus in the decision making process as will be explained 
in greater depth in the next section. 
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3.6 Candidate Vehicle Selections 
Based on the weighting data, for either an individual or a group, the 6 candidate 
vehicles can be ranked relative to their quantitative scoring using a decision matrix 
software program. This ranking, again for either an individual or a group, can be 
compared against the overt candidate vehicle choice rankings. This section includes 
analysis on the candidate vehicle rankings derived from weighting and choosing methods. 
 
3.6.1 Vehicle Ranking Based on Weighting Using DECMAT 
To assist in the quantitative analysis of courses of action (COAs) developed as 
part of the military decision making process (MDMP), the U.S. Army Command and 
General Staff College (CGSC) directed the development an AHP-based decision matrix 
software program called DECMAT. This program can process both relative value and 
raw data (multiplication) matrices in order to calculate the best candidate in a set given an 
established set of criteria weights and an array of evaluation criteria. When the principal 
attribute weights generated by the cumulative group-data (Table 25) as well as the 
candidate vehicle specification data (Table 23) were placed into DECMAT, candidate 
vehicles were ranked in the following order: C (high survivability, tracked), F (high 
survivability wheeled), A (high lethality, tracked), D (high lethality, wheeled), B (high 
mobility, tracked), and E (high mobility, wheeled).   
 
3.6.1.1  DECMAT’s Algorithm 
DECMAT uses either a relative values or a multiplication matrix with weighted 
products to calculate this rank. The relative value score is simply the sum of products for 
weighting values and normalized criteria (Equation 20). In this equation, i is the 
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candidate index, wj is the weighting value for criteria j, and îjc  is the normalized criteria 
value j for candidate i. 
The multiplication matrix score is calculated differently, but has the advantage of 
accepting dimensional values for each candidate. Using the same nomenclature as 
Equation 20 with the exception of cij, which is the non-normalized criteria value j for 
candidate i, Equation 21 is the formula used to calculate a weighted product score. More 
specifically, each candidate performance specification (non-normalized cij) is raised to 
the power of its column attribute weight, then these exponentiated values are multiplied 
across rows to produce a candidate score.145 In terms of the final score, less is better. If 
the objective is to maximize the criteria of interest, then w is negative; if the objective is 
to minimize the metric, then w is positive (Equation 21). Before proceeding further, it 
may be worth stating that the underlying premise of this method is that attribute efficacy 
directly sums to determine a candidate’s worth. Critically, synergisms and conflictions 
are not considered in the calculation of the best candidate in the set of options. 
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145 Richard B. Stikkers, DECMAT, Version 2.2, 26OCT1998, no copyright, published under Borland’s 
License Statement. 
146 Low score wins. 
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3.6.1.2 DECMAT Algorithm Example 
An example of the weighted product method (Equation 21) is provided below. 
Imagine a consumer is investigating the purchase of a new truck for his ranch. He has 
only two criteria: purchase cost and carrying capacity. In other words, he wants a cheap 
truck that can carry as much as possible. Upon questioning, he rated cost as (much) more 
favored to capacity, therefore the weighting values assigned to cost and capacity are 3 
and 1 respectively. He is considering two truck models: Alpha and Beta. Cost and 












Less is better 
Load [ton] 
1.0 
More is better 
Alpha 30 2 
Beta 25 1.25 
 
The weighted product score (Equation 21) indicates that based on the decision 
maker’s preferences and the candidates available, Beta has a lower score and is thus 






Alpha 30 2 1.35 10









3.6.1.3 Sensitivity Analysis  
When applied within DECMAT, the group attribute weighting values for the 
principal attributes produced a vehicle rank that was used as the order of merit. Using the 
available software functions, a sensitivity analysis was conducted on the 3 principal 
attributes and 8 specification metrics (Table 23) with their respective population 
weighted average weighting values. Through exercising the software, it appeared that the 
DECMAT routine increases the weighting on each attribute one at a time. This precludes 
gaining insight on any interactions between attribute weightings, and it also does not 
appear to consider sensitivity to weighting decreases.  
None of the survivability metrics (armor thickness, armor material density, and 
blast protection rating) were reported as sensitive to weighting, meaning that candidate C 
remained the top-ranked vehicle within the weighting value bounds explored for the 
metrics used to define survivability. Only one lethality metric (cannon kinetic energy) 
was sensitive to weighting. If this metric weighting was increased from 0.15 to 0.42, the 
top-ranked candidate switched from C to A. This is an almost 300% change in preference 
weighting value. Two mobility metrics were sensitive to weighting, but again at very 
large factor increases in weighting value. If the weighting for acceleration was increased 
from 0.08 to 0.51 (greater then 6 times increase in weighting required), then the top 
candidate shifted from C to F. And if the weighting value for the power to weight ratio 
was increased from 0.08 to 0.77, the top candidate shifted from C to D. Thus, a nearly 
order-of-magnitude increase in weighting was required to make candidate D the top 
ranked candidate. A summary of the sensitive metric weightings, as well as the values 
associated with the change, are provided in Table 27. 
151 
 




















0.15    0.42   
(2+) 
A 
Power to weight 
(Mobility) 




Based on the cumulative group’s strong weighting for survivability, and the 
distinct advantage possessed by candidates C and F with respect to the metrics used to 
contribute to candidate survivability, i.e., armor material density, blast protection rating, 
armor thickness, the candidate vehicle rank order was fairly insensitive to even very large 
factor increases in either lethality or mobility metric weightings. While candidate F had a 
slight advantage in blast protection rating, candidate C had a measurable advantage in 
armor thickness making it rank consistently better in the decision matrix results. 
Somewhat surprisingly, weighting values varied significantly among individual 
respondents, but collectively both groups converged on commensurate values for 
survivability, lethality, and mobility. While the convergence demonstrates consensus, it is 
not an overt indicator of weighting validation or candidate quality. In other words, the 
consensus on weighting values does not, in itself, indicate that a selection based on these 
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weighting values would produce a candidate with greater performance than any other in 
the set of options. 
 
3.6.2 Individuals as “Choosers” 
In Group 1, 5 individuals (21%) overtly chose candidate C as the best, while in 
Group 2, 13 individuals (62%) chose candidate C. Group 2 had 40% more respondents 
choose DECMAT’s best vehicle, while in Group 1, 4 individuals (17%) correctly chose 
one of DECMAT’s top two candidates. In gaming parlance, e.g., horseracing, this is 
known as an “exacta”. In Group 2, 7 individuals (33%) earned exactas. In both Group 1 
and Group 2, three individuals ranked their overt candidate selection for the top three 
vehicles in the same order as DECMAT (12% and 14% respectively). In gaming 
parlance, this is known as a “trifecta”. A strikingly large number of individuals chose 
either candidate C or F (combination) as their best candidate: 54% and 76% respectively. 
These results for raw scores and as fractions of the population are provided in Table 28. 
 














C, F, A 
% 
 
 “Top 2” 
C and F 
%  
Group 1 
N = 24 
5 
    21% 
4 
   17% 
3 
   12% 
13 
   54% 
Group 2 
N = 21 
13 
   62% 
7 
  33% 
3 
   14% 
16 
    76% 
Random Guess 
Probability 
17% 3.3% 0.83% 33% 
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The probability of simply guessing the correct order for the top three vehicles, 
e.g., getting a trifecta, is one in 120 (0.83%), while the probability of guessing the correct 
order of the entire set of candidates is one in 720 (0.14%). Equation 22 calculates the 
number of permutations of r objects chosen from n objects: P(n,r). So the probability of 












Examining the survey responses through the “lens” of probability is informative, 
especially if one assumes that individuals in both groups were equally skillful in 
identifying the more preferable ground combat vehicle candidates. For example, 
participants in Group 2 were 3 times as likely to choose the DECMAT “winner” C (62%) 
than participants in Group 1 (21%) who, as a group, chose C only slightly more often 
than would be expected by random chance (17%). Group 1’s selections demonstrate that 
the choice of C was not obvious from the raw data. That said, individuals in both groups 
bested random chance (33%) to choose one of DECMAT’s “Top 2” C and F as their top 
choice: Group 1, 54%; Group 2, 76%. Group 1 selections demonstrate that the superiority 
of C or F was somewhat obvious based on the raw data, but clearly not as obvious as it 
was to Group 2 respondents.  
At the same time, the statistical rarity of trifectas (0.83% or 1 out of 120 
probability) permits some interesting inferences from the data. Trifectas, which require 
skill and insight, occurred equally often in both groups, supporting the claims that 1) the 
two groups were about equally skilled with respect to ground combat vehicle selection 
choosing {C, F, A} over 15 times more often than would be expected merely by chance, 
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and 2) the format(s) for the data presentation did not significantly aid (or hinder) the 
ability of certain, perhaps particularly skilled/insightful, individuals to identify “superior” 
fighting vehicle candidates.  
The story is somewhat different in the case of exactas (3.3% or 1 out of 30 
probability) on which the two groups diverge. While it has already been noted that many 
individuals in both groups were able to identify C and F as superior ground combat 
vehicle candidates, Group 2 participants were twice as likely as Group 1 participants to 
choose exactas (33% versus 17%), but both groups much more often than expected by 
mere chance. Group 2’s relative performance advantage over Group 1’s in choosing the 
“Top 2” (2% versus 21%) 7), exactas (33% versus 17%), and winners (62% versus 21%) 
directly reflects the influence of the data presentation format, namely the decision support 
tools (Table 24, Figure 28 and Figure 29) promoted consensus and directed—for good or 
potentially for bad—the decision making.   
 
3.6.3 Individual and Group Consistency with Respect to Choosing and Weighting 
Each respondent was assessed an internal consistency (IC) rating that measured 
the mean square error between the respondent’s personal weighting choice from the 
survey and their overt vehicle choice (Equation 23), i.e., a statistical measure of deviation 
between their outright selection and their stated desires. The subscript wt stands for 
weighting, i.e., rank derived from attribute weights, while the subscript ch stands for 
choosing, i.e., rank attributed to overt choice. The variable N is the number of candidates 
under consideration. The vehicle choice by personal weighting is the vehicle ranking that 
would have been selected if the respondent’s weightings were used with no further 
consultation with the respondent. In other words, the candidate rankings were calculated 
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based on the logic and insight reflected or embodied in the attribute weightings as applied 


















Each survey respondent was also assessed on their external consistency between 
two standards: the first, EC1, measured the mean square error between the group’s 
collective attribute weighting choice and a respondent’s personal overt choice (Equation 
24); the second, EC2, measured the mean square error between the group’s collective 
attribute weighting choice and a respondent’s personal weighting choice (Equation 25). 
The collective group is defined as the group of respondents. As there were two main 
groups of respondents, an individual is compared against his particular response group. 
The variable j is an index for the six candidate vehicles A–F. The subscript pop is the 
average for the collective population, while i represents an individual respondent. So for 
these equations, the population is the respective group of respondents, i.e., the collective 
group. The group’s vehicle selection can simply be considered a popularity vote, where 

































































Figure 34: Cropped portion of Figure 27, i.e., investigation methodology. The 
consistency terms are depicted with respect to the comparative elements 
used for each type. 
These metrics, IC, EC1, and EC2 were created by the author in order to quantify 
the consistency between an individual’s weightings and selection, as well as compare 
those values with respect to the group’s weightings. In other words, these metrics serve as 
an indicator of how stable an individual’s rankings were when compared against their 
own weighting and the group weighting. Since this is an active area of interest to 
behavioral economists, i.e., the linkage between the logical and illogical decisions made 
by consumers, similar metrics may appear in those contexts. Therefore, these heuristics 
seemed an appropriate measure of the respondent’s level of consistency by comparing 
their weighted choice to their overt choice.  
When considering the group averages for internal and external consistency, the 
second group was more consistent, i.e., it had lower average values for IC, EC1, and EC2 
(Table 29). The major differences between the surveying of the two groups were the (1) 
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time between weighting and choosing solicitation and (2) the decision support tools 
presented to the second group.  
 
Table 29: Internal and External Consistency Averages 
 ICavg EC1avg EC2avg 
Group 1 
N = 24 
2.2 2.1 0.9 
Group 2 
N = 21 
1.5 1.6 0.2 
 
 Group 2 was more consistent than Group 1 for all measures, perhaps due to the 
decision support tools that embodied the generally accepted ground combat vehicle value 
system of survivability, lethality, and mobility. Also, for both groups, most individuals 
had a weighting derived candidate rank that closely matched the group weighting derived 
candidate rank, as depicted with the metric EC2. This value was so low for Group 2 
because most individuals appear to have relied on the decision support tools (namely 
Figure 28) which embodied the collective value system and associated weightings. These 
observations provide further evidence of the consensus building and directing of the 
decision making afforded by the decision support tools.  
The respondent data was further analyzed to see if there was any correlation 
between individuals that could be described as “skilled choosers” and “adept weighters”. 
A good chooser was someone whose overt vehicle choice converged closer to the group’s 
collective weights that produced the DECMAT hierarchy ranking of the vehicles. A good 
chooser had a low value for EC1. A good weighter was categorized as someone who had 
a low value for EC2, i.e., their individual weighting converged closely to the correct 
ranking of the vehicles for the group’s collective weights. Looking at both groups, those 
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individuals that ranked in the top five for EC1 typically ranked in the top five for EC2 
indicating there was a positive correlation between assessing weights and selecting 
vehicles (note: three of the top five in each group chose trifectas). It also appeared that 
the majority of good weighters and good choosers (7 of 10 individuals) were from the 
maneuver branches (armor, infantry, aviation) of the Maneuver, Fires and Effects 
divisional areas, formerly known as combat arms branches in the U.S. Army.147 
 
3.6.3.1  Illustration and Interpretation of Consistency Calculations 
An example is now presented to demonstrate the method used to calculate a 
respondent’s internal consistency of weighting and choosing (IC), external consistency 
with respect to his overt choice as well as his collective group’s weighted choice for 
vehicle ranking and (EC1), and his external consistency with respect to his weighted 
choice and his group’s collective weighted choice for vehicle ranking (EC2).  
We revisit the rancher scenario, this time where a group of ranchers are 
considering the purchase of a replacement truck given three choices, Alpha, Beta, and  a 
new model Gamma (§ 3.6.1). In this case, we will also assume a group of respondents has 
provided criteria weighting preference, which if used in conjunction with a pairwise 
comparison matrix and a decision support software title like DECMAT, produce a 
vehicle ranking of Beta (#1), Alpha (#2), and Gamma (#3). Additionally, when this same 
notional collective group use any/all means available to rank the three candidates, they 
respond with a like ranking of Beta (#1) and Alpha (#2), and Gamma (#3).  
Two individuals provide weightings which can be used to derive a vehicle ranking 
unique to their values as depicted in Table 30. Additionally, when asked to overtly 
 
147 Of the top five in both groups (10 individuals), only three were from basic branches other than combat 
arms. And of those three, one was branch detailed armor (a combat arms branch). 
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choose the vehicles, each individual generates a ranking unique to their preferences as 
depicted in Table 30. 
 
Table 30: Alpha, Beta, and Gamma Truck Selection Example 
 Weighting Overt 
 #1 #2 #3 #1 #2 #3 
Individual 1 Beta Alpha Gamma Gamma Beta Alpha 
Individual 2 Gamma Alpha Beta Beta Alpha Gamma 
Group Beta Alpha Gamma n/a n/a n/a 
 
Individual 1’s consistencies are calculated:  























































While individual 2’s consistencies are calculated: 
 
























































In this example, we may say that the first individual was more internally 
consistent, since he chose vehicles in concert with his weighting-based choice; in other 
words, his IC value was better (IC1 < IC2). We may also say that the second individual 
chose more consistently with respect to the group’s weighted-ranking (EC12 < EC11). 
Finally, we can say that the first individual weighted more consistently with the group 
(EC21 < EC12). In fact, the first individual’s weighted choice matched the group’s 
weighted choice perfectly, i.e., EC21 = 0. Given more individuals, weighting criteria, and 
potential candidates available for selection, the distinction between, as well as the insight 
gained, from using these measures of consistency becomes more apparent than in this 
simple illustrative example of only two individuals and three candidates. However, the 
basic procedure used to calculate these values remains the same. 
 
3.6.4 Group Attribute Weighting and Candidate Vehicle Selection 
Figure 35 illustrates the candidate vehicles rank-ordered according to the two 
group’s attribute weighting and overt choosing. In the figure, the group’s candidate 
ranking from 1 to 6 is presented as a column. On the outside (columns 1 and 4) is the 
order derived from the group attribute weighting average, and on the inside (columns 2 
and 3) is the order calculated from the group ranking tally. Even in the absence of a 
decision support tool and after 10-days delay between the attribute weighting survey and 
an overt vehicle selection choice using raw data only (Table 23), Group 1 did a “good” 
job, i.e., good is defined as consistent with the DECMAT score, of overtly choosing a 
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candidate. As a group, they chose F (or the second ranked candidate) over C (or 
DECMAT’s top scoring candidate); 54% chose either C or F as their top candidate. As 
this group’s ranking order was further analyzed, Group 1 was somewhat inconsistent with 
respect to order regarding weighting-derived candidate versus overt vehicle choice. Also, 
Group 1 ranked vehicle D second, demonstrating an apparent focus on the wheeled 
configurations versus performance specifications as both F and D were wheeled variants. 
Based on Group 1’s selections, it appears that the more detailed candidate vehicle data 
without contextual reference (relative with respect to top performer, dimensional with 
respect to principal attributes) led to inconsistent choices and possible fixation on 
distinct, less relevant candidate specifications.   
 Given a possible advantage of having an attribute-focused survey in temporal 
proximity to the overt vehicle selection exercise, as well as a visual decision support too 
(bar graph) that packages the relevant vehicle engineering data in a directly additive 
fashion that clearly identifies what may be considered the best candidate, Group 2 
appeared more consistent with respect to weighting and choosing. In the preceding 
sentence, “best candidate” is italicized because again, the fundamental premise of a 
directly additive scoring method is that attributes contribute in an additive fashion toward 
candidate worth, and critically there is no synergy or conflicting interactions among 
attributes.  
Regarding the improved consistency, Figure 35 illustrates this trend. Group 2 
chose an order closer to their weighting preference than the first group did. More 
specifically, while the first group had three candidate vehicles move up in rank, and three 
candidate vehicles move down in rank, with respect to weighting rank and choosing rank. 
The second group had just a single swap of rank. This figure also demonstrates how 
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Figure 35: Rank ordered candidate vehicles A–F rank, as derived from group averaged 
attribute weighting and group averaged ranking scores. A green arrow 
indicates an increase in ranking from group weighting to group choosing, a 
red arrow indicates a decrease in ranking. In Group 1, vehicles F and D were 
tied  in overt choice. 
 
3.7 Effects of Decision Support Tools on Candidate Vehicle Selection 
Based on Group 2’s overt candidate vehicle selection results, the presentation of 
the raw performance specification data (Table 23), subsequently normalized with respect 
to the top performer in each field (Table 24), and then visually depicted in both a bar 
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chart (Figure 28) and two-attribute comparison graphs (Figure 29) created better internal 
consistency (lower IC) and higher group consensus (lower EC1 and EC2).  
The bar chart depiction of vehicle worth ranked best in an ordinal assessment of 
weighting tools and visual aids with Group 2 with over 58% of those surveyed scoring 
the bar chart first or second (out of 4 forms of data) in preference. In terms of data 
presentation preference, the bar chart was followed in order of preference by the 
normalized specification data of candidate vehicles and then simply the raw data. Based 
on the affinity for the bar chart, as well as its similarity to the histogram of the overt 
candidate selections, it appeared that respondents may have simply relied on the height of 
the bar for the corresponding candidate vehicle and ranked them according to the chart. 
To test this hypothesis, the Pearson correlations between attribute bar length (Figure 28) 
and overt choices (Figure 36) were computed. These very strong correlations lend 
credence to the argument that Group 2 may have relied heavily on the graphical 
representations made to them, thus sounding a cautionary role for would-be data 
suppliers and surveyors. The statistical correlation between candidate vehicle (or attribute 
bar height) and overt choice was very strong with a value of 0.98, as was the correlation 
between just the survivability portion of the candidate vehicle bar and selection (0.93) 
and the survivability-lethality portion (0.97). Notably, there were no significant 
correlations observed for Group 1, and the other correlations for Group 2 were weak to 
moderate (Table 31).   
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Figure 36: Overt top choice histogram. The first and second ranked vehicle candidates 
from DECMAT scoring methods, i.e., C and F, are labeled parenthetically. 
The populations for Group 1 and Group 2 are N = 24 and N = 21 
respectively.  




S L M SL SM LM SLM 
Group 1 0.46 0.08 0.1 0.47 0.53 0.16 0.58 
Group 2 0.93 0.20 -0.40 0.97 0.86 -0.10 0.98 
 
 
148 Correlations considered strong (> 0.9) are highlighted in green. 
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Figure 37: Pearson correlations between attribute bar length and overt choice. By relative 
magnitude for each group, Groups 1 and 2 demonstrated similar affinity for 
the attributes (single and in combination) of S, L, SL, SM, and SLM, with 
the difference being an amplification in relative correlation magnitude for 
Group 2.  
While 54% of Group 1 ranked vehicles C or F as their top choice, 80% of Group 2 
ranked vehicles C or F as their top choice (Figure 36). It should be noted that in both 
cases, the two groups produced principal attribute weighting values that generated 
virtually the same preferential order (albeit B and E are swapped indicating slightly 
greater mobility preference from Group 1). However, the Group 1 deviated from this 
order in overt selection, notably in the absence of decision support tools that may have 
reinforced this weighting in a visual manner. When analyzing Figure 37 by relative 
magnitude, Groups 1 and 2 demonstrate a similar affinity for most attributes, notably 
survivability, lethality, and the combinations of survivability-lethality, survivability-
mobility, and survivability-lethality-mobility. The main difference is that the stronger 
correlation observed for Group 2 illustrates the amplification of the response attributed to 
the alternative decision support tools afforded to them during their overt selection. That 
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said, both groups appear to have shared a similar value system with respect to the 
principal attributes.  
Even though there were no strong correlations for Group 1, the composite 
interpretation of survivability, lethality, and mobility (SLM) was ordinally ranked first in 
correlation value for both Group 1 and Group 2. This demonstrates a proclivity for both 
groups to choose candidates in accordance with these attributes, even in the absence of a 
decision support tool designed explicitly to present the engineering data in a method 
amenable to direct interpretation. In other words, a fraction of Group 1 was still able to 
divine from the raw data the underlying candidate merit through the composite lens of 
survivability, lethality, and mobility. Finally, since Group 2 showed such a strong 
correlation with the chart and the overt selection, this strongly suggests that a number of 
respondents based their overt decisions on this tool.  
Regarding the vehicle configuration, i.e., wheels versus tracks, Groups 1 and 2 
indicated some preference for wheeled over tracked candidates. Group 1 overtly chose 
71% of their top candidates as wheeled variants, while Group 2 only chose 38% of their 
top candidates as wheeled, due to the remaining 62% being awarded to candidate C (a 
tracked vehicle) as driven by the bar chart. The vehicle configuration had no explicit 
contribution toward the calculation of a candidate vehicle score, which was based purely 
on technical specifications, but this wheels-versus-tracks specification—one which holds 
strong contextual merit among some decision makers—may have led some to discount 
tracked candidates in favor of wheels, or vice versa.  
It can be conjectured that, given this freedom to choose, the bar chart depiction of 
candidate vehicle survivability, lethality, and mobility at least encouraged the respondent 
to resolve an advantage with respect to one attribute with an apparent weakness in 
another. Done in a more visual way, as opposed to a numeral in a table or matrix, the bar 
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chart may have kept the decision maker visually and cognitively apprised of the relative 
attribute merit of each prospective candidate vehicle with respect to the set. In any case, 
regardless of the way the information was presented, both groups were free to choose the 
final ranking in whichever manner or order they desired or felt appropriate. 
 
3.7.1 Potential Perils and Pitfalls of Decision Support Tools 
These observations demonstrate the implicit dangers associated with the methods 
pursued in this chapter. Since a fundamental premise of AHP is that the qualities of 
candidates are simply additive, not conflicting, and contribute positively toward the 
desired objective, the scalar magnitude of the bar chart can potentially misinform a 
decision maker if it does not reflect the true efficacy of a candidate vehicle. This implicit 
assumption that the AHP function totally defines the design space may even be 
interpreted as demonstrating an incredible amount of hubris and prescience with regard to 
ground combat vehicle design and eventual usage. This makes the methods and data 
presentation susceptible to failed additive logic. Blind faith in a method like AHP or the 
data presented may yield a false sense of confidence with the decision and outcome.  
If the candidate qualities are not simply additive, if there are conflictions between 
attributes, and if the attributes do not contribute positively, i.e., “more is not better”, 
toward vehicle performance, then this method could lead design and decision efforts 
down a fruitless path. Any error in these assumptions, especially in light of how 
persuasive the bar chart appears to have been toward decision maker overt candidate 
vehicle choice, could sway a group toward a suboptimal candidate, one plagued with 
attribute conflictions and negative interactions not captured or fully considered in the 
evaluation of available options. This could substantially misdirect developmental efforts, 
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while wasting time and money, valuable commodities made more so by the challenges 
present in the contemporary operating environment. 
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3.8 Lessons Learned 
 The way in which information was presented affected candidate vehicle selection. 
When comparing weighting-derived versus overtly-chosen vehicle selection, the 
inclusion of a nondimensional visual depiction of combat vehicle specification data as 
related to the principal attributes of survivability, lethality, and mobility was found to 
improve the consistency and apparent quality of choice from a set of candidate 
platforms. Conversely, raw data left in absolute terms and not linked to an attribute 
reduced consistency and may have encouraged respondents to focus on singular 
metrics or the vehicle configuration itself.  
 The data presentation method made a difference in overt candidate vehicle selections. 
In the most preferred form, i.e., the bar chart representation, the visual depiction of 
survivability, lethality, and mobility correlated strongly with decision maker overt 
choice. The strong correlation can provide benefit for consensus building and for 
collapsing complex data into a simpler form. However, it can also present misleading 
conclusions without proper validation of weighting values and candidate efficacy.   
 Weighting values varied significantly among individual respondents, but collectively 
both groups converged on commensurate values for survivability, lethality, and 
mobility. While the convergence demonstrates consensus, it is not an overt indicator 
of weighting validation or candidate quality.  
 In the format pursued for these decision support tools, the packaging of specification 
data with respect to survivability, lethality, and mobility assumed an additive 
relationship between the criteria. Given the dynamic interactions between combat 
vehicle attributes, this may be an ineffective method of guiding a selection effort. In 
other words, the strength of a weighting value is dependent on validation of its 
contribution to a performance metric. Without contextual understanding of the 
significance of weighting values or the relationships between attributes, the numeric 
or scalar depicted superlative may not be the best choice. This is a warning to both 
analyst and decision maker alike as to the limitations of using this method to guide a 




The work in Chapter 3 demonstrated that decision support tools built around the 
principal attributes of survivability, lethality, and mobility can significantly improve the 
consistency of group selection of a ground combat vehicle. The improvements came from 
greater consistency between decision-maker attribute preference and the related levels of 
those attributes in candidate vehicles. Given that ground combat vehicles are primarily 
designed to be a mobile and protected source of firepower, it was logical to build an 
organizational framework around the principal attributes of survivability, lethality, and 
mobility, and then to place metrics appropriately beneath those attributes. As most 
decision support tools increase dimensions for candidate evaluation and rely on relative 
value comparisons, both techniques were employed in the comparison matrix creation 
and visual aids provided to respondents. 
A prerequisite for this effort was the collection of weighting data for the 
calculation and subsequent visualization of candidate vehicle performance specifications. 
Once the framework and weighting values were established, the amalgamation of 
performance specifications lent itself to any visual depiction consistent with the 
survivability, lethality, and mobility construct. Respondents expressed preference for the 
bar chart depiction of relative candidate levels of each principal attribute. Use of this 
visual interpretation of performance data highly correlated to more consistent ranking 
selection to the extent it appears that respondents relied heavily on it. 
A source of vulnerability in any decision making pursuit is the elusiveness of data 
to validate the decision quality. The inherent uncertainty in many pursuits, as well as the 
inability to forecast how alternative abandoned candidate selections may have fared, 
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make it difficult to evaluate decision quality. In the absence of a definitive validation of 
weighting values, decision-maker and engineer can simply be consistently wrong in the 
pursuit of what is believed to be an effective combat vehicle. To use a marksmanship 
analogy, the tools used helped to “tighten the shot group” or reduce the difference 
between weighting-derived and overtly-chosen vehicle selection. However, a subsequent 
effort is necessary to see if the shots are “on target”, i.e., is the candidate selection rank 
order validated by some simulation effort or practical demonstration exercise. 
Alternatively, a preceding effort aimed at investigating the relative value and parametric 
relationships between survivability, lethality, and mobility would do more to aid decision 
makers since information of this sort could contribute “further up stream” in the decision 
process. In other words, a deeper appreciation for the attribute interactions and 
correlations with platform performance could guide the creation of options versus simply 
being used to choose better among a finite set of candidates. From a design perspective, 
insight gained on the relative contribution and interaction of each attribute might be used 
to direct performance metrics.  
In conclusion, the high art of decision making is not simply choosing among 
alternatives, but to foster an environment conducive with generating previously 
unconsidered  alternatives. In the next chapter, a survivability, lethality, and mobility 
framework will be used to evaluate the relative contribution of the principal attributes on 
the performance of a prototypic combat vehicle. In doing so, the respondent weighting 
data produced in Chapter 3 can be compared with the relative attribute contribution 
toward creating a winning fighting vehicle in a simulated combat environment.  
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Chapter 4: Performance Effects and Attribute Interactions of 
Survivability, Lethality, and Mobility 
Again, it is possible to fail in many ways, while to succeed 
is possible in only one way… excess and defect are 
characteristics of vice, and the mean of virtue… for men 
are good in but one way, but bad in many. 
     —Aristotle,  Nichomachean Ethics 
  
Theory guides, experiment decides.   
 —I.M. Kolthoff 
4.1 Introduction 
A set of prototypic ground combat vehicles, each with methodically prescribed 
levels of survivability, lethality, and mobility, were designed and subsequently fought by 
ROTC cadet volunteers in a physics-based, simulated combat environment. The results of 
each mission were analyzed to investigate the relative effects and coupled interactions 
between the combat vehicle principal attributes in relation to a series of performance 
metrics. The results from the simulations demonstrated that the principal attributes do not 
appear to contribute to platform efficacy in a simply additive fashion. Rather, in some 
cases, a surprising result was observed, i.e., mission performance actually dropped with 
greater relative levels of an attribute. The findings indicate that it may not be advisable to 
prescribe vehicle requirements without first performing some simulations or at least 
thoroughly considering the net effect and interactions of the principal attributes with 
respect to combat system performance. This practice may be referred to as performance-
based design, or the concept of pursuing attributes with a concerted and cognizant focus 




In light of the attribute weighting values solicited from respondents and described 
in Chapter 3, the U.S. Army officers who participated in the survey exercises were 
clearly focused on survivability as the dominant principal attribute. However, one must 
question the value of such weighting values in the absence of contextual validation of the 
relative contributions and interactions (conflictions and synergisms) between 
survivability, lethality, and mobility with respect to ground combat vehicle performance. 
In Ogorkiewicz’s treatise on the evaluation of tank designs, this respected combat vehicle 
designer provides a strongly worded caution regarding the potential errors in comparing 
alternative platform designs by considering only the performance metrics.149 In a 
complaint echoing Bekker’s disdain for the use of the term “mobility”, Ogorkiewicz goes 
on to criticize the lack of specificity when dealing with many of these terms. He goes on 
further to explain how these attributes and metrics can be inconsequential measurements 
for consideration if not deliberately linked in some way to overall platform performance. 
The cautionary note struck by Ogorkiewicz provided the impetus for the research 
question and related work contained in this chapter. Here, the research question is: What 
are the relative contributions and interactions of survivability, lethality, and 
mobility to ground combat vehicle performance? This question deals with 
investigating a method to identify, in a simulated environment, for example—the relative 
contributions/effects and possible coupling between attribute levels and combat vehicle 
platform performance. 
There is a complex, dynamic interaction between principal attributes at the 
platform level and their net effect on system performance. Intuitively, one can sense that 
 
149 R.M. Ogorkiewicz, Design and Development of Fighting Vehicles. (New York: Doubleday and 
Company, 1968) 132-139. 
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excessive levels of survivability can handicap mobility and reduce the ability to move 
and engage targets, i.e., reduce lethality. Also, for a fixed vehicle mass budget, platform 
volume, and per-unit (vehicle) cost, redistributing respective fractions between the 
equipment primarily dedicated to each principal attribute may, and most likely will, affect 
vehicle performance metrics. 
Since combat vehicles serve as an extension and amplifier of its crewmembers’ 
capacity to complete their mission, it may be instructive to first consider the principal 
attributes as they might pertain at the individual soldier level. Imagine an individual is 
preparing to enter a room to combat a threat lurking inside. In preparation for this task, 
the individual is given an assortment of body armor and weapons from which to choose. 
Most individuals would try to find an appropriate, perhaps dynamic, balance between 
protecting himself (survivability), arming himself (lethality), and maintaining the ability 
to move about as freely as possible (mobility). This would probably be done iteratively in 
a don gear – test – change gear – test fashion, until the individual was satisfied with the 
capabilities and kit he had assumed on his person. With too much body armor, an 
individual becomes an ineffective fighter—a target to the threat if you will. With an 
abundance of weaponry, the fighter may also become bogged down by weight and would 
likely yield some (potentially considerable) ability to move under the load of so much 
armament. A capable fighter relies on some semblance of balance among the principal 
attributes of survivability, lethality, and mobility in order to equip himself in an effective 
fashion, thereby increasing his odds of defeating the threat and surviving the engagement. 
For a combat platform crew, the dynamics are similar, but the option of shedding 
or assuming desired levels of survivability, lethality, and mobility are far more restrictive 
as they are largely established in a prescriptive fashion by the requirements generated and 
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specified by the ground combat vehicle designer. In other words, the settings and 
thresholds for protection, firepower, and movement are largely fixed.150  
A combat vehicle in the conceptual or deliberate design phase has many imposed 
“budgets”, e.g., mass, volume, cost, and schedule. The relative efficacy of the platform, 
as measured by success in combat, is a function of the relative worth of the attribute level 
in comparison to the performance achieved within each budgetary limit. Ground combat 
systems fought by a crew of trained operators harnesses that capability for discretionary 
use of the commander. Regarding the elusiveness of elucidating the dynamic interactions, 
the absence of distinct relationships among these characteristics precludes objective 
analysis using simply attributes, traits and metrics. It also represents the greatest criticism 
of earlier efforts to quantify ground combat system “net worth” among candidates.151  
In contemporary efforts, the significance of these platform attributes remains a 
relevant, critical, and timely subject. In a 2010 briefing at the Institute for Advanced 
Technology, the Commander of the Army’s Research, Development, and Engineering 
Command (RDECOM) discussed the value of pursuing balance among mobility, 
survivability, and lethality in the pursuit of the next ground combat vehicle.152 The term 
“balance” was not discussed further, but may refer to the performance achieved for 
metrics related to these attributes. It may also refer to the mass, volume, or financial 
budget dedicated to subsystems and functions directly related to the principal attributes. 
To paraphrase Aristotle, good fighting vehicles all share the capacity to provide 
crewmembers with a mobile, protected source of firepower, while bad fighting vehicles 
 
150 Some vehicles have modular armor packages that can be added on based on the enemy situation and 
mission profile. 
151 R.M Ogorkiewicz, Design and Development of Fighting Vehicles, (New York: Doubleday and 
Company, 1968) 132-139. 
152 Briefing given by Major General Nickolas G. Justice, Commander, Research and Development 
Engineering Command (RDECOM) to the Senior Service Fellow Program at the Institute for Advanced 
Technology, Austin, Texas, on April 28, 2010. 
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have unique shortcomings in one or more areas, e.g., poor mobility, inadequate 
survivability, ineffective lethality, etc. The legacy systems, e.g., Abrams tank, Bradley 
IFV, appear retrospectively to have brought a balance of principal attributes to the 
battlefield. Even considering initial shortcomings related to these platforms, the evolved, 
balanced performance specifications illuminate prior decision maker efforts focused on 
the design of a vehicle possessing all the essential constituent elements of a fighting 
vehicle, i.e., survivability, lethality, and mobility.  
In contrast, the vehicles procured in the first decade after 9/11 have been rather 
unbalanced, e.g., Stryker with high mobility, but low survivability and lethality, and 
MRAP with high survivability but low lethality and mobility.153 As previously stated in § 
1.3, the Stryker required protective upgrades to address this shortcoming. The minimal 
use of the first generation MRAPs in OEF directly reflects the lack of mobility afforded 
by these highly survivable, but oversized platforms.154 Understanding the correlation and 
interaction of the attribute with its attendant effects on net platform performance is a 
fundamental step toward understanding how to design a balanced fighting vehicle.155  
While the challenges and uncertainties associated with characterizing these 
relationships are not trivial, the potential return on successfully pursuing them—say in a 
physics-based simulation environment—could illuminate synergy and conflicts between 
attributes, as well as quantify the net contribution or amplification of an attribute level on 
vehicle performance. Given the complexity and dynamics of a ground combat vehicle “in 
action”, it may be (and likely is) unreasonable to anticipate the net effect of the 
movement of a given tertiary metric, secondary trait, or even principal attribute may have 
 
153 As stated previously, the MRAP refers to a class of vehicles of various design and function.  
154 Dan Lamothe, “MRAPs To Get Upgrade for Afghanistan” Marine Corps Times, May 3, 2009. The 
MRAP program dedicated $158 million to procure advanced independent suspension systems for specific 
variants in an effort to improve the off-road (cross country) mobility of the vehicles.  
155 Kate Brannen, “Army Unveils New GCV Requirements” Army Times, November 30, 2010. 
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on overall system performance. That said, an exploration built around a design of 
experiment (DOE) framework, even in a simulated environment, could enlighten the 
design process for a fighting vehicle by revealing a methodology to gauge the net 
contribution of attributes on platform performance metrics that matter most.  
Having insight into these interactions can also aid programmatic decisions, e.g., 
directing resources toward the most meaningful metrics, traits, and attributes. For 
example, in the highly unlikely scenario that a program encountered a surplus of money, 
time, or design space, it would be valuable to know where and how to apply it on the 
fighting vehicle for its best advantage.156 But, in the more likely scenario, when forced to 
make a reduction in unit cost, program schedule, or performance requirements, 
knowledge of the contributions and interactions can literally inform the vehicle designer 
where to trim “fat” and where to spare “bone and muscle” in the fighting vehicle 
platform. Those metrics deemed less important, or even inconsequential, could be 
relaxed, while metrics associated with critical attributes could be defended with tangible 
evidence of their importance to system performance. Further, an understanding of the 
interactions between design parameters (a.k.a., factors) could further the theory of 
fighting vehicle design by providing a unified framework to pursue the influence of these 
attributes in a more holistic manner. 
 
4.2.1 Methodology to Study the Relative Contributions and Interactions 
The methodology developed to investigate this chapter’s research question 
focused on exploring the relative contributions and interactions of survivability, lethality, 
and mobility to ground combat vehicle performance follows. A 2-level, 3-factorial DOE 
 
156 Some ground combat systems developed in the post Cold War era, particularly after 9/11, were required 
to be C-130 capable, meaning that the weight and volume of the vehicle was limited to a level such that it 
could be transported by the Air Force C-130 cargo aircraft.  
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framework was established to investigate the effect of varying survivability, lethality, and 
mobility (referred to as factors in the DOE framework) at acceptable and enhanced levels 
(referred to as thresholds or treatments in the DOE framework). Having adopted this 
framework and experimental technique, a collection of prototypic, simulated combat 
vehicle variants were built using the Joint Reconnaissance and Targeting System 
(JRATS) software, which is fully described in § 4.2.1. Vehicles were built in both tracked 
and wheeled configurations, all emulating representative levels of survivability, lethality, 
and mobility by essentially varying the armor package, the weapon system, and the 
power plant, respectively. The vehicles were subsequently fought in a search and destroy 
mission in a simulated urban environment, a mission typical of major combat operations 
in the COE. The collection of mission and platform performance data populated a DOE 
matrix. Statistical analysis, using the ANOVA F-test, was performed to determine the 
statistical significance (or perhaps, more aptly in the context of an exploratory exercise, 
distinguishability) of effects from single attributes (survivability, lethality, and mobility) 





2 levels (acceptable: −, enhanced: +)
3 factorial (survivability, lethality, mobility)
Build JRATS variants 
Fight JRATS variants, record data 
Populate DOE database 
Conduct ANOVA on results Plot effects and interactions
Conduct further analysis
F-test 














Figure 38: Flow chart for methodology designed to investigate the effects and 
interactions of varying levels of survivability, lethality, and mobility to 
ground combat vehicle performance in the JRATS simulated environment.  
4.2.2  Design of Experiments (DOE) and the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
DOE is a “planned approach for determining cause and effect relationships.”157 
As such, it was deemed an appropriate method to explore the notion of attribute 
thresholds on a simulated combat platform and the observed performance metrics, like–
percentage of missions won (win %). By defining platform attribute levels (S for 
survivability, L for lethality, and M for mobility) as the “test factors”, and system 
performance as an “effect”, e.g., win %, the DOE framework is suited for an exploratory 
effort. The DOE methodology captures the test factor contributions on various effects, as 
 
157 Mark Anderson and Patrick Whitcomb, DOE Simplified Second Edition (Florida: CRC Press, 2007). 
introduction.  
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well as any observable interactions among them. In the absence of a definitive objective 
function describing the relative inputs for fighting vehicle performance, the DOE 
methodology can qualify and even quantify the relative effects of a collection of 
parameters constituting a complex, dynamic, highly coupled system like a ground combat 
vehicle. DOE does this more efficiently and with greater insight on possible interactions 
than the classic one-factor-at-a-time (OFAT) approach.158  
The advantage of factorial design becomes more pronounced as an increased 
numbers of factors or variables are examined.159 To illustrate, consider a two-level, two-
factor experiment. To achieve the precision yielded by DOE in four experiments, OFAT 
requires six experiments. For three factors, the DOE calls for 8 runs versus 16 for OFAT. 
The relative efficiency of the factorial design continues to increase with every added 
factor, since “factorial design provides contrast of averages, thus providing statistical 
power to the effect estimates.”160  
 
Table 32: Number of Experiments Required for OFAT versus DOE 
number of factors (k)
at 2 levels  OFAT DOE 
2 6 4 
3 16 8 
 
As previously stated, another advantage of DOE is that it can reveal interactions 
of factors, often key to understanding a process (or underlying phenomenon and/or 
mechanism). With its ability to characterize interactions and its embedded efficiency, 
 
158 Mark Anderson and Patrick Whitcomb, DOE Simplified Second Edition (Florida: CRC Press, 2007), 
41-43. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid., 8-12.  
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DOE enables the investigator to examine a broader volume of design space and to draw 
inferences about a process. For this experiment, the possible interactions investigated are 
between the principal attributes of survivability (S), lethality (L), and mobility (M). 
In some ways, the use of DOE is a paradoxical approach. To set up a meaningful 
experiment, the investigator should have a high level of non-statistical acumen regarding 
the problem. In other words, they should be very knowledgeable in the subject matter in 
order to choose the factors to study. Additionally, the process in question is normally of a 
complex nature. However, the design and analysis of the experiment, especially for an 
initial exploratory effort, should be kept as simple as possible. In light of these 
considerations (i.e., extensive knowledge coupled with great uncertainty, and observed 
system complexity but designed experiment simplicity) a fundamental underlying 
concession is that the investigator does not yet know the underpinnings of the process. 
The system itself is complex, else the experiment could begin from a more focused point 
of departure. Once an established base of knowledge is formed, iteration through 
confirmatory and exploratory experiments can push the complexity and insight gleaned to 
higher planes of understanding regarding the effects and their potential interactions. 
The goal of an exploratory DOE is to “declutter” or “frame” the problem in an 
organized fashion to gain an understanding of the basic framing of the parameters at 
hand. In this specific case, the parameters of interest are the relative levels of 
survivability, lethality, and mobility designed into a prototypic fighting platform fought 
in a simulated combat mission. In recognition for his pioneering work in the field of 
DOE, the mathematical organization and structure of the two-factor (2k) experiment 
aimed at determining the main effects and interactions of k factors at two different levels 
is also known as the Yate’s method or Yate’s standard order.161  
 
161 Frank Yates, “The Design and Analysis of Factorial Experiments” Technical communication No. 35 
Imperial Bureau of Soil and Science, Harpenden, England (1937). 
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Key to applying this method is adherence to building a balanced orthogonal array 
of experimental candidates.162 This orthogonality can be visually appreciated when using 
two or three factors (Figure 39). In the context of this experimental framework, the seven 
degrees of freedom are: the main effects of survivability (S), lethality (L), and mobility 
(M); the two-factor interactions of survivability and lethality (SL), survivability and 
mobility (SM), and lethality and mobility (LM); and the three-factor interaction of 
survivability and lethality and mobility (SLM).163 This notation for single attribute as 









Figure 39: Two level, three factorial DOE graphical depiction for survivability, lethality, 
and mobility. 
Given the apparent novelty of using DOE to explore ground combat vehicle 
design, the objective of this application was an exploration, rather than a confirmation, of 
the attribute effects (survivability, lethality, and mobility) on a series of global 
 
162 Mark Anderson and Patrick Whitcomb, DOE Simplified Second Edition (Florida: CRC Press, 2007)  
46-59.  
163 Douglas C. Montgomery, Design and Analysis of Experiments, Second Edition  (New York: Wiley, 
1984) 267-270. 
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performance metrics. With the foundation for this general approach detailed by examples 
in DOE texts and literature, a 2k factorial design was adopted. This form “is particularly 
useful in the early stages of experimental work when there are likely to be many factors 
investigated.”164 In a 2k framework, 2 refers to the number of levels, established at a high 
and low threshold, and k refers to the number of factors or attributes. A 23 factorial 
experiment was examined and discussed in this chapter that investigated the survivability, 
lethality, and mobility attributes at acceptable and enhanced levels of efficacy on a 
collection of JRATS-generated prototypic combat vehicles.  
 
4.2.3 DOE Framework Example 
To illustrate Yate’s standard order with three notional factors A, B, and C at two 
levels + and − with response (or global performance metric) Y,  a notional test matrix is 
organized as shown in Table 33. If the singular effects A,B,C, the two-factor interactions, 
AB, BC, AC, and the three-factor interaction, ABC, are symbolized collectively by the 
set of factors or interactions q, where q ={A, B, C, AB, BC, AC, ABC}, then the 
respective effect of an element of qi on the response Y can be calculated by using 
Equation 26.  
 
164 Douglas C. Montgomery, Design and Analysis of Experiments, Second Edition  (New York: Wiley, 
1984) 11-18, 261-265. 
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Table 33: Two-level (+, −), Three Factor (A,B,C) Test Matrix with Observed Response Y 
   Factors Response 
Standard Run A B C Ystandard 
1 random − − − Y1 
2 random + − − Y2 
3 random − + − Y3 
4 random + + − Y4 
5 random − − + Y5 
6 random + − + Y6 
7 random − + + Y7 
8 random + + + Y8 
 
     
 
 





where  is the arithmetic mean of
responses Y such that the sign (q ) 0
and similarly is the arithmetic mean of


















In Equation 26, the sign of q is defined to be the sign of the product of factor(s) of 
q. For example, using Table 33, the sign for q defined as the interaction of AB is positive 
for standards 1 (−×− = +), 4 (+×+ = +), 5 (−×− = +), and 8 (+×+ = +). Likewise, the sign 
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for q defined as the interaction of AB is negative for standards 2 (+×− = −), 3 (−×+ = −), 
6 (+×− = −), and 7 (−×+ = −).  
The significance of the effect, either for a single attribute or for an interaction 
between attributes, is that it yields insight to the investigator as to what the average 
amount of increase or decrease a modification of an attribute has on a performance 
metric. In simple terms, a large relative effect signifies that the attribute of interest has a 
meaningful consequence on the response. As will be discussed next, a statistical analysis 
known as the analysis of variance (ANOVA) is subsequently done in order to quantify 
the statistical significance (or distinguishable from experimental “noise”) of the observed 
effect, i.e., the level of certainty that the measured effect is not simply due to chance or 
“noise” in the data.  
 
4.2.4 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
After the effects have been catalogued, an ANOVA routine was used to quantify 
the statistical significance of each observance. To aid in quickly identifying this 
significance, a method based on the creation of Pareto charts depicting the absolute value 
of each effect (Effect)qi—charted from largest to smallest—was used.165 The Pareto chart 
provides a quick look at the largest effects and helps to identify the observed effects that 
are the statistically outlying contributors to the system response. In the Pareto chart, the 
y-axis is the absolute value of the average change in the response metric over acceptable 
and enhanced levels of that attribute. This method expediently identifies those effects 
which are subsequently screened to ensure that each identified effect has an F-test 
commensurate with some level of confidence, e.g., 90%.  
 
165 Mark Anderson and Patrick Whitcomb, DOE Simplified Second Edition (Florida: CRC Press, 2007), 
47-52.  
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Having identified the significant or distinguishable effects, the first step in the 
ANOVA process is to calculate the sum of squares for (Effect)qi (or, for simplicity, just 
Effecti), SoSi using Equation 27. In this equation, N is the number of runs, which is 8 for 
a full factorial, 23 DOE. The sum of squares for the model and residual, SoSmodel and 
SoSresidual, respectively, are calculated using Equation 28. In this equation, n is the 
number of statistically distinguishable effects (n<M), where M is the total number of 
effects studied. Note, the degrees of freedom of the residual is M-n. Then, the mean 
square for the factor (or interaction) qi, the model, and the residual are MSi, MSmodel and 
MSresidual respectively, found using Equation 29.  Last, use Equation 30 to calculate the F-
value. In this equation, MSresidual is the collection of effects not considered to be 
distinguishable, i.e., forming the residual. Table 34 has an abbreviated list of critical F-
values used in this study. In this table, the first column has the number of elements in the 
numerator (NUM) and in the denominator (DEN). For example, if one was evaluating the 
statistical significance of a single attribute (NUM = 1) against a residual composed of 5 
attributes (DEN = 5), one references the second row (1/5) for the F-value corresponding 
to either the 90% or 95% confidence level. 
For a 23 DOE framework, there are 7 degrees of freedom, some fraction of which 
are statistically distinguishable (observed effects) and the remainder assumed as 
residuals. In this framework, the 7 degrees of freedom (M = 7) using the capital letter 
abbreviations for the fighting vehicle principal attributes are S, L, M, SL, SM, LM, and 
SLM. As an example, if two attributes appeared dominant in magnitude to the group, 
then the model has two degrees of freedom (n = 2) and the residual has 5 degrees of 
freedom (M – n = 5). To state the statistical certainty associated with the effect under 
investigation in the model, the F-value calculated must be greater than the value 
associated with the cross-referenced value associated with the NUM and DEN 
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intersection as observed in a distribution table.166 Those treatments or attributes with at 
least 90% confidence, or an F-value commensurate with 90% certainty, are typically 
considered significant or distinguishable. Higher levels of certainty can be established 
based on the risk tolerance of the investigator and the desired objective of the experiment, 
i.e., exploratory versus confirmatory. As this was an exploratory exercise, 90% was 




SoS Effect Equation 27
model residual
1 1




SoS SoS SoS SoS

 
   Equation 28
model residuali














Table 34: Critical F-values for Statistical Significance at the 90% and 95% Confidence 








5 4.06 6.61 
1
4 4.55 7.71 
2
5 3.78 5.79 
3
4 4.19 6.59 
 
166 Mark Anderson and Patrick Whitcomb, DOE Simplified Second Edition (Florida: CRC Press, 2007), 
189-194.  
167 Source for critical F-values is www.statsoft.com/textbook/distribution-tables. 
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The Pareto chart can be made more meaningful by nondimensionalizing the 
effects by dividing the absolute value of the dimensional effect by its associated standard 
















In this equation, the subscript i is the factor (or interaction) of interest, and 
MSresidual is the mean square of the residual. For a 2-level, 3-factorial experiment, the 
value for N+ and N−, i.e., the number of runs for which sgn qi > 0 and  sgn qi < 0, 
respectively, are both 4, so the denominator of the equation simplifies to the square root 
of one-half of the mean square of the residual.  
This is known as a t-value or t-test. Similar to the F-test, a critical t-value 
associated with a confidence level, e.g., 90%, can by plotted on the nondimensionalized 
Pareto chart to highlight those attributes providing statistically distinguishable levels of 
effect to the performance metric of interest. The critical t-values, also available in tabular 
form (not shown here), only requires the degrees of freedom of the residual (M-n) for 
reference. However, using the nondimensionalized Pareto chart the observer may lose 
contextual reference for the relative contribution to the performance metric or system 




4.2.5 Example Implementation of DOE and ANOVA: Rancher Truck Options 
In order to demonstrate the DOE and ANOVA methodology, we revisit the 
rancher and his search for a replacement truck one last time. As a quick reminder, the 
rancher needs a new truck and is trying to decide between two models: Alpha and Beta. 
Having seen the decision support data, the rancher settled on purchasing the Beta. 
However, when finalizing the details of the purchase, he was presented with three sets of 
options: standard or high stiffness sets of leaf springs; two-wheel or four-wheel drive 
powertrain; and standard or oversized tires. The costs of these options were all 
comparable, so his main focus was on the performance related to these options, namely 
the time it takes to load and drive the vehicle on a short, challenging cross-country course 
representative of a repetitive task at the ranch. In an effort to make the sale, the dealer 
made arrangements for the rancher to conduct a comparison test using the DOE and 
ANOVA methodology. The framework is a two-level, three-factorial experiment.  
The test (experiment) will be the average course lap time per standard, where a 
standard is the predetermined set of options in accordance with the DOE test-matrix 
(Table 35). After a random run order is established (second column), and the experiment 
is completed, the DOE matrix is fully populated. In this table, there is only one effect  of 
interest (Y), namely, average lap time to complete a repetitive task for which the rancher 
plans to use the new truck. The term “standard” refers to the unique factorial combination 
of experimental factors applied for a given run and the term “run” is the randomly 
generated sequence number for the successive iteration through the set of standards, i.e., 













































1 3 − − − 31 
2 5 + − − 24 
3 6 − + − 29 
4 7 + + − 22 
5 2 − − + 32 
6 8 + − + 26 
7 1 − + + 31 
8 4 + + + 25 
 
On average, the effect of the stiffer springs (calculated using Equation 26 as 
demonstrated below) reduced the course lap time by 6.5 s. The subscript for Y refers to 
the standard number (or cross reference to the factorial combination) applied for that 
experimental run. Note that the effect of the stiffer springs is essentially the average lap 
time of trucks with stiffer springs minus the average lap time of trucks with the standard 
springs. 
 
2 4 6 8 1 3 5 7
spring
24 22 26 25 31 29 32 31
6.5 s
4 4 4 4
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Effect
           
       
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On the other hand, on average, the effect of the 4-wheeled powertrain was to 
reduce the lap time by 1.5 s. 
 
3 4 7 8 1 2 5 6
powertrain
29 22 31 25 31 24 32 26
1.5 s
4 4 4 4
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Effect
           
       
Finally, the average effect of increased tire size was to increase the lap time by 2 s. 
 
5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4
tire
32 26 31 25 31 24 29 22
2 s
4 4 4 4
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Effect
           
      
 At this point, it appears that the stiffer shocks have the greatest impact on 
reducing the time it takes to complete this task on the ranch. The addition of four-wheel 
drive also helps, but not as much. The larger tires have a detrimental effect, as seen by the 
positive number which indicates an increase in time. 
 Similarly, the average interactions of shocks and powertrain, shocks and tires, 
powertrain and tires, and finally any three-way interaction between all of the factors are 
calculated. Interestingly, there was no synergism between the stiffer springs and the 4-
wheeled power train. 
  
1 4 5 8 2 3 6 7
spring×powertrain
31 22 32 25 24 29 26 31
0.0 s
4 4 4 4
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Effect
           
    
  
Meanwhile, there were only modest levels of interaction between springs and tire 
size, as well as powertrain option and tire size. 
 
1 3 6 8 2 4 5 7
spring×tire
31 29 26 25 24 22 32 31
0.5 s
4 4 4 4
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Effect
           
      
1 2 7 8 3 4 5 6
powertrain×tire
31 24 31 25 29 22 32 26
0.5 s
4 4 4 4
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Effect
           
      
 Based on the small values generated for all three calculations, it appears there is 
very little interaction between the three attributes. For thoroughness, the final calculation 
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considers the possibility of a three-way interaction between all of the options. As 
anticipated, there is no distinguishable effect. 
 
2 3 5 8 1 4 6 7
spring×powertrain×tire
24 29 32 25 31 22 26 31
0.0 s
4 4 4 4
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Effect
           
    
 At this juncture, it appears the stiffer set of springs yields the best increase in 
performance (as measured by a reduction in lap time). To establish a statistical basis for 
confidence in this observation, an ANOVA is performed on the data. The effects of single 
attributes, double interactions, and three-way interaction are ranked and plotted on a 
Pareto chart (Figure 40). In the chart, S, T, and P represent the effect due to the springs, 
the tires, and the powertrain, respectively. Any combination of S, T, P indicates an effect 
due to some interaction between the attributes. Additionally, a parenthetical notation 
indicates the effect is negative. In this specific example, that means a reduction in time 
for the task of interest. It is clear from this chart that the effect of the springs, tires, and 
powertrain dominate the collective group of single attribute effects, as well as their two-
way and three-way interactions. Enhanced springs and tires reduce the task time, while an 
enhanced powertrain increases it.  
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σ: statistically distinguishable, >90% (F-test)
(A): negative effect, attribute A
 
Figure 40: Pareto chart for time effects on the Beta options for the rancher problem. This 
chart includes the results from the two-level, three-factorial experiment for 
the Beta truck and the three option choices (S = springs, T = tires, P = 
powertrain). Negative effects are labeled parenthetically, and statistically 
distinguishable effects are followed by a σ. 
The next step is an F-test to determine the statistical significance of the effects 
using an ANOVA routine. The Beta truck option example has 7 degrees of freedom 
(DoF): S, T, P, ST, PT, SP, SPT. Table 36 has the values and procedures used in an 
ANOVA routine in order to generate the F-values so that the statistically distinguishable 
effects can be identified. 
In this table, Equation 27 is used to calculate the SoS for each attribute, and 
Equation 28 is used to calculate the SoS for the model and residual, respectively. In this 
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example, the model is assumed to have 3 DoF and the residual have 4 DoF. 
(Differentiating the statistically distinguishable effects from the remainder can be an 
iterative process.) Equation 29 is used to calculate the mean sum of squares (MS) for 
each effect, the model, and the residual. Finally, Equation 30 is used to calculate the F-
value for each effect and the model.  
 
Table 36: ANOVA for Beta Truck Options. 
 SoS168 DoF MS F-value 
model 
2(-6.5)2 + 2(-2)2  
 
+ 2(1.5)2 = 97 
3 97/3 = 32.33 32.33/0.25 =  129 
springs 2(-6.5)2 = 84.5 1 84.5/1 = 84.5 84.5/0.25 = 338
tires 2(-2)2 = 8 1 8/1 = 8 8/0.25 = 32 
powertrain 2(1.5)2 = 4.5 1 4.5/1 = 4.5 4.5/0.25 = 18 
residual 
2 (0.5)2 + 2(0.5)2  
 
+ 2(0)2 + 2(0)2 =  
 
1.0 
4 1/4 = 0.25  
 
The F-values are subsequently cross-referenced with a cumulative distribution 
table (abbreviated Table 34) at a desired confidence level. In doing so, since the 
generated F-values are greater than the critical values found in the 90% table, we can say 
with >90% certainty that the stiffer springs were the greatest source of improved 
performance for the truck, followed by the larger tires. The powertrain had a negative 
effect on performance and should be left at the low level. For one degree of freedom 
(numerator) and four degrees of freedom (denominator), at 90% certainty the F-value is 
 
168 For N = 8, N/4 = 2, therefore each squared effect in this column is multiplied by 2. 
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4.55, and at 95% certainty the F-value is 7.71.  The same procedure can be applied for 
other performance metrics of interest, with each metric considered having a unique set of 
effect values for the model and residual.  
As previously discussed, the Pareto chart can also be nondimensionalized on a t-
value scale (Equation 31), and a critical t-value for 90% certainty can be plotted across 
the attribute t-values to visually highlight the statistically distinguishable attributes 
(Figure 41). In this figure, each dimensional effect has been transformed to a 
nondimensional t-value. For this example, with the residual having 4 degrees of freedom 
(DoF), the critical t-value is 2.132 (green horizontal dashed line across Figure 41). Thus, 
in this illustration, the effects of S, T, and P are statistically distinguishable for the truck 
performance. Based purely on this one performance metric (course lap time), stiffer 
springs appear to be the best single upgrade for the rancher’s new truck purchase. 
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Pareto Chart for Beta Option Effects on t-value Scale
























Figure 41: Pareto chart for Beta option effects on t-value for the rancher problem. Once 
again, the magnitude of effect for the three option choices (S = springs, T = 
tires, P = powertrain)  are plotted, this time on a nondimensional t-value 
scale. The critical t-value for a residual having 4 degrees of freedom (green 
dashed line) is plotted, and any effect bar extending above this threshold can 






In summary, the steps necessary to use the data from a two-level, full-factorial, 
DOE experiment and conduct ANOVA are:169 
1. Calculate effects of factors and interactions on system response(s) of interest. 
2. Sort absolute value of effects in descending order. 
3. Plot absolute value of effects on a Pareto chart. 
4. Label distinguishable effects (presumed model).  
5. Label  indistinguishable effects (presumed residual). 
6. Calculate each effect’s sum of squares (SoS). 
7. Construct ANOVA table, calculate mean squares (MS) and F-values. 
8. Using tables, identify critical F-values for DoF at a 90% confidence level. 
9. Iterate, if necessary (returning to step 4). 
10. Plot main effect(s) and interaction(s). Interpret results. 
11. If desired, plot the nondimensional t-value Pareto chart with critical t-value. 
 
4.2.6 Principles of DOE to Investigate Principal Attribute Effects and Interactions 
There are three basic principles to observe when conducting the DOE method, in 
this case to investigate the survivability, lethality, and mobility attribute effects and 
interactions. First, conduct the basic experiment in repetition. In this specific case, the 
experiment was a search and destroy mission performed repetitively by trained ROTC 
cadet operators fighting with a prototypic combat vehicle of varying design specification 
with respect to a 23 DOE construct.  
 
169 Mark Anderson and Patrick Whitcomb, DOE Simplified Second Edition (Florida: CRC Press, 2007), 
61-62. This list has been modified from the 12-steps presented in the text. Anderson and Whitcomb also 
include steps for plotting effects using a half-normal y-axis scale.  
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The next principle to observe is randomization. As will be discussed in the 
conduct of the experiment, the ROTC cadet operators were randomly assigned combat 
platforms for each mission set. Furthermore, candidate vehicle assignment was also 
randomized across the operator population during the entire experiment.  
The last principle referred to in the DOE construct is blocking. Also to be 
expounded upon in the description of the methodology, the session was broken down into 
two distinct blocks: tracked vehicle trials and wheeled vehicle trials. In both blocks, the 
same group of trained operators was used after all were trained to a baseline standard of 
proficiency. Training was done prior to entering the blocked phase of the experiment.  
 
4.2.7 Interactions Among Principal Attributes 
For a properly designed experiment, there should be observable responses with 
respect to variations in attributes. Responses may also be attributed to interactions 
between attributes. To aid in classifying the types of observable interactions, these effects 
can be categorized as resembling one of four types with various subtypes.  
In the following figures, a notional response C is presented as a function of two 
attributes a and b at low and high levels indicated as subscripts. The marginals and slope 
difference are calculated using Equation 32 and Equation 34. The marginal described by 
Equation 32 and Equation 33 refer to the average difference between the net effect of a 
and b respectively at high and low thresholds. A low value for an attribute marginal 
signifies low effect. The absolute value of the slope described by Equation 34 denotes the 
relative change in the plotted effect at low and high thresholds. A low value for the 
absolute value of this slope term indicates a low amount of interaction between attributes. 
A discussion of the observed mathematical relationships for the marginals and slopes is 





a b a b a b a b
a
C C C C           Equation 32
marginal
2 2
b a b a b a b a
b
C C C C           Equation 33
   :slopea a a b a b a b a bC C C C             Equation 34
 
Type I interaction depicted in Figure 42, occurs when neither factor is 














I: In a type I interaction, neither 
the factors nor the interaction 
have an effect on the response. 
Both marginals equal zero, and 
the slope difference is zero. 
Figure 42: Type I attribute interaction and effect. 
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  Type II, depicted in three variants in Figure 43, occurs when the factors are 
distinguishable, but there is no interaction between them. In example IIa, factor a is 
distinguishable, but b is not. In example IIb, factor b is distinguishable, however a is not. 
In example IIc, both a and b are distinguishable, although there is no apparent interaction 













IIa:  In a type IIa interaction, 
factor a has an effect and there 
is no interaction, ab. The 
marginal a has some value, 
the marginal b does not, and 













IIb: In a type IIa interaction, 
factor b has an effect and 
there is no interaction, ab. The 
marginal b has some value, 
the marginal a does not, and 













IIc: In a type IIa interaction, 
factor a and b have an effect 
and there is no interaction, ab. 
The marginals for a and b 
have some value and the slope 
difference is zero. 
Figure 43: Type II attribute interactions and effects. 
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When a Type III effect occurs (Figure 44), the interaction between factors is 
distinguishable, but the individual factors are not. This is evident in the cross-pattern of 













III: In a type III interaction, 
factor a and b have no effect 
but there is an interaction  ab. 
The marginals for a and b are 
zero, and the slope difference 
has some value. 
Figure 44: Type III attribute interaction and effect. 
And finally are the Type IV effects where both the factors and the interactions are 
distinguishable (Figure 45). In example IVa, the interaction, as well as factor a, are 
distinguishable. In example IVb, the interaction, in addition to factor b, is distinguishable. 
In examples IVc and IVd, the interaction and both factors are distinguishable. The subtle 
difference between IVc and IVd is that the magnitude of the interaction is commensurate 
with the individual effects in IVd. These graphical examples are the simplest cases, and 
in practice the observed responses are rarely this clear. Any change in slope between 
lines indicates an interaction of sorts; the magnitude of this change correlates with the 
scale of the interaction. These simple examples can still serve as a starting point to 
categorize the observed interactions and factor effects.170  
 
170 Mark Plonsky, of the University of Wisconsin, presents these examples for a demonstration of two-way 
DOE and ANOVA. The type classing of the interactions (I-IV) were added as a way of organizing the eight 















IVa: In a type IVa interaction, factor a 
has an effect and there is an interaction, 
ab. The marginal for a has some value, 
the marginal for b is zero, and the slope 













IVb: In a type IVb interaction, factor b 
has an effect and there is an interaction, 
ab. The marginal for b has some value, 
the marginal for a is zero, and the slope 













IVc. In a type IVc interaction, factor a 
and b have an effect and there is an 
interaction, ab is greater in magnitude 
than the single effects. The marginal for 
a and b have some value, and the slope 













IVd. In a type IVd interaction, factor a 
and b have an effect and there is an 
interaction, ab. The marginal for a and 
b have some value, and the slope 
difference is some value. 
Figure 45: Type IV attribute interactions and effects. 
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4.3 Methodology 
In accordance with the principles of DOE, a set of prototypic vehicles was 
conceived in order to fully populate a 23 test matrix, i.e., acceptable and enhanced levels 
of survivability, lethality, and mobility. These vehicles were fought by a team of recruited 
and trained operators within the Joint Reconnaissance and Autonomous Targeting 
Simulation (JRATS) environment. A collection of workstations for the group of operators 
served to increase the number of missions run on each platform in an efficient manner. 
Prior to the conduct of the missions, data from the design report for each variant was 
collected to produce a set of a priori performance metrics, namely mass, cost, volume 
and schedule index. Mission results were subsequently used to produce a set of a 
posteriori performance metrics, namely win %, blue %, red %, and time %. Each 
operator fought an assigned, but random variety of tracked and wheeled prototypic 
platforms within the JRATS simulation environment. Using the previously illustrated 
DOE/ANOVA techniques, the collected data were interrogated for distinguishable effects 
due to single attributes or the interactions between them.  
 
4.3.1 Joint Reconnaissance and Autonomous Targeting System (JRATS) 
Simulation Environment 
In order to explore the selective contributions and interactions between the 
principal attributes of survivability, lethality, and mobility, it was decided that 
simulations using configurable combat platforms were needed. To build and test a 
prototypic combat platform with a focus on exploring these principal attributes, a search 
was conducted to find a software package that could provide these basic simulation 
requirements. With the resources and within the timeframe available, and after conferring 
with several program managers at the Program Executive Office for Simulation, 
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Training, and Instrumentation (PEO STRI), a software package used for a Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU) program manager capstone exercise was recommended as 
a good candidate. By “good”, it is meant that it was available for use, had a relatively 
short learning curve, and was well developed, having been based on the successful 
civilian gaming title, Mindrover®. The software version developed for the government, 
known as the Joint Reconnaissance and Autonomous Targeting System (JRATS), is a 
military version of the commercially produced Mindrover® robotic fighting vehicle 
simulation game.171 Mindrover®, originally designed as a space-vehicle robot simulator, 
was created to provide a user with an environment to build and subsequently battle 
against opponent space vehicles in virtual reality.172 The JRATS version sustained the 
physics-based vehicle dynamics and weapon capabilities, but moved the setting to an 
urban environment representing a COE combat zone. The JRATS title also produces 
design reports focused on vehicle performance attributes, as well as relevant program 
management considerations like cost and schedule implications.173 
The JRATS environment allows the user to construct a prototypic combat vehicle 
and then subsequently fight it against a JRATS-generated, autonomous enemy vehicle. 
This environment dovetails into a capstone exercise where teams design, procure, and 
virtually fight candidate vehicles for the notional Joint Unmanned Ground-combat 
Vehicle (JUG-V) program. In JRATS, there are five missions from which to choose, 
several types of base vehicle chassis upon which to build, and a host of design choices to 
make in the virtual creation of the fighting vehicle (Table 37). Construction of the 
prototype was fairly simple; it was similar to using software like Simulink® or LabView® 
 
171 Lindsey Thornhill, et. al., “Design of an Agile Unmanned Combat Vehicle – A Product of the DARPA 
UGCV Program” Proceedings of SPIE, Vol. 5083 (September 2003) 358-370.  
172 Mindrover®: Student Instructions for System Engineer and Test Manager, Version 2.1gh 
173 Several other titles were investigated including Tacops 4.04 and BCTP. None offered the versatility to 
prototypically design platform variants as well as JRATS.  
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in which components are simply dragged and dropped onto a design board, then wired 
together using a series of connections, functions, and math operators.  
Table 37: JRATS Vehicle Design Choices 
Category Choices 
Mission 
Seek and destroy (passive enemy) 
Interoperability (passive enemy) 
Mine detection (passive enemy) 
Seek and destroy (active enemy) 






Large (high output) 
Medium (moderate output) 
Small (low output) 
Armor material 
Depleted Uranium (DU) 












Tread controls (tracked) 
Steering controls (wheeled) 
Thruster controls (hover) 
Power components 
Fuel cell (small or large) 
Battery (small or large) 
Auxiliary power unit (APU) 
Weapon components 
Heavy machine gun 
Missile (laser guided, single or triple) 
Missile (unguided, single or triple) 
Trigger designations174 
Sensor components Minesweeper 
Miscellaneous components 




174 The course manager for the DAU PMT352 recommended using the Logitech ATK3 user interface with 
JRATS since the 11 available trigger switches and fine adjustment tuning parameters could be used to dial 
each prototype to the specificity required. 
206 
After deploying and subsequently fighting the vehicle in the combat simulation, 
JRATS produces a short summary mission completion report, providing the user with a 
rating of success or failure, elapsed mission time (timemission), the friendly vehicle’s 
remaining health (bluemission %), and threat vehicle’s remaining health (redmission %). 
Figure 46 depicts the organization of both design and mission report metrics generated 
from JRATS. Figure 47 expands the principal attributes from design report metrics and 
those produced from the after-action report (AAR) provided at the completion of a 
JRATS mission.  
For the purposes of this research, only tracked and wheeled platforms fighting 
against an active enemy in the urban environment were considered. This mission profile 
best represented the COE, i.e., a determined enemy fighting from within the confines of a 
city traversing improved roads.175 It is well understood that the exclusive scenario chosen 
represents a small fraction of the range of types of combat one may encounter in full 
spectrum operations (Figure 48). Additionally, in the form furnished by DAU, JRATS 
does not allow for interaction between friendly units.176 In other words, this was a one-
on-one combat simulation against a computer opponent in what constitutes a narrow band 
of the entire array of full spectrum operations. Fortunately, JRATS still afforded the user 
with a host of vehicle design options including armor materials, weapon packages, and 





175 Jason Conroy and Ron Martz, Heavy Metal: A Tank Company's Battle to Baghdad (Virginia: Potomac 
Books, 2006). 
176 The original Mindrover title allowed vehicles to be hosted in a virtual combat arena where one can fight 
other users and their designs. The military version had this capability at DAU, but they were not able to 
export the function remotely for use in this research. Attempts were made to import the military vehicles 




















Figure 46: JRATS design report metrics produced for each variant. Metrics classified 
under the principal attributes are listed in the subsequent figure. 
 










power to weightlaser range finder
sensors timemission (AAR)
red mission % (AAR)
bluemission % (AAR)
 
Figure 47: JRATS variant performance data available from both the variant design report 
and mission after-action report (AAR). Those values produced from the 















Figure 48: Partial expansion of full spectrum operations into combat variants, population 
density areas, and climate types, showing those examined in this study. The 
bold and blue-italicized branch represents the path chosen in JRATS. More 
specifically, the mission profile is a one-on-one, offensive, search and 
destroy operation. 
4.3.2 Vehicle Design Specifications for DOE 
In order to explore the effects and interactions of the three principal attributes, a 
collection of 18 candidate fighting vehicles was designed. Eight were required for each 23 
full-factorial, wheeled and tracked experimental DOE matrix. Two additional vehicles, 
one wheeled and one tracked, were also constructed to serve as training platforms for the 
mission operators. In building the variants, Anderson’s guidance concerning aggressive, 
but realistic level-setting was considered. He states that “one of the most difficult 
decisions for DOE, aside from which factors to chose, is what levels to set them. A 
general rule is to set levels as far apart as possible so one is more likely see an effect, but 
not exceed the operating boundaries.”177 Anderson later goes on to discuss the value of a 
controlled, pretrial of factors, or a proof-of-concept experiment for the experiment itself.  
 
177 Mark Anderson and Patrick Whitcomb, DOE Simplified Second Edition (Florida: CRC Press, 2007), 
44-45. 
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To explore the capabilities and limitations of the JRATS software, the designer 
(author) ran several hundred missions and iteratively designed dozens of vehicles. As a 
result, a sense of how the attributes should be tuned up and down on each platform was 
developed. Additionally, instead of thinking of the factors as plus and minus, it was 
helpful to consider the works of Bhote, who, rather than use terms like plus and minus, or 
low and high, respectively, recommends the terminology of marginal and best, or 
acceptable and best.178 With consideration for the attributes of interest for a ground 
combat vehicle, the low (or minus) threshold was an acceptable level, and the high (or 




Survivability (−) Survivability (+)
Lethality (−) Lethality (+)




Figure 49: Attribute dial and design tree indicating an acceptable (−) or enhanced (+) 
setting for design specifications. Note that just the left portion of the tree has 
been expanded completely, ending in a tracked candidate with an acceptable 
(−) level of survivability, lethality, and mobility.  
 
178 Keki Bhote and Adi Bhote, World Class Quality: Using Design of Experiments to Make It Happen 
(New York: AMA, 2000) 241-249. 
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Considering the tunable performance metrics previously presented in Table 38 
and depicted in Figure 49, a design matrix was formulated for the three attributes of 
survivability, lethality, and mobility at two prescribed levels. The observed performance 
envelopes from the previous missions completed by the author as preliminary work 
(approximately 500 missions on a variety of design variants) were reflected upon in 
constructing the formulations depicted in Table 38. The term XTV stands for 
experimental tracked vehicle and XWV stands for experimental wheeled vehicle; these 
variants were fought to collect data. Likewise, the numeral succeeding XTV or XWV is the 
specific variant in accordance with the matrix.  TTV  and TWV are used to designate the 
training tracked and wheeled variants, respectively; these were used for training purposes 
in order to preserve the integrity of the capabilities in the set of XTVs and XWVs. 
Unless otherwise noted, each candidate platform had an identical power package, 
separate from the power plant, consisting of two fuel cells, two auxiliary power units, and 
two standard batteries (Table 39 and Table 40).179 In order to keep a balanced 
comparison, these elements were subsequently added to the mass and cost values for the 
platforms. The power elements were connected in parallel to the main virtual busswork in 
order to share power between the varying locomotive demand and weapon loads. 
Additionally, tracked vehicles and wheeled vehicles had distinct control mechanisms as 
prescribed by the JRATS vehicle construction plans. In the tables that follow, a capital 
letter signifies an enhanced level for an attribute, while a lowercase letter signifies an 
acceptable level for an attribute.  Finally, in the tabular depictions of the factorial designs, 
 
179 XTV7 had one APU and no batteries. Additionally, XWV3 and 5 had no batteries, and XWV7 had no 
APUs. The mass and cost of these individual items were later added to maintain an equitable design among 
candidates. 
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the relative size of the vehicle turret, cannon, or hull on the accompanying thumbnails is 
indicative of the level of survivability, lethality or mobility for that variant. 
 





rolled homogeneous (steel) armor 
aluminum body 







2× heavy machine gun 
laser range finder 
communications suite 
ground penetrating radar 
2× guided missile pods 
2× heavy machine gun 
laser range finder 
communications suite 






low output powerplant 
aluminum frame 
high output powerplant 
composite frame 
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Table 39: Experimental Tracked Vehicle (XTV) Variants for DOE with Indicated Levels 



































Table 40: Experimental Wheeled Vehicle (XWV) Variants for DOE with Indicated 



























As mentioned, the group of ROTC cadet operators were first run through training 
missions using the TTV and TWV in order to establish a baseline level of proficiency 
with the JRATS software and user interface. Therefore, in addition to the eight wheeled 
and eight tracked vehicles for the three-attribute, two-level, full-factorial DOE 
experiment, a training wheeled vehicle (TWV) and training tracked vehicle (TTV) were 
also constructed to allow the operators to conduct preparatory missions on impartial 
platforms representative of those types that would be fought during the record missions 
using the XTVs and XWVs (Table 41). In this table, the over bar signifies an 
intermediate level of each attribute, i.e., between acceptable and enhanced. These two 
vehicles were designed with an intermediate level of survivability, lethality, and mobility 
(aluminum construction, single missile launcher, medium output powerplant) with 
respect to an acceptable and enhanced level possessed in the XTVs and XWVs.  
Table 41: Training Vehicle Variants, Tracked and Wheeled (TTV and TWV) with 











For reference, a visual depiction of the JRATS design screen is provided as Figure 
50. Naming convention within the JRATS vehicle library followed the convention listed 
in the previous tables. Figure 51 contains a simulation rendering of a completed tracked 




Figure 50: JRATS design screen.  Build components are placed on a virtual breadboard. 
Logic components and interface modules are wired together to form the 
functional combat platform prototype. 
 
 
Figure 51: JRATS vehicle rendering of a completed tracked combat platform.  
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4.3.3 Test Matrix 
In accordance with the principle of randomization, a spreadsheet was constructed 
using a random number generator in conjunction with rules intended to ensure each 
operator at each workstation did not fight redundant platforms. This was also done to 
plan an equitable number of missions (120 per variant, or 8 operators fighting 15 
missions per variant) for each vehicle.180  
 
Experimental Tracked Vehicle Test Matrix (XTVs 1–8) 
workstation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
0-20 min 3 5 2 8 4 5 6 1 2 6 1 4 8 5 3 7 
20–40 min 5 6 8 1 3 2 4 7 6 1 5 7 4 2 8 3 
40-60 min 6 2 5 3 7 8 1 4 4 8 3 6 2 7 5 1 
60-80 min 8 1 3 5 6 4 7 2 8 3 7 1 6 4 2 5 
 
Experimental Wheeled Vehicle Test Matrix (XWVs 1–8) 
workstation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
0-20 min 8 1 5 7 4 2 6 3 5 2 3 1 4 7 6 8 
20–40 min 6 4 2 5 3 8 1 7 3 1 8 7 2 4 5 6 
40-60 min 4 5 1 3 7 6 2 8 1 6 7 5 8 3 2 4 
60-80 min 1 7 6 8 5 3 4 2 6 3 4 2 5 8 7 1 
 
 
180 Workstations 15 and 16 went unoccupied due to last-minute personal conflicts of the ROTC cadet 
operators. As willing and able, operators from other workstations assumed extra missions, particularly as 
time permitted in the XTV block. 
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4.3.4 Performance Metrics for Analysis 
Four a priori performance metrics unique to each vehicle and insensitive to the 
conduct or results of the mission (vehicle mass, per vehicle cost, exterior vehicle volume, 
and schedule index) were calculated for the design variants. Four a posteriori 
performance metrics as related to the conduct and results of the mission (win %, blue %, 
red %, and time %) were calculated based on data recorded for each mission run by the 
14 operators. 
 
4.3.4.1 A Priori Performance Metrics 
Vehicle mass for each variant was a simple output value from the JRATS design 
report. Meanwhile, for cost, from the same variant vehicle design report, five separate 
costs were summed for each platform: development, procurement, unit, MILPERS 
(military personnel), O&S (operations and support) and disposal (Equation 35). The cost 
reported represents a major (Acquisition Category or ACAT 1D) program cost for 500 
combat systems notionally apportioned among the services, therefore this summed value 
of associated costs was divided by 500 to produce a per-unit or individual JRATS vehicle 
cost.181  
 
cost [$M] = ($development + $procurement + $unit + $MILPERS + $O&S + $disposal)/500 Equation 35
 
Exterior vehicle volume was estimated from the dimension of the machine gun 
component, a constant element on each variant. The completed design was rotated in 
space and subsequently analyzed to approximate the length, width, and height of the 
 
181 JRATS assumes 20 vehicles for low rate initial production (LRIP) 1, 30 vehicles for LRIP 2, with 50 
vehicles destined for the Marine Corps, 150 for the Air Force, and 300 for the Army. 
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completed platform with respect to this component. Assuming the cannon was 2 m long, 
an estimate for each platform volume was produced for the set of XTVs and XWVs. 
For the schedule index, two dimensionless values were combined from the design 
report, i.e., the ratio of development to production costs times the producibility index 
(PI), generated from the variant design report. The ratio of costs produces a value 
indicative of schedule risk. For example, a system with a low ratio of development to 
production costs is generally assumed as more mature (less risky) since the majority of 
funds are being directed toward production. On the other hand, a less mature system with 
more schedule risk has a larger fraction of funds used to further develop the design, hence 
a higher value for the fraction of development to production costs. The producibility 
index is a nondimensional value indicative of the manufacturing challenge associated 
with the design. The selected performance specifications are provided for the tracked and 
wheeled vehicles used in the DOE full-factorial matrix, including average values and 


















4.3.4.2 A Posteriori Performance Metrics 
At the completion of each JRATS mission, a short summary report alerted the 
operator as to whether the mission was a success (win) or not (loss), the residual 
percentage of health for the operator’s (friendly) (bluemission % ) and enemy (redmission %) 
vehicles, and the expired time for the mission (minutes and seconds). These values were 
used to calculate four a posteriori performance metrics. Win % is simply the fraction of 
missions won by the platform; it may be considered the most critical global performance 
metric (Equation 37). Clearly, for win %, more is better. Blue % is the average residual 
health of the platform for successful missions; it is a proxy of system protection or 
survivability (Equation 38). In this equation, bluemission % is the residual health fraction 
for the friendly vehicle for a specific mission, and time-out is the occurrence of a mission 
failure due to an expiration of time, i.e., 15 minutes expired. Here again, for blue %, more 
is better. Red % is the average residual health fraction for the threat (enemy) platform 
from the missions; it is a proxy of friendly system firepower or lethality (Equation 39). In 
this equation, redmission % is the residual health fraction for the threat (enemy) vehicle for 
a specific mission. For red %, less is better as this means the threat platform had more 
damage incurred onto it. Time % is the average fraction of time for the mission (Equation 
40); it is a proxy of system mobility. In this equation, timemission is the elapsed time for the 
mission, or the final time recorded. In this same equation, the 15 minutes in the 
denominator is the time limit for each mission. For time %, less is better as this means the 
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 ▼ Equation 40
 
4.3.5 8-step Training Model  
To build up a statistically representative database of virtual reality mission 
performance for the tracked and wheeled DOE prototypic combat vehicles, a group of 
system operators was recruited and trained on the JRATS combat simulation software. 
The training portion of the experimental session included software and hardware training, 
tracked vehicle trials, wheeled vehicle trials, and an after-action review. To gain 
permission for the use of human subjects in this research, an amendment to the existing 
IRB study was submitted and subsequently approved (Appendix 9–Appendix 12). This 
amendment documented the purpose of the experiment, as well as the training and 
collection steps proposed for the session. The 8-step training model was also 
implemented in order to organize the tasks required to conduct this experiment in an 
effective manner (Table 42). 
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Table 42: 8-step Training Model182 
1.  Plan the training 
2.  Train and certify leaders 
3.  Recon the site 
4.  Issue the plan 
5.  Rehearse the training 
6.  Execute the training 
7.  Conduct AAR 
8.  Retrain as necessary 
 
The training and experiment were planned in conjunction with a University of 
Texas at Austin ROTC senior lab session.183 This helped ensure that the subjects were the 
most militarily experienced cadets available. The proctor (author) served as the primary 
trainer for the simulation exercises and the cadet chain of command assisted with the 
experiment protocols. To minimize disruption to cadet schedules, a deployable package 
of 16 workstations, user interfaces, and training aids was assembled for remote use in the 
ROTC area. After issuing the plan, a full-factorial test simulation was conducted on every 
 
182 U.S. Army Field Manual 7-0, Train the Force. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, 
D.C., 2002. 
183 Sharon Begley, “What’s Really Human? The trouble with student guinea pigs.” Newsweek, July 23, 
2010. In her article, Begley references the ongoing work of Joseph Henrich of the University of British 
Columbia. In Henrich’s published paper in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, he explores a weakness in some 
human subject experiments in that the analysis does not account for innate differences between the student 
subject population and the greater population. In this experiment, an effort was made to chose subjects 
which were representative of the military they will soon serve in. 
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workstation for each DOE XTV and XWV variant to ensure functionality of all test 
equipment (hardware and software).  
Upon arriving at the training site, a block of instruction was provided on the 
general topic of fighting vehicles and the concepts of survivability, lethality, and 
mobility. This included a discussion about platform survivability, lethality, and mobility, 
as well as a review of actions-on-contact and battle drills. After a brief orientation to the 
individual workstations, a series of training and familiarization missions was conducted 
with these UT Austin ROTC volunteer operators.  
The formal training session for JRATS consisted of driver training on a wheeled 
and tracked platform, weapon training against a passive threat vehicle, weapon training 
against an active threat vehicle, and training missions simulating the same conditions the 
operator would encounter during the record portion of the experimental session. This 
training followed the “crawl-walk-run” method. The “crawl” training missions on the 
wheeled and tracked training vehicles were analogous to initial driver training. No 
weapons were enabled, and the enemy was kept in a passive mode. None of the cadets 
had ever driven a tracked vehicle before, therefore this training was vital to develop 
operator skills to an acceptable level of performance when navigating a tracked platform 
in an urban environment. The “walk” training missions included single weapon systems 
enabled against a passive enemy.184 The first weapon activated for use was the heavy 
machine gun and laser range finder (LRF), and the second weapon was the guided missile 
pod with the LRF.  
The “run” training missions were full-speed engagements against an active enemy 
in the same simulated urban environment. These missions also included formal reporting 
of mission performance to ensure all subjects recorded the data in a satisfactory manner 
 
184 The passive enemy setting in JRATS keeps the enemy from tracking or firing on the friendly platform. 
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(win/loss, bluemission %, redmission %, time). The performance review also helped identify 
those subjects requiring remedial training. Group learning was encouraged during the 
training session with in-stride discussions of the tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTPs) which appeared conducive with effective missions.  
All training missions were conducted on the tracked and wheeled training vehicle 
variants (TTV and TWV) in an effort to preserve the integrity of the record mission 
platforms (XTVs and XWVs) designed for the experiment. A copy of an example 
scorecard is included as Appendix 14. The operational graphic used to orientate the 
subjects to the virtual reality mission environment is depicted in Figure 52. This was 
provided to the operators during the training mission in order to provide an overhead 
view of the terrain to include general axis of movement (clockwise around city) and 
potential sites for enemy activity (red stars on graphic). A snapshot of the terrain depicted 
in the JRATS simulation is provided in Figure 53. Operators were instructed to move 
about the city in a clockwise fashion until the enemy vehicle was spotted. Upon making 
visual contact with the enemy, the operators were instructed to conduct actions on contact 


















Figure 52: JRATS operational graphics for urban combat mission against an active 
enemy. The dotted arrow indicates the directed scheme of maneuver for the 
operators to move through the city. The red stars are the locations in the city 
where enemy contact is likely, i.e., where the computer randomly spawns 





Figure 53: JRATS urban environment screenshot. The simulation does not account for 
collateral damage to the structures in the city. 
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4.4 Data Collection 
After each mission, the operator recorded a win or loss, the residual health for the 
friendly vehicle (bluemission %), the residual health for the threat vehicle (redmission %), and 
mission time that expired. A winning mission would have some value for bluemission %, a 
zero for red %mission, and some residual mission time. Moreover, a losing mission due to 
catastrophic insult would have a zero for bluemission %, some value for redmission %, and 
some residual mission time. A losing mission due to a “draw” or mission time-out would 
have some values for both bluemission % and redmission % and a zero for residual time. In 
rare instances, both vehicles destroyed each other simultaneously. This was also recorded 
as a loss, with both friendly and threat platforms having zero residual health (bluemission % 
= redmission % = 0%).  
Data collected contributed to the formulation of global a posteriori performance 
metrics, the most important one being mission success (win %), and the other three 
serving as proxies for assessing system survivability (blue %), lethality (red %), and 

















XTV1 6.44 151 1375 8 15 3 
XTV2 7.14 159 1555 16 14 2 
XTV3 8.18 200 1415 9 15 3 
XTV4 8.56 201 1595 16 13 2 
XTV5 7.03 159 1455 6 17 4 
XTV6 7.53 159 1635 16 15 3 
XTV7 8.44 142 1455 8 17 4 
XTV8 8.94 202 1675 16 15 3 
  XTVavg 7.78 171 1520 12 15 3 
SD 0.88 25 109 5 1 1 
 













XWV1 6.34 154 775 6 18 6 
XWV2 6.84 155 955 11 15 5 
XWV3 7.75 156 805 7 18 6 
XWV4 8.25 197 955 11 15 5 
XWV5 6.72 120 845 5 20 8 
XWV6 7.22 156 1035 10 17 7 
XWV7 8.14 205 805 6 21 9 
XWV8 8.64 199 1075 11 16 7 
 XWVavg 7.49 168 906 8 18 7 
SD 0.83 30 114 3 2 1 
 
185 Note the vehicle mass indicative of a robotic vehicle. The maximum velocity may also be indicative of 
the performance of the platform, but the vehicles move quite rapidly through the environment since it 
appears the JRATS simulation runs at 5× speed. SD is the standard deviation for each column. 
186 Ibid. 
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XTV A Priori  Performance Results, Normalized
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Figure 54: XTV a priori performance results, normalized. 
XWV A Priori  Performance Results, Normalized
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Figure 55: XWV a priori performance results, normalized. 
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4.4.1 UT Austin ROTC Cadet Operator Population 
The final group of operators consisted of 14 cadets (N = 14; 10 males, 4 
females).187 Of these, four cadets had prior combat experience, having served as enlisted 
soldiers prior to joining the ROTC program. All test subjects had driver’s licenses 
indicating experience operating wheeled vehicles. Notably, there was great diversity in 
gaming experience, ranging from minimal weekly participation (seven cadets) to greater 
than 20 hours per week (two cadets). Figure 56 depicts the self-reported weekly gaming 















Figure 56: Weekly gaming participation (self reported) of 14 operators. 
Regardless of their gaming interest or proficiency, the adherence to the eight-step 
training model using the “crawl-walk-run” methodology ensured that all subjects were at 
an acceptable level of system aptitude prior to beginning the experiment. This was 
verified with thorough screening of the record training missions in a stage-gate process. 
The test protocol had each operator conduct 15 missions on 10 randomly assigned 
platforms (two training vehicles, four tracked vehicles, and four wheeled vehicles) 
 
187 Of the original 16 cadets recruited, two had last-minute conflicts that prevented their participation. 
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providing overlapping coverage and resulting in data for over 1,600 missions 
(approximately 100 missions per vehicle). The workstation vehicle assignment matrix is 




Figure 57: JRATS screenshot during contact with enemy. Note smoke signatures from 
previous insult, as well as the incoming missile from the threat vehicle. 
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Figure 58: JRATS screenshot during contact. In this shot, the guided missile has drifted 
left of the laser and has missed the threat vehicle. 
 
4.4.2 Experimental Tracked Vehicle (XTV) Results and Observations             
The first 800 missions were conducted on the experimental tracked vehicles, 
XTVs 1–8. The results of these missions are summarized in Figure 60. These results are 
also normalized in Figure 61 with respect to the best performer for each metric. Since the 
objective is to minimize the red % and time %, these two performance metrics were 
normalized with respect to the minimum (best) variant value, then subsequently inverted.  
For example, the variant with the lowest value for time % scored a 1.0 on this adjusted 
scale.  
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The XTV summary figures are followed by sequence-related figures displaying 
the attribute effects and interactions in greater detail. For each of the eight performance 
metrics (four a priori and four a posteriori), a Pareto chart with supporting observations, 
as well as attribute interaction graphs with observations, are provided. The column 
adjoining the interaction charts includes a narrative and type classing of the attribute 
effects and relationships. Once again, an attribute within parentheses indicates a negative 
effect toward the performance metric. Moreover, if the attribute is followed by a σ, then it 
passed with an ANOVA F-test with at least 90% confidence. A complete summary of 
both XTV and XWV attribute effects, as well as an exhaustive list classifying each 
interaction chart by the four types previously discussed, is provided in Table 45 and 
Table 46. These two tables encapsulate the major observable and calculable trends from 
the 32 preceding figures. The referenced figures are included in column reference for 
each attribute and observed interaction.  
A catalog of component weights and costs was also compiled in order to produce 
a variant breakdown of mass and cost by attribute. Mass values were elicited from the 
JRATS design software; commensurate fractions of supporting mass for lethality and 
mobility components was calculated by virtual design of a simply supported set of 
parallel beams adequate enough to carry the load of the identified components. Figure 78 
includes the variant cost and schedule index values, plus a composite performance value 
depicted as the sum of win %, blue %, red % and time %. In order to investigate the 
learning curve of the mission operators as a function of user platform familiarity, the 
variant win % was calculated and averaged for each user after just 5 missions and 
subsequently compared to the final average at the completion of 15 missions per operator 
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Figure 59: XTV win % learning curve. The variant performance after the first 5 missions 
from each operator is compared against the final average. This is the average 
of each operator’s learning curve on each respective platform.188 
The enhanced survivability platform had the greatest learning curve, i.e., the 
change in win % after the first 5 missions when compared to the final average. Since this 
variant had the lowest mobility performance, with no gain in lethality, operators 
presumably struggled initially to maneuver around the city in the mission to destroy the 
threat platform. Aside from the baseline variant (XTV1), all other variants had a learning 
curve less than 3%.  
 
188 In this chart, and all that follow which depict the eight variants, the sequence of pluses and minuses 
correspond to the level of survivability, lethality, and mobility designed into the variant. For example, a 
“−−+” would signify acceptable levels of survivability and lethality, and an enhanced level of mobility. The 
letters beneath are lower case for low levels and capitalized for high levels. For example, the sequence “s L 
m” would indicate low levels of survivability and mobility, and a high level of lethality. 
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Figure 60: XTV a posteriori performance results with respect to time %, red %, blue %, 
and win %. 
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Figure 61: XTV a posteriori performance results normalized with respect to the best 
variant in each of the four performance metrics. 
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When the raw data from Figure 60 was normalized by the best variant in each of 
the four a posteriori performance metrics, as seen in Figure 61, several interesting 
observations were made. First, the top performing variants for win % all possessed 
enhanced levels of either lethality or mobility. Conversely, the variants possessing 
enhanced levels of survivability had lower win % than their numerical predecessors, with 
the sole exception of XTV8. Additionally, while several variants earned > 70% for win 
%, i.e., XTVs 3, 5, 7 and 8, enhanced lethality was conducive to a good time % 
performance as well. While enhanced mobility could create a win % commensurate with 
enhanced lethality, only lethality could also create a variant with the most competitive 
time % value. The decisive destruction of the threat platform, enabled by enhanced 
lethality, created the best win % values,  while simultaneously curtailing the mission, 
hence good time % values. Enhanced mobility was consistently associated with variants 
that had good red % values. An operator of a variant with enhanced mobility and 
acceptable lethality was forced to adopt an attrition style of combat. This meant that the 
nimbleness of the platform was used to put the vehicle in a position of advantage for 
employment of the machine gun. Whether the mission was a win or not, this fighting 
style reduced the threat vehicle health rating, thereby yielding good values for red %. 
An ANOVA routine, as explained previously, was done to determine the 
statistical significance of the effect. For any given effect (due to a single attribute or an 
interaction), if it passed an F-test at a 90% threshold, then that effect is followed by a σ 
on the appropriate Pareto figures, which illustrate the magnitude of the factor effect on 
the performance metric. Additionally, those attributes contributing negatively toward the 
metric of interest are labeled parenthetically. For example, if lethality were a statistically 
distinguishable factor in red %, then on the accompanying Pareto chart the respective bar 
would be labeled as “(L), σ”. Since the objective is to reduce the enemy’s combat power 
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(negative trend), this means that the attribute lethality is working to reduce the enemy 
vehicle fighting capacity, or red %. The sigma (σ) indicates this effect passed an ANOVA 

































σ: statistically distinguishable, >90% (F-test)
(A): negative effect, attribute A
 
Figure 62: Pareto chart of mass effects, XTVs. 
 All principal attributes had a distinguishable effect on mass. Survivability had the 
greatest effect on increasing variant mass for the XTVs. The average increase in variant 
mass from acceptable to enhanced levels of survivability was 180 kg, an increase of 
almost 12% with respect to the average XTV gross vehicle weight. The increase in armor 
density and thickness, while increasing the combat survivability index, placed a 
noticeable large mass penalty on the variant. Mobility had the second greatest effect on 
increasing XTV variant mass, but with less than half the relative increase when compared 
to survivability (80 kg versus 180 kg). This mass increase was associated with the larger 
powerplant and drivetrain. Lethality had the lowest effect on XTV variant mass with a 
contribution of 40 kg, 4 times as low as survivability and half as low as mobility. In this 
simple model, no interactions significantly effected mass.   
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The LS interaction is a type IIc, 
where lethality and survivability 
have an effect with no interaction. 
The marginal for lethality (40) is 
positive, indicating a mass 
penalty for enhanced lethality. 
The marginal for survivability 
(180) is higher, indicating a 
greater penalty. The change in 
slope (0) indicates no interaction 





The MS  interaction is a type IIc, 
where mobility and survivability 
have an effect with no interaction. 
The marginal for mobility (80) 
and survivability (180) are 
positive, indicating a mass 
penalty for enhanced survivability 
and mobility. The change in slope 
(0) indicates no interaction 





The ML interaction is a type IIc, 
where there is an effect from 
mobility and lethality but no 
interaction. The marginals for 
lethality (40) and mobility (80) 
are positive, indicating higher 
mass with enhanced lethality and 
mobility. The change in slope (0) 
indicates no interaction between 
mobility and lethality. 
 Figure 63: Interaction graphs of mass effects, XTVs. 
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σ: statistically distinguishable, >90% (F-test)
(A): negative effect, attribute A
 
Figure 64: Pareto chart of cost effects, XTVs. 
Here again, all principal attributes had a distinguishable effects on cost. Lethality 
had the greatest effect on increasing variant cost for the XTVs. The average increase in 
variant mass from acceptable to enhanced levels of survivability was nearly $1.5 million 
(M), an increase of almost 20% with respect to the average XTV per vehicle price tag. 
The high premium associated with the addition of the guided missile system was a costly 
upgrade that was reflected in the possession of enhanced lethality. Survivability had the 
second greatest effect on increasing XTV variant cost, but at only one-third the relative 
increase when compared to lethality ($0.52 M versus $1.5 M). Mobility had the lowest 
effect on XTV variant cost with an effect nearly 4 times as low as lethality. The 
components associated with enhanced mobility, i.e., the high output powerplant, were 
relatively inexpensive with respect to variant cost. 
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The LS interaction is a type IIc, 
where both lethality and 
survivability have an effect with 
no interaction. The marginal for 
lethality (1.5) is positive, 
indicating higher cost for 
enhanced lethality. The marginal 
for survivability (0.5) is lower 
but also positive. The small 
relative change in slope (0.2) 





The MS  interaction is also of 
type IIc, where mobility and 
survivability have an effect in the 
absence of interaction. The 
marginal for mobility (0.4) and 
survivability (0.5) are positive, 
indicating a mass penalty for 
enhanced survivability and 
mobility. The change in slope (0) 
indicates no interaction between 
survivability and mobility. 
 
 
The ML interaction is a type IIc, 
where there is an effect from 
mobility and lethality but no 
interaction. The marginal for 
lethality (1.5) and mobility (0.4) 
are positive, indicating increased 
cost with enhanced lethality and 
mobility. The change in slope is 
relatively low (0.1) indicating 
minimal interaction between 
mobility and lethality. 
Figure 65: Interaction graphs of cost effects, XTVs. 
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σ: statistically distinguishable, >90% (F-test)
(A): negative effect, attribute A
 
Figure 66: Pareto chart of volume effects, XTVs. 
Survivability had by far the greatest and only statistically distinguishable effect on 
increasing variant volume for the XTVs. The average increase in variant occupied 
volume from acceptable to enhanced levels of survivability was more than 8 m3, an 
increase over 50% with respect to the average XTV vehicle volume. The possession of an 
enhanced level of survivability, created by upgrading the armor material, made the 
platform grow substantially in length and width in order to accommodate the material and 
provide the increased space for the armor. Mobility and lethality trailed far behind 
survivability with approximately a 1 m3  increase in variant volume associated with those 
two attributes. While enhanced mobility was largely internal to the structure, enhanced 
lethality made the vehicle grow in height to accommodate the missile launcher.  
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The LS interaction is a type IIa, 
where survivability has an effect 
with no interaction. The marginal 
for lethality (1) indicates a slight 
increase in volume for enhanced 
lethality. The marginal for 
survivability  (8) indicates a large 
increase in volume for enhanced 
survivability. The relatively small 
change in slope (1) indicates no 
significant interaction.  
 
 
The MS  interaction is a type IIa, 
where survivability has an effect 
with no interaction. The marginal 
for mobility (-1) and survivability 
(8) are negative and positive, 
indicating a small decrease and 
large increase in variant volume 
for enhanced mobility and 
survivability respectively. The 
change in slope (2) indicates no 
significant interaction between 




The ML interaction is a type I, 
where there is no significant 
effect from lethality or mobility. 
The marginal for lethality (1) and 
mobility  (1) indicate a small 
penalty for enhanced lethality and 
mobility with respect to the 
variant volume. The change in 
slope (1) indicates minimal 
interaction between mobility and 
lethality. 
Figure 67: Interaction graphs of volume, XTVs. 
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σ: statistically distinguishable, >90% (F-test)
(A): negative effect, attribute A
 
Figure 68: Pareto chart of schedule index effects, XTVs. 
Lethality had the greatest effect on increasing schedule index for the XTVs. The 
average increase in variant schedule index from acceptable to enhanced levels of lethality 
was nearly 30, an increase of almost 18% with respect to the average XTV schedule 
index. Since enhanced lethality increased the developmental costs so substantially, this 
affected the schedule index in the same manner. Survivability was the second most 
expensive attribute, and this financial impact was observable with its ranking behind 
lethality in schedule index. The pursuit of greater survivability would incur extra 
manufacturing and production costs, thereby increasing the associated schedule for that 
attribute. Interestingly, the interaction SLM is nontrivial, albeit its origin is not currently 
obvious. 
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The LS interaction is a type IVc, 
where survivability and lethality 
have an effect as well as an 
interaction. The marginal for 
lethality (29) is positive, 
indicating higher schedule index 
for enhanced lethality. The 
marginal for survivability  (17) 
indicates increased schedule index 
for enhanced survivability. The 
relative change in slope (27) 
indicates an interaction.  
 
The MS  interaction is a type IVb, 
where mobility has an effect as 
well as an interaction. The 
marginal for mobility (-12) and 
survivability (17) are negative and 
positive, indicating a decrease and 
increase in schedule index for 
enhanced mobility and 
survivability respectively. The 
change in slope (26) indicates an 
interaction between survivability 
and mobility. 
 
The ML interaction is a type IVa, 
where there is an effect from 
lethality as well as an interaction. 
The marginal for lethality (29) 
and mobility  (-12) indicate a 
penalty for enhanced lethality and 
a benefit for enhanced mobility 
with respect to the schedule index. 
The change in slope (33) indicates 
interaction between mobility and 
lethality. 
Figure 69: Interaction graphs of schedule index effects, XTVs. 
245 














σ: statistically distinguishable, >90% (F-test)
(A): negative effect, attribute A
 
Figure 70: Pareto chart of win % effects, XTVs. 
 Lethality had the greatest effect on win % for the XTVs. The average increase in 
win % from acceptable to enhanced levels of lethality was greater than 26%. With respect 
to the average XTV win %, this is an increase of nearly 42%. The increased firepower 
associated with enhanced lethality yielded a weapon system that could destroy the threat 
in two shots, versus a persistent engagement over a long duration required with the 
acceptable level of lethality. Mobility ranked expectedly high, as the effect of enhanced 
movement contributed to dominant maneuver on the threat system. The average increase 
in win % index from acceptable to enhanced levels of mobility was nearly 19%. While 
the interaction between lethality and mobility was not statistically distinguishable in this 
simulation exercise, these two attributes that combine to create the vital military capacity 
to conduct maneuver, clearly combined to improve win %. Notably, survivability had a 
negative effect on win %, presumably because it hampered mobility. 
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The LS interaction is a type IVc, 
where both lethality and 
survivability have an effect as well 
as an interaction. The marginal for 
lethality (26) is positive, indicating 
a beneficial trend with enhanced 
lethality. The marginal for 
survivability (-10) is negative, 
indicating a penalty for enhanced 
survivability. The change in slope 
(17) indicates an interaction.  
 
 
The MS interaction is a type IIc, 
where there is an effect from 
mobility and survivability but not 
much interaction. The marginal for 
mobility (18) is positive, indicating 
a beneficial trend with enhanced 
mobility. The marginal for 
survivability (-10) is negative, 
indicating a penalty for enhanced 
survivability. The change in slope 
(0.5) is minimal, indicating a low 
level of interaction. 
 
The ML interaction is a type IVd, 
where there is an effect from both 
attributes as well as an interaction. 
The marginal for both mobility (18) 
and lethality (26) are positive, 
indicating a benefit in enhanced 
lethality and mobility. The change 
in slope is also high (23) indicating 
an interaction between mobility and 
lethality. 
Figure 71: Interaction graphs of win % effects, XTVs. 
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σ: statistically distinguishable, >90% (F-test)
(A): negative effect, attribute A
 
Figure 72: Pareto chart of blue % effects, XTVs. 
Lethality had the greatest effect on blue % for the XTVs. The average increase in 
blue % from acceptable to enhanced levels of lethality was over 8%. This was a 
surprising result, as it was expected that survivability would most greatly contribute 
toward better blue %. In fact, survivability had a negative effect on blue %. Contrary to 
initial thought, blue % was a proxy for lethality effectiveness and not survivability 
effectiveness. However, when survivability was added to an already lethal platform, it 
appeared to have a beneficial effect. With respect to the average XTV value, lethality 
improved blue % more than 9%. This single distinguished attribute had the only 
statistically distinguishable effect on blue % for XTVs. Lethality had an effect nearly 4 
times greater than the next ranking element, i.e., the interaction effect of survivability and 
lethality. Since the enhanced lethality more effectively enabled the removal of the threat 
from the battlefield, the enemy was denied an opportunity to engage the friendly 
platform, thereby contributing the greatest effect to blue %. 
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The LS interaction is a type IVb, 
where lethality has an effect as 
well as an interaction. The 
marginal for lethality (9) is 
positive, indicating a beneficial 
trend with enhanced lethality. The 
marginal for survivability (-1) is 
minimal, indicating a penalty for 
enhanced survivability. The 




The MS  interaction is a type IVa, 
where there is an effect from 
survivability as well as an 
interaction. The marginal for 
mobility (1) is positive, indicating 
a slight beneficial trend with 
enhanced mobility. The marginal 
for survivability (-1) is negative, 
indicating a penalty for enhanced 
survivability. The change in slope 
(3) is minimal, indicating a low 
level of interaction. 
 
The ML interaction is a type IVa, 
where there is an effect from 
lethality as well as a small 
interaction. The marginal for 
lethality (9) is positive, indicating 
a benefit in enhanced lethality, 
while the marginal for mobility 
(1) is small, indicating meager but 
positive effect with enhanced 
mobility. The change in slope is 
small (3) indicating a weak 
interaction between mobility and 
lethality. 
Figure 73: Interaction graphs of blue % effects, XTVs. 
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σ: statistically distinguishable, >90% (F-test)
(A): negative effect, attribute A
 
Figure 74: Pareto chart of red % effects, XTVs.  
Lethality and mobility had the greatest observed effects on red % for the XTVs. 
The average decrease in red % (parenthetically annotated in Figure 74) from acceptable 
to enhanced levels of lethality was over 15%. Mobility was the next most distinguishable 
attribute. The average decrease in red % (parenthetically annotated in Figure 74) from 
low to high levels of lethality was over 12%. Both lethality and mobility contributed to a 
reduction in red % at nearly the same level. The fighting style of an operator with a 
variant possessing an enhanced level of lethality fought categorically differently than an 
operator with a variant possessing an enhanced level of mobility. Since each could attain 
the same ends, i.e., the destruction of the threat platform, the apparent distinction between 
these two attributes is small. Enhanced survivability had a notable negative effect on the 
friendly platform’s ability to induce damage to the threat vehicle. The extra mass 
associated with this attribute diminished the ability to maneuver on the threat.  
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The LS interaction is a type 
IVc, where both lethality and 
survivability have an effect as 
well as an interaction. The 
marginal for lethality (-15) is 
negative, but this is beneficial 
since we desire the red health to 
be low. The marginal for 
survivability (10) is positive, 
indicating a penalty for 
enhanced survivability, i.e., 
higher enemy health. The 
change in slope (17) indicates 
an interaction.  
 
The MS  interaction is a type 
IIc, where there is an effect 
from mobility and survivability 
but no interaction. The marginal 
for mobility (-13) is negative, 
indicating a beneficial trend 
(lower enemy health) with 
enhanced mobility. The 
marginal for survivability (10) 
is positive, indicating a penalty 
for enhanced survivability. The 
change in slope (1) is minimal, 
indicating a low level of 
interaction. 
 
The ML interaction is a type 
IVd, where there is an effect 
from lethality as well as an 
interaction. The marginals 
lethality (-15) and mobility (-
12) are negative, indicating a 
benefit in enhanced lethality 
and mobility. The change in 
slope (10) indicates an 
interaction between mobility 
and lethality. 
Figure 75: Interaction graphs of red % effects, XTVs. 
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σ: statistically distinguishable, >90% (F-test)
(A): negative effect, attribute A
 
Figure 76: Pareto chart of time % effects, XTVs. 
Somewhat surprisingly, lethality, not mobility, had the greatest effect on time % 
for the XTVs. Initially, it was thought that the enhanced mobility would afford the 
operator with a platform that could more quickly navigate the environment and destroy 
the threat. While this was generally true, the decisive factor in reducing time % was not 
in movement, but in destroying the threat. A platform with enhanced mobility could 
move faster, but the time required to persistently attrit the enemy with the acceptable 
weapon system was longer than that associated with the enhanced lethality weapon 
system. The average decrease in time % (parenthetically annotated in Figure 76) from 
acceptable to enhanced levels of lethality was over 19%. This is a nearly 30% reduction 
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in mission time % with respect to the average time % for the XTV variants. Mobility was 
the next most distinguishable attribute with respect to reducing the time %. The average 
decrease in time % (parenthetically annotated in Figure 76) from acceptable to enhanced 
levels of lethality was over 11%. This is more than half as much of a relative reduction in 
time % with respect to the effect of lethality. Critically, reducing the mission time % 
concomitantly reduces the time the platform and crewmembers are placed at risk, as well 
as their attendant reliance on energy, supplied by vulnerable fuel convoys. These have 
direct implications at the operational level. Of all a posteriori metrics, time % stands out 
as a valuable indication of platform effectiveness. Again, dominant firepower and a 
nimble platform were winning characteristics for variant success.  
 
253 







































The LS interaction is a type IIb, 
where only lethality has an effect 
with meager interaction. The 
marginal for lethality (-19) is 
negative, but this is beneficial 
since it is desired that the mission 
time be low. The marginal for 
survivability (0.5) is positive, 
indicating an inconsequential 
penalty for enhanced survivability, 
i.e., longer time. The small change 
in slope (2) indicates minimal 
interaction.  
 
The MS  interaction is a type IVb, 
where only mobility has an effect 
as well as an interaction. The 
marginal for mobility (-12) is 
negative, indicating a beneficial 
trend (faster time) with enhanced 
mobility. The small marginal for 
survivability (0.5) is positive, 
indicating a penalty for enhanced 
survivability. The change in slope 
(5) indicates interaction between 
survivability and mobility. 
 
The ML interaction is a type IIc, 
where there is an effect from 
mobility and lethality but no 
interaction. The marginals for 
lethality (-20) and mobility (-12) 
are negative, indicating a benefit in 
enhanced lethality and mobility. 
The change in slope is low (1) 
indicating minimal interaction 
between mobility and lethality. 
Figure 77: Interaction graphs of time % effects, XTVs. 
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Figure 78: XTV cost, schedule, and performance (normalized by the best in category). 
Performance is the sum of the normalized values for variant win %, blue %, 
red %, and time % divided by the number of a posteriori metrics (4). Cost is 
the per vehicle cost normalized with respect to the variant with the lowest 
per vehicle cost. Schedule is the normalized schedule index with respect to 
the variant with the lowest schedule index. 
 When analyzing Figure 78, the cheapest variant also had the second best schedule 
index (XTV1). However, this variant also had the second worst performance value, 
where only XTV2 performed worse. The best performing variant (XTV8) was also the 
most expensive and had the worst schedule index. In essence, the high performance of the 
apex variant came at a price and with an attendant increase to the schedule index. All of 
the well performing candidates were also costly, given that the components associated 
with enhanced lethality were expensive to produce and develop. In essence, as with many 
pursuits, “you get what you pay for.” The categorical difference with a fighting vehicle, 
though, is the ultimate price a crewmember might pay for being second best.  A cheap, 
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but ineffective platform, is not really a bargain. This suggests controlling cost and 
schedule on a well-performing, robust candidate should be the goal. 
  
4.4.3 Experimental Wheeled Vehicle (XWV) Results and Observations 
The next 800 missions were conducted on the wheeled vehicle variants (XWVs). 
In identical reporting fashion to that previously presented for the tracked vehicle trials, a 
collection of figures followed by a similar series of Pareto charts and interaction graphs 
are presented. Figure 80 and Figure 81 provide a roll-up of the performance and 
normalized performance of the XWVs. These missions were conducted in the final 90 
minutes of the five-hour experimental session. There was no apparent degradation in 
operator performance due to fatigue; in fact, the win % for XWVs was higher than for the 
XTVs (60% versus 72%). The ordering of the blocks, as well as the session duration, 
were initial concerns in the creation of the aggressive test matrix. Since it was assumed 
the tracked vehicles (XTVs) would be unfamiliar to most operators, this block was done 
first to benefit from the increased alertness of the respondents. In hindsight, it appears 
this was unnecessary since the subjects in fact recorded the best performances with the 
XWVs. Again, a comparative assessment of the learning curve associated with the 
operator and the platform was conducted after five missions and compared to the final 
win percentage for the wheeled variants (Figure 79).  
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Figure 79: XWV win % learning curve. The variant performance after the first 5 missions 
from each operator is compared against the final average. This is the average 
of each operator’s learning curve on each respective platform. 
Similar in fashion to the results for the XTVs, the XWV learning curve was 
greatest for the enhanced survivability platform. Since this variant had the lowest 
mobility performance, with no gain in lethality, operators presumably struggled initially 
to maneuver around the city in the mission to destroy the threat platform. An apparent 
degradation in performance over time was notably different for the XWV variant results 
was. Most striking were the results for the apex design, XWV8, which experienced an 
over 5% drop in win % when the first 5 missions were compared to the final average. It 
may be conjectured, that the elevated baseline mobility for XWVs, enhanced even more 
for XWV5 and XWV8, caused operators to move in an ineffective or more “sloppy” 
fashion, suggesting that the platform performance is directly effected by operators.  
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Figure 80: XWV a posteriori performance results with respect to time %, red %, blue %, 
and win %. 
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Figure 81: XWV a posteriori performance results normalized with respect to the best 
variant in each the four performance metrics. 
258 
In similar fashion to the XTV results, when the raw data from Figure 80 was 
normalized as seen in Figure 81, several interesting observations were made. First, the 
top performing variants for win % all possessed enhanced levels of either lethality or 
mobility. Conversely, the variants possessing enhanced levels of survivability had lower 
win % than their numerical predecessors, with the sole exception of XWV8. 
Additionally, while several variants earned > 75% for win %, i.e., XWVs 3, 5, 6 and 8, 
enhanced lethality was conducive to a good time % performance as well. Mobility, as an 
attribute, was more pronounced in effect for the XWV results, as one might expect. The 
wheeled variants had better baseline mobility and could attain greater performance 
(speed, acceleration), even under the load of enhanced survivability. Additionally, 
enhanced mobility could create a win % commensurate with enhanced lethality, but only 
lethality could also create a variant with the most competitive time % value. The 
deliberate attrition of the threat platform, enabled by enhanced mobility and augmented 
by a heavy machinegun supplied with an inexhaustible source of ammunition, created the 
best win % values for the XWVs, albeit with the added risk of extended mission times. 
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σ: statistically distinguishable, >90% (F-test)
(A): negative effect, attribute A
 
Figure 82: Pareto chart of mass effects, XWVs. 
Like for XTVs, all three principal attributes had a distinguishable effect on mass. 
Survivability had the greatest effect on increasing variant mass for the XWVs. The 
average increase in variant mass from acceptable to enhanced levels of survivability was 
170 kg, an increase of over 18% with respect to the average XWV gross vehicle weight, a 
fraction about the same as seen with the XTVs. Mobility had the second greatest effect on 
increasing XWV variant mass, but at more than half the relative increase when compared 
to survivability (90 kg versus 170 kg), here again comparable to the XTVs. Lethality had 
the lowest effect on XWV variant mass with a contribution 5 times as low as 
survivability and one-third low as mobility. Enhanced mobility, achieved with the same 
high output powerplant used for the XTV, had a larger fractional effect on the XWVs 
because the baseline mass for the XWVs was lower.  
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The LS interaction is a type IIc, 
where both lethality and 
survivability have an effect with 
no interaction. The marginal for 
lethality (30) is positive, 
indicating a penalty in mass for 
enhanced lethality. The marginal 
for survivability (170) is much 
higher. The small change in 
relative slope (20) indicates a 




The MS  interaction is also of type 
IIc, where mobility and 
survivability have an effect in the 
absence of interaction. The 
marginal for mobility (90) and 
survivability (170) are positive, 
indicating a mass penalty for 
enhanced survivability and 
mobility. The change in slope (20) 
indicates minimal interaction 




The ML interaction is a type IIc, 
where there is an effect from 
mobility and lethality but no 
interaction. The marginals for 
lethality (30) and mobility (90) are 
positive, indicating higher mass 
with enhanced lethality and 
mobility. The change in slope is 
low (20) indicating minimal 
interaction between mobility and 
lethality. 
Figure 83: Interaction graphs of mass effects, XWVs. 
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σ: statistically distinguishable, >90% (F-test)
(A): negative effect, attribute A
 
Figure 84: Pareto chart of cost effects, XWVs. 
As with the results for the XTVs, all three principal attributes were statistically 
distinguishable with respect to XWV cost. Lethality had the greatest effect on increasing 
variant cost for the XWVs. The average increase in variant mass from acceptable to 
enhanced levels of survivability was over $1.4 million (M), an increase of almost 25% 
with respect to the average XWV per vehicle price tag. Survivability had the second 
greatest effect on increasing XWV variant cost, but at nearly one-third the relative 
increase when compared to lethality ($0.5 M versus $1.4 M). Mobility had the lowest 
effect on XWV variant cost with a contribution commensurate with lethality ($0.4 M). 
Here again, these values and the precedence of attributes was comparable to the XTVs. 
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The LS interaction is a type IIc, 
where both lethality and 
survivability have an effect with 
no interaction. The marginal for 
lethality (1.4) is positive, 
indicating higher cost for 
enhanced lethality. The marginal 
for survivability (0.5) is lower 
but also positive. The small 
relative change in slope (0.1) 





The MS  interaction is also of 
type IIc, where mobility and 
survivability have an effect in 
the absence of interaction. The 
marginal for mobility (0.4) and 
survivability (0.5) are positive, 
indicating a mass penalty for 
enhanced survivability and 
mobility. The change in slope 
(0.1) indicates a very low level 
of interaction between 
survivability and mobility. 
 
 
The ML interaction is a type IIc, 
where there is an effect from 
mobility and lethality but no 
interaction. The marginal for 
lethality (1.4) and mobility (0.4) 
are positive, indicating increased 
cost with enhanced lethality and 
mobility. The change in slope is 
relatively low (0.1) indicating 
minimal interaction between 
mobility and lethality. 
Figure 85: Interaction graphs of cost effects, XWVs. 
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σ: statistically distinguishable, >90% (F-test)
(A): negative effect, attribute A
 
Figure 86: Pareto chart of volume effects, XWVs. 
As with XTVs, survivability had by far the greatest effect on increasing variant 
volume for the XWVs. The average increase in variant volume from acceptable to 
enhanced levels of survivability was over than 4.5 m3, an increase over 40% with respect 
to the average XWV vehicle volume. The XWVs were nominally smaller than the XTVs, 
therefore the relative increase in volume for enhanced survivability was also lower. 
However, the trends for attribute effects for XWV variant volume were again comparable 
to the XTVs. Mobility and lethality trailed far behind survivability with approximately 
0.75 m3  increase in variant volume associated with those two attributes. There were no 
statistically distinguishable attribute interactions observed for XWV volume. 
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The LS interaction is a type IIa, 
where survivability has an effect 
with no interaction. The 
marginal for lethality (1) 
indicates a slight increase in 
volume for enhanced lethality. 
The marginal for survivability  
(5) indicates a large increase in 
volume for higher survivability. 
The relatively small change in 
slope (1) indicates no significant 
interaction.  
 
The MS  interaction is a type IIa, 
where survivability has an effect 
with no interaction. The 
marginal for mobility (-1) and 
survivability (5) are negative and 
positive, indicating a small 
decrease and large increase in 
variant volume for enhanced 
mobility and survivability 
respectively. The change in 
slope (2) indicates no significant 




The ML interaction is a type I, 
where there is no significant 
effect from lethality or mobility. 
The marginal for lethality (1) 
and mobility  (1) indicate a small 
penalty for enhanced lethality 
and mobility with respect to the 
variant volume. The change in 
slope (1) indicates minimal 
interaction between mobility and 
lethality. 
Figure 87: Interaction graphs of volume effects, XWVs. 
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σ: statistically distinguishable, >90% (F-test)
(A): negative effect, attribute A
 
Figure 88: Pareto chart of schedule index effects, XWVs. 
Lethality had the greatest effect on increasing schedule index for the XWVs, 
suggesting that particular attention should be paid to keep these components on schedule. 
The average increase in schedule index from acceptable to enhanced levels of lethality 
was nearly 43, a value greater than 25% of the average schedule index. Simultaneously 
pursuing enhanced lethality and mobility also adds to the schedule index. No other 
attribute effect, single or as a coupled interaction, had a statistically distinguishable effect 
on schedule index for the XWV variants. Since the nominal cost of the XWVs was less 
than the XTVs, but the components associated with lethality cost the same, the relative 
effect of this attribute was larger for XWV schedule index.  
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The LS interaction is a type IIc, 
where survivability and lethality 
have an effect but there is no 
interaction. The marginal for 
lethality (43) is positive, and the 
marginal for survivability  (18) is 
also positive. The low relative 
change in slope (1) indicates 






The MS  interaction is of type IIa, 
where mobility has no effect as 
well as no interaction. The 
marginal for mobility (5) 
indicates a slight increase in 
schedule index for enhanced 
mobility. The marginal for 
survivability (18) indicates a more 
substantial increase in schedule 
index for enhanced survivability. 
The change in slope (6) indicates 
a small interaction between 
survivability and mobility. 
 
The ML interaction is a type IVa, 
where there is an effect from 
lethality and interaction with 
mobility. The marginals for 
lethality (43) and mobility (5) 
indicate a  more significant 
penalty for enhanced lethality 
with respect to the schedule 
index. The change in slope (42) 
indicates interaction between 
mobility and lethality. 
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Figure 89: Interaction graphs of schedule index effects, XWVs. 













σ: statistically distinguishable, >90% (F-test)
(A): negative effect, attribute A
 
Figure 90: Pareto chart of win % effects, XWVs. 
Notably, mobility, not lethality, had the greatest effect on win % for the XWVs. 
This is, perhaps, not surprising, given wheeled platform’s intrinsically superior mobility 
in the urban environment depicted in the JRATS simulation. The average increase in win 
% from acceptable to enhanced levels of lethality was greater than 10%. The interactions 
between lethality and mobility as well as survivability and mobility outranked lethality in 
terms of commensurate level of effect on win % for XWVs, reflecting the fact that either 
enhanced lethality or survivability could be added to an enhanced mobility platform 
without deleterious effect on win %. The observed superiority of the interactions 
indicates that mobility had an additive effect on both lethality and survivability with 
respect to win %. Mobility, ranked first for XWV relative effect on win %, was ranked 
second for XTV relative effect on win %, right after lethality. At this point in the 
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experiment, the operators were able to leverage a commanding knowledge of the scenario 
and threat vehicle patterns and create mission success with either the acceptable or 
enhanced lethality.  
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The LS interaction is a type IVc, 
where both lethality and 
survivability have an effect as well 
as an interaction. The marginal for 
lethality (7) is positive, indicating 
a beneficial trend with enhanced 
lethality. The marginal for 
survivability (-5) is negative, 
indicating a penalty for enhanced 
survivability. The change in slope 
(10) indicates an interaction.  
 
The MS  interaction is a type IVc, 
where there is an effect from 
mobility and survivability as well 
as an interaction. The marginal for 
mobility (10) is positive, indicating 
a beneficial trend with enhanced 
mobility. The marginal for 
survivability (-10) is negative, 
indicating a penalty for enhanced 
survivability. The change in slope 
(8) indicates a moderate level of 
interaction. 
 
The ML interaction is a type IVd, 
where there is an effect from both 
attributes as well as an interaction. 
The marginals for both mobility 
(3) and lethality (13) are positive, 
indicating a benefit in enhanced 
lethality and mobility. The change 
in slope is (6) indicating an 
interaction between mobility and 
lethality. 
Figure 91: Interaction graphs of win % effects, XWVs.  
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σ: statistically distinguishable, >90% (F-test)
(A): negative effect, attribute A
 
Figure 92: Pareto chart of blue % effects, XWVs. 
The results for XWV blue % differed the most of any a posteriori performance 
metric when compared against the XTV results. Lethality had the greatest effect on blue 
% for the XWVs. The average increase in blue % index from acceptable to enhanced 
levels of lethality was over 8%. With respect to the average XWV blue %, this is an 
increase of more than 9%. The interaction between all three attributes of survivability, 
lethality, and mobility, as well as the interaction between survivability and lethality, also 
had a statistically distinguishable effect on blue % for XWVs at cascading levels of under 
7% and 5% respectively. The three-way interaction may be indicative of a balanced 
platform, one in which the attributes all contribute positively toward vehicle efficacy. 
Operating from a higher baseline of mobility performance, XWV blue % was positively 
influenced by the interaction of survivability and mobility. Since the XWV could move 
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better even with the enhanced survivability, the extra armor had a beneficial effect on 
blue % but critically only with the complement of enhanced lethality; otherwise, 
enhanced survivability, on its own, had a negative effect on blue %. Similar to the results 
for XTVs, lethality ranked first for XWV blue %. Again, the best way to protect the 
friendly platform was by removing the potential for the threat vehicle to induce an insult; 
it was not by simply adding armor. 
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The LS interaction is a type IVa, 
where lethality has an effect as 
well as an interaction. The 
marginal for lethality (8) is 
positive, indicating a beneficial 
trend with enhanced lethality. The 
marginal for survivability (-2) is 
minimal, indicating a small 
penalty for higher survivability. 
The change in slope (10) indicates 
an interaction.  
 
 
The MS  interaction is a type IVc, 
where there is an effect from 
survivability but no significant 
interaction. The marginal for 
mobility (1) is positive, indicating 
a slight beneficial trend with 
enhanced mobility. The marginal 
for survivability (-3) is negative, 
indicating a penalty for higher 
survivability. The change in slope 
(1) is minimal, indicating a low 
level of interaction. 
 
The ML interaction is a type IVa, 
where there is an effect from 
lethality as well as an interaction. 
The marginal lethality (7) is 
positive, indicating a benefit in 
enhanced lethality, while the 
marginal for mobility (1) is small, 
indicating meager but positive 
effect with enhanced mobility. 
The change in slope is high (8) 
indicating an interaction between 
mobility and lethality. 
Figure 93: Interaction graphs of blue % effects, XWVs.  
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σ: statistically distinguishable, >90% (F-test)
(A): negative effect, attribute A
 
Figure 94: Pareto chart of red % effects, XWVs. 
For the XWVs, mobility had the greatest effect on red %.  For the same reasons 
stated for win %, the possession of enhanced mobility atop a commanding knowledge of 
the threat platform created detrimental effects for the enemy vehicle. And again, since the 
persistent attrition of threat health via an attack with machineguns would erode this 
metric regardless of a win, mobility was the most dominant attribute for XWV red %. 
The average decrease in red % (parenthetically annotated in Figure 68) from acceptable 
to enhanced levels of mobility was nearly 8%.  There was also a positive interaction 
between survivability and mobility, presumably because the enhanced mobility platform 
was not substantially hampered by the heavier armor. Moreover, the extra protection 
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afforded by enhanced survivability enabled the friendly system to survive in the game 
longer, providing more time to attrit the threat health and contribute to a decrease in red 
%.  
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The LS interaction is a type IVc, 
where both lethality and 
survivability have an effect as 
well as an interaction. The 
marginal for lethality (-8) is 
negative, but this is beneficial 
since we desire the red health to 
be low. The marginal for 
survivability (5) is positive, 
indicating a penalty for 
enhanced survivability, i.e., 
higher enemy health. The change 
in slope (2) indicates minimal 
interaction.  
 
The MS  interaction is a type 
IVc, where there is an effect 
from mobility and survivability 
as well as an interaction. The 
marginal for mobility (-10) is 
negative, indicating a beneficial 
trend (lower enemy health) with 
enhanced mobility. The marginal 
for survivability (5) is positive, 
indicating a penalty for higher 
survivability. The change in 
slope (2) is also minimal, 
indicating a low level of 
interaction. 
 
The ML interaction is a type 
IVd, where there is an effect 
from lethality as well as an 
interaction. The marginals 
lethality (-8) and mobility (-10) 
are negative, indicating a benefit 
in enhanced lethality and 
mobility. The change in slope is 
high (8) indicating a strong 
interaction between mobility and 
lethality. 
Figure 95: Interaction graphs of red % effects, XWVs. 
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σ: statistically distinguishable, >90% (F-test)
(A): negative effect, attribute A
 
Figure 96: Pareto chart of time % effects, XWVs.   
Surprisingly, lethality, not mobility, clearly had the greatest effect on time % for 
the XWVs. The average decrease in time % (parenthetically annotated in Figure 96) from 
acceptable to enhanced levels of lethality was over 14%. This is a nearly 37% reduction 
in mission time with respect to the average time % for the XWV variants. The interaction 
between survivability and mobility, as well as mobility alone were the next most 
distinguishable attributes with respect to reducing the time %. The average decrease in 
time % (parenthetically annotated in Figure 96) from low to high levels of lethality was 
over 8% for both. While an operator with the XWV variant could achieve commensurate 
levels of win %, blue %, and red % with a highly mobile platform, enhanced lethality was 
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the attribute that could most definitively reduce the time to complete the mission. This 
was consistent across both XTV and XWV platforms. Additional armor was truly 
beneficial on an enhanced mobility, or to a less extent, an enhanced lethality platform; 
otherwise, it degraded performance noticeably.  
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The LS interaction is a type IVc, 
where lethality and survivability 
have an effect with an interaction. 
The marginal for lethality (-7) is 
negative, but this is beneficial since 
we desire the mission time to be 
low. The marginal for survivability 
(14) is positive, indicating a penalty 
for enhanced survivability, i.e., 
longer time. The small change in 
slope (5) indicates minimal 
interaction.  
 
The MS  interaction is a type IVc, 
where mobility and survivability 
have an effect as well as an 
interaction. The marginal for 
mobility (12) is positive, indicating 
greater time with enhanced 
mobility. The marginal for 
survivability (-5) is negative, 
indicating a reduction for enhanced 
survivability. The change in slope 
(6) indicates interaction between 
survivability and mobility. 
 
The ML interaction is a type IVa, 
where there is an effect from as 
well as an interaction. The 
marginals for lethality (-9) and 
mobility (-1) are negative, 
indicating a benefit in enhanced 
lethality and mobility. The change 
in slope is high (14) indicating 
interaction between mobility and 
lethality. 
Figure 97: Interaction graphs of time % effects, XWVs. 
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XWV Cost, Schedule, and Performance, Normalized
1.00 0.93 0.82 0.77
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Figure 98: XWV cost, schedule, and performance (normalized). Performance is the sum 
of the normalized values for variant win %, blue %, red %, and time % 
divided by the number of metrics (4). Cost is the per vehicle cost normalized 
with respect to the variant with the lowest per vehicle cost. Schedule is the 
normalized schedule index with respect to the variant with the lowest 
schedule index.  
In similar fashion to the analysis done for the XTVs, when analyzing Figure 98, 
the cheapest variant also had the second worst performance value, where only XWV2 
performed worse. The best performing variant, XWV8, was the most expensive and had 
the worst schedule index. Again, the high performance of the apex variant came at a steep 
price and with considerable increase to the schedule index. While the two top performing 
candidates were fairly costly (XWV3 and XWV8), unlike the XTVs, mobility had a more 
dominant role in improving performance. Since this attribute was much cheaper to 
develop at an enhanced level, this created economical variants with performance 
approaching that of an enhanced lethality variant.  
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Table 45: Statistically Distinguishable (> 90% F-test) Attributes With Respect To XTV 
and XWV Performance Metrics 







Figure Page σattribute(s) Figure Page 
mass S, M, L Figure 62 237 S, M, L Figure 82 260 
cost L, S, M Figure 64 239 L, S, M Figure 84 261 




L Figure 68 243 L Figure 88 265 
win % L, M Figure 70 245 none Figure 90 267 
blue % L Figure 72 247 L, SL Figure 92 270 
red % none Figure 74 249 M Figure 94 273 
a posteriori 
time % L, M Figure 76 251 L, M Figure 96 276 
 
The attributes affecting a priori performance metrics were very consistent 
between XTVs and XWVs. While survivability dominated the mass and volume of both 
tracked and wheeled vehicles, lethality was the greatest source of cost and increasing 
schedule index. The XTVs and XWVs shared all components and design choices across 
the two blocks of the experiment, and aside from the vehicle configuration and size, the 
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components and subsystems were identical, e.g. XTV 8 and XWV 8. Therefore, it was 
expected that the attributes affecting these metrics would be consistent across blocks. 
The results for the a posteriori performance metrics for XTVs and XWVs were 
similar, but more distinct across design configuration. Mobility took on a greater 
precedence for its contribution to XWV performance than it did for XTVs. In both XTVs 
and XWVs, lethality was the most significant attribute contributing toward improved 
time %. Unlike the other three a posteriori performance metrics, time % is insensitive to 
the means by which it is achieved. From this perspective, the value of lethality stood out 
for both XTVs and XWVs in enabling the mission to be completed as quickly as possible, 
thereby producing efficient and effective platforms. 
 
With respect to attribute interactions, Table 46 serves as a cross-reference source 
for the type-classing of all principal attribute interactions for the a priori and a posteriori 
performance metrics. For example, if one was interested in the interactions associated 
with XTV mass, this table includes the graphs, type-classing of the interactions, and page 











Table 46: Principal Attribute Interactions Classified and Cross Referenced for XTV and 
XWV Performance Metrics 
  XTV XWV 
Performance 
Metric 
 Type Effects Figure Page Type Effects Figure Page 
LS IIc L, S  Figure 63 238 IIc L, S Figure 82 259 
MS IIc M, S  Figure 63 238 IIc M, S Figure 82 259 mass 
ML IIc M, L  Figure 63 238 IIc M, L Figure 82 259 
LS IIc L, S Figure 65 240 IIc L, S Figure 85 262 
MS IIc M, S Figure 65 240 IIc M, S Figure 85 262 cost 
ML IIc M, L Figure 65 240 IIc M, L Figure 85 262 
LS IIa S Figure 67 242 IIa S Figure 87 264 
MS IIa S Figure 67 242 IIa S Figure 87 264 volume 
ML I none Figure 67 242 I none Figure 87 264 
LS IVc L, S, LS Figure 69 244 IIc L, S Figure 89 267 
MS IVb S, MS Figure 69 244 IIa S Figure 89 267 
schedule 
index 
ML IVa M, ML Figure 69 244 IIb L, ML Figure 89 267 
LS IVc L, S, LS Figure 71 246 IVc L, S, LS Figure 91 269 
MS IIc M, S Figure 71 246 IVc M, S, MS Figure 91 269 win % 
ML IVd M, L, ML Figure 71 246 IVd M, L, ML Figure 91 269 
LS IVb L, LS Figure 73 248 IVa S, LS Figure 93 272 
MS IVa S, MS Figure 73 248 IVc M, S, MS  Figure 93 272 blue % 
ML IVa L, LM Figure 73 248 IVa L, LM Figure 93 272 
LS IVc L, S, LS Figure 75 250 IVc L, S, LS Figure 95 275 
MS IIc S, M Figure 75 250 IVc M, S, MS Figure 95 275 red % 
ML IVd M, L, ML Figure 75 250 IVd M, L, ML Figure 95 275 
LS IIb L Figure 77 253 IVc L, S, LS Figure 97 278 
MS IVb M, MS Figure 77 253 IVc M, S, MS Figure 97 278 time % 
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Figure 99: Average variant win record (XTV and XWV) in a survivability, lethality, and 
mobility domain. An XTV and XWV variant coincident at a point share the 
same relative levels of survivability, lethality, and mobility. 
4.5 Relative Contributions and Interactions of Survivability, Lethality, and 
Mobility on Ground Combat Vehicle Performance   
The results from the XTV and XWV JRATS missions (approximately 100 
missions per variant) provided data for the four a priori performance metrics (mass, cost, 
volume, and schedule index) and the four a posteriori performance metrics (win %, blue 
%, red %, and time %). The following analysis is focused on the attribute effects and 
interactions contributing toward the observable trends and distinguishable contributions 
toward performance metric values when evaluating the difference between an acceptable 
and enhanced attribute level. 
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4.5.1 Analysis of Attribute Effects and Interactions On A Priori Performance 
Metrics of Mass, Cost, and Schedule Index 
The DOE/ANOVA attribute effect analysis conducted on the three design metrics 
of mass, cost, and schedule index, was done with the absolute values produced from the 
JRATS design report. Having previously presented the results and observations on these 
values, more detailed analysis on the a priori performance metrics follows. A 
consolidated chart of the relative effects is first presented (Figure 100). In this chart, the 
attribute effects have been normalized with respect to the largest attribute effect. A red 
bar indicates a negative effect on the a priori metric of interest, and a green bar indicates 




























































Figure 100:  Effects of principal attributes on a priori performance metrics for XTVs and 
XWVs. A red bar indicates a negative effect on the metric, and a green bar 
indicates a positive effect on the metric. The length of the bar has been 
scaled in length with respect to the greatest effect for that metric in the XTV 






For both XTV and XWV variants, higher survivability had the greatest 
statistically distinguishable impact on vehicle mass (Figure 62 and Figure 82). The 
pursuit of higher survivability was achieved by upgrading the armor material from steel 
to depleted uranium. At high impact velocity, the denser armor material is better at 
retarding a penetrator’s progress through the armor. High vehicle mass can also serve to 
diminish the effect of a blast by reducing global acceleration of the vehicle. While this 
denser material yielded a higher combat survivability index (CSI) rating, it produced an 
effect on mass more than twice that of the next ranking statistically distinguishable 
attribute, mobility. This finding is not surprising, as the armor commensurate with a well- 
protected combat vehicle comes at a penalty; in this case, high gross vehicle weight, can 
impede tactical movement as well as limit inter and intratheater transportability or 
operational and strategic mobility. All of the variants were of the same order in gross 
vehicle weight, with the difference in mass between the minimum and maximum XTV 
and XWV variants found to be 18% and 27% respectively. However, the average XTV 
was nearly 40% heavier then the average XWV, indicative of the penalty for possessing a 
higher CSI that comes with  greater mass, heavier armor and a tracked platform. 
From the vehicle mass breakdown analysis, it was clear that survivability assumed 
the largest fraction of mass penalty on the platform. Again, this was consistent with the 
results from Chapter 2 in which this attribute not only affected vehicle mass at the 
greatest rate, but also worked against the other principal attributes. The even-numbered 
XTV and XWV variants, which had high levels of survivability possessed, on average, 
11% and 17% greater mass, respectively, than the odd-numbered XTVs and XWVs. 
While there were no statistically distinguishable interactions for mass, in practice, if the 
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vehicle mobility performance were held constant with respect to the load requirement 
(gross vehicle weight), then one should expect an interaction between the attribute of 
survivability and mobility. The assumption of more weight for greater protection will 
lead to higher demand for capability associated with the attribute of mobility.  
Mobility was the next ranking statistically distinguishable attribute on platform 
mass. As the virtual “bill payer” to transport the array of combat vehicle sub-systems, this 
was an expected result indicative of the large mass associated with complete powerplant 
and drivetrain sub-systems. Lethality ranked last in principal attribute relative effect on 
vehicle mass. This matches conventional systems that have collective masses of 
protective material and drivetrain components that dwarf the mass associated with the 
weapon system. For example, the Abrams tank weighs over 70,000 kg, but the entire 
cannon system to include the fire control system and a full complement of ammunition 
weighs less than 5,000 kg. 
 
4.5.1.2 Cost 
For both the XTV and XWV variants, higher lethality had the greatest statistically 
distinguishable impact on vehicle cost (Figure 64 and Figure 84). In fact, as can be seen 
in those figures, the effect from lethality on vehicle cost was nearly three times that of the 
next ranking attribute. The sophisticated nature and high technology related to modern 
combat systems remains a costly pursuit, particularly with the weaponry. The JRATS 
simulation placed a heavy premium on the high-performance lethality components like 
guided missiles and laser targeting and guidance system. 
From the design reports, it also appeared that lethality caused the most 
distinguishable increase in per-unit cost. This was a relatively simple vehicle to design 
and virtually construct; however, analysis of this type on a more complex system would 
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still be valuable to identify analogous critical pathways for the mass and cash associated 
with a system. When considering a program management tool like a Gannt chart, the 
critical pathway on a system is often the one identified as having the longest lead-time or 
the one with the greatest interconnectedness and relative reliance from other systems.  
In the words of Norman Augustine, “agony is equal to ecstasy cubed”, a reference 
to prior work that illustrates the extreme increase in cost (agony) for incremental gains in 
performance (ecstasy). In these cases, every variant was relatively expensive and heavy. 
The cost ranges, between most and least expensive variants were of a similar scale with 
28% for XTV and 27% for XWV candidates. Fighting vehicle performance comes at a 
high cost, but paramountly, failure to attain supreme performance over a foe consumes 
energy resources and potentially incurs the ultimate price, both to crew and to the nation 
which allocated resources in the first place. Survivability and mobility ranked behind 
lethality in terms of relative effect on vehicle cost. That said, enhanced protection 
technologies can be costly endeavors, and the physical challenges associated with 
defeating an insult on length and time scales an order of magnitude less than what is 
required to generate the insult are not trivial. As an attribute, one would expect mobility 
to have the lowest relative contribution to platform cost, since this is a relatively 
straightforward design effort that can leverage off commercial efforts. 
 
4.5.1.3 Volume 
The attribute that had the greatest effect on vehicle volume for the XTVs and 
XWVs was survivability (Figure 66 and Figure 86). This single attribute dominated the 
others with respect to the observed increase in vehicle volume at low and high levels. The 
enhanced armor associated with the highest combat survivability index caused a large 
increase, not only in vehicle mass, but also in vehicle volume. It should be noted that this 
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relative improvement in protection was geared toward reducing vulnerability at the 
expense of being more susceptible. Statically, a vehicle with a greater presented area is 
more susceptible to attack, but may be more resistant to insult if the invulnerability is 
great enough. Dynamically, a vehicle that is sluggish, i.e., presents an easier target, could 
again be more susceptible to attack, but at the same time more resistant to insult if the 
invulnerability is great enough. More simply, big boxes are easier to hit than small boxes, 
and slow boxes are easier to hit than fast boxes. 
The larger volumes occupied by the vehicles with greater protective levels of 
armor presented the threat platform with a larger target. More specifically, the greater 
survivability increased the length and width, or footprint of the platform, while the 
lethality increased the height of the platform. The greater lethality enabled by the guided 
missile system, which sat on a slightly elevated pedestal mount that increased the height 
of the vehicle by approximately 0.5 m. Navigating through the small city did not present 
any obstructions to vehicular movement, but in a more realistic environment the larger 
volume of the well-armored vehicles may have restricted movement for these variants in 
restricted terrain.  
 
4.5.1.4 Schedule Index 
The attribute that had the greatest effect on the schedule index on the XTVs and 
XWVs was lethality (Figure 68 and Figure 88). As previously discussed, this index was 
created from design report outputs in order to compile a nondimensional value depicting 
schedule considerations. An enhanced level of lethality brings with it increased cost and 
developmental effort. Therefore, in practice, it is probable that an advanced form of 
firepower could have the biggest impact on a schedule. As a group, the XTVs had 
slightly higher average schedule indices than the XWVs (172 versus 168). The pursuit of 
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enhanced levels of survivability could also bring with it increased effect on the schedule 
index. In order to break the survivability paradox, i.e., that increased levels of protection 
through conventional means can make a system simultaneously less vulnerable to insult, 
but more susceptible to insult, a more mass and volumetrically efficient means of system 
protection is needed, say a surface that can visually cloak the vehicle with the 
background. Whether this pursuit is for an active, passive, or combination active/passive 
protection system, the effort to improve survivability will incur a large relative effect on 
the schedule index. 
Again, in practice, there is considerable uncertainty associated with each of these 
values. Historically, cost overruns and schedule delays are more often the rule than the 
exception. In fact, cost and schedule often defer in priority to the absolute pursuit of 
supreme performance. The demonstrated DOE approach, with the inclusion of 
uncertainty related to attribute mass, cost, and schedule, could forecast programmatic 
impacts to cost, performance, and schedule through a sensitivity analysis and the related 
impact on program objectives. For example, since the effect on mass associated with 
lethality was quite small, even great uncertainty regarding the component weights 
dedicated to enabling this attribute would have a relatively low net effect on the gross 
vehicle weight. However, since survivability dominated the mass of the vehicle, even 
small uncertainty related to the protective components comprising the platform could 
potentially have a greater mass penalty on the system.   
 
4.5.2 Analysis of Attribute Effects and Interactions On A Posteriori Performance 
Metrics of Win %, Blue %, Red %, and Time % 
The attribute weighting results from Chapter 3 indicated that survivability held 
greatest precedence with survey respondents. The subjective metric crosswalk exercises 
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done in Chapter 2 qualitatively demonstrated that the pursuit of greater levels of 
survivability compete with the attributes of lethality and mobility, since the mass 
associated with conventional armor protection can reduce the ability to maneuver or fire 
and move on the enemy from a position of advantage. Going into these exercises, it was 
somewhat expected that for all performance metrics, variant performance would begin at 
some arbitrarily low value for the minus-minus-minus (acceptable survivability, lethality, 
and mobility) vehicle, then slowly increase in efficacy until peak performance was 
observed for the plus-plus-plus (enhanced survivability, lethality, and mobility) vehicle. 
While this trend was generally true for both the XTVs and XWVs, some interesting 
patterns were observed, as well as some consistently dominant attributes with respect to 
the performance metrics of win %, blue %, red %, and time %. 
A consolidated chart of the relative effects is first presented (Figure 101). In this 
chart, the attribute effects have been normalized with respect to the largest attribute 
effect. A red bar indicates a negative effect on the a posteriori metric of interest, and a 


































































Figure 101: Effects of principal attributes on a posteriori performance metrics for XTVs 
and XWVs. A red bar indicates a negative effect on the metric, and a green 
bar indicates a positive effect on the metric. The length of the bar has been 
scaled in length with respect to the greatest effect for that metric in the XTV 
or XWV block. 
4.5.2.1 Win % 
For both XTVs and XWVs, lethality was the dominant attribute that contributed 
to the greatest increase in win % (Figure 70 and Figure 90). The advanced weaponry 
afforded to the variants with high levels of lethality demonstrated an increased ability to 
engage and destroy the threat vehicle in the JRATS simulation. Afforded to the operators 
with the addition of a potent guided missile system, the increased standoff and greater 
probability of kill that accompanied greater lethality improved variant win % markedly. 
The seek and destroy mission was most successfully pursued with a dominant source of 
firepower. As a group, the XWVs had nearly a 10% greater win % average than the 
XTVs at 72% to 60% respectively. Since the XWV block followed the XTV block, some 
fraction of the advantage may be credited to the experience gained from nearly 3 hours of 
simulation training and XTV missions. Additionally, all operators possessed driver’s 
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licenses, but notably none had ever driven a tracked vehicle prior to the exercise. While 
both the XTV and XWV variant peak win % came from the superlative design (+++ or 
XTV8 and XWV8), these variants only slightly edged out win % greater than lighter, 
cheaper variants that had high levels of lethality (Figure 59 and Figure 79). The greater 
lethality allowed the user to engage and destroy the threat platform in 2 decisive shots, 
while the lower lethality required a more concerted effort to continually engage the threat 
platform until the health rating had been attritted to zero. 
 
4.5.2.2 Blue % 
In similar fashion to the observations for win %, the XTV and XWV blue % 
performance metric was dominated by the effects of lethality (Figure 72 and Figure 92). 
Since the engagement scenario was evenly sided and conventional, the best protection 
appeared to be afforded by simply removing the threat from the battlefield altogether. 
This elimination was most heavily influenced by the possession of advanced levels of 
weaponry, but also enhanced mobility. In other words, in this notional and conventional 
fight in an urban environment, the best defense was offense. If the threat could be 
defeated prior to insulting the friendly platform, this gave the greatest protective benefit 
to the metric of blue %. Denying the threat an opportunity to engage the friendly vehicle 
had the most substantial effect on increasing blue % than in simply armoring the 
platform.  
Survivability had a slight negative effect on blue % for both the XTV and XWV 
variants. The extra armor, while increasing the combat survivability index of the variant, 
made it a larger, slower and generally less nimble target. Mobility had a slight positive 
effect on blue % for both the XTV and XWV. The advanced level of movement afforded 
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by the larger powerplant not only aided in maneuver, but reduced the susceptibility of the 
friendly platform by making it a more challenging target to hit.  
 
4.5.2.3 Red % 
For the XTVs, red % was most influenced by lethality (Figure 74), while for the 
XWVs, red % was most influenced by mobility (Figure 94). As a group, the XWVs 
induced more damage to the threat vehicles than the XTVs on an order similar to the 
advantage observed in the difference between win %. The XWV block of missions 
occurred after the XTV block, and at this point the operators had a commanding 
knowledge of the simulation scenario, as well as the threat vehicle search patterns. The 
possession of enhanced mobility enabled the operator to place a sustained rate of machine 
gun fire onto the threat platform, thereby reducing the threat health regardless of whether 
the mission ended with a win or not.  
 
4.5.2.4 Time % 
For both XTVs and XWVs, lethality was the dominant attribute for improving 
time % (Figure 76 and Figure 96), with the XTVs also being heavily influenced by 
mobility. Unlike the other a posteriori metrics, time % was singularly the only metric that 
could be measured irrespective of tactic or technique. For example, two radically 
different fighting styles employed on two unique variants may have produced similar 
values for performance with respect to win %, blue %, and red %, but the value for time 
% would serve as an independent measure of how quickly the mission was run regardless 
of tactic or technique.  
The XWVs, possessing an already higher level of inherent mobility, did not 
observe the same commensurate benefit of higher mobility.  As a class of vehicles, the 
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XWVs were markedly faster at completing the mission, enjoying more than a 20% 
advantage (lower value) in time % over the XTVs (37% versus 59%). The XWVs 
themselves were faster, and since the simulation was topographically benign and without 
cross country movement or obstacles, the potential advantage of a tracked configuration 
possessed by the XTVs were not demonstrable in this scenario. Additionally, as with the 
other a posteriori performance metrics, the operators during the XWV block had virtually 
mastered the game, both from an environmental consideration and from an enemy 
perspective. At this point in the experiment, the operators could virtually anticipate the 
spawning location and search patterns of the threat, thereby reducing the time % 
remarkably. Considering lethality and mobility as the constitutive elements of maneuver 
warfare, the XTV and XWV blocks demonstrated that these two attributes, either 
employed uniquely or in combination, led to the greatest reduction in time %. As an a 
posteriori attribute, this was the most conclusive, since various tactics and techniques 
may have produced a comparable win %, blue %, or red %, but only a fast, decisive 
engagement could affect the a posteriori metric of time % (Figure 76 and Figure 96).  
  
4.5.3 Effects of Survivability 
As previously noted, survivability had the greatest impact on increasing XTV and 
XWV mass and volume. It was the second most dominant attribute with respect to 
increasing per vehicle cost. The weight associated with the armor dominated the vehicle 
mass breakdown analysis and imposed a heavy (no pun intended) consequence on gross 
vehicle weight. The extra armor, assumed to be composed in a complex array similar to 
modern armor, had an even greater effect on variant volume. The higher protective levels 
increased the occupied volume by almost 50%. The deployability index was also 
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hampered by the increased survivability associated with even-numbered XTV and XWV 
variants. 
When analyzing the a posteriori metrics, while an upward trend was generally 
true from variant 1 to 8, i.e., that the performance for the first variant achieved some low 
level and gradually grew to some high level for the final variant, the surprising results 
were the downturns observed when system survivability increased at the exclusion of 
both enhanced lethality and mobility. As a sole factor, greater survivability had an 
observable negative effect on every a posteriori performance metric. With the exception 
of the apex vehicle designs (XTV8 and XWV8, both + + +, i.e., enhanced for 
survivability, lethality, and mobility), nearly every even-numbered candidate (enhanced 
survivability) had lower performance than its numerical predecessor. Remarkably, this 
was observed for both XTVs and XWVs. In other words, increasing survivability alone 
decreased performance, in some cases significantly.  
Mission failures caused by time-outs were also associated with higher 
survivability. Of the 89 XTV mission time-out failures, 51 (58%) occurred on the more 
sluggish, even-numbered platforms. In addition, of the 11 XWV mission time-out 
failures, 8 (73%) were recorded on even-numbered variants. The greater mass, associated 
with more protection, hindered movement to the point that some operators simply could 
not maneuver the vehicle fast enough around the urban environment to engage the threat 
platform in the 15-minute mission time limit. Even if, at a platform level, this proved to 
be a winning tactic for crew survivability, this was a losing strategy for the employment 
of resources that could not complete the mission and extend the time crewmembers are 
placed at risk. 
The only two variants that appeared to benefit from increased survivability were 
those that also had increased levels of lethality and mobility, i.e., XTV8 and XWV8. The 
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high mobility was needed to adequately transport the extra mass associated with the 
greater armor protection. Statistically, there was no benefit on win % from higher 
survivability.  
In Table 45, survivability had a negative effect and/or interaction on all global 
performance metrics. This was consistent with the results from Chapter 2 of this 
manuscript. Interestingly, this matched observed trends with the MRAP fielding 
particularly in OEF. From a mission success perspective, it was not a good technical 
approach to simply “armor-up” the platform. The steepest decline in performance from a 
numerical predecessor was from both XTV and XWV 1–2. Additionally, the highest 
learning curves for win % for both the XTV and XWV were on the second variant, i.e., 
the high survivability variant. For XTV2, there was a 7% learning curve from the first 5 
missions to the final, and for XWV2, there was a 5% learning curve. In other words, the 
operators had to work harder to adapt at fighting a sluggish, albeit better protected (less 
vulnerable but more susceptible) variant. These findings warrant further analysis; they at 
least require some consideration as to how best attain high survivability by considering 
both vulnerability and susceptibility in fighting vehicle design.  
For the XTVs and XWVs, survivability had a detrimental effect on reducing the 
enemy vehicle health. The lack of mobility imposed by a higher combat survivability 
index seemed to reduce the ability of the friendly platform to move to a point of 
advantage necessary to deploy a lethal payload. This means that, while the armor 
provided more passive protection to the friendly platform (i.e., reducing the vulnerability 
of the system), it could be considered more susceptible to attack since the friendly system 
had a reduced capacity to evade an attack. Perhaps due to their increased nominal masses, 
the tracked vehicles were not as significantly penalized with respect to time for carrying 
additional armor (high survivability). However, while not statistically distinguishable, the 
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trend for survivability on wheeled platforms was to increase the mission time. This result 
matches practice, where most armored, well-protected vehicles are tracked. Wheeled 
chassis are not able to withstand the substantial weight and load dynamics associated 
with assuming a heavy armor shell. 
It is worth restating that the JRATS notional search and destroy mission was an 
offensive, force-on-force, meeting engagement, absent many of the challenges and 
dangers of the COE, any of which could reinforce the benefit of higher survivability. In 
actual practice, it is quite possible that, while a less vulnerable platform may become 
mission incapable at a lower rate than a less armored variant, its crew may have a greater 
personnel survivability rate, given insult in a better-protected platform.  
In other words, a vehicle may be less susceptible and therefore able to evade 
strikes in a smaller, more nimble platform, but any insult endured in the more vulnerable 
vehicle could prove to be the last. To use a naval analogy, low vulnerability versus low 
susceptibility could mean the difference between being dead in the water or being truly 
sunk. For Army fighting vehicles, survivability efforts are mainly focused on reducing 
vulnerability, whereas the Air Force and Navy have pursued contemporary systems with 
a concurrent focus on making systems less susceptible as well. In some extreme cases, 
the systems are exceedingly vulnerable, but were designed to be extraordinarily 
insusceptible due to stealth, speed, and range. This creates a composite survivability risk 
which is mitigated to an acceptable level by the overall system design. Regardless, in the 
context of this experiment, it appears that, while the greater armor afforded to the high 
survivability platforms reduced vulnerability, it made the platforms more susceptible to 
attack since these candidates were bigger and slower, hence actually less survivable from 
the perspective of possessing a platform with capacity to complete the prescribed 
mission. And as previously stated, if the vehicle target area is assumed as a rectangular 
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prism encapsulating the vehicle, it is safe to assume that big boxes are easier to hit than 
small boxes, and slow boxes are easier to hit than fast boxes. 
 
4.5.4 Effects of Lethality 
Enhanced lethality for XTVs and XWVs created the greatest effect on both cost 
and schedule index. The achievement of superlative firepower came at the literal expense 
of advanced weaponry that was costly to develop and procure in the JRATS environment. 
However, this cost, when balanced with the apparent advantages in simulated combat 
performance, i.e., win %,  blue %, red %, and time %. Additionally, of the three principal 
attributes, lethality had the smallest impact on vehicle mass, making advanced 
performance conducive with inter and intratheater mobility, as well as placing minimal 
demand on tactical mobility.  
When analyzing the effect of principal attributes on the metric related to mission 
success, for both XTV and XWV variants, lethality was the dominant attribute most 
conducive with win %, blue % (via destroying the insult-producing threat), and reducing 
time %. The increased firepower associated with the high level of lethality substantially 
increased the ability of the platform to dominate the threat vehicle. Considering the 
simplicity of the engagement and the terrain associated with the JRATS simulation 
environment, the dominance of lethality among attributes and interactions may not be 
that surprising, since engaging and removing the threat from the battlefield was a sure-
fire way to complete the mission efficiently, both for reducing time and protecting the 
friendly platform.  
When analyzing the performance metric of blue %, it appeared from the results 
that the best defense in the combat simulation was offense both in terms of lethality and 
mobility (Figure 72 and Figure 92). For both the XTV and XWV variants, lethality had 
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the greatest positive effect on residual platform health. Since the simulation only dealt 
with a single threat platform, the removal of enemy vehicle, enabled by greater lethality, 
made the entire simulation largely permissive and safe. Additionally, there was no IED 
threat in the simulation. With the inclusion of multiple threat vectors and a persistent IED 
presence in a simulation, the results could have more favored survivability as the 
dominant attribute contributing to blue health. However, in the context of this exercise, 
lethality not only served as the most potent attribute for mission success, it also had the 
greatest positive impact on preserving system health, measured as blue %.  
As with the win % analysis, lethality was again the most dominant attribute for 
both reducing the time % for XTVs and XWVs (Figure 76 and Figure 96). The higher 
lethality ended the fight quicker, providing nearly double the effect on residual mission 
time than the next ranking attribute. Decisively engaging the enemy, preferable on the 
first meeting engagement, was apparently the best source of protection for the friendly 
platform, especially when done at a stand-off range that was not conducive with the 
threat vehicle being able to engage. 
The benefit of advanced lethality was contained to the single vehicle representing 
friendly forces. However, with multiple systems fighting together, the benefit of 
advanced lethality could benefit neighboring platforms in an extrinsic fashion. In other 
words, the protective value of destroying threats on the battlefield can be shared. This is a 
capability only offered by lethality, since survivability and mobility are considered 
intrinsic attributes in that, except for hypothetical situations, the protection and 
movement generated by a platform is largely restricted to that single system.  
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4.5.5 Effects of Mobility 
As the constitutive partner to lethality in ground maneuver warfare, mobility was 
the second ranking attribute in nearly every a posteriori metric for both XTV and XWV 
variants. Where lethality reigned supreme, mobility was the attribute secondary, albeit 
not always at a level necessary to satisfy the test for statistical significance. Mobility 
ranked second to lethality for XTV win %, red %, and time %. For XWVs, mobility was 
the top ranking attribute for win % and red %. For XWV time %, mobility ranked third in 
measurable effects. This lower ranking could be explained by how, even at low levels of 
mobility, the terrain favored the wheeled platforms and diminished the apparent 
advantage of additional capacity with this attribute.  
More importantly, greater mobility contributed in a positive fashion toward every 
a posteriori performance metric. The high mobility XTV and XWV variants enjoyed a 
nearly 10% reduction in time %. The greater top speed and acceleration afforded by the 
high output powerplant allowed the operators to navigate around the city faster and find 
and subsequently engage the threat platform quicker. In this regard, mobility created 
positive operational effects on the order of enhanced lethality. The freedom to move 
about the battlefield at a greater rate generated beneficial effects similar to lethality. 
 
4.5.6 Survivability, Lethality, and Mobility Interactions 
Statistically distinguishable interactions among attributes were not observed in the 
DOE results from either the wheeled or tracked JRATS variants. The interaction of 
lethality and mobility, depicted as “LM” on the Pareto chart for win effect, did appear 
third for tracked vehicles and fourth for wheeled vehicles, but again not at a level 
commensurate with 90% confidence.  
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The author observed that ROTC mission operators used the enhanced 
performance of vehicle attributes to suit the mission. For example, an operator wielding a 
candidate platform with greater lethality (missiles) engaged at longer range and with 
greater precision in offensive pursuit of the threat platform. However, an operator 
possessing a vehicle with greater mobility adopted a more aggressive style of maneuver 
that capitalized on the faster acceleration and helped not only evade threat fire, but also 
enabled movement of the platform to a position of advantage. In other words, the 
operators fought the best they could with the platform they had. The operators adopted an 
offensive fighting style that best suited the variant; this may have muted the appearance 
of statistically distinguishable interactions between attributes than if a more prescriptive 
or automated fight plan was established.  
In this respect, the singular and coupled effects of lethality and mobility observed 
in this experiment with regard to the global performance metrics may represent a 
quantifiable correlation of the ubiquitous military term called maneuver. High lethality 
universally led to better performance, and only when mobility was hindered by high 
survivability, did it not contribute to better performance results. Finally, and unlike the 
negative interaction of survivability, was the observation that lethality and mobility 
contributed in a complementary fashion to higher performance on the interaction charts. 
Absent from this observation was a more definitive value for the interaction of lethality 
and mobility on the charts of attribute effects. 
This also echoes a similar conclusion made by Ogorkiewicz regarding vehicle 
design after World War II which: 
  
followed from the general acceptance of the fact that their effectiveness depends, 
above all else, on their gun-power and provides a contrast with the days when the 
302 
designers of the “infantry” tanks were preoccupied with armour protection and 
when the “cavalry” tanks were characterized by undergunned mobility.189 
The interaction of these two attributes, while observable, was not statistically 
distinguishable. As single attributes, lethality and mobility (in that order) had the greatest 
positive impact on mission success, but the coupled effect was not statistically 
distinguishable. Interestingly, for both the wheeled and tracked vehicles, increased 
survivability had a negative effect on mission success. In the JRATS simulation, the 
presence of armor without increased means to move (mobility) or fight (lethality) 
contributed negatively toward the vehicle success rate.  
 
4.5.7 Wheels Versus Tracks 
In the combat vehicle design arena, the debate of “wheels versus tracks” ranks 
high on an arbitrary scale of combat vehicle design consideration contentiousness. The 
deliberations surrounding this basic vehicle architectural decision go back decades, and 
were hot topics during the selection of the Stryker, as well as the design phases of the 
Future Combat Systems (FCS) program. Since the JRATS environment was a very 
simple area to maneuver, with no incline or obstacles, only hard improved roads, and no 
cross country movement or major terrain features, the simulation did not reveal the 
superiority of tracked platforms on those terrains. The nominal win record for the eight 
wheeled vehicles was 72%, while the family of tracked vehicles averaged 60%. 
Additionally, less than 2% of wheeled missions were time-out failures (11 of 735), but 
almost 11% (89 of 825) of the tracked vehicle missions were of this type of failure. The 
tracked vehicles did produce slower mobility performance specifications, particularly in 
acceleration.  
 
189 Ogorkiewicz, Design and Development of Fighting Vehicles, 42.  This quote appears in the beginning 
of his chapter on tank design and development since 1942.  
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From a resource management perspective, the tracked vehicles could be 
considered better since a time-out mission loss is a failure mode altogether distinct from a 
mission loss via enemy insult. No commander wants an unsuccessful mission, but a crew 
that fails to destroy a time-sensitive target by a prescribed point still lives to fight another 
day. Possible explanations as to why the operators performed slightly better on the 
wheeled chassis include the benefit of having conducted 800+ missions on tracked 
platforms prior to the wheeled variants. Previous Army studies: 
 
unanimously concluded that a tracked configuration is an optimal solution for 
tactical, high-mobility roles (off-road usage greater than 60 percent), gross vehicle 
weights in excess of 20 tons, and missions requiring unrestricted terrain 
movement, continuous all-weather operations, smaller silhouettes/dimensional 
envelopes, and greater survivability. 190  
International studies on this contentious topic produced similar results, adding depth to 
the discussion, by also evaluating the advantage in lethality provided by tracked 
vehicles.191 Tracked vehicles typically provide a more stable weapon platform to fire 
from, yielding higher rates for probability of hit. In light of the actual benefits of tracked 
combat vehicles, the simulation results showed an advantage in wheeled candidates. 
Finally, it is also possible that the operators may have still been learning the subtle 
intricacies of maneuvering a tracked vehicle in the tight proximity of an urban 
environment.  
 
4.5.8 Human Factors Considerations 
Lastly, with regard to learning and variant distinction was an assessment of the 
correlation between gaming experience and performance. There was a moderate, but not 
insignificant correlation (0.5) between self-reported weekly gaming activity and average 
 
190 Paul Hornback, “The Wheel Versus Track Dilema” Armor Magazine (March-April 1998) 33-35.  
191 Jurgen Erbe, ”Wheels or Tracks?” Military Technology (July 1994) 10-17. 
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performance. And aside from the best ranked and two worst ranked ROTC cadets, there 
was variation in rankings among individuals from the tracked series to wheeled series 
with an average change in performance rank of 3. Modern mounted warfare can trace its 
lineage back to medieval knights and the horse-mounted cavalry. In the spirit of this 
military ancestry, to use a contextual cavalry analogy, in this small sample it appeared 
there was one “bell sharp” (best performer), 11 “troopers” (moderate performers), and 
two “shavetails” (low performers).192 This assessment is based on rankings where the 
individual performance on a platform was compared to the group average performance on 
those same candidates.  
The operators learned the JRATS system very quickly, progressing through the 
TWV and TTV training session in nearly half the time allotted. Additionally, the group 
discussions during the training session disseminated a collective batch of tactics, 
techniques, and procedures that benefited all the operators. Having spent nearly three 
hours in the training and XTV missions prior to the second block  consisting of XWV 
missions, the results were somewhat muted by the fact that the operators had figured out 
how to deftly “game the system” via near absolute dominance of the threat platform. 
Additionally, the operators began to sense or recognize the gradient associated with the 
variant numbering convention. This seemed to only improve the performance of the 
operators and is realistic in that a mounted warrior would want to know both the 
capabilities and limitations of the combat platform. 
 
 
192 Emmett M. Essin, Shavetails and Bell Sharps: The History of the U.S. Army Mule (Nebraska: First 
Bison Books, 1997), 96-97. Before the quartermaster presented a new mule to the train, the tail was shorn 
to provide an easily recognizable symbol to the train master. As the tail grew out, and the mule learned to 
take its place autonomously at the sound of the bell, this distinguishing physical feature would disappear. 
The same methodology was used for horse mounted cavalry troopers. Upon initial assignment of horse and 
tackle, the tail was shaved to enable the veterans with a quick way of identifying the at-risk, inexperienced 
soldiers. Again, as the tail grew, the trooper was simultaneously gaining experience. The term endures 
today in modern cavalry units, where newly assigned troopers are often referred to as “shavetails”.  
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4.6 Lessons Learned 
 Lethality appeared to be the dominant principal attribute for simulated combat vehicle 
performance, showing a distinguishable, positive benefit for every a posteriori 
performance metric, i.e., increasing win % and blue % while reducing red % time %. 
Mobility had a similar positive effect on every a posteriori performance metric. 
 Greater survivability had an observable negative effect on every performance metric, 
except the “triple plus” (enhanced survivability, lethality, and mobility). Survivability 
was also the greatest source of mass for the platforms, both from the DOE/ANOVA 
data and the vehicle mass breakout study. The simple mission environment, free of 
IED threats, could have favored a more protected platform. 
 No statistically distinguishable attribute interactions were observed, but lethality and 
mobility clearly complemented each other in that both had commensurate levels of 
positive effect on performance. This matched the doctrinal definition of maneuver, or 
the use of fire and movement to dominate the enemy.  
 The mission operators performed slightly better on the wheeled variants versus the 
tracked candidates. This could have been due to increased proficiency (wheeled block 
followed tracked block of experiment) and general familiarity with wheeled vehicles. 
 The operators controlling the platform during the offensive mission modified their 
tactics to capitalize on the advantages afforded by the platform. This reduced the 
possible display of attribute interactions or coupling of effects, but also reinforced the 
value of considering human factor interaction with system performance. In other 
words, it may be difficult to imagine how an operator will employ an advanced 
capability, therefore the value of including operators in an exploratory fashion such as 




In conclusion, this chapter demonstrated that it may be viable to prototypically 
design simulated combat platforms using a DOE construct in order to calculate 
statistically distinguishable correlations between the attributes of survivability, lethality, 
and mobility with respect to performance metrics. The simulation and modeling effort, 
which included human subject mission operators, was insightful particularly with respect 
to the employment of the weapon systems in relation to the computer-controlled threat 
platform. From this basic simulation exercise, lethality was the most dominant attribute, 
serving as a statistically distinguishable source of greatest effect with respect to the 
performance metrics. This attribute was also reinforced subjectively by its maneuver 
counterpart, mobility.  
Somewhat disappointing was an absence of statistically distinguishable 
interactions, particularly an observance of a lethality–mobility interaction toward a 
performance metric. As individual attributes, lethality and mobility were the dominant 
sources for increased platform efficacy. Together, they had a marginal, but statistically 
insignificant, effect. Unique fighting styles for each type of platform may have masked 
observable interactions. 
Perhaps paradoxically, survivability was observed to have a negative effect on 
nearly every performance metric, even friendly vehicle health. Many observations were 
well below statistical significance, i.e., in the noise of the problem, but this was a 
consistent observation across XTVs and XWVs. This is somewhat counterintuitive, since 
conventional wisdom is to protect the platform at all costs. Perhaps the simplistic nature 
of the simulation (i.e., single threat vehicle with no IEDs) was unable to completely 
portray the COE, an environment defined by a lack of definition and a persistently 
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evolving unknown threat. That said, a more sophisticated simulation may reinforce (or 
further refute) the value of this attribute in performance metrics, but as it stands, with 
respect to the data collected from the 1,600 missions run in support of this DOE 
construct, lethality was the clear winner. 
The value and significance of an approach such as this is that, in the absence of an 
empirical model which can capture the net platform effect from tuning attribute 
thresholds, the analysis of the results can demonstrate to the decision maker what 
principal attributes (and related secondary traits and tertiary metrics) are contributing to 
or in some cases driving a priori or a posteriori performance metrics. With the additional 
inclusion of uncertainty, the results provided could be elevated even higher, given that 
virtually any developmental pursuit as ambitious as the undertaking of designing and 
testing a ground combat system involves large amounts of risk and uncertainty. Without a 
contextual understanding for these impacts, in this case provided by a prototyping 
software tool, the pursuit of requirements related to metrics can contribute in an 
insignificant way, or worse yet, hinder performance while adding to the schedule and 
hence cost. Finally, as a program evolves over time, a method such as this could 
demonstrate to the decision maker which metrics, traits, and attribute is sacred ground, 
critical to mission performance. Likewise, those areas not demonstrated as contributing in 
a statistically distinguishable way toward performance goals could be relaxed in order to 
relieve programmatic pressures associated with cost, performance, and schedule. 
The respondents surveyed in Chapter 3 deemed survivability as the most 
important attribute in combat vehicle design. In Chapter 2, the qualitative assessment of 
principal attributes, as well as the fielded ground combat vehicle principal attribute 
ranking analysis (Figure 24) indicated that the pursuit of enhanced survivability can 
impede the achievement of ground combat vehicle performance measures. Likewise, the 
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achievement of superior strategic mobility, afforded by a compact, light vehicle, 
constrains the design and limits performance. In the set of variant platforms, XTV1 and 
XWV1 would have earned high marks for strategic mobility, yet their a posteriori 
performance was poor, besting only the enhance survivability platforms (XTV2 and 
XWV2). In essence, the collective contribution of combat vehicle survivability, lethality, 
and mobility, coalesce to yield a capable fighting platform. Within this group of 
attributes, the results from Chapter 4 indicated that lethality was the dominant attribute in 
achieving peak performance under a mission simulating offensive operations against a 
peer threat. In an effort to explore the ability to generate greater target effects in pursuit 
of higher lethality, the next chapter will explore the advanced weapon concepts related to 
both powder cannons and railguns. 
309 
Chapter 5:  Advanced Weapon System Concepts—Conventional 
Cannonry Versus Electromagnetic Guns 
There are three stages of scientific discovery: first 
people deny it is true; then they deny it is important; 
finally, they credit the wrong person. 
—Alexander Von Humboldt 
 
Give them the third best to go with; the second best  
comes too late, the best never comes. 
—Sir Robert Watson-Watt 
5.1 Introduction 
A pair of combat platforms, namely a tank and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), 
each with protection capabilities representative of a future conventional threat, were 
established as challenging targets for an advanced weapon system design effort. In light 
of the results from Chapter 4, with lethality clearly being the dominant principal attribute 
for creating advantageous effects with performance metrics, the focus for this effort was 
to pursue enhanced levels of lethality in a two-pronged approach: one prong was to create 
an evolutionary improvement in lethality performance using conventional powder gun 
theory and concepts, while the other prong was to create a revolutionary improvement in 
lethality performance using railgun theory and concepts. A railgun is defined as a specific 
disruptive weapon technology within the general class of  electromagnetic launch 
devices. While it appears that neither the advanced tank-caliber powder gun nor railgun 
concepts could be feasibly designed to defeat an advanced future tank threat from a 
mobile, tactical system, the railgun concept could theoretically be engineered to destroy 
advanced IFVs with the added benefit of developing and exploring a new range of 
performance opportunities possible when, perhaps in the future, projectiles are launched 




If the possession of dominant levels of lethality is the most important attribute a 
combat vehicle can have in the performance of major combat operations, then the 
objective of this chapter was to explore how theoretical weapon systems could be 
advanced in pursuit of greater lethality. In recognition of the most dangerous course of 
action ground forces are charged with conducting, the explicitly stated mission of the 
U.S. Army is to “fight and win our Nation’s wars by providing prompt, sustained land 
dominance across the full range of military operations and spectrum of conflict in support 
of combatant commanders.” For a ground combat vehicle, good strategic mobility yields 
prompt responsiveness. A design with high battlefield efficiency enables the operational 
level of war to sustain this combat power for greater duration. If, as the old military 
saying goes, “amateurs talk tactics, and experts talk logistics”, then the most 
sophisticated analysis on fighting vehicle design should occur at the operational level of 
war. Deployed maneuver units place huge demands on the network of logistical support, 
so an efficient projection of combat power can yield large savings throughout.  
At the tactical level, platform dominance is a strong function of capability 
overmatch, or the materiel performance advantage leveraged against the foe.193 The 
overmatch is a function of a crew’s ability to quickly, accurately, and efficiently generate 
target effects that impede or prevent the threat platform from generating an insult. 
Recognizing the value of Just War Theory, and the related principles that guide military 
development pursuits in a moral and ethical fashion, the truth remains that fighting 
vehicles are designed to enter the fray and fight.  
 
193 Stephen Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us About the Future of Conflict” 
International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996). Biddle also argues that there is a strong interaction 
between technology and skill in producing a benefit. 
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The fact that a combat platform must be mobile and survivable is in 
accompaniment of its inherent lethality. As previously discussed, at the core of its 
functional capabilities, a ground combat system can simply be considered as a mobile and 
protected source of firepower. The lethality is derived from the ability to generate power 
and deliver energy on a designated target. The weapon energy is either absorbed into the 
target or passes through the armor as residual energy. The residual energy that perforates 
the armor can go on to damage proximal components (Figure 102). Perhaps then, it is not 
surprising that lethality was the most statistically significantly attribute in achieving 
performance objectives in the combat simulations conducted in the previous chapter. As 
previously observed and discussed, this attribute, dominated nearly every performance 






Figure 102: Notional target (blue cube) being insulted by a vector quantity of incident 
energy (red arrow) of an unspecified type. A fraction of this energy is 
reflected, some is absorbed into the target, and a portion passes through the 
target as residual energy.194  
 
194 LTG (R) Dutch Shoffner provided the original idea for this target-insult interaction graphic.  
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The scaling analysis done in Chapter 2 also illustrated the extreme challenges 
concerned with protecting against advanced lethality. The length and time scales 
associated with retarding an insult are approximately an order of magnitude less than in 
generating the insult. Using a tank cannon as an example, the insulting (delivering) 
system has approximately 5 m of cannon length and 5 ms of launch time to generate 10 
MJ of kinetic energy. For a passive system, the insultee (receiving) system may have only 
0.5 m of armor and less than 0.1 ms to mitigate the insult in order to protect the crew 
from injury and avoid catastrophic damage to the fighting platform. The engineering 
fields of both armor and cannons are notably mature, and even fractional improvements 
in performance requires long-term committed efforts to tease greater capability from 
what under previous conditions and design capabilities were considered optimized 
designs.  
From an engineering perspective, an investment in higher lethality poses a 
considerable design challenge to the highly constrained recipient system. Stated 
alternatively, for a simple system the physical burden of defending against an advanced 
threat is higher than in generating it. It may be observed in nature that for similar physical 
reasons we learn to throw before we learn to catch. In harmony with the U.S. Army’s 
strategic mission statement, a fighting vehicle must primarily dominate its opponent. An 
efficient design enables economical and persistent sustainment throughout operations. To 
provide a strategically prompt response, the system should have good measures for 
transportability. The classical notion of lethality connotes complete destruction of the 
threat system. However, when considering scalable or tunable consequences induced to a 











Figure 103: Spectrum of target effects ranging from deterrence to unqualified defeat.195 
 Among the principal attributes defined and explored, lethality is further 
distinguished from survivability and mobility in that lethality can be shared among 
friendly systems and deployed in support of adjacent elements. Multiple systems can use 
their lethality to converge on a single target (massing of fires), and a dominant lethal 
asset can be used to directly support a friendly element, e.g., from a support by fire or  
attack by fire position. Therefore, greater lethality, unlike survivability and mobility, can 
benefit systems not in direct possession of the weapon system. Prior to virtually 
designing a powder gun and railgun system with the explicit objective of destroying an 
advanced set of notional threat platforms, it is instructive to investigate the relative 
requirements for performance overmatch through the lens of a series of warfare modeling 
differential equations known as the Lanchester Laws of Combat.
 
195 The source for this concept of scalable weapon effects can be credited to Mr. Scott McPheeters, U.S. 
Army Acquisition Project Manager, Directed Energy Applications Office, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. 
This concept was originally presented at the Electric Fires Symposium, hosted by the U.S. Army Fires 
Center of Excellence, Fort Sill, Oklahoma in August, 2010. 
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5.3 Lanchester Laws of Combat 
Developed during World War I, the equations describing the Lanchester Laws of 
Combat occupy a prominent place in the study of warfare.196 The two most significant 
contributions from this work—the direct fire square law and the indirect fire linear law—
remain at the core of many contemporary Department of Defense combat simulation 
computer models. These elegant equations offer many strengths, including the ability to 
“shed light on the quantity versus quality debate” with “a simple paradigm for 
understanding the dynamics of combat.”197  
Originally developed for aerial combat, the Lanchester Laws were found to 
function well at mathematically describing conventional, homogeneous ground warfare 
engagements. Late in the 1960s, these laws were further developed to account for 
unconventional, asymmetrical, and heterogeneous warfare like the campaigns typifying 
counterinsurgency operations in the Vietnam War. Proponents of the Lanchester Laws 
appreciate its “virtue of simplicity: [since] it makes strong simplifying assumptions, 
which nevertheless are (at least sometimes) close to being realizable.” 198 The models as 
well “bring out, through a subtle process, some stark conclusions” especially regarding 
the balance of quality or effectiveness and quantity or number of forces. 199 
 
 
196 John W.R. Lepingwell, “The Laws of Combat? Lanchester Reexamined”, International Security, Vol. 
12, No 1, (Summer 1987) 89-134.  
197 Ibid. 
198 Niall MacKay, “Lanchester combat models” Mathematics Today, (June 2006). 
199 T. W. Lucas and J. E. McGunnigle, “When is model complexity too much? Illustrating the 
benefits of simple models with Hughes’ salvo equations” Naval Research Logistics  (2003) 
197-217. 
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5.3.1 Lanchester Square Law for Direct Fire 
When considering line-of-sight or direct fire engagements, the Lanchester square 
law is applicable. Simplifying assumptions include that weapon fire is distributed evenly 
over targets, all targets are visible and targetable, and the consequences of insult are 
determinable so fires are immediately shifted.  
The basic square law equations are presented below as Equation 41and Equation 
42. In these equations, R(t) is the size of the red (enemy) force at time t, r is the 
effectiveness of red’s fire on blue forces, B(t) is the size of the blue (friendly) force at 
time t, and b is the effectiveness of blue’s fire on red forces. Solving these two equations 
for the case of equally matched forces gives the square law equality condition (Equation 
43). “This equation states that two forces are equal when the products of the square of 
their force levels and their effectiveness are equal.”200 
 
   dB t rR t
dt
  Equation 41
   dR t bB t
dt
  Equation 42





dB t rR t
dR t bB t
 Equation 44
The significance is that the appropriate measure or scale of a force’s military 
capability is the force level squared times its effectiveness.201 For example, if a force 
level is doubled, its fighting strength is increased by a factor of four, while if its 
 
200 John W.R. Lepingwell, “The Laws of Combat? Lanchester Reexamined”, International Security, Vol. 
12, No 1, (Summer 1987) 96. 
201 Ibid. 
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effectiveness is doubled, the fighting strength simply doubles. By observing the 
differential causality ratio from Equation 44, the force attrition equations have been 
derived explicitly and are subsequently depicted in Equation 45 and Equation 46.  
 
       ( ) 0 cosh 0 sinhrB t B rbt R rbt
b
  Equation 45
       ( ) 0 cosh 0 sinhbR t R rbt B rbt
r
  Equation 46
 These equations have also been solved to get the time at which the loser’s forces 
go to zero, where the loser is defined as the side, red or blue, possessing less combat 
strength at the outset, i.e., values for r, R(0), b, and B(0) in Equation 43 produce an 












     
 
Equation 47
The square law equations “depend upon the forces being sufficiently large that the 
discrete firing processes can be approximated by the continuous differential equation.”202 
For conventional warfare involving U.S. ground forces engaged with a peer threat, it is 
likely that the threat will be a numerically superior force.203 The significance of this 
observation, when considering the Lanchester square law, is that friendly forces must 
possess an inordinately high level of combat effectiveness with respect to the opposing 
 
202 John W.R. Lepingwell, “The Laws of Combat? Lanchester Reexamined”, International Security, Vol. 
12, No 1, (Summer 1987) 129.  
203 James Hackett, The Military Balance 2010,  International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: 
Routledge, 2010). The United States ranks in the top ten in a list of countries by size of troops when 
accounting for active, reserve, and paramilitary forces.  In the event of ground troop involvement against a 
peer threat, these operations would occur in an overseas contingency environment, meaning that forces 
would be deployed in some fraction of the total combat power available to the nation. On the included list 
of financial expenditures, the United States is the clear global leader. 
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force in order to generate a fighting strength predictive of success in the anticipated 
battle.  
In other words, it is inadequate to possess marginal capability overmatch against a 
peer threat. To counter the squared numerical benefit of a relative troop strength 
differential, the friendly forces must possess factor levels of greater effectiveness. The 
notion of this balance of power revolves around the “quantity versus quality” debate best 
captured by Stalin when he reflectively stated that “quantity has a quality all its own.” In 
Figure 104, the square law was used to simulate a meeting engagement of a friendly 
infantry brigade with 2,500 soldiers opposing a threat infantry division with 10,000 
soldiers. After 72 hours of continuous fighting, the friendly forces have finally achieved 
numerical superiority, but the fighting effectiveness required to achieve this was nearly a 


































Figure 104: Lanchester square law simulation for a friendly (blue) force infantry brigade 
opposing a threat (red) force division, an approximately 1:4 numerical ratio 
of forces. The threat force began the battle with 10,000 soldiers, while the 
friendly force began with 2,500 soldiers.  
Since their introduction in 1916, these equations have been further developed and 
utilized at much higher levels of complexity in order to account for heterogeneous forces, 
composite units, attrition, movement, and even morale. Even under all cases of additional 
complexity, the dominant elements remain as quantity and quality, or the size of 
converging forces and the effectiveness of those fighting units. For direct fire 
engagements, knowing how dominant the attribute of lethality was in creating successful 
fighting vehicles in the JRATS simulations, the Lanchester square law can demonstrate 
that if one expects to be numerically inferior to an opposing force, it is insufficient to 
simply possess a “safe” margin of superiority in effectiveness against a peer threat. 
Rather, the design goal should toward levels of performance approaching outright 
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dominance in order to garner the combat strength necessary for a friendly force to attain 
mission success against a numerically superior foe. 
 
5.3.2 Lanchester Linear Law for Indirect Fire 
When considering non-line-of-sight or indirect fire engagements, the Lanchester 
linear law is applicable. Simplifying assumptions include that weapon fire is distributed 
evenly over an area and not specifically aimed at targets, firers do not have information 
on the effects of fire, and targets can potentially be fired upon after destruction.  
The basic linear law equations are presented below as Equation 48 and Equation 
49. In these equations, R(t) is the size of the red (enemy) force at time t, r is the 
effectiveness of red’s fire on blue forces, B(t) is the size of the blue (friendly) force at 
time t, and b is the effectiveness of blue’s fire on red forces. “If homogeneous forces with 
the same weapons and vulnerabilities on each side [are assumed]” then the linear law 
equality can be used (Equation 50). “The linear law differs from the square law in several 
important respects. First, it does not give any special advantage to force level. Second, 
concentration of forces has no effect on reducing the winner’s total casualties.”204 
 
     dB t rR t B t
dt
  Equation 48
     dR t bB t R t
dt
  Equation 49








204 John W.R. Lepingwell, “The Laws of Combat? Lanchester Reexamined”, International Security, Vol. 
12, No 1, (Summer 1987) 102. 
320 
These linear-law differential equations have also been explicitly solved as a 
function of time to generate attrition relationships for both blue and red forces (Equation 
52 and Equation 53). As with the square law simulation, the blue force needs a 
significantly higher effectiveness, this time a factor of five greater than the red force, in 
order to generate numerical superiority during the 72-hour battle (Figure 105).  
The described organized-chaos and fog-of-war present in modern combat in major 
combat operations appears to have qualities of both the linear and square law. While 
these laws and the accompanying examples are recognized to be highly idealized cases, 
they remain an integral part of combat simulation methodology.  
Weapon developers working toward materiel solutions for an expeditionary force 
chartered to fight and win wars should strive for capability overmatch approaching order 
of magnitude greater effectiveness when compared against peer threat systems. For direct 
fire platforms, this means that metrics contributing to enhanced lethality should be 
expanded as far as possible in the operational envelope.  
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Equation 52 (above) 
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Figure 105: Lanchester linear law simulation for a friendly (blue) force infantry brigade 
opposing a threat (red) force division, an approximately 1:4 numerical ratio 
of forces. The threat force began the battle with 10,000 soldiers, while the 
friendly force began with 2,500 soldiers. 
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5.4 Concept of Electric Fires 
Nearly a thousand 1,000 years ago, the Chinese documented the first use of 
gunpowder for military purposes. These early weapons consisted of bamboo tubes loaded 
with a tamped mixture of gunpowder and shrapnel-producing materials.205 Almost a 
millennium later, ground combat warriors rely on the same basic technology of burning 
propellant and harnessing the pressure of expanding gases to launch projectiles across the 
battlefield. There is a compelling vision to revolutionize the weapons of warfare by using 
electrical energy as the basis for power generation.206 Concepts and technologies in this 
area abound, ranging from fully mature fielded systems to what may be considered the 
lunatic fringe of science fiction.  
In the emerging frontier of electromagnetic weaponry, the Chinese appear to have 
once again championed a new military technology by being the first country to proclaim 
this developing concept as the future domain for warfare. In a 2010 paper from the 
International Electromagnetic Launch (EML)  Symposium, Wang Ying, the president of 
the Chinese EML Association, defined four generations of weaponry: mechanical energy 
or cold weapons (swords, bows and arrows), chemical energy weapons (firearms), 
nuclear energy weapons (bombs), and the class currently under development which he 
broadly called electromagnetic weapons. To quote from his treatise, Wang states that “at 
present, it is the Chinese who firstly disclose the law of scientific development of 
armament to the world, namely, the fourth-generation weaponry is the electromagnetic 
 
205 Jacques Gernet, translated by J.R. Foster and Charles Hartman, A History of Chinese Civilization 
(Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 311. 
206 Richard A. Marshall, “Railgunnery: Where Have We Been, Where Are We Going?” IEEE Transactions 
on Magnetics, Vol 37, No 1, January 2001, 440-444. 
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weaponry.”207 He goes on to further describe five distinct classes of electromagnetic 
weapons including electromagnetic kinetic energy, electromagnetic pulse, artificial 
intelligence, information weaponry, and electromagnetic interference weapons. 208 
 
5.4.1 Types of Electric Fires Weaponry 
The types of electromagnetic weapons emerging from this developing domain can 
alternatively, and preferably, be organized under the general classification of Electric 
Fires, or devices that transform electrical energy into a desired effect on a target of 
interest.209 This broad framework, seen in Figure 106, arranges the advanced concepts in 
a complementary and nested hierarchy that shares electrical energy as the source for 
power generation and creation of target effects. With the exception of the launcher class 
that use electromagnetic forces to accelerate a payload, the types of weapons in the 
Electric Fires domain each exist in a band of the electromagnetic spectrum depicted in 
Figure 107. Of particular interest for ground combat systems is the prospect of using 
electromagnetic forces to accelerate projectiles.  
 
 
207 Wang Ying and Jiange Zhang,  “Electromagnetic Launch Leading to Electromagnetic Weapon Era” 
2010 International Electromagnetic Launch Symposium (Brussels, Belgium: IEML, 2010) 1-8.  
Two years prior, Matt Cilli of the (former) Army Railgun program gave an award winning IEML 
presentation on the evolution of tactical weapons throughout history. He classified the four types of throw 
energy as being human, mechanical, chemical, and electromagnetic (future). Wang’s paper expounded on 
this generational framework, elevating the construct to the strategic level and broadening the scope to 
include all classes of electromagnetic weaponry beyond simple launch or throw devices. 
208 Ibid., 1-8. 
209 Electric Fires is not a doctrinal term, however this title has been used in several conference settings and 
seems to capture the essence of creating target effects with electrical energy as the prime source for the 
























Figure 106: Electric fires organizational framework.210 
 
 
Figure 107: Electromagnetic spectrum. Note the relationship between wavelength and 
energy.211 Source for the graphic is www.antonine-education.co.uk.  
 
210 For an excellent review on directed energy fundamentals, see Laser Weapons: The Dawn of a New 
Military Age by Bengt Anderberg and Myron Wolsbarsht (New York: Plenum Press, 1992). Beam 
Weapons: The Next Arms Race by Jeff Hecht (New York: Plenum Press, 1984) provides a historical 
reference to this emerging domain of weaponry, mostly from a Cold War context. 
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5.3.2 Electromagnetic Launch 
When considering the key cannon performance metric of muzzle velocity, 
electromagnetic launchers have achieved muzzle velocities beyond the theoretical limits 
of a tactical powder cannon, with laboratory launchers routinely achieving 2.4 km/s.212 In 
these velocity regimes, dense penetrators can deposit specific energy levels 
commensurate with high explosives. The expanding gases in a conventional powder gun 
operate on velocity scales on the order of the sound speed of the working fluid inside the 
bore. The theoretical velocity limit for these expanding gases is approximately of 5 – 8 
km/s, with practical limits for a tactical launcher in the 1.5 to 2.0 km/s range.213  
 
5.3.2.1 Kinetic Energy versus High Explosive 
As an example of the criticality of projectile velocity with respect to target effects, 
consider two target interactions, one kinetic and one chemical–explosive (Figure 108). In 
this figure, a 1 kg long rod penetrator encountering a target at 3 km/s deposits 4.5 MJ of 
kinetic energy on the target (KE = ½mv2, (½ of 1kg at (3000m/s)2 = 4,500,000 J). 
Similarly, 1 kg of high explosive (e ≈ 4.5 MJ per kg) releases a similar amount of energy 
on the target. While the gross amounts of energy brought to the target are commensurate, 
the kinetic energy is much more efficient at insulting the target than the free expansion of 
blast induced pressure from the release of chemical energy (90% versus 10%).214 In other 
 
211 Doug Beason, The E-Bomb: How America's New Directed Energy Weapons Will Change the Way 
Future Wars Will Be Fought (Cambridge, Massachussetts: De Capo Press, 2005) 20-28. This book 
classifies directed energy as including microwave and laser technologies.  
212 R.M. Ogorkiewicz, Technology of Tanks (United Kingdom: Jane’s Information Group, 1991) 93.  
213 R. Heiser, “Gasdynamic Limits of Maximum Attainable Muzzle Velocities for Conventional Guns” 5th 
International Symposium on Ballistics (Toulouse, France, 1980) 234-249. 
214 Harry D. Fair, Electromagnetic Launch Short Course, hosted by the Institute for Advanced Technology 
at Austin Texas, July 23-26, 2007, slides 11-14. 
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words, the net energy deposited into the target with kinetic energy is greater, since a 
larger fraction of energy deposited with the chemical energy munition is lost to expansion 
in free space.  
At hypervelocity, on a specific energy or equivalent mass perspective, inert 
projectiles can deposit energy proportional to the yield attained by high explosive 
materials. There are many challenges associated with attaining bullet speeds in excess of 
2 km/s. There are also significant handling requirements and transportability issues 
associated with contemporary ammunition that rely on the release of chemical energy to 
both accelerate and, in some cases, insult a targeted threat.  
 
 
Figure 108: Kinetic energy (KE) on left and chemical or high-explosive (HE) energy on 
right interacting with a notional target (blue block of RHA). Crater volume 
from the KE interaction is approximately an order of magnitude greater than 
the HE. Dr. Harry Fair provided a discussion and graphics that served as the 
source for the creation of this figure. 





5.3.2.2 Electromagnetic Launch Railguns 
In the division of Electric Fires known as electromagnetic launch, the competing 
class of these future weapon concepts is called the railgun.215 Named for the parallel 
conductors or rails that form the working surface of the launcher, the function of a simple 
railgun can be considered as that of a one-turn, linear, direct current (DC) motor.216 As 
current flows down a conducting rail, it generates a magnetic field around the rail. As the 
current crosses perpendicularly through this magnetic field across a bridging element, in 
this case an armature that is free to move, a Lorentz force is imparted into the armature as 
well as any launch package mated to it. Since the armature is free to move, the launch 
package can be propelled down the length of the cannon. In this way, the current 
continues to flow back down its companion parallel rail, imparting a force onto the 
launch package until the circuit is opened, normally occurring when the armature has 




215 I.R. McNab, “Early electric gun research” Magnetics, IEEE Transactions, Jan 1999 Volume: 35,  Issue: 
1, 250 – 261. McNab provides a thorough historical review of the 100+ years of electric gun research.  
216 Wang Ying, Richard Marshall, and Cheng Shukang Physics of Electric Launch (Beijing, China: China 










Figure 109: Railgun schematic illustrating the propelling Lorentz force generated in the 
region where the current (J) crosses the magnetic field (B). The armature is 
considered free to slide along the rails.217  
Through virtual-work analysis, the force imparted to the projectile in a simple, 
solid armature, one-turn railgun, takes the familiar form of Equation 54, where L′ is a 
electromagnetic bore geometry parameter called the inductance gradient with units of 
microhenries per meter squared (μH/m2), and I is the current with units of amperes. As 
explained by Marshall, “in an ordinary motor there are hundreds of turns so the current is 
used hundreds of times as it were. With the [simple] single-turn railgun, the current is 
used once so it must be hundreds of times higher to enable reasonable propelling forces 
to be obtained.”218 For a tactical launcher designed for a ground combat vehicle, peak 
current values are on the order of megaamperes (MA), a level necessary to generate 
muzzle energies in the megajoule (MJ) range. Given that the launch event occurs in 5-10 
 
217 Harry D. Fair, “Electromagnetic Launch Fundamentals” Electromagnetic Launch Short Course, hosted 
by the Institute for Advanced Technology, Austin, Texas, July 23-26, 2007. 
218 Richard A. Marshall and Wang Ying, Railguns: Their Science and Technology (Beijing, China:  China 
Machine Press, 2004) 5. 
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milliseconds (ms), the peak power discharge is in the gigawatt (GW) range. For a ground 
combat system, therein lies the engineering problem: how to efficiently store MJ levels of 
energy, generate GW levels of power (for very short, pulsed durations), and direct MAs 
of current to create tactically significant levels of launch energy.  
21
2
F L I Equation 54
With some appreciation for the technical challenges associated with creating a 
tactical railgun system (critical path element being the power supply and related 
switching), the first question one may ask is why launch projectiles electromagnetically? 
The short answer is speed. At the tactical level, for direct fire cannons, electromagnetic 
launch yields increased lethality, since penetration efficiency is a strong function of 
impact velocity. For indirect fire cannons, higher muzzle velocity yields both greater 
maximum effective range (MER) and higher impact velocity.  
At the operational level, there may be a reduction in logistical demands since 
electromagnetic launch munitions do not require any propellant or powder charge. This 
can equate to substantial savings in transport requirements since for ordnance velocity 
rounds (muzzle velocities of 500–1500 m/s), the powder charge is approximately half the 
mass of the projectile. Additionally, a concept based on the transformation of electrical 
energy can, in theory, accept multiple sources for energy storage and power discharge.  
At the strategic level, railguns could yield greater specific cannon energy, as well 
as a scaleable and tunable weapon system that could reduce collateral damage and act in 
concurrence with the proportionality tenet of Just War Theory. In the next two sections, 
the opportunities and challenges of pursuing electromagnetic launch are further explored 
using the survivability, lethality, and mobility construct for direct fire systems. To 
provide a balanced alternative, a conventional powder gun system with evolutionary 
capability is also presented.   
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5.5 Advanced Direct Fire Powder Gun and Railgun Systems 
 
                  
Figure 110: Armor branch insignia, standard (left) and as modified by the author (right). 
The modified insignia replacing a saber with a lighting bolt signifies electric 
fires.219 
The analysis for the direct fire engagement scenario was conducted in reverse 
sequential order against a notional advanced threat vehicle (Figure 111). The starting 





internal ballistics  
Figure 111: Notional direct fire engagement consisting of a terminal, external, and 
internal ballistic event. 
The terminal ballistic event began as the projectile contacted the target and ended 
when the projectile had transferred all available energy to the threat system. The 
objective for the terminal ballistic event was to perforate the threat armor, a requirement 
in generating an insult conducive with destroying the system. The next step was external 
 
219 Source for unmodified armor branch insignia graphic is http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Armor-
Branch-Insignia.png. 
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ballistics analysis. This stage analyzed projectile travel through the atmosphere from 
muzzle departure to imminent target impact. The goals for the external ballistic event 
were to fly quickly and accurately to the target. These first two steps were done 
irrespective of the launch source. The last step in the direct fire analysis focused on 
internal ballistics. Internal ballistic analysis began with commission of a lethal payload 
and ended with impending departure of the payload from the muzzle. The internal 
ballistic analysis was done for both an advanced powder gun and railgun concept. A 
unique launch package design for both powder gun and railgun was developed using best 
practices. Additionally, a powder gun and railgun cannon system, to include magazine, 
and power supply (for the railgun concept) was also theoretically constructed. 
 
5.5.1 Target Effects and Terminal Ballistics 
Beginning with terminal ballistic analysis, a review of historical development and 
recent design trends served to guide the generation of technical requirements. The 
predominant improvement in terminal ballistic performance since the end of World War 
II has been on achieving higher penetration efficiency through increased impact 
velocity.220 In the early 1950s, the U.S. military demonstrated target impact penetration 
of up to 660 mm (over 2 ft) of rolled homogeneous armor (RHA). This was done at 
relatively low impact velocities (800 m/s), very high impact energies (300+ MJ), and 
incredibly large amounts of propellant energy (1000+ MJ).221 To illustrate the magnitude 
of this energy, a 4,000 lb car smashing into a brick wall at 75 mph has approximately 1 
MJ of kinetic energy at the moment of impact.  
 
220 W. Lanz, W. Odermatt, G. Weihrauch, “Kinetic Energy Projectiles: Development History, State of the 
Art, Trends” International Symposium of Ballistics, TB-19, May 2001, 1192-1197. 
221 Ibid., 1192-1193. 
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When considering the performance from the 1950s, modern tank caliber kinetic 
energy penetrators match this 660 mm depth, but with much higher efficiency. For 
example, a large caliber, direct fire bullet, like the M829 armor piercing, fin stabilized, 
discarding sabot (APFSDS) round fired from 120 mm M256 cannon found in the M1 
Abrams series main battle tank, impacts at nearly a mile a second (1600 m/s). To achieve 
660 mm of penetration, the faster impact requires only 2% of the kinetic energy on target 
than the earlier example (6 MJ versus 300 MJ). Interestingly, the local system efficiency, 
or the ratio of impact kinetic energy to incident chemical energy, is actually lower with 
the high velocity case. Approximately 40 MJ (9 kg at 4.4 MJ per kg) of propellant are 
required to generate the muzzle velocity commensurate with 6 MJ of energy on target in 
the high velocity projectile. However, the current system achieves that penetration depth 
with 9 kg of propellant, compared to the 1950s setup which needed 250 kg. In other 
words, the high velocity design is able to transfer each MJ of impact energy into 110 mm 
of penetration, while the lower velocity case gets only 2 mm of penetration per MJ.  
For two main reasons, this is not an entirely fair comparison. First, the 1950s 
example is based on a laboratory fixture wholly unsuited for tactical application. Second, 
several other key design features have jointly contributed to improved penetration 
performance. For example, additional advances in penetrator design, including the use of 
denser materials, lighter sabots, and high aspect ratio penetrators (ratio of length of 
penetrator to the diameter of the penetrator), have also helped increase penetration depth. 
Even with these concessions, the fact remains that the most dominating factor in target 





5.4.1.1  Penetration Efficiency 
The factor that impact velocity plays with penetration efficiency becomes evident 
when constant energy impact events are plotted as a function of velocity using the 
Lanz/Odermatt/Jenquartier equations, one of which is presented as Equation 55.222 In this 
equation, P is the depth of target penetration, Lw is the penetrator length, λ is the ratio of 
penetrator length to penetrator diameter, θ is the angle of obliquity for target impact 
(a.k.a. the NATO angle), mNATO is the exponent for plate inclination (assumed as 0.225), 
ρ is the material density for penetrator (subscript p) and target (subscript t), vp is the 
impact velocity, and Rm is the target material tensile strength. The variable c is found 
using Equation 56, and the term for f(λ) is found using Equation 57, where a1 equals 3.94 
and a2 equals 11.2. When material properties are assumed for standard target and 
penetrator design (Table 47), this produces the classic s-shape curve seen in Figure 113. 
Figure 114 includes a similar curve overlaid with data points for nearly 100 ordnance and 
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222 Held, Manfred, “A Tutorial on the Penetration of Kinetic-Energy (KE) Rounds” Journal of Battlefield 
Technology, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2004, 1-8. This is an excellent overview of KE impact physics.  
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Figure 112: Proxy vehicles used to develop notional threat armor packages. Pictured on 
the left is the Russian T-80UM2 “Black Eagle”.  On the right is the Russian 
BMPT-2 “Terminator”. 223 
 
 





Figure 113: Normalized penetration as a function of impact velocity. 
 
Figure 114: Experimental values of normalized penetration (P/L) as a function of impact 
velocity. 224, 225 
 
224 V. Hohler and A.J. Stilp, “Penetration of Steel and High Density Rods in Semi-Infinite Steel Targets” 
3rd International Symposium on Ballistics, Karlsruhe, Germany, H3: 1-12, 1977.  
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Figure 115: Terminal ballistic schematic from Lanz and Odermatt (2000) depicting long 
rod penetrator impacting target at an oblique angle.226 
An exhaustive review by de Rosset and Amico on the experimental results of 
kinetic energy projectiles over a wide range of velocities, aspect ratios, and scales, found 
that an impact velocity of 2050 m/s was optimal for high aspect ratio (L/D = 30) direct 
fire penetrators.227 Assuming armor penetration requirements for an advanced tank and 
IFV (P = 1000 mm and 100 mm of RHA respectively) at a NATO angle of 60°, Equation 
55 was used to calculate the optimal penetrator length.228 
 
 
225 W. Lanz and W. Odermatt, “Penetration Limits of Conventional large Caliber Anti Tank Mines / 
Kinetic Energy Projectiles” 13th International Symposium on Ballistics, Stockholm Sweden, Vol. 3, 225-
233, 1992.  
226 W. Lanz and W. Odermatt, “Minimum Impact Energy for KE Penetrators in RHA Targets”, European 
Forum on Ballistics and Projectiles, St. Louis, France, April 2000. 
227 William S. de Rosset, and D. Andrew D’Amico, “Optimum Velocity Penetrators”, Defense Technical 
Information Center, 1995, 7. 
228 Lanz and Odermatt, 2000. This paper also calculated optimal impact velocities. The authors concluded 
that the optimal velocity was considerably slower than de Rosset and D’Amico calculated, but they also 
only considered powder gun launches which induce higher peak acceleration during launch requiring more 
sabot structural mass. 
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5.4.1.2  Behind Armor Debris 
At this point, given its high density and identification as a likely replacement for 
conventional depleted uranium penetrators, a tungsten penetrator slug was designed to 
ensure perforation of the armor on the proposed set of advanced fighting vehicles, i.e., a 
tank and IFV with protection equivalent to 1000 mm and 100 mm of RHA respectively. 
For rounds with an aspect ration of 30 (λ), the high density slugs are depicted in Figure 
117, and accompanying specifications for each are provided in Table 48. It should be 
noted that these values are just for the lethal mass of the penetrator designed to perforate 
the armor. In addition to demonstrating increased penetration efficiency with 
hypervelocity, it has also been shown that behind armor debris increases with impact 
velocity. Behind armor debris “significantly contributes to the incapacitation of personnel 
and damage of internal components of armored vehicles subjected to perforating impacts 
by kinetic energy penetrators.”229    
At constant impact energy, this debris appears to increase in quantity and over a 
larger solid angle at higher velocity.230 The debris cloud can be considered as a truncated 
ellipsoid composed of fragments radiating outwards from the point of armor perforation. 
In experimental tests, a series of thin plates (referred to as “witness packs”) are arranged 
behind the target. These plates provide forensic evidence of the behind armor debris 
emanating from the target hole. As impact velocity increases, the maximum emission 
angle (θmax), number of fragments, and fragment perforations at successive plates, all 
 
229 Edward W. Kennedy and David L. Diehl, “Behind-Armor Debris Produced by DU-3/4Ti and WHA 
Penetrators at Ordnance and Higher Velocities” Army Research Laboratory Technical Report 3784, May 
2006, 1-3. WHA stands for tungsten (chemical symbol W) heavy alloy. WHA is a formulation designed for 
penetrators. 
230 C. Anderson, Jr., S. Bless, T. Sharron, and R. Subramanian, “Behind Armor Debris Comparisons at 
Ordnance and Hypervelocities” TARDEC Combat Vehicle Survivability Symposium, Monterey, 
California, 1995.  
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increase.231 Each fragment has a unique mass, trajectory, and velocity, which at best can 









Figure 116: Schematic depicting generation of behind armor debris cloud (truncated red 
ellipse) consisting of target and projectile fragments radiating outward.232 
 
231 J.L. Verolme, M. Szymczak, “Behind-Armour Debris Modeling for High-Velocity Fragment Impact” 
17th International Symposium on Ballistics, Midrand, South Africa, March 1998, 259-265. 
232 Ibid. This figure was generated based on the generally accepted depiction of a truncated ellipse forming 
the behind armor debris field extending from the crater of target penetration.  
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L = 840 mm, D = 28 mm
L = 84 mm, D = 2.8 mm
 
Figure 117: Penetrators for advanced tank target (top) and advanced IFV target (bottom) 
designed to penetrate 1000 mm and 100 mm of RHA respectively.  
Table 48: Hypervelocity Tank and IFV Tungsten Penetrator Specifications 
Specification Variable Tank round IFV round 
penetration 
depth 
P 1000 mm 100 mm 
length of 
penetrator 
L 840 mm 84 mm 
diameter of 
penetrator 
D 28 mm 2.8 mm 
mass of 
penetrator 
m 7 kg 700 g 
kinetic energy 
of penetrator 
KE 16 MJ 1.6 MJ 
 
5.5.2 Target Engagement and External Ballistics 
Assuming an engagement at 2,000 m and drag induced deceleration determined 
from Equation 58, Equation 59 was used to calculate a required muzzle velocity of 2134 
m/s, rounded up to 2150 m/s. In Equation 58, ρ is the density and the subscript p and ∞ 
are for the penetrator and atmosphere respectively. The coefficient of drag, Cd is assumed 
as 0.15. If the impact velocity (vimp) is set at 2050 m/s, then  Equation 58 and Equation 59 
can be solved simultaneously to find the deceleration per km (v′) and required muzzle 
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velocity  (vmuz). The bullet leaves the muzzle at approximately Mach 6, and for the 
relatively short flight the deceleration occurs in the supersonic range. Therefore, one can 
assume a constant drag coefficient in this equation.233 This agrees with the aeroballistic 
kinetic energy penetrator deceleration rule of thumb of 50 m/s loss in velocity for each 










In order to sustain proper orientation downrange from a smoothbore cannon, a 
titanium nose cone and set of six stabilizing fins was designed based on a proven design 
in the M829 series of APFSDS kinetic energy rounds (Figure 119). A simplifying 
assumption was that the leading edge is a simple high aspect ratio cone. In actual 
practice, this critical feature requires a more sophisticated profile (e.g., von Kármán or 




233 S.S. Chin, Missile Configuration Design (New York: McGraw Hill, 1961) 23-36.  
234 Held, 1-3. Another useful rule of thumb comes from this paper which estimates the length of long rod 
penetrator as a function of the square of the ratios of penetrator and target densities.  
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Figure 118: Drag coefficient as a function of Mach number for typical hypervelocity 
aeroshell utilizing a von Kármán nosecone, tubular body, trailing boattail, 
and clipped delta wing stabilizing fins.236  
windscreen nosecone (θcone = 18°)
clipped delta wing stabilizing fins 
(×6, θfin = 20°)
4D
1.5 D
1.5 D  
Figure 119: Kinetic energy long rod penetrator with titanium windscreen nosecone and 
clipped delta wing stabilizing fins. 
 
236 Robert L. McCoy, Modern Exterior Ballistics: The Launch and Flight Dynamics of Symmetric 
Projectiles (Penssylvania: Schiffer Publishing, 1999) 72-77.  
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 The design and construction of the flight body (nose and fins) is a critical 
component that ensures the penetrator reaches the target accurately and efficiently. 
Assuming thin gauge titanium is used for the flight surfaces, the mass is surprisingly 
small for a standard cone and set of six fins (257 g and 3 g for the tank and IFV round 
respectively).237 This mass for nose cone and fins was subsequently accounted for in the 
exterior and interior ballistic calculations.  
 
5.4.2.1  Time of Flight and Lag Time 
The last aspect of external ballistics analysis considered dealt with time of flight 
and lag time. Time of flight is the time required to travel from muzzle to target. 
Assuming constant drag, time of flight can be calculated from Equation 62. In Equation 
62, vmuzzle is the muzzle velocity, k1 is a constant found using Equation 65, and r is the 
range to the target.  In Equation 65, ρatm is the atmospheric density, Aprojectile is the cross 
sectional area of the projectile, CD is the coefficient of drag for the projectile, and mprojectile 
is the mass of the projectile. Lag time (Equation 63) is the “time difference, or lag 
between the actual flight time and the time to the same range in a vacuum.”238 This lag 
time is used to calculate crosswind induced deflection in the classical formula presented 





237 B.P. Burns, L. Burton, and W.H. Drysdale, “Methodologies for Forecasting Sabot Mass for Advanced 
Gun and Projectile Systems” Ballistic Research Laboratory Technical Report, BRL-TR-3387, June 1991, 
4-5. The authors provide a rule of thumb tare weight for stabilization devices of 150–250 g. The produced 
values (257 g) agree with this provided tare weight value. 
238 Robert L. McCoy, Modern Exterior Ballistics: The Launch and Flight Dynamics of Symmetric 













  Equation 63










5.4.2.2  Crosswind Deflection 
To explore the effect of high impact velocity on crosswind induced drift and time 
of flight, a parametric sweep of muzzle velocity at constant muzzle energy was 
conducted. In this case, 10 MJ were made available for launch, with 2 kg dedicated to 
parasitic mass.239 The parasitic mass ratio is the fraction of mass of the loaded launch 
package that does not travel to the target. The range for muzzle velocity was from 1500 
to 2500 m/s. The range to the target was 2000 m, and a constant crosswind of 10 m/s (22 
mph) was assumed. The aspect ratio (λ) was set at 30. The penetrator mass as a function 
of velocity was found using Equation 66, where Emuzzle is the muzzle energy of the 
cannon. The diameter and cross sectional area of the penetrator as a function of velocity 
were found using Equation 67 and Equation 68. The terminal velocity of the penetrator as 




239 At 1500 m/s, this mass represents the current fraction required to sustain launch. The assumption was 
made that as the velocity increased and the lethal payload decreased (constant energy), that this supporting 
mass would sustain launch at higher velocity but lower projectile mass. 
344 
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Figure 120:  Target deflection and time of flight versus muzzle velocity for a constant 
energy cannon. Crosswind speed is 10 m/s, and muzzle energy is held at 10 
MJ with 2 kg of the launch package dedicated to parasitic mass. The y-axis 
is the fraction of deflection off of a 1 m2 target area. 
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5.5.3 Target Acquisition and Internal Ballistics 
The last step in the examination of advanced direct fire systems was to conduct 
internal ballistic analysis. This was done in three main areas. First was design of the 
cartridge (powder gun) and integrated launch package (railgun). For a powder gun, the 
cartridge consisted of a penetrator carried in a mid-drive configuration with discarding 
sabots set in a combustible shell casing packed with propellant (Figure 121). For a 
railgun, the launch package consisted of the same penetrator carried by a mid-drive 
armature and discarding sabots (Figure 122). Next was the cannon or launcher barrel 
design. Cannon length for the large caliber round was fixed at 6 m and for the medium 
caliber round it was set at 3 m. An advanced composite overwrap was considered for both 
the powder gun and railgun design (Figure 124 and Figure 125). Lastly was embodiment 
of the ammunition magazine (powder gun) and the ammunition storage area with power 
supply (railgun). Based on prior work, the bore for the tank round powder gun was 
assumed to be 140 mm (20 mm greater than the current NATO standard tank gun 120 
mm ammunition).240  The powder gun designed to propel the advanced IFV round was 
assumed to be 35 mm.241 A previous design effort was used to create the railgun system 
for the tank round with a 90 mm round bore.242  Likewise, the railgun envisioned to 
 
240 Asher H. Sharoni and Lawrence D. Bacon, “The Future Combat System (FCS): Technology Evolution  
Review and Feasibility Assessment, Part Two- Armament” Armor Magazine, (Sep-Oct 1997) 29-35. The 
140 mm design was originally conceived under the ARDEC XM291 Advanced Tank Cannon program 
(ATAC).  
241 Jerome T. Tzeng and Edward M. Schmidt, “Comparison of Electromagnetic and Conventional Guns 
from a Mechanics and Material Aspect” 23rd International Symposium on Ballistics, Tarragona, Spain (16-
20 April 2007) 597 – 604. In this paper, the authors compare the existing Mauser Mk 30-2 firing the 
Oerlikon PMC287 kinetic energy projectile with a comparable railgun with a 14.5 mm × 32.7 mm 
rectangular bore.  
242 J.J. Hahne, J.L. Upshaw, J.H. Herbst, J.H. Price, “Fabrication and Testing of a 30 mm and 90 mm 
Laminated, High L′ Railgun Designed and Built at CEM-UT” IEEE Transactions on Magnetics, Vol 31, 
no. 1, January 1995, 303-308. 
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propel the advanced IFV round had a 15 mm round bore. This was comparable to the 










Figure 121: Kinetic energy cartridge based on M829 series round.244  
Long Rod PenetratorSabot
Mid-drive ArmatureClipped Delta Wing 
Stabilizing Fins  
Figure 122: Hypervelocity kinetic energy integrated launch package. 
 
To design the structures (sabots, obturator, and bore riders)  required to support 
the subcaliber, long rod penetrator during its journey down the powder gun, the closed-
 
243 R. A. Marshall, “Railgun bore geometry, round or square?” IEEE Transactions on Magnetics, Jan 1999, 
427-431.   
244 Source for unshaded graphic is www.inetres.com/gp/military/cv/weapon/M256.html 
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form design formulas developed by Burns, Burton, and Drysdale were used (Equation 70 
and Equation 71).245 In these equations, c is the mass of the propellant charge, P is the 
breech pressure, dsp is the diameter of the penetrator plus twice the groove height, A1 is a 
design constant (A1 = 0.000087), and Lf  is the length of the flight body. For the railgun 
launch package, values developed independently by British and U.S. exploratory design 
effort were used.246, 247  For conventional cannons at high ordnance velocities (1500 -
1700 m/s), contemporary parasitic mass ratios are 0.45, and values as low as 0.3 are 
achievable using advanced sabot materials and novel fabrication methods.248  However, 
as velocity is increased into the hypervelocity regime (2000 m/s), the parasitic mass ratio 
climbs back up to the half-fraction range. The supporting structures, which contribute to 
the parasitic mass, scale with the inertial forces during the extremely violent launch 
event. High velocity powder guns have a high piezometric efficiency normally in the 
50%–60% range.249 Piezometric efficiency (εp) is the ratio of average pressure to peak 
pressure during the launch event.250 The peak to average acceleration ratio is the inverse 
of εp. A muzzle velocity commensurate with hypervelocity launch requires high peak 




245 B.P. Burns, L. Burton, and W.H. Drysdale, “Methodologies for Forecasting Sabot Mass for Advanced 
Gun and Projectile Systems” Ballistic Research Laboratory Technical Report, BRL-TR-3387, June 1991. 
246 M.M. Hinton, N.R. Coooper, D. Haugh, and M.A. Firth, “On the Parasitic Mass of Launch Packages for 
Electromagnetic Guns” 10th U.S. Army Gun Dynamics Symposium, ADA404787: 2001, 291-304. 
247 Alexander E. Zielinski, “Integrated Launch Package Design With Considerations for Reduced-Scale 
Demonstration” IEEE Transactions on Magnetics, Vol. 39, No. 1, January 2003, 402-405. 
248 M.M. Hinton, N.R. Coooper, D. Haugh, and M.A. Firth, “On the Parasitic Mass of Launch Packages for 
Electromagnetic Guns” 10th U.S. Army Gun Dynamics Symposium, ADA404787: 2001, 292.  
249 Donald E.  Carlucci, Sidney S. Jacobson. Ballistics: Theory and Design of Guns and Ammunition. New 
York: CRC Press, 2007, 94-96. 
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  Equation 71 
 
Railguns can achieve higher muzzle velocities with a lower εp. The 
electromagnetic force applied to the launch package is finely controlled by the switching 
and discharge of the power supply. However, the parasitic mass ratio for a railgun launch 
package includes the armature or the sliding electrical bridging structure that forms a 
circuit between the two rails. This critical component subjected to millions of amperes of 
current flow and 100+ kgees (1 kgee = 1,000 g or 1,000 × 9.81 m/s2) of acceleration is 
designed to perform several functions. Therefore, the mass advantage given to a railgun 
launch package for lower peak acceleration values is offset by the multifunctional 
requirements of the armature for the launch event. For the kinetic energy penetrator 
carried by a mid-drive armature with supporting sabots and front bore riders, the railgun 
parasitic mass ratio is again in the half-fractional range.251, 252 Therefore, for both the 
powder gun and railgun launch package, the parasitic mass ratio was assumed to be 0.5. 
 
251 M.M. Hinton, N.R. Coooper, D. Haugh, and M.A. Firth, “On the Parasitic Mass of Launch Packages for 
Electromagnetic Guns” 10th U.S. Army Gun Dynamics Symposium, ADA404787: 2001, 302-303. 
Depending on the launch phase (internal, external, and terminal), the parasitic mass ratio is defined 
differently. For example, some elements that travel downrange to the target do not contribute to the 
penetration event and therefore are sometimes considered to be parastitic mass (aeroshell, fins, tracer 
cartridge). Within this chapter, the author considered the parasitic mass ratio to be the fraction of internal 
ballistic support structures divided by the total launch package mass. 
252 R.J. Hayes and T.E. Hayden. “Experimental Results from Solid Armature Tests at the Center for 
Electromechanics at The University of Texas at Austin Center for Electromechanics” IEEE Transactions 
on Magnetics, Vol. 29, No. 1, January 1993, 819-825. This paper presents results from a similarly designed 
90 mm laboratory cannon firing a demonstration launch package with long rod penetrator.  
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This meant that each system would have to accelerate a mass equal to twice the 
penetrator from zero to 2150 m/s along the length of the respective barrel.  
In order to design the propellant charge required to propel the bullet in the powder 
gun, a series of charge mass correlations were consulted. From Heiser and Horst, 
Equation 72 was used to determine the muzzle velocity for a given propellant charge c. In 
this equation, echarge is the specific energy of the propellant, γ is the ratio of specific heats 
for the working fluid, and V is the volume of the barrel (Vo is the chamber volume and 
Vmuzzle is the volume of the chamber and the length of bore). Using launch properties for 
the 120 mm M256 with an M829A2 APFSDS round, Equation 72 predicts a muzzle 
velocity of 1697 m/s versus 1650 m/s measured. Alternatively, Ogorkiewicz and 
Rhienmetall present muzzle velocity estimation solely as a function of the ratio of charge 
mass to launch package mass. In Ogorkiewicz version (Equation 73), mc is the mass of 
the charge or propellant and mp is the mass of the projectile. In the Rhienmetall 
estimation (Equation 74), ζ is a characteristic coefficient equal to 0.46, ε is a weighting 
factor equal to 0.5, and Qex is a property of the propellant equal to about 4 kJ per kg. Note 
that in Equation 74 the ratio of charge mass and propellant mass are in the denominator 
and are inverted. These two equations have been plotted across a range of mass ratios 
(φmass) for comparison (Figure 123). In the figure, vOg is the Ogorkiewicz predicted 
velocity and vRh is the Rhienmetall predicted velocity with units of m/s. For a required 
muzzle velocity of 2150 m/s, the average mass ratio predicted is approximately 2.5. This 
means that a 1 kg projectile would require 2.5 kg of propellant in the cartridge.  
As a comparison, the M829A2 firing at a muzzle velocity of 1670 m/s has 
approximately 9 kg of propellant for an 8 kg projectile. This projectile mass includes both 
the penetrator and the sabots. The Rhienmetall equation under predicts the muzzle 
velocity by less than 100 m/s. With this data, the values for the mass and volume of the 
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powder gun cartridges and railgun integrated launch packages for the tank and IFV 
targets were calculated (Table 49). The calculated mass of the powder gun cartridge 
includes the penetrator, aeroshell, sabots, propellant, obturator, and combustible casing. 
The calculated mass for the railgun integrated launch package consisting of the 
penetrator, aeroshell, sabots, obturator, and mid-drive armature. The cartridge volume 
was estimated based on a scaled up M256 cannon with a larger bore (140 mm versus 120 
mm) and bigger breech volume (183 mm diameter versus 156 mm). The breech is the 
oversized area at the base of the cartridge where the propellant begins to burn during the 
launch process. The integrated launch package volume was calculated based on a 
cylinder that would serve as the logistical transport tube for the launch package. This is a 
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Table 49: Powder Gun Cartridge and Railgun Integrated Launch Package Properties 
 tank round IFV round 
 mass [kg] volume [cm3] mass [kg] volume [cm3] 
Powder Gun 49 31,910 4.9 116 
Railgun 14 6,362 1.4 19 
 
 
Figure 123: Predicted muzzle velocity using the Ogorkiewicz (vOg) and Rhienmetall (vRh) 
equations as a function of the ratio of charge mass to projectile mass (φmass).  
The next step was to design the powder gun cannon and railgun cannon which 
could support the launch of the projectiles. For the powder gun, a maximum chamber 
pressure of 700 MPa was assumed.253 For the railgun design, an inductance gradient (L′) 
of 0.55 μH per m was assumed. The average acceleration (ā ) was found from Equation 
75. In this equation, lbore is the length of the bore. With this, the average and peak current 
I were found from Equation 76 and Equation 77 where mlaunch package is the mass of the 
 
253 Donald E.  Carlucci, Sidney S. Jacobson. Ballistics: Theory and Design of Guns and Ammunition (New 
York: CRC Press, 2007) 5.2-5.4. This value is nearly 25% greater than the maximum chamber pressure of 
the 120 mm M256 cannon in the Abrams tank.  
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entire launch package and η is the average to peak acceleration (assumed as 0.75). With 
this peak current I, the pressure generated from the bore (Pbore) was found from Equation 
78. Finally, the ratio of outer to inner radii (ζbore) was found from Equation 79 where σy is 
the yield strength of the containment material .254 This closed-form solution is derived for 
a monobloc wall construction based on the Lamé equations for thick-walled, pressure 
vessel design. With this ratio and an assumed yield strength from a high-modulus, carbon 
fiber overwrap construction material, a powder cannon and railgun cannon were extruded 




























  Equation 78
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254 Carlucci makes an interesting observation in his text when he plots ζbore versus the ratio of chamber 
pressure and yield strength. As this Pbore over σy approaches 0.58, the ratio of inner and outer bore radii 
approaches infinity.  In other words, the chamber pressure can never be greater than 58% of wall material 
yield strength. 
255 Joshua Keena and Tess Moon, “Bore Configuration Analysis for a Direct Fire Railgun” Classified 








Figure 124: Powder gun cannon cross section schematic.  








Figure 125: Railgun cannon cross section schematic. 
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Finally, to account for the railgun power supply, switching, and ancillary 
equipment, a spreadsheet modeling tool developed by Mallick and Crawford was used.256 
This program accepts a collection of weapon system and technical requirements, and 
produces an estimation for numerous aspects of the design of the composite system. The 
values for system mass and volume as they would directly impact a first-order analysis on 
fighting vehicle design were of greatest interest. The input parameters used for the 
simulation are provided in Table 50 (pulsed alternator and launcher), and the output 
values for the railgun system, as well as the design values for the powder gun system, are 
listed in Table 51.257 As a cursory look at the advanced concepts presented, the cannon 
mass only considers the barrel, breech, and cabling (for railgun). The magazine is 













256 John Mallick and Mark Crawford, Launcher System Sizing Tool V16xFW, Institute for Advanced 
Technology, Austin, Texas 2007.  
257 Ian R. McNab, “Pulsed Power Fundamentals” work supported by ARL DAAA21-93-C-0101, Institute 
for Advanced Technology, Austin, Texas, April 1996.   
355 
Table 50: Railgun Sizing Tool Input Parameters 
Pulsed Alternator 
Parameters 
Units Tank IFV 
Maximum speed rpm 11000 11000 
Maximum B at stator winding Tesla 3 3 
Maximum tip speed m/s 600 600 
Maximum temperature 
rise/shot 
K 30 30 
Operating Banding Stress ksi 700 450 
Number of Alternators  # 2 2 
Shot Rate  per minute 4 8 
Desired Shots Stored # 2 3 
Muzzle Energy MJ 32 3 
Muzzle Velocity m/s 2150 2150 
Peak Acceleration kgee 85 120 
Piezometric Efficiency # 0.75 0.65 
Gun Efficiency # 0.50 0.50 
Inductance Gradient L' μH/m 0.55 0.55 
 
Table 51: Powder Gun and Railgun System Specifications258 
Property 140 mm  
powder gun 
90 mm  
railgun 




total mass [kg] 6,000 13,000 1,300 2,800 
cannon mass [kg] 4,000 3,000 1,000 700 
magazine mass [kg] 2,000 500 300 100 
power supply mass [kg] n/a 9,500 n/a 2,000 
 
258 All mass values have been rounded to the nearest 100 kg. 
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5.5.4 In-stride Assessment of Advanced Weapon System Concepts 
At this point, neither tank cannon appears to be a good candidate. The problems 
with larger caliber (>125 mm) powder gun cannons are fairly well established and have 
been faithfully avoided to date. In other forums, the 140 mm concept has been presented 
internationally; perhaps reassuringly, this brief study converged on the same general 
scaling issues and design challenges. In essence, the pursuit of higher tank caliber 
lethality with a powder gun ends up producing a very heavy cartridge that necessitates 
either splitting the cartridge into two or more pieces (projectile and propellant) or 
designing an autoloader that can handle the round. The cannon and breech for the powder 
gun are also markedly higher as the operating pressure must be raised to attain the higher 
muzzle velocities. In physical terms, the cannon and complementary ammunition 
approach that of an artillery system, is wholly unsuited for a mobile and protected source 
of firepower like a ground combat vehicle. 
 
 
Figure 126: Entities that contain 10 kJ of energy (Marshall, 2001).259  
A final consideration in the analysis of an advanced, high velocity cannon concept 
involves the effect of muzzle velocity on recoil force. The larger the recoil force, the 
more equipment required to mitigate that force to minimize the vehicle motion and return 
 
259 Richard A. Marshall, “Railgunnery: Where Have We Been, Where Are We Going?” IEEE Transactions 
on Magnetics, Vol 37, No 1, January 2001, 440-444. This article describes the persistent challenges with 
railgunning as well as the progress made in the 1990s. 
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the cannon to battery after firing. “By conservation of momentum, a reaction is applied to 
the launcher that is equal and opposite to that of the projectile and any other inertia 
ejected out the muzzle.”260 Railguns have the advantage of generating a relatively flat 
ballistic curve, which simplifies the analysis, while also serving as the best case for a 
powder gun. The case considered is a constant energy cannon with a constant recoiling 
mass (cannon and breech). Similar to the time of flight and target drift analysis as a 
function of muzzle velocity, recoil force was analyzed as a function of velocity. The 
cannon length was set at 6 m, and the muzzle energy held at 10 MJ. Recoiling mass was 
assumed at 2,000 kg. Muzzle velocity ranged from 1500 m/s to 2500 m/s. The governing 
equations for this analysis follow.  
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E Fdx F x   Equation 81





I Fdt ma dt F t     Equation 83
 
For a constant energy cannon system of fixed length, the force acting on the 
projectile over the range of velocities analyzed is 1667 kN. The impulse I imparted into 
the cannon, found with Equation 82, is a function of velocity and mass, and for a fixed 
energy system the mass is also a function of velocity ( m(v) = 2×KE/v2 ).  Once the 
impulse is known for the launch package, this can be imparted into the cannon (recoiling) 
mass to calculate the rearward velocity. Assuming a stroke length of 0.5 m, the force 
 




required to retard the recoiling motion within the stroke length can be found and 
represents the recoil force or the force imparted to the trunion or cannon support 
immediately following the launch event.  
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Figure 127: Cannon impulse as a function of muzzle velocity for a fixed length, constant 
energy system. Range of velocities is from 1.5 km/s to 2.5 km/s. Cannon 

















Figure 128: Recoil force as a function of muzzle velocity for a fixed length, constant 
energy system.  
5.5.5 Medium Caliber Potential for Tactical Railguns 
When facing an advanced tank target, neither the powder gun nor the railgun 
concepts appear to be attractive candidates. While the increased caliber of the powder 
gun may be undesirable for a ground combat system designed to defeat tanks, the railgun 
concept appears infeasible for a similar target end state. Given current technology, the 
mass and volume of the power supply present impracticable design penalties onto the 
railgun equipped platform. Put simply, entirely too much mass and a very large amount 
of volume must be dedicated to the power supply. The energy densities for the rotating 
machine electrical storage devices are several orders of magnitude lower than the 
propellant (Figure 126). Equipment required for power production and energy storage of 




With regard to the IFV cannon, investigating the railgun system designed to 
defeat an advanced IFV produces a challenging, but feasible candidate. The power supply 
and associated equipment for a medium energy weapon could theoretically be 
incorporated into a future combat platform. The railgun cannon system capable of 
generating 3 MJ generates a physically possible, albeit very technically challenging 
solution for an advanced direct fire weapon system. While the mass associated with the 
railgun system is almost 4 times greater than the powder gun, the railgun ammunition is 
only one quarter of the weight of the powder gun cartridges. For a similarly sized system, 
the railgun equipped fighting vehicle can carry more ammunition, while relieving the 
operational level of some materiel costs associated with ammunition resupply and  the 
associated transport. Additionally, a vehicle based around a railgun could shed weight 
normally directed toward safe handling and storage of the ammunition. For example, the 
heavy compartmented areas (passive) and magazine fire suppression systems (active) 
would not be required at the level they currently are for a system designed around largely 
inert stores of ammunition.     
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5.6 Lessons Learned 
 For a direct-fire cannon system, there are significant challenges associated with firing 
projectiles at hypervelocity. Powder guns require disproportionately large propellant 
loads to achieve marginal increases in velocity. Railgun power supplies are quite 
heavy and voluminous for a large-caliber mobile system. However, a medium-caliber 
railgun is a theoretically feasible candidate for an advanced weapon system designed 
to defeat advanced threat infantry fighting vehicles. 
 Hypervelocity impact holds substantial benefit for both direct- and indirect-fire 
systems. The gains in lethality performance collectively generate greater effectiveness 
for an advanced concept direct fire weapon system, a requisite if one hopes to address 
the “quality versus quantity” issue predicted by the Lanchester Laws of Combat. 
 With respect to target effects, hypervelocity impact enjoys greater penetration 
efficiency than an ordnance velocity event. Additionally, the behind armor debris 
(BAD) is considerably greater for a hypervelocity impact projectile. 
 With respect to engagement, hypervelocity reduces the time of flight between muzzle 
and target. For a constant energy system under steady crosswind conditions, there is a 
minor increase in deflection off target at hypervelocity, correctable with proper 
sensing apparatus and an appropriate ballistic solution. 
 With respect to the launcher system, for a tank cannon concept (30+ MJ), the powder 
gun ammunition cartridge and barrel become impractical for a hypervelocity concept. 
For a railgun design, while the integrated launch package is quite compact, given 
current manufacturing technology and material properties, the power supply is 
infeasible in both mass and volume. 
 The 3 MJ IFV railgun system appears to be a feasible candidate. The railgun weapon 
system mass is four times that of a conventional system, but the ammunition is less 
than 25% as heavy and occupies much less space. Additionally, this power supply 
could be repurposed for an advanced 120 mm mortar system with double the range of 
a conventional system. 
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5.7 Conclusions   
Advanced weapon concepts that can provide greater performance will require 
significant investment. Powder guns may be approaching the physical limits of practical 
muzzle velocity for a tactical system. Railguns, while offering substantial increases in 
muzzle velocity, require considerable weight dedicated to a power supply and switching 
equipment. The question then is whether to invest in an incremental improvement at the 
margins of a conventional technology, or to explore the potential advancements of a 
disruptive, unproven technology like electromagnetically launching projectiles.  
In either case, higher muzzle velocity yields benefit at each stage of lethality 
analysis. At the target, higher velocity increases penetration efficiency, meaning a 
projectile can create deeper penetration. Moving through the target, hypervelocity has 
been shown to increase behind armor debris (BAD), a substantial contributor of lethal 
effects in target subsystem interaction.  
When evaluating the external ballistics, higher velocity clearly reduces flight 
time. For a long-range engagement, this can mean greater weapon effectiveness, both in a 
single engagement (shooting before receiving insult) and in multiple engagements 
(switching rapidly to various targets). For a constant energy case, higher velocity did not 
contribute to substantial drift off target. 
At the launcher, neither the tank railgun cannon nor the tank powder gun seemed 
to be good hypervelocity candidates. The powder gun cartridges are too large, and the 
power supply for the railgun is too large, both in mass and volume. However, the medium 
energy, 3 MJ railgun power supply appears feasible. This level of kinetic energy would 
be sufficient to service a range of targets, to include advanced IFVs, medium tanks, and 
moderately fortified bunkers. Additionally, since the muzzle energy of a railgun cannon 
is controllable, this weapon concept would provide crewmembers with a scaleable and 
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tunable source of firepower. Moreover, as the propulsion of the railgun projectiles do not 
require a chemical propellant, crew safety would be increased by the removal of this 
source of potential sympathetic detonation and deflagration. 
A power supply of this order could also conceivably be used for an advanced 
mortar system. The current 120 mm mortar fires a 13 kg projectile with a peak muzzle 
velocity of just over 300 m/s. Conventional mortars can fire out to a maximum range of 
just over 7 km. A DARPA-funded project successfully demonstrated cantilever railgun 
launch of a modified 120 mm round at speeds in excess of 500 m/s (2 MJ launch energy). 
Increasing the muzzle velocity to the limits of available power could double the range of 
this potent indirect-fire weapon system beyond what is presently capable using a 
conventional powder charge propellant. A shared design between a direct-fire and 
indirect-fire railgun power supply could be used on both an advanced direct fire and 
improved large-caliber mortar platform.  
In summary, achieving advanced capability in any form will be an expensive, 
challenging, and risky endeavor. The pursuit should be in a direction that offers the 
highest theoretical limits, versus working at the margins of mature technologies. At 
another level of analysis, electromagnetic launch concepts demonstrate great advantage at 
the operational level through the compactness and safety afforded by the inert launch 
packages. At the same time, conventional powder gun enhancements aimed at creating 
greater lethality or range seem to further burden the operational level’s supply network 
with larger cartridges and greater amounts of incendiary propellant.  
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Chapter 6:  Summary and Conclusions 
Here in America we are descended in blood and in 
spirit from revolutionists and rebels - men and 
women who dare to dissent from accepted doctrine. 
As their heirs, may we never confuse honest dissent 
with disloyal subversion. 
—Dwight D. Eisenhower  
 
6.1 Motivation Revisited 
Soldiers serving in the U.S. Army genuinely appreciate the simple benefits 
afforded by good decisions and good design. Leaders that can formulate superior 
decisions generally employ soldiers in a more effective manner. Those good decisions 
can also contribute to the more efficient use of an organization’s resources, a benefit 
made more essential today in light of the prevalent constraints of the contemporary 
operating environment, both in terms of financial and human resources. When evaluating 
the simple tools, as well as the most complex systems,  furnished to troops in the U.S. 
Army, good design generally makes the soldier’s ability to complete tasks and 
accomplish missions that much easier, again a welcome relief in light of the high 
operational tempo persistent in the contemporary operating environment.  
With respect to ground combat vehicles, it was the humble intention of this 
research to contribute, even in an incremental fashion, to furthering considerations for, 
and quality of, the technical decisions regarding the design and selection of advanced 
ground combat vehicles. The general approach was to explore several novel avenues, all 
aimed at improving the chances for success in the seemingly intractable problem of 
designing and selecting an advanced ground combat vehicle. The engineering domain of 
a fighting vehicle is characterized by a high degree of technical challenges, as well as 
competing demands, all made more salient considering the life and death implications 
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involved with a tactical engagement with the enemy. This work also recognized that 




6.2 State of the Art 
The historical review of military technological pursuits highlighted the persistent, 
apparently timeless, challenges associated with developing and adopting novel concepts 
in a government organization, defined by bureaucracy and constrained by rigid processes. 
While one may regard the contemporary operating environment as being exceptionally 
tested—in terms of balancing an array of competing demands, working under high levels 
of uncertainty, and reacting too slowly to development opportunities—these conditions 
appear to be more the norm than the exception in the two-plus centuries defining U.S. 
military history. For example, after demonstrating individual weapon performance 
superiority in virtually every measurable way, i.e., reloading time, accuracy, weight, etc., 
it still took the U.S. Army over five decades to replace muzzle loading muskets with 
breech loading rifles. While not an excuse to accept the status quo, it does help to place 
current challenges in a historically relevant context.261  
What does appear distinctly different in the contemporary operating environment 
is the increasing rate of change in the evolution of warfare. Attributable to factors such as 
globalization, networked organizations, and the near-instantaneous sharing of 
information, the pace of development in military affairs shows evidence of hastening. 
The threats faced by the U.S., operating within a global network and engulfed in a 
massive, virtually instantaneous exchange of information, have pushed the speed of 
growth and continue to challenge traditional processes for technology developers. This, 
in turn, has demanded more robust materiel solutions, better postured to react to the 
higher levels of uncertainty observable on a rapidly evolving battlefield. In other words, 
 
261 For a maritine example of a missed opportunity regarding a revolutionary technology, see the John 
Ericcson and his experience with the Britich Navy rejecting his twin-screw propeller design. 
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there is greater demand for adaptation in even what may be regarded as evolutionary 
design efforts. The demand for effective and efficient materiel solutions developed over 
shorter design cycles necessitate decision support tools that can assist decision makers in 
pursuing the most bountiful and well-founded prospects over a timescale commensurate 
with addressing the requirement in a judicious and responsible manner. 
When considering the post 9/11 focus on stability operations, again a historical 
perspective has value. Contrary to what may be popular belief, the history of the U.S. 
Army has been largely characterized by stability operations, highlighted with 
participation in eleven wars, all of which were necessitated by real threat to national 
security. These wars were precipitated by a peer challenger postured in discord to U.S. 
national interest.  
In looking forward, the most probable course of action will be continued 
participation in stability operations, or those often described as “Small Wars”. But to be 
prepared for major combat operations, this persistent effort must be balanced with, at a 
very minimum, sustainment of conventional capabilities vigilantly forged and expertly 
honed over decades to address to the most dangerous course of action, those that 
imperatively involve the U.S. militarily in major combat operations. However, as this 
(thankfully) unlikely event (full-scale war) is also the most threatening (most threatening 
to national security), the portfolio of advanced development concepts should also include 
enhancing and expanding those capabilities aimed at facing the conventional scenarios 
depicted by major combat operations.  
Related to the current focus on stability operations, contemporary requirements 
appeared to be defined more by mysteries than puzzles. While puzzles can be considered 
as well-defined, loosely or formally structured problems to which there is presumably a 
solution, mysteries deal with more ill-defined, still evolving, hence poorly structured 
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problems to which there is likely no definitive solution. Unsurprisingly then, current 
developmental efforts focused on major combat operations revolve around addressing 
puzzles, while the focus on creating and sustaining military power in support of stability 
operations is largely centered on addressing mysteries. Stated differently, within the 
puzzle-mystery continuum, major combat operations are positioned at a more pronounced 
position on the puzzle axis, while stability operations are placed higher along the mystery 
axis. For materiel developmental pursuits intended to function well in both realms, 
concerted attention should be given to functioning in both the puzzle- and mystery-
dominated arenas. Related to the rapid pace of evolving needs, materiel solutions need 
more inherent robustness to help underwrite the high uncertainty associated with future 
pursuits in an environment often largely characterized by mystery. 
Products of a puzzle-solving era, the U.S. Army legacy systems (Abrams tank, 
Bradley fighting vehicle) are a tribute to foresight and technical effort during the Cold 
War. Although these platforms took decades to design and field, they have reigned 
supreme on the battlefield in several wars and countless operations. Somewhat 
disappointingly, vehicle design pursuits in the post Cold War era have not been as 
fruitful. The Stryker, lauded for its superior transportability, has been criticized for 
lacking sufficient protection and firepower. The family of Mine Resistant Ambush 
Protected (MRAP) vehicles provide crews with a highly survivable platform that has no 
organic weapon system. More troubling, the mass and overall dimensions of early MRAP 
variants imbued them with poor mobility over most forms of complex terrain. 
Additionally, the high survivability is mostly a function of acquired invulnerability due to 
armor appliqués that besiege the platform and create a highly susceptible system.  
In both cases, remedial efforts were subsequently conducted in an attempt to bring 
some semblance of what may be referred to as attribute “balance” to these platforms. For 
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example, the Stryker was the recipient of several armor upgrade packages. Also, more 
recently, better accepted versions of the MRAP have been somewhat smaller, and have 
also been upgraded in theater with both weapon system and optics equipment.  
The U.S. Army’s major developmental program, the Future Combat System 
(FCS) was cancelled outright due to a myriad of concerns, including cost overruns and a 
general uncertainty regarding the contribution such systems would make in future 
warfare. The ground combat vehicle (GCV) program, the succeeding effort focused on 
the replacement infantry fighting vehicle, has twice been postponed (August, 2010, 
January 2011) due to issues involving the performance requirements and capabilities of 
this advanced combat platform. The recent failures and cancellations with respect to 
fighting vehicle pursuits, while not entirely unique in the history of military programs, do 
present an alarming pattern, made all the more so by the rapidity of design evolutions and 
the conventional pursuits of peer threat nations, which operate in a manner unconstrained 
by a commitment to stability operations in the Middle East. In fact, the recent poor track 
record of U.S. Army ground combat vehicle pursuits motivated this research. 
In an effort to contribute to the state of the art with respect to fighting vehicle 
design and selection, the field of decision analysis was surveyed, as it has been exercised 
in previous military efforts to good effect. This discipline offers an array of techniques 
and approaches designed to enrich the quality of decision making events. The analytic 
hierarchy process and related methods were useful in capturing decision maker attribute 
weighting values in a networked, echeloned fashion.   
With regard to the theory, science, and engineering associated with fighting 
vehicles, a rich record of combat vehicle design theory and technical reference was 
found, but it appears to have peaked in volume during the Cold War. Notable 
contributions are attributed to R.M. Ogorkiewicz, as well as the U.S. Army Materiel 
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Command’s voluminous production of a vehicle design handbook series. A 21st century 
updated version of these handbooks would serve future designers with reference material, 
refreshed to account for advances in the physical sciences, as well as to reflect the 




6.3 Ground Combat Vehicle Design Characteristics and Operational Considerations 
Notably, the considerable art of decision analysis is not in simply choosing the 
methodically determined best candidate among a set of alternatives. Rather, the greatest 
contribution a decision analyst can provide to a decision maker is in the creation of 
unique alternatives that are in accord with an organization’s higher-level, underlying 
principles. Identifying these fundamental principles is a step sometimes overlooked in 
decision analysis. Often the focus is to build an attribute hierarchy upward from the 
primary objective without looking downward at the essence of the pursuit. Just like trees 
need roots, a sound approach to developing a decision support network branching upward 
(limbs) from the design objective (trunk) must include an investigation directed 
downward (roots) to unearth the guiding principles and underlying doctrinal basis for the 
endeavor. 
In this manuscript, the formation of the roots for the decision-analysis hierarchy, 
tree network included a review of the elements of combat power, the requirements for 
full spectrum operations, and an appraisal of the principles of war. The review of the 
doctrinal framework for U.S. Army operations served to strengthen the argument for the 
perpetual need of ground combat systems that can provide crews with enhanced levels of 
protection, firepower, and movement on the battlefield. Continual participation in 
stability operations immediately following the decisive actions in major combat in Iraq 
and Afghanistan have overshadowed the conventional capabilities leveraged in the initial, 
opening offensive and defensive operations. This overshadowing brings to question what 
level of resources should be directed toward assets typically thought of as conventional, 
both in form and function, like fighting vehicles. With major combat operations as the 
most dangerous course of action for the military, and with ground combat systems 
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serving as an enabling asset in the prosecution of stability operations, fighting vehicle 
advancement and design remains an indispensable element in the creation and 
sustainment of combat power for future forces. Supporting this claim is the observation 
of vehicles pursued for stability purposes that have, over time,  accumulated functional 
equipment to fill gaps in initially lacking attributes, such as survivability and lethality.  
In analyzing the four quadrants of full spectrum operations, the basic properties 
and inherent capabilities of fighting vehicles seemed to be a vital asset in the prosecution 
of three types of full spectrum operations: offensive, defensive, and stability operations. 
Within these three types of operations, there is clearly a blending among types. For 
example, operations labeled nominally as offensive are characterized by some fraction of 
activity dedicated to both defensive and stability operations. In other words, even a sole 
focus on stability operations does not relax the requirement of U.S. forces to be capable 
of conducting offensive and defensive operations within the stability operation 
framework. In addition, this multifaceted prosecution of major combat operations 
reinforces the need for comprehensive fighting platforms that bring superior levels of 
firepower, protection, and mobility to bear on the enemy. 
In reviewing the elements of combat power, a fighting vehicle’s lethality, 
survivability, and mobility directly contributes to the protection, fires, and maneuver 
elements. As efficient and well-equipped energy transformers, combat platforms are 
significant elements in the generation of combat power, transforming potential power into 
combat actions conducive with the completion of offensive, defensive, and stability 
missions and related tasks. Finally, in analyzing the principles of war, the attributes 
afforded by a fighting vehicle’s employment (presence and utilization) are 
complementary to at least five of the nine principles: offensive action, mass, maneuver, 
security, and surprise. This examination of the fundamentals reinforced the need for 
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continued development on fighting vehicles that bring organic protection, firepower, and 
movement to the battlefield. 
After revisiting the doctrinal basis for the utility afforded by a fighting vehicle 
and the enabling characteristics that make it a vital component of generating and 
sustaining combat power, a decision support framework was built around the principal 
attributes of survivability, lethality, and mobility. These chosen terms provide a 
doctrinally sound and technically founded basis in which to organize and classify 
engineering metrics.  
In organizing the attributes, traits, and metrics that comprise the fighting vehicle 
domain, a metric crosswalk qualitatively demonstrated real competing demands between 
principal attributes. Most notably, the pursuit of higher survivability through 
conventional means can have penalizing effects on platform lethality and mobility. The 
mass and volume of improved survivability (via reducing vulnerability) worked against 
the objectives associated with better mobility, while also consuming weight and space 
that could be used for lethality-based equipment. Additionally, survivability even has 
conflicts among its own secondary traits. For example, the pursuit of reducing 
vulnerability through conventional means normally increases susceptibility. A large, 
heavy, well-fortified platform (low vulnerability) is typically, slow, cumbersome, and 
presents an easy target with distinct signature (high susceptibility). Equally important, 
invulnerable platforms are typically not mobile.  
Parsing and discriminating the principal attributes at the three levels of war 
provided insight into the contrasting and complementary interests at specific stratum. 
Each level of war operates with its own, often fundamentally different, set of interests. 
While the tactical level is typically most concerned with possessing the greatest 
capability, the operational level is often most interested in the efficiency of such 
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capabilities since this level is largely responsible for sustaining the intratheater combat 
power. The strategic level is primarily focused on the overall effectiveness of the network 
of warfighting elements.  
The principal attributes were found to be well defined in both the literature and 
doctrine at the tactical level of war. Mobility, with its familiar analogs at the operational 
level (intratheater movement) and strategic level (intertheater movement or 
transportability) was also well defined at these two levels of war. But, for a tactical asset 
like a ground combat vehicle, the concept of lethality and survivability at the operational 
and strategic levels of war remains elusive and abstract. While the notion and connotation 
of these two attributes at the higher levels of war is appreciated at a superficial level, their 
refinement requires more analysis. 
An exploratory thought experiment that considered the notional deployment of a 
ground combat vehicle in contact with a threat platform focused on the scaling of mass, 
length, and time of the principal attributes of survivability, lethality, and mobility at the 
tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. This exercise demonstrated that the 
tactical level of war experiences the greatest range in mass, length, and time scales for 
combat actions related to survivability, lethality, and mobility. The operational and 
strategic levels enjoy greater stability and much narrower ranges of scale for these 
dimensional considerations. As fixed levels focused on generating and sustaining combat 
power, both spatially and temporally, the operational and strategic levels are largely 
isolated from the direct effects related to the operational uncertainty at the tactical level. 
Not surprising then, these two levels enjoy relative stability with respect to mass, length, 
and time scales associated with the principal attributes which demonstrates the inherent 
peril in designing a ground combat vehicle to largely meet the needs at the strategic and 
operational levels. 
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An additional exercise investigated the relative objective ranking of fielded 
combat platforms that demonstrated prowess; it indicated that strategic and operational 
mobility appear incongruent with tactical survivability and lethality. Platforms that 
possessed high levels of inter and intratheater transportability (i.e., good operational and 
strategic mobility) were typically not highly capable vehicles when measuring tactical 
lethality and survivability. The mass and volume associated with high levels of firepower 
and protection are not conducive with ease of movement at length scales commensurate 
with the operational and strategic levels of war. The benefit of rapid deployability 
(strategic mobility) is negated if the strategically positioned and operationally supported 
asset lacks the tactical lethality and survivability needed to perform its primary 
warfighting function of affording commanders and their crews with a mobile and 




6.4 Attribute Weighting and Candidate Vehicle Selection 
The work in Chapter 3 demonstrated that decision support tools built around the 
principal attributes of survivability, lethality, and mobility can significantly improve the 
consistency of group selection of a ground combat vehicle. The improvements came from 
greater consistency between decision-maker attribute preference and the related levels of 
those attributes in candidate vehicles. Given that ground combat vehicles are primarily 
designed to be a mobile and protected source of firepower, it was logical to build an 
organizational framework around the principal attributes of survivability, lethality, and 
mobility, and then to place metrics appropriately beneath those attributes. As most 
decision support tools increase dimensions for candidate evaluation and rely on relative 
value comparisons, both techniques were employed in the comparison matrix creation 
and visual aids provided to respondents. 
The abstraction of the desired qualities of a combat vehicle via principal attribute 
weighting can help steer engineering efforts and align programmatic interests with design 
work via “commander’s intent” versus specifications. However, without insight as to the 
synergy and confliction among the principal attributes of survivability, lethality, and 
mobility, as well as a way to correlate those attributes with combat vehicle efficacy in a 
way representative of future mission profiles, the decision efficiency and consensus 
gained could be for naught. Stated more explicitly, an effort to quantify the effect an 
attribute has on combat vehicle performance should precede, rather than succeed, an 
attribute weighting solicitation.  
A source of vulnerability in any decision making pursuit is the elusiveness of data 
to validate the decision quality. The inherent uncertainty in many pursuits, as well as the 
inability to forecast how alternative abandoned candidate selections may have fared, 
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make it difficult to evaluate decision quality. In the absence of a definitive validation of 
weighting values, decision-maker and engineer can simply be consistently wrong in the 
pursuit of what is believed to be an effective combat vehicle. To use a marksmanship 
analogy, the tools used helped to “tighten the shot group” or reduce the difference 
between weighting-derived and overtly-chosen vehicle selection. However, a subsequent 
effort is necessary to see if the shots are “on target”, i.e., is the candidate selection rank 
order validated by some simulation effort or practical demonstration exercise. 
Alternatively, a preceding effort aimed at investigating the relative value and parametric 
relationships between survivability, lethality, and mobility would do more to aid decision 
makers since information of this sort could contribute “further up stream” in the decision 
process. In other words, a deeper appreciation for the attribute interactions and 
correlations with platform performance could guide the creation of options as opposed to 
simply being used to choose better among a finite set of candidates. From a design 
perspective, insight gained on the relative contribution and interaction of each attribute 
might be used to direct performance metrics.  
The U.S. Army officer survey respondents rated platform survivability as the 
most important principal attribute among survivability, lethality, and mobility. The 
concentration on survivability was likely reflective of a decade focused on stability 
operations, punctuated by increasingly lethal and sophisticated attacks with IEDs. The 
potential impact of pursuing attributes in an imbalanced fashion, especially when 
survivability can create debilitating performance penalties, has the potential to diminish 
fighting vehicle effectiveness, particularly in the conduct of major combat operations. 
The combination of a priming exercise performed with a principal attribute 
weighting survey, along with a decision support tool explicitly designed to visualize data 
in accordance with those principal attributes, improved consistency in weightings and 
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vehicle selection. The method of collapsing metric data beneath the principal attributes, 
and the visual depiction of the relative contribution to survivability, lethality, and 
mobility, was most preferred, but also potentially most misleading, among respondents.  
It was mildly informative, but largely futile, to collect weighting data from such a 
robust population beyond the principal attribute level. In order to offer meaningful 
preferences on secondary traits, one must already possess deep insight as to the 
competing demands and dynamic interactions between combat vehicle sub-systems. At 
the metric level, weighting data was largely indistinguishable, their function would best 
be served with utility functions derived from engineering relationships.  
A prerequisite for this effort was the collection of weighting data for the 
calculation and subsequent visualization of candidate vehicle performance specifications. 
Once the framework is established and the weighting values are accounted for, the 
amalgamation of performance specifications lends itself to any visual depiction consistent 
with the survivability, lethality, and mobility construct. Respondents had high preference 
for the bar-plot depiction of relative candidate levels of each principal attribute, and the 
use of this visual interpretation of performance data highly correlated to vehicle selection. 
A source of vulnerability in any decision making pursuit is the elusiveness of 
validating the quality of the decision. The inherent uncertainty in many pursuits, as well 
as the inability to forecast how alternative candidate selections would have performed, 
makes it difficult to evaluate the quality of the decision. In the absence of a definitive 
validation, decision-maker and engineer may simply be consistently wrong in the pursuit 




6.5 Performance Effects and Attribute Interactions of Survivability, Lethality, and 
Mobility 
With a basic framework enriched with synthesized weighting data from a 
representative population, the significance of these weightings with respect to platform 
performance was sought out in earnest. Using a DOE/ANOVA construct, in conjunction 
with a virtual reality combat simulation software tool, it may be possible to link platform 
performance with attribute efficacy. This methodology has the potential to address the 
single largest criticism of metric-based analysis, i.e., not connecting specification 
thresholds with platform performance. By designing and constructing virtual platforms in 
an orthogonal array with respect to varying levels of survivability, lethality, and mobility, 
and capturing system performance in a combat simulation exercise, the data demonstrated 
statistically significant attribute effects in conjunction with relative levels of protection, 
firepower, and movement.  
Lethality appeared to be the dominating attribute, showing a statistically 
significant effect on performance for every a posteriori global metric (win %, blue %, red 
%, time %). Lethality was also the greatest source of cost for the platforms, both from the 
DOE/ANOVA data and the vehicle cost breakout study. Admittedly, given the relative 
simplicity of the simulation exercise, the one-on-one engagement with a peer threat on a 
battlefield absent of IEDs, friendly vehicles, and additional insult-producing systems, the 
scenario clearly favored greater firepower. As a participant in major combat operations or 
warfare typified by attrition, the ability to decisively destroy the threat led to greater 
mission success, faster mission completion, and greater survivability enabled by the 
eradication of the threat. 
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Mobility also had a positive effect on platform performance, albeit at a lower 
relative level and not always at a statistically distinguishable level. In the simulation 
exercise, greater mobility led to a change in tactics, where operators embraced a faster-
paced, harassing fire and attack method. With enhanced lethality, operators largely 
focused on a more methodical, long-range engagement of the threat. This observation 
was evident in the results, where both lethality and mobility had a positive effect on every 
a posteriori performance metric.  
Enhanced survivability had a negative effect on the performance of every 
candidate except the “triple plus” (enhanced survivability, lethality, and mobility). 
Survivability was also the greatest source of mass and volume for the platforms, both 
from the DOE/ANOVA data and the vehicle mass breakout study. As the vehicle became 
less vulnerable, through the assumption of more protective armor, the weight encumbered 
movement and reduced operator ability to maneuver the platform to a position of 
advantage necessary to destroy the target.  
No statistically distinguishable attribute interactions were observed, but lethality 
and mobility clearly complemented each other in that both had commensurate levels of 
positive effect on performance. This matched the doctrinal definition of maneuver, or the 
use of fire and movement to dominate the enemy. And again, since the simulation 
operators appeared to embrace the benefits of either greater lethality or greater mobility 
by modifying offensive tactics, each attribute contributed to higher performance in a 
unique way. The effects of survivability and mobility were largely in line with 
expectation, but the results of increased lethality, even in this basic simulation package, 
were a surprise and demonstrated the value of including a human operator in the trigger-
pulling portion of a simulation.  
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In the context of the simulation exercise, the mission operators performed slightly 
better on the wheeled variants versus the tracked candidates. This could have been due to 
increased proficiency (wheeled block followed tracked block of experiment) and general 
familiarity with wheeled vehicles. However, tracked vehicle performance included many 
more failures due to mission time-out (versus being destroyed by the threat platform). 
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6.6 Advanced Weapon System Concepts—Conventional Cannonry Versus 
Electromagnetic Guns 
As the cornerstone for countless warfare simulation codes, the differential 
equations from the Lanchester Laws of Combat demonstrated that numerical superiority 
is overcome only by a large factor of dominance in system effectiveness. These laws shed 
light on the pursuit of higher effectiveness for conventional systems, as well as inform 
decision makers about the significance of the “quality versus quantity” debate. If one 
expects to fight as a numerical inferior, it is not sufficient to simply have overmatch 
against a foe. Rather, it appears to take large advances in system effectiveness to achieve 
the combat power necessary to create the conditions for success. 
For a direct-fire, mobile cannon system, there are significant challenges 
associated with firing large projectiles at hypervelocity. Powder guns require increasingly 
larger propellant loads to achieve marginal increases in velocity. Railgun power supplies 
are very heavy and occupy too much space for a large-caliber tactical system. 
Considering an advanced, large-caliber cannon, it was deemed infeasible to pursue with 
existing technologies for either a powder gun or railgun. The large caliber hypervelocity 
powder cartridges are not conducive with a tactical platform magazine, and the power 
supply required for a large caliber railgun is too massive.  
Even with these challenges, hypervelocity holds substantial benefit for both direct 
and indirect fire systems. These gains collectively generate greater effectiveness for an 
advanced concept direct fire weapon system, helping to further address the “quality 
versus quantity” issue. With respect to target effects, hypervelocity impact enjoys greater 
penetration efficiency than an ordnance velocity event. Additionally, the behind armor 
debris (BAD) is considerably greater for a hypervelocity projectile. In terms of 
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engagement, hypervelocity reduces the time of flight between muzzle and target. For a 
constant energy system under fully developed, crosswind conditions, there is a minor 
increase in deflection at hypervelocity, correctable with proper sensing apparatus and an 
appropriate ballistic solution. At the source of commission (cannon) for a constant energy 
system, hypervelocity produces lower recoil force, thereby requiring less recoil 
mitigation equipment.  
For a tank cannon (large caliber) concept, the 30+ MJ powder gun ammunition 
cartridge and barrel assembly becomes impractical for a hypervelocity concept. For a 
railgun design, while the integrated launch package and barrel design is quite compact, 
given current manufacturing technology and material properties, the power supply is 
infeasible with respect to both mass and volume. However, for an IFV cannon (medium 
caliber) concept, the 3 MJ IFV railgun system appears to be a feasible candidate. The 
railgun weapon system mass is four times that of a conventional system, but the 
ammunition is less than 25% as heavy and occupies much less space.  
A power supply of this magnitude is also conveniently scaled to deploy an 
extended range mortar system. Mortars and IFVs can be considered the younger siblings 
of heavy artillery and main battle tanks, so the order of magnitude reduction in power 
supply requirements lends itself to conventional technologies. Additionally, the demand 
for heavy artillery and main battle tanks in stability operations is low, but the capabilities 
afforded by an electromagnetic direct fire and indirect fire family of platforms could 
provide substantial benefit to future warfighters. As previously discussed, the scaleable 
effects or option to tune the lethality of a weapon system is possible with railguns and 
could give commanders greater control in reducing collateral damage. At the other end of 
the spectrum, the lethality benefits created from firing at hypervelocity could yield great 
tactical advantage in terms of kinetic effectiveness. 
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Chapter 7:  Future Work 
     In war, there is no second prize for the runner up. 
—General Omar Bradley 
 
So in the Libyan Fable it is told 
That once an eagle, stricken with a dart,  
Said when he saw the fashion of the shaft,  
“With our own feathers, not by others' hands, 
Are we now smitten.” 
  —Aeschulus 
7.1 Looking Forward 
For the ground forces of the U.S. military, the decade following 9/11 could best 
be described as transformative. Stability operations, focused on engaging and defeating 
asymmetrical threats, while simultaneously providing security for rebuilding efforts, have 
dominated both theaters in Iraq and Afghanistan. Major combat operations, once the 
foundation for training and equipping ground forces, have clearly been superseded with 
counterinsurgency operations and the host of challenges associated with descriptive tasks, 
such as nation building, peace enforcement, and security training. At the same time, some 
peer competitor nations continue to pursue higher levels of performance in conventional 
systems for a range of reasons, including internal security, global ambitions, and export.  
This presents a series of quandaries for the design and selection of the next 
generation of ground combat vehicles intended to replace legacy platforms like the M2 
Bradley IFV. How should the successor platform requirements be drafted in order to 
pursue candidate vehicles conducive with battlefield dominance in future wars? And, 
given a set of valid requirements, what decision support tools can be leveraged to aid in 
the design and selection of an advanced fighting vehicle? 
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7.2  Ground Combat Vehicle Design Characteristics and Operational 
Considerations 
If the doctrinal terms of survivability, lethality, and mobility adequately capture 
the imbued value and core functional requirements of a fighting vehicle on the battlefield, 
then the layering of these attributes at the three levels of war can help distinguish the 
relative merit of various technological pursuits at the various strata of military operations. 
There are areas of opportunity that may be worthy of further analysis and future work in 
this regard. Within the initial framework presented, which sought to introduce the 
concept of operational and strategic lethality and survivability, these previously 
undefined terms could benefit from more scrutiny and deeper analysis to determine what,  
if any, meaning can be assigned to them. At the tactical level, the principal attributes of 
survivability, lethality, and mobility were found to be well defined, both in doctrine and 
literature. Mobility at the operational and strategic levels was also clearly understood, 
since analogous terms like transportability and inter- and intratheater mobility are 
commonly used to describe the ability to move a combat vehicle at the higher echelons of 
command. However, while the terms of lethality and survivability may possess 
significance at the operational and strategic levels of war, these previously unexplored 
terms remain vaguely characterized. At best, a set of meaningful metrics was assigned to 
each in an effort to qualify, if not quantify, the significance of lethality and survivability 
at the operational and strategic levels of war. These terms are worthy of further analysis 
in both defining and quantifying their potential significance. 
For a tactical asset, the concept of operational and strategic lethality and 
survivability remain ill defined and not yet fully understood. The concept of operational 
and strategic lethality simply does exist for weapon systems controlled at those respective 
386 
levels. In addition, the exercises sought to create metrics describing the lethality and 
survivability considerations for a tactical asset at the operational and strategic levels as a 
way of conveying the essence of these previously unexplored terms. As a first look at 
these terms, more work should be done to create a better taxonomy and improved metrics 
that adequately serve a decision maker and facilitate easier use.   
The proposed framework focused on the principal attributes deemed essential in 
the context of a study on fighting vehicles. In the materiel development world, large 
programs and projects typically focus on three global issues: cost, performance, and 
schedule. If the principal attributes presented in this manuscript revolve around the 
performance of the platform, then they could possibly be compressed into a performance 
branch, sharing that level with a further expansion of a cost and schedule branch. In other 
words, the first level in the hierarchal framework for the program decision support tool 
would begin with the cost, performance, and schedule branches.  
For a ground combat vehicle, the survivability, lethality, and mobility framework 
could expand out from the performance branch. A complementary framework would 
need to be developed in order to add the cost and schedule branches. A large portion of 
this proposed work would fall under the purview of program management considerations, 
i.e., varieties in scheduling and cost considerations. The end state would be a decision 
support tool built around the ubiquitous programmatic considerations of cost, 
performance, and schedule. 
It might also make for an interesting study to virtually deconstruct a complete 
legacy system, and account for the mass, volume, and financial cost associated with each 
component with a focus of accounting for the explicit or implicit contribution of each 
with respect to survivability, lethality, and mobility. For example, consider a bare turret 
and hull for an Abrams tank. With the cost, mass, and volume occupied by each of these 
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major components, some fraction of each would contribute (objectively and/or 
subjectively) to the platform survivability, lethality, and mobility. As one virtually built 
the vehicle via the military logistics system, data on the weight, volume, and cost of each 
part and component could be sorted and fractioned among the principal attributes 
accordingly. Once complete, the investigator would have a breakout of how the fighting 
vehicle’s mass, volume, and cost are apportioned among the principal attributes 
comprising the combat system efficacy. This could provide a historical reference as to 
how weight, volume, and cost were apportioned among the various systems comprising a 
combat vehicle, as well as provide insight as to how one might best pursue a reduction in 
weight, volume, or cost by addressing the most prevalent attribute in a respective area of 
concern. 
This was done at a very small scale using the JRATS platforms and design 
information provided as components. A preliminary effort, approximating 25% of the 
vehicle hull and mobility components, was also done using an M1A2 Abrams and the 
logistic database provided by the logistics supply agency (LOGSA). Knowledge and 
expertise of the end item (vehicle) is required to efficiently order the major systems and 
subsystems in order to avoid deconstructing the vehicle down into too small of parts. 
Additionally, some components will objectively contribute to a principal attribute (e.g., 
the track serves the platform principal attribute of mobility), while others will 
subjectively divide among attributes. For example, some fraction of the hull mass, cost, 
and volume contribute to platform mobility, with the residual supporting survivability 
and lethality considerations. With some level of uncertainty and interpretation, an effort 
such as this should  depict where the mass, cost, and volume were consumed with respect 





7.3 Performance Effects and Attribute Interactions of Survivability, Lethality, and 
Mobility 
The JRATS software served as an exploratory effort in identifying the competing 
demands and complementary relationships between survivability, lethality, and mobility. 
As a single-user system fighting against a basic threat platform, it had the basic 
requirements to conduct the described study. This technique could be applied to leverage 
the much more sophisticated combat simulation environments at the U.S. Army’s 
disposal. Considerable up-front work would have to be done in order to tune existing 
simulated capabilities in a way conducive with the DOE construct. However, these 
simulations are far superior in realism and user interaction than the JRATS title. The 
close-combat-tactical-trainer (CCTT) comes to mind as a candidate system. CCTT is 
largely used to teach mounted maneuver warfare in a simulated environment. In the 
CCTT, crews work together in a realistic capsule representing the interior of a fighting 
vehicle. 
Systems are networked together and visible through viewing ports and periscopes, 
providing the ability to fight as a combined arms team. In the context of DOE, a 
framework designed around the principal attributes of survivability, lethality, and 
mobility,  could conceivably be tuned up and down in order to replicate the two-level, 
three-factorial candidate vehicle design used in this study. CCTT end state metrics would 
be recorded to further explore the effects and interactions of these principal attributes on 
fighting vehicle performance. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the dynamics and interplay 
between systems with regard to lethality places great value on the inclusion of a human in 
the decision making cycle of commission of a lethal, albeit simulated, munition.  
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In this experiment, the statistics were designed to analyze the correlation of 
performance with respect to the attributes of interest (survivability, lethality, and 
mobility), so a subsequent study would have to be conducted to pursue the sensitivity of 
user performance to candidate design. Finally, in accordance with full spectrum 
operations, future simulations should include both defensive and stability operations to 
evaluate ground combat performance and the relative contribution of principal attributes 
in a broader mission profile. 
For the classical decision analysis portion of this manuscript, the apparent 
shortcomings of AHP suggest further investigation of MAUT. A hybridization effort that 
uses MAUT for the initial direction for an advanced technology pursuit, followed by an 
AHP effort to guide the final aspects of a project, might be beneficial. Nanry’s 
Econometric Frontier Analysis uses an MAUT approach for the decision analysis with 
respect to pursuing high risk, but high reward, military technologies. The proposed 
hybrid approach would be consistent with this technique. 
When considering the DOE methodology, the principal attributes were tested at 
the tactical level. In addition to a more robust platform and integration of multiple 
systems, the attributes could be expanded to the three levels of war, making for a two-
level, 9-factorial experiment. This might illuminate in a quantitative fashion the inherent 
conflicts and synergisms between the principal attributes at the levels of war. 
Additionally, the performance metrics could be collapsed and a similar study using the 
DOE framework could be done in order to explore the relationships between cost, 
performance, and schedule. This was done in observation only in Chapter 4, since the 
DOE test matrix was designed around the principal attributes, and particularly not cost, 
performance and schedule effects, i.e., enhanced and acceptable levels of cost and 
schedule. 
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Related to the DOE experiments done in Chapter 4, the missions consisted solely 
of offensive operations against a peer threat. In order to fully explore the contributions of 
a ground combat vehicle in full spectrum operations, further study could include 
defensive, as well as stability operations, for single as well as multiple systems. If a 
decision maker had a sense for the future operational demand tendencies, i.e., stability 
focused, the results could provide the relative effects and interactions among attributes 
toward the performance metrics of interest in that particular type of full spectrum 
operations. Finally, any future DOE work involving users actively fighting virtual 
systems in a simulated combat environment should include user sensitivity analysis. This 
might reaffirm the need to pursue revolutionary, versus evolutionary, improvements in an 
attribute since marginal increases may not be significant enough to be statistically 
distinguishable given the operators’ proclivity to adopt to and adapt with the platform 
they are given.  
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7.4 Advanced Weapon System Concepts—Conventional Cannonry Versus 
Electromagnetic Guns 
Since survivability, as an attribute, presented such penalty to the other 
attributes—both conceptually in Chapter 2 and in simulated results in Chapter 4—this 
clearly represents an area requiring a revolutionary technology development. Simply 
adding more armor to reduce vulnerability is an exercise bound to increase susceptibility 
and reduce mobility and lethality. Likewise, if the U.S. Army continues to fight off a 
charter based on major combat operations, it appeared from the simulation exercise that 
lethality was the attribute that produces the greatest effect on key performance metrics 
like win %. For railguns and other weapons associated with electric fires, this will require 
further work in power supply and switching technology. As previously discussed, in the 
225 year history of the U.S. Army,  there has been active participation in only 11 major 
wars, but hundreds, if not thousands, of actions described as dealing with stability 
operations. The future descriptor of this class of operation has been referred to as wide-
area security missions (WASM). Observations of ongoing operations in Afghanistan 
depict a WASM, i.e., small units widely dispersed, conducting missions in support of 
stability operations.  
With the focus on WASM, indirect-fire coverage at a theater level could be a 
desirable capability of the operational, as well as tactical, level commanders in the area of 
operations. For a theater of the size representative in Afghanistan, 3 strategically placed 
100+MJ railguns could provide indirect coverage of forward operating bases and combat 
outposts. A system of this scale would match the U.S. Navy’s railgun program, and 
provide a first-look for ground forces as to the tactical, operational, and strategic 
implications of introducing a revolutionary weapon technology on the battlefield. 
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Furthermore, the pursuit of a static, ground-based, theater-level railgun system would 
relax the spatial and mass requirements that currently make this technology infeasible for 
a mobile system. Finally, the continued development of ground-based railgun systems 
could promote further development in an emerging area of technological innovation that 
several peer threat countries have deemed as being nothing less than the next generation 
of warfare. The minimal cost of, at least, sustaining the current level of understanding, 
and more importantly, preserving the human capital that have fostered development in 
electromagnetic launch, could far outweigh the risks of abandoning a technology which, 
if matured, would expand the performance capabilities for direct- and indirect-fire 




7.5 Putting the “Mechanical Turk” to Work for the U.S. Army 
A shared goal of both DARPA’s AVM/FANG and the U.S. Army’s GCV 
programs is the pursuit of greater assured success in the form, fit, and function of initial 
prototypes, enabled by higher fidelity, multi-physics modeling and simulation efforts 
during the virtual design of vehicle concepts. Consistent with the goal of 
eliminating/minimizing the number of physical prototypes that are required, a 
Mechanical-Turk-like virtual battlefield can be developed to allow U.S. Army personnel 
to virtually fight and simultaneously collect mission-related performance data that can 
provide an in-stride assessment of the ongoing design efforts. This concept was inspired 
by Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, in which humans perform tasks via an online interface 
that machines cannot yet do as efficiently or effectively.262 For example, an online 
publisher might ask participants to write a short book synopsis, and in reward, will pay 
some nominal fee for each synopsis, i.e., task performed. As conceived here, engineers 
would continue to improve their design prototypes, which would be available 
continuously (and updated as appropriate) for virtual combat by a set of operators that 
could test the vehicles in a combat environment typical of current and future anticipated 
theaters of battle. For example, virtual crews can register for access to the environment. 
After signing in and receiving a simulated mission brief, they can fight the platforms 
(commanders, gunners, drivers, etc.); simultaneously and transparent to the user, 
performance of the vehicle variants as well as that of the operators is collected for 
subsequent analysis and synthesis to assess the relative merits (or demerits) of any design 
modifications. In this way, the sensitivity of the design specifications with respect to 
simulated combat vehicle performance, as well as the relative effect of pursuits in 
 
262 Duncan J. Watts, Everything Is Obvious: Once You Know The Answer (New York: Crown Business, 
2011) 190-196, 209. 
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enhancements (similar to that in Chapter 4) can provide valuable, real-time feedback to 
designers and program managers alike.  
During periods of urgently needed redesign, the networked operators and threat 
environment can be virtually imported to the actual operational theater through existing 
frameworks used for mission rehearsal exercises (MRE). Here again, designer and 
manager can provide in-stride feedback on the design through the evolution of the quest 
for a successor vehicle or modification to a legacy system, as opposed to the current 
practice of assessing design efficacy less frequently and without the immense knowledge 
base that a virtual simulation environment provides. 
A U.S. Army version of the Mechanical Turk that provides an iterative, integrated 
design-assessment means for fighting vehicle design represents a significant paradigm 
shift in the pursuit of an advanced ground combat vehicle. It embraces a searcher—rather 
than planner—approach, one not coincidently paralleling the mystery and puzzle 
paradigm. This methodology relies on performance data to direct and proactively 
influence the design effort, versus relying on engineering specifications to forecast the 
ability to achieve superior system performance. While one might anticipate some initial 
resistance or reluctance to adopt this paradigm, the benefit it offers could be great. 
Rewards of pursuing attribute enhancements, e.g., survivability, lethality, or mobility, as 
a function of simulated fighting vehicle operational performance should outweigh the risk 
and complexity associated with crowd sourcing as well as “freeing” and “democratizing” 




Appendix 1: Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) and Definitions. 
The following matrix lists the various technology readiness levels and 




1. Basic principles 
observed and reported.  
 
Low  level of technology readiness. Scientific research 
begins to be translated into applied research and  
development. Examples might include paper studies of a 
technology’s basic properties. 





Once basic principles are observed, practical 
applications can be invented. Applications are speculative 
and there may be no proof or detailed analysis to support the 
assumptions. Examples are limited to analytic (paper) 
studies.  
3. Analytical and 
experimental critical 
function and/or 
characteristic proof of 
concept. 
 
Active research and development is initiated. This includes 
analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically 
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the 
technology. Examples include components that are not yet 
integrated or representative. 
4. Component and/or 




Basic technological components are integrated to establish 
that they will work together. This is relatively “levels of war 
fidelity” compared to the eventual system. Examples 
include integration of “ad hoc” hardware in the laboratory. 
5. Component and/or 





Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. 
The basic technological components are integrated with 
reasonably realistic supporting elements so it can be tested 
in a simulated environment. Examples include “high 
fidelity” laboratory integration of components.  
 
 
263 Virtual Acquisition Handbook for Program Executive Office Combat Support and Combat Service 
Support (PEO CSCSS), Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM), Warren, Michigan, 2010. 
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model or prototype 
demonstration in 
a relevant environment. 
 
Representative model or prototype system, which is well 
beyond that of TRL 5, is tested in a relevant environment. 
Represents a major step up in a technology’s 
demonstrated readiness. Examples include testing a 
prototype in a high-fidelity laboratory environment or in 
simulated operational environment.  
7. System prototype 
demonstration in an 
operational 
environment 
Prototype near, or at, planned operational system. 
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring 
demonstration of an actual system prototype in an 
operational environment such as an aircraft, vehicle, or 
space. Examples include testing the prototype in 
structured or actual field use. 
 
8. Actual system 
completed and qualified 
through test and 
demonstration. 
 
Technology has been proven to work in its final form and 
under expected operational conditions. In almost all cases, 
this TRL represents the end of true system development. 
Examples include developmental test and evaluation of 
the system in its intended or preproduction configuration 
to determine if it meets design specifications and 
operational suitability. 
 
9. Actual system proven 
through successful mission 
operations. 
 
Actual application of the technology in its production 
configuration and under mission conditions, such as those 
encountered in operational test and evaluation. Examples 
include using the system by operational users under 




Appendix 1 (continued) 
Supplemental definitions 
 
Breadboard: Integrated components that provide a representation of a system/subsystem 
and which can be used to determine concept feasibility and to develop technical data. 
Typically configured for laboratory use to demonstrate the technical principles of 
immediate interest. May resemble final system/subsystem in function only. 
 
High Fidelity: Addresses form, fit and function. High-fidelity laboratory environment 
would involve testing with equipment that can simulate and validate all system 
specifications within a laboratory setting. 
 
Low Fidelity: A representative of the component or system that has limited ability to 
provide anything but first order information about the end product. Low-fidelity 
assessments are used to provide trend analysis. 
 
Model: A functional form of a system, generally reduced in scale, near or at operational 
specification. Models will be sufficiently hardened to allow demonstration of the 
technical and operational capabilities required of the final system. 
 
Operational Environment: Environment that addresses all of the operational 
requirements and specifications required of the final system to include 
platform/packaging. 
 
Prototype: A physical or virtual model used to evaluate the technical or manufacturing 




Appendix 1 (continued) 
 
Relevant Environment: Testing environment that simulates the key aspects of the 
operational environment. 
 
Simulated Operational Environment: Either 1) a real environment that can simulate all 
of the operational requirements and specifications required of the final system, or 2) a 
simulated environment that allows for testing of a virtual prototype; used in either case to 
determine whether a developmental system meets the operational requirements and 
specifications of the final system. 
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264 Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s Armor and Artillery, 2006-2007. Virginia: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006. 
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Appendix 3: Research Proposal for the University of Texas Human Subject 
Institutional Review Board (IRB). 
IRB  Research Proposal  
Joshua M. Keena 
PhD Candidate, Mechanical Engineering 
University of Texas at Austin 
  
I. Title: Attribute Weighting Survey Questionnaire for Ground Combat Vehicle 
Design and Selection Considerations 
 
II. Investigators (co-investigators): Joshua M. Keena 
 
III. Hypothesis,  Research Questions, or Goals of the Project: The goal of this project 
is to capture the subjective relative weightings soldiers place on the multitude of 
attributes and metrics used to design and select ground combat vehicles. 
 
IV. Background and Significance: 
 
The design and/or selection of a ground combat vehicle is often an exercise in 
trade-offs enabled by appropriate decision support tools.  In order to aid in the 
compilation and distillation of performance data, measurable attributes are often 
weighted appropriately (Saaty, 1977).  By querying a statistical sample of the 
user population with questions focused on capturing the subjective weightings 
each places on the various performance aspects of a ground combat vehicle 
candidate, these weightings can subsequently be used to either guide design 
efforts and resources or to streamline selection processes.   
 
V. Research Method, Design, and Proposed Statistical Analysis: 
 
I will present the participants with a series of ground combat vehicle attributes 
and metrics organized in accordance with a hierarchy.  The participants will first 
be asked to rank order the attributes, and subsequently they will be asked to 
subjectively rate the attributes with respect to the predecessor.  The goal of this 
second step is to use the weightings with a pair-wise rating algorithm (Hwang 
and Yoon, 1983).  A consistency ratio check will be performed on the weightings 
prior to analysis. The collected data will be analyzed with respect to standard 
deviation, mean, and median.  Attribute weightings will then be applied to the 
various metrics in the framework of a decision support tool being constructed. 
 
VI. Human Subject Interactions 
 
A. The potential participants will be active Army soldiers attending the Institute for 
Advanced Technology’s (IAT) Intermediate Qualification Course (IQC).  This 
three-week course, hosted by the IAT, is focused on providing Acquisition Corps 
(AC) officers with procurement field training.  The population will be both male 
and female Soldiers, aged approximately from 30-45.  The total population of  
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B. participants will number approximately 60 subjects.  In accordance with Army 
regulations and standards, all participants will be in good health.  Given the fact 
that the population will be composed of more senior (field grade) military 
officers, it is highly unlikely that any of the participants are likely to be 
vulnerable to coercion or undue influence.  All students enrolled in the IQC 
course meet screening criteria and are eligible for inclusion in the study.  
Participation will of course be voluntary, and there will be an alternate activity 
available for those not wishing to contribute to this research project.  I expect 
human subject involvement in this project to begin in late October, 2010 and to 
end in late March 2011.   
 
B. The course director for the IQC program of instruction (POI) has agreed to 
allow me to use 75 minutes of discretionary time in his course to conduct this 
survey questionnaire.  Students formally enrolled in the IQC course through the 
Army Training Requirements and Resource System (ATRRS) have been 
prescreened and are fully qualified, both professionally and academically, to 
participate in this study.  
 
C. I will present all participants with a consent form and maintain copies with my 
confidential research archives.  Additionally, each participant will be given a 
copy of the signed consent form.   
 
D.  Research Protocol.  I will ask participants to rank and weight various ground 
combat vehicle performance metrics and attributes.  They will fill out the 
questionnaire in the conference room of the IAT during a discretionary period in 
the IQC syllabus.  It should take 60 minutes to fill out the survey, and I have 
been allotted an additional 15 minutes for a brief introduction period as well as 
questions and answers.  The data collected on each participant will be what is 
known in the Army as a standard name line (SNL), as well as three pieces of data 
used for professional background cataloging.  This will include combat 
experience, graduate education, and current job position.   
 
E.  I will protect and observe the privacy of each participant by only contacting 
them with follow up questions using methods they have agreed to on the 
questionnaire.  Furthermore, I will contact them during times that they have 
indicated are acceptable (e.g., a professional email account ‘army knowledge 
online’ or ‘ako’).   
 
F.  I will protect the confidentiality of participants by maintaining strict control 
of all questionnaires in a locked file cabinet maintained in my office at the IAT, 
room 4.11126.  I will not divulge to others any data that is inconsistent with the 
understanding of the original disclosure.  The names will only be recorded on the 
original survey.  All digital entries and subsequent analysis will rely on a code 
generated for confidentiality purposes. I will destroy this data within 12 months, 




Appendix 3 (continued)  
 
G. The IQC coordinator has afforded me access to the course population during 
a period of discretionary time.  We will conduct the survey in an established 
conference room.   
 
VII.  I rate this survey exercise as low risk.  If, for unforeseen circumstances, I lose 
confidentiality of the participants’ responses, I will notify the participants of this 
through established contact methods.   
 
 
VIII. The participants could benefit from contributing to this project because they will be 
exposed to an organizational framework for cataloging and weighting the various 
principal and derivative metrics used to quantify the relative merit of a ground 
combat system.  Since the participants are all serve in the military procurement field, 
this subject is apropos for the range of specialists I anticipate engaging with.  The 
benefits of participation heavily outweigh the risks.   
 
IX.  No other sites or agencies are involved in this research project.   
 
X. This project will not receive review from another IRB.   
 
Respectfully, 
Joshua M. Keena 
PhD candidate 
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Appendix 4: IRB Consent Form 
Title: Attribute Weighting Survey Questionnaire for Ground Combat Vehicle Design and 
Selection Considerations 
IRB PROTOCOL # 
Conducted By: Joshua M. Keena 
Of The University of Texas at Austin:   Department / Office;  ME/4.11126 Telephone: 
232-4471 
 
You are being asked to participate in a research study.  This form provides you with information 
about the study.  The person in charge of this research will also describe this study to you and 
answer all of your questions. Please read the information below and ask any questions you might 
have before deciding whether or not to take part. Your participation is entirely voluntary.  You 
can refuse to participate or stop participating at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to 
which you are otherwise entitled.  You can stop your participation at any time and your refusal 
will not impact current or future relationships with UT Austin or participating sites.  To do so 
simply tell the researcher you wish to stop participation.  The researcher will provide you with a 
copy of this consent for your records. 
 
The purpose of this study is to capture the subjective relative weightings soldiers place on the 
multitude of attributes and metrics used to design and select ground combat vehicles.  I intend to 
interview up to 60 soldiers for this study.   
 
If you agree to be in this study, we will ask you to do the following things: 
 Participants will be oriented to the research project through a short presentation 
 Participants will be given a short descriptive vignette of the design considerations for a 
future ground combat vehicle  
 Participants will be asked to rank order, then subjectively rate, a collection of attributes 
and metrics descriptive of the measurable aspects of a vehicle 
 
Total estimated time to participate in study is 75 minutes 
 
Risks of being in the study are no greater than everyday life.   
 
Benefits of being in the study include exposure to the design process and requisite 




Confidentiality and Privacy Protections: 
The data resulting from your participation may be made available to other researchers in the 
future for research purposes not detailed within this consent form. In these cases, the data will 
contain no identifying information that could associate you with it, or with your participation in 
any study. 
 
The records of this study will be stored securely and kept confidential. Authorized persons from 
The University of Texas at Austin, members of the Institutional Review Board, and (study 
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sponsors, if any) have the legal right to review your research records and will protect the 
confidentiality of those records to the extent permitted by law.  All publications will exclude any 
information that will make it possible to identify you as a subject. Throughout the study, the 
researchers will notify you of new information that may become available and that might affect 
your decision to remain in the study. 
 
Contacts and Questions: 
 
If you have any questions about the study please ask now.  If you have questions later, want 
additional information, or wish to withdraw your participation call the researchers conducting the 
study.  Their names, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses are at the top of this page.   
 
If you would like to obtain information about the research study, have questions, concerns, 
complaints or wish to discuss problems about a research study with someone unaffiliated with the 
study, please contact the IRB Office at (512) 471-8871 or Jody Jensen, Ph.D., Chair, The 
University of Texas at Austin Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects at 
(512) 232-2685. Anonymity, if desired, will be protected to the extent possible. As an alternative 
method of contact, an email may be sent to orsc@uts.cc.utexas.edu or a letter sent to IRB 
Administrator, P.O. Box 7426, Mail Code A 3200, Austin, TX 78713. 






Age:_________ Gender:_________  Basic Branch / MOS: _________ 
 
Highest degree attained (e.g. AA, BS):_____________  
 
Operational Experience: ________________________________________________ 
(e.g. SFOR, OEF, include # of tours for multiple deployments) 
 




Appendix 5: Attribute Weighting Survey Script 
Attribute Weighting Survey Script 
 
In support of the construction of a decision support tool being used in both the 
design and selection of the next Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) candidate, you have 
been asked to provide your objective and subjective input for the generation of attribute 
weighting values. At this early stage, consider the GCV as the successor to the Bradley 
Infantry Fighting Vehicle (M2A3 IFV). Your contribution to this study should be a 
reflection of your past military experiences, present duty position, and, perhaps toughest 
of all to predict, what you foresee to be the needs and capabilities of our future armed 
forces.  Undoubtedly, the potential combat scenarios for future warfighters include a mix 
of both conventional (e.g. Desert Storm) and irregular warfare (e.g. OIF, OEF). 
 
In the context of this exercise, you are going to focus strictly on combat platform 
performance.  Cost and schedule considerations are being addressed in a subsequent 
forum.  Moreover, with respect to performance, consider the worth of a ground combat 
vehicle to be a function of its principal attributes of Lethality, Survivability and Mobility. 
These three principal attributes can be further broken down into secondary traits and 
tertiary metrics. 
 
While the GCV is clearly a platform that will operate as a tactical level asset, one 
should also consider the operational and strategic implications of the principal metrics.  
Some of these are easy to conceptualize (e.g. Strategic Mobility, like intertheater 
transportability), and others are more abstract notions (e.g. Operational Lethality, like 
collateral damage incurred).  For tactical assets, it is normally easier to envision the 
negative operational and strategic implications of the principal attributes.  In any case, 
use your best judgment when providing your rankings and feedback. 
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Appendix 6: Attribute Weighting Survey Tool      
 
Part I:  Introduction 
 
In support of the construction of a decision support tool being used in both the 
design and selection of the next Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) candidate, you have 
been asked to provide your objective and subjective input for the generation of attribute 
weighting values. At this early stage, consider the GCV as the successor to the Bradley 
Infantry Fighting Vehicle (M2A3 IFV). Your contribution to this study should be a 
reflection of your past military experiences, present duty position, and, perhaps toughest 
of all to predict, what you foresee to be the needs and capabilities of our future armed 
forces.  Undoubtedly, the potential combat scenarios for future warfighters include a mix 
of both conventional (e.g. Desert Storm) and irregular warfare (e.g. OIF, OEF). 
 
In the context of this exercise, you are going to focus strictly on combat platform 
performance. Cost and schedule considerations are being addressed in a subsequent 
forum.  Moreover, with respect to performance, consider the worth of a ground combat 
vehicle to be a function of its principal attributes of Lethality, Survivability and Mobility. 
These three principal attributes can be further broken down into secondary traits and 
tertiary metrics. 
 
While the GCV is clearly a platform that will operate as a tactical level asset, one 
should also consider the operational and strategic implications of the principal metrics.  
Some of these are easy to conceptualize (e.g. Strategic Mobility, like intertheater 
transportability), and others are more abstract notions (e.g. Operational Lethality, like 
collateral damage incurred).  For tactical assets, it is normally easier to envision the 
negative operational and strategic implications of the principal attributes.  In any case, 






Appendix 6 (continued) 
Part II:  Principal Attributes at the 3 Levels of War 
 
Working definitions:   
 
Lethality is defined as the probability that a weapon will damage or destroy a target such 
that it can no longer carry out its intended mission. 
 
Mobility is defined as a quality of a combat platform which permits movement from 
place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill its primary mission. 
 
Survivability is defined as an inherent quality of protecting personnel, weapon system, 
and equipment such that the crew can carry out their dedicated mission. 
 
The Strategic level of war is the level at which a nation determines security objectives 
and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives.   
 
The Operational level of war links the employment of tactical forces and flow of 
sustenance resources to achieve the strategic end state.   
 
The Tactical level of war is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces using 




Figure 1 (left): GCV virtual prototype with highlighted regions contributing to 
attributes of lethality, mobility, and survivability. 
Figure 2 (right): Levels of War. 
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Considering the GCV concept, rank order the principal attributes of Lethality, 
Mobility, and Survivability as you value their relative importance to the overall 








With respect to #2, #1 is:  Equal     Slightly favored     Favored     Strongly favored 
(circle one) 
With respect to #3, #1 is:  Equal     Slightly favored     Favored     Strongly favored 
(circle one) 
With respect to #3, #2 is:  Equal     Slightly favored     Favored     Strongly favored 
(circle one) 
 
Rank order, from 1-9, with 1 being the most important to you, and 9 being the least 
important to you, a ground combat system’s attribute characteristics of Lethality, 
Mobility, and Survivability at the three levels of war, i.e. (Tactical Lethality, 
Operational Lethality… Strategic Survivability).     
 
 
Level and attribute   (rank) 
 
1.  Tactical Lethality   _________ 
 
2.  Tactical Mobility   _________ 
 
3.  Tactical Survivability  _________ 
 
4.  Operational Lethality  _________ 
 
5.  Operational Mobility  _________ 
 
6.  Operational Survivability _________ 
 
7.  Strategic Lethality  _________ 
 
8.  Strategic Mobility  _________ 
 
9.  Strategic Survivability  _________ 
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Part III:  Lethality 
 
Considering the definition for lethality, this attribute is a function of the weapon system 
capacity to acquire and deploy a payload (Acquisition), the ability to fly from muzzle to 
target (Engagement), and the effects generated on the target (Effects).   
 
Rank order the secondary traits of Lethality, namely Acquisition, Engagement, and 








With respect to #2, #1 is:  Equal     Slightly favored     Favored     Strongly favored 
(circle one) 
With respect to #3, #1 is:  Equal     Slightly favored     Favored     Strongly favored 
(circle one) 
With respect to #3, #2 is:  Equal     Slightly favored     Favored     Strongly favored 
(circle one) 
 
The following is a list of metrics that relate to the Lethality of a weapon system.  
Based on your experience and knowledge, these metrics may vary from familiar 
(e.g. range) to unfamiliar (e.g. BAD or behind armor debris).  In any case, please 
rank the following metrics from 1 (most important) to 10 (least important). 
 
Metric  Rank  Short Definition      
  
BAD  ________  behind armor debris, material flying behind target 
CAL  ________  combat ammunition load, rounds stored on platform 
Frecoil  ________  recoil force after firing, weapon system kick 
KE  ________  kinetic energy imparted to target 
lcannon   ________  cannon length 
MER  ________  maximum effective range, how far can you hit a target 
Pkill  ________  probability (percent chance) that target is killed 
tflight  ________  time of flight to target 
treload  ________  time to reload weapon 
tuneability ________  ability to tune or scale weapon effect to target specificity 
 
List one additional metric you would want to consider with respect to Lethality: 
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 Part IV:  Mobility 
 
Considering the definition for mobility, this attribute is a function of the platform 
capability to drive on unimproved surfaces (Cross Country), the ability to move on 
improved surfaces (Roadworthiness), and the capacity for which it can deal with the 
unforeseen manmade and natural obstacles it may encounter (Robustness).   
 
Rank order  the secondary traits of Mobility, namely Cross Country, 
Roadworthiness, and Robustness as you value their relative importance to the 







With respect to #2, #1 is:  Equal     Slightly favored     Favored     Strongly favored 
(circle one) 
With respect to #3, #1 is:  Equal     Slightly favored     Favored     Strongly favored 
(circle one) 
With respect to #3, #2 is:  Equal     Slightly favored     Favored     Strongly favored 
(circle one) 
 
The following is a list of metrics that relate to the Mobility of a combat platform.  
Based on your experience and knowledge, these metrics may vary from quite 
familiar (e.g. vmax, or top speed) to unfamiliar (e.g. P/w ratio or the ratio of engine 
power to vehicle weight).  In any case, please rank the following metrics from 1 
(most important) to 10 (least important). 
 
Metric  Rank  Short Definition      
  
CG  _____  height of center of gravity, measure of stability 
hclimb  _____  vertical height of obstacle that vehicle can climb over 
P/w  _____  ratio of engine power to gross vehicle weight 
range  _____  range vehicle can travel without resupply 
rturn  _____  turning radius 
VCIn  _____  vehicle cone index, measure of ability to travel on soil 
vmax  _____  maximum velocity or top speed 
wgap  _____  width of gap that vehicle can cross over 
ηfuel  _____  fuel efficiency 
%slope  _____  percent slope that vehicle can climb 
 
List one additional metric you would want to consider with respect to Mobility: 
411 
Appendix 6 (continued) 
 
Part V:  Survivability 
 
Considering the definition for survivability, this attribute is a function of the platform 
capacity for which it can recover from damage (Repairability), the ability to avoid 
detection (Susceptibility), and the ability to take a hit (Vulnerability). 
 
Rank order  the secondary traits of Survivability,  namely Repairability,  
Susceptibility, and Vulnerability as you value their relative importance to the 








With respect to #2, #1 is:  Equal     Slightly favored     Favored     Strongly favored 
(circle one) 
With respect to #3, #1 is:  Equal     Slightly favored     Favored     Strongly favored 
(circle one) 
With respect to #3, #2 is:  Equal     Slightly favored     Favored     Strongly favored 
(circle one) 
 
The following is a list of metrics that relate to the Survivability of a combat 
platform.  Based on your experience and knowledge, these metrics may range from 
quite familiar (e.g. mass or weight of the vehicle) to unfamiliar (RHAeq or equivalent 
armor thickness).  In any case, please rank the following metrics from 1 (most 
important) to 10 (least important). 
 
Metric  Rank  Short Definition      
  
Across  ________  cross sectional area or silhouette presented to threat 
Afootprint ________  footprint area occupied by platform 
BPR  ________  blast protection rating, akin to the yield of an IED 
Ecombustible ________  combustible or flammable energy stored on board 
em  ________  areal density ratio of armor with respect to rolled steel 
hclearance ________  ground clearance of vehicle 
mass  ________  gross vehicle mass or weight 
modularity ________  number of main sub-components comprised of vehicle 
RHAeq  ________  armor thickness, equivalent with respect to rolled steel 
v-hull  ________  belly of vehicle has vee shape 
 
List one additional metric you would want to consider with respect to Survivability: 
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Appendix 6 (continued) 
 
Part VI:  Decision Support Tools 
After an exhaustive design and analysis process comprising several years, you have 
now been asked to participate in the selection of the next GCV.  A brief summary of 
the respective performance is listed below.  This is only raw data, i.e. weights and 











































































A 95 12 4000 66 300 11 850 300 80,000
B 70 6 2500 100 500 16 600 250 60,000
C 65 5 3200 45 250 12 1000 500 50,000
 
You may notice that the first three metrics deal with lethality, the next three address 
mobility, and the last three focus on survivability.  With respect to the current 
inventory of Army vehicles, if one were to nondimensionalize the performance 
values for the three principal attributes by dividing the value by an established, 
familiar standard, the Abrams main battle tank, Stryker armored personnel 
carrier, and MRAP mine resistant utility vehicle could serve as the respective 
benchmarks.  For example, instead of considering a vehicles range in kilometers or 
miles, if its nondimensional range was greater than 1, it would be better than the 
Stryker, if it were less than 1, it would be worse than the Stryker, and if it were 
equal to 1, it would be equal to the Stryker.   
 
Following this normalization effort using the Abrams, Stryker, and MRAP as the 
standard of performance for lethality, mobility, and survivability metrics 
respectively, the data in table 1 has been nondimensionalized and is displayed in 



































A 1.10 1.12 1.25 0.65 0.60 0.69 0.85 0.67 1.21 





Appendix 6 (continued) 
 
Additionally, this nondimensionalized data can be depicted graphically.  For 
example, the three candidates A,B, and C, can be plotted on axes representing 


















Figure 3 (left): plot of candidates A,B, and C on x-y-z axis of Lethality, Mobility, 
and Survivability 

















Figure 5 (left): ):  plot of Lethality versus Mobility for candidates A,B, and C 




Appendix 6 (continued) 
 
If you were choosing a GCV candidate, please rank order the tables and figures that 
would be most helpful in making a selection.  As a reminder: 
 Table 1 is raw data that you would encounter in a standard decision matrix 
 Table 2 is the same data normalized against established benchmarks with respect 
to Lethality, Mobility, and Survivability 
 Figure 3 is a three-dimensional plot of the candidates on axes representing the 
principal attributes 
 Figures 4-6 are two-dimensional plots of the candidates on axes representing the 
principal attributes. 
Place a weighting value after each entry using the following scale: 
1: very helpful  2: helpful 3: neutral  4: not helpful 
 
 
1.____________________________  _______ 
 
2.____________________________  _______ 
 
3.____________________________  _______ 
 
4.____________________________  _______ 
 
 
What did you like and/or dislike about the visual decision support tools, i.e. Figures 







Most tough decisions in the acquisition corps involve tradeoffs and concessions.  
This involves separating the ‘nice-to-haves’ from the ‘must-haves’.  From personal 
experience, what generic aspects of projects or programs do you feel are critical, 








Appendix 6 (continued) 
 
Please briefly define or list the qualities and metrics that come to mind when you 








































* term not addressed doctrinally for a tactical-level asset 
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Appendix 7: Group 1 GCV Attribute Weighting Survey Raw Data 
subject 
criteria IS01 IS02 IS03 IS04 IS05 IS06 IS07 IS09 IS10 IS12 IS14 IS15 
L 0.41 0.25 0.59 0.32 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.26 0.14 0.20 0.16 0.14 
M 0.26 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.30 0.44 0.22 0.19 0.33 0.49 0.54 0.53 
S 0.33 0.59 0.25 0.56 0.54 0.44 0.63 0.55 0.53 0.31 0.30 0.33 
TL 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 
OL 2 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 2 2 2 4 
SL 4 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 2 3 4 
TM 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 
OM 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 3 2 1 
SM 2 2 1 2 3 1 2 3 2 1 4 2 
TS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 
OS 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 
SS 2 3 3 2 4 3 1 3 4 2 3 4 
EB 0.33 0.11 0.54 0.12 0.40 0.14 0.13 0.63 0.16 0.62 0.16 0.12 
IB 0.33 0.24 0.16 0.27 0.20 0.53 0.25 0.15 0.59 0.25 0.30 0.27 
TB 0.33 0.65 0.30 0.61 0.40 0.33 0.62 0.22 0.25 0.13 0.54 0.61 
BAD 9 9 7 10 4 8 8 10 2 10 9 9 
CAL 7 6 6 4 6 4 7 8 5 6 1 5 
F_recoil 8 10 10 6 9 9 1 5 10 9 7 7 
KE 6 5 3 8 2 3 4 7 9 8 2 8 
l_cannon 10 8 9 9 10 10 5 9 4 5 8 10 
MER 2 1 2 2 3 2 6 2 6 1 3 2 
P_kill 1 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 7 4 1 
t_flight 4 3 5 3 8 7 9 3 8 3 10 4 
t_reload 5 4 4 5 5 5 10 6 7 2 5 6 
tuneable 3 7 8 7 7 6 2 4 1 4 6 3 
cc 0.41 0.65 0.33 0.53 0.54 0.59 0.11 0.25 0.33 0.24 0.55 0.49 
road 0.26 0.11 0.14 0.33 0.16 0.16 0.44 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.26 0.20 
robust 0.33 0.24 0.53 0.14 0.30 0.25 0.44 0.62 0.53 0.65 0.19 0.31 
cg 1 3 7 4 1 5 3 9 1 10 3 9 
h_climb 2 9 3 5 3 2 10 8 5 5 4 8 
P/w 5 4 1 6 7 4 4 7 8 7 7 10 
range 4 1 5 8 4 7 8 1 9 1 1 2 
r_turn 9 8 10 7 5 6 2 5 2 8 6 1 
VCI_n 3 6 9 1 6 1 7 10 4 6 5 4 
v_max 6 2 4 10 8 8 5 2 7 9 9 7 
w_gap 8 10 8 2 9 3 1 6 6 3 10 5 
etta_fuel 10 5 6 9 10 9 6 3 10 2 2 6 
%_slope 7 7 2 3 2 10 9 4 3 4 6 3 
repairable 0.33 0.24 0.20 0.12 0.16 0.24 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.25 0.14 
susceptible 0.33 0.11 0.40 0.27 0.54 0.11 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.29 0.16 0.33 
vulnerable 0.33 0.65 0.40 0.61 0.30 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.53 
A_cross 3 4 2 4 1 6 5 5 9 6 5 2 
A_foot 9 10 10 5 7 10 6 4 8 9 4 4 
BPR 4 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 
E_comb 5 3 9 6 3 9 4 6 7 3 6 7 
e_m 2 5 3 2 4 7 9 3 6 5 10 9 
h_clear 8 9 8 8 10 8 10 8 3 8 8 6 
mass 7 8 7 9 8 5 3 7 5 7 7 10 
modular 10 6 6 7 9 3 8 9 10 2 9 3 
RHA_eq 1 2 4 3 5 2 7 2 2 1 2 8 
v_hull 6 7 5 10 6 4 2 10 4 10 3 5 
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Appendix 7 (continued) 
 
      subject 
criteria 
IS01 IS02 IS03 IS04 IS05 IS06 IS07 IS09 IS10 IS12 IS14 IS15 
A 0.46 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.45 0.42 0.47 0.48 0.44 0.41 0.40 0.40 
B 0.45 0.42 0.47 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42 
C 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21 
D 0.33 0.36 0.29 0.34 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.35 0.38 0.36 0.37 0.37 
E 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 
F 0.31 0.28 0.34 0.30 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.26 
from att: A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 
from at: B 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 
from att: C 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
from att: D 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
from att: E 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
from att: F 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
choice: A 3 2 3 5 5 4 6 4 3 5 2 4 
choice: B 5 3 5 6 2 2 4 2 6 2 5 5 
choice: C 1 4 2 4 6 3 5 1 1 4 4 1 
choice: D 4 5 1 2 3 1 1 5 4 3 1 3 
choice: E 6 6 6 3 1 6 2 6 5 6 6 6 
choice: F 2 1 4 1 4 5 3 3 2 1 3 2 
diff L 0.13 0.04 0.31 0.03 0.12 0.17 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.09 0.12 0.15 
diff M 0.01 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.23 0.27 0.26 
diff S 0.12 0.15 0.20 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.18 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.15 0.11 
sum 0.25 0.29 0.62 0.29 0.24 0.35 0.37 0.20 0.29 0.45 0.54 0.52 
rank 3 8 23 7 2 12 13 1 5 18 21 19 
IC A 2 1 2 4 4 3 5 3 2 3 0 2 
IC B 3 1 3 4 0 0 2 0 4 1 4 4 
IC C 4 1 3 1 1 2 0 4 4 1 1 4 
IC D 1 2 3 1 0 2 2 2 1 0 2 0 
IC E 0 0 0 3 5 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 
IC F 2 3 1 3 0 1 1 1 2 3 1 2 
sum 12 8 12 16 10 8 14 10 14 8 8 12 
IC rank 14 2 14 22 7 2 18 7 18 2 2 14 
EC1 A 2 1 2 4 4 3 5 3 2 4 1 3 
EC1 B 3 1 3 4 0 0 2 0 4 0 3 3 
EC1 C 4 1 3 1 1 2 0 4 4 1 1 4 
EC1 D 1 2 2 1 0 2 2 2 1 0 2 0 
EC1 E 0 0 0 3 5 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 
EC1 F 2 3 0 3 0 1 1 1 2 3 1 2 
sum 12 8 10 16 10 8 14 10 14 8 8 12 
EC1 rank 14 2 7 22 7 2 19 7 19 2 2 14 
EC2 A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
EC2 B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
EC2 C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC2 D 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC2 E 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC2 F 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
sum 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 




Appendix 7 (continued) 
      subject 
criteria IS16 IS18 IS19 IS20 IS21 IS22 IS23 IS24 IS25 IS26 IS27 IS29 
L 0.53 0.60 0.22 0.13 0.14 0.65 0.55 0.22 0.13 0.47 0.14 0.16 
M 0.33 0.10 0.15 0.28 0.29 0.11 0.26 0.15 0.28 0.15 0.33 0.25 
S 0.14 0.29 0.63 0.58 0.57 0.24 0.19 0.63 0.58 0.38 0.53 0.59 
TL 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 
OL 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 3 3 
SL 3 3 1 3 1 3 2 1 3 2 3 4 
TM 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 
OM 4 1 1 2 1 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 
SM 4 1 1 3 2 3 2 1 3 1 1 1 
TS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 
OS 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 3 
SS 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 4 3 2 3 4 
EB 0.11 0.50 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.28 0.33 0.20 0.20 0.16 
IB 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.28 0.21 0.28 0.24 0.28 0.33 0.28 0.40 0.30 
TB 0.65 0.25 0.63 0.58 0.66 0.58 0.62 0.44 0.33 0.52 0.40 0.54 
BAD 9 6 3 10 4 8 8 10 3 7 7 10 
CAL 5 4 7 3 5 7 7 9 2 6 6 5 
F_recoil 7 10 2 9 10 9 9 7 10 9 8 4 
KE 8 5 9 2 3 3 6 5 8 8 10 6 
l_cannon 10 9 1 5 9 10 10 6 6 10 9 9 
MER 1 3 8 1 2 2 5 8 5 2 4 2 
P_kill 2 1 10 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 
t_flight 4 8 6 7 8 5 4 3 9 4 5 7 
t_reload 6 2 5 6 7 6 3 4 4 3 3 3 
tuneable 3 7 4 8 6 4 2 2 7 5 1 8 
cc 0.32 0.33 0.22 0.58 0.53 0.28 0.64 0.22 0.49 0.54 0.48 0.62 
roadworthy 0.12 0.33 0.15 0.28 0.14 0.58 0.18 0.15 0.20 0.16 0.35 0.14 
robust 0.56 0.33 0.63 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.18 0.63 0.31 0.30 0.17 0.24 
cg 9 4 4 2 10 6 5 5 2 10 2 2 
h_climb 4 6 3 3 7 5 9 6 10 9 5 1 
P/w 10 7 9 10 1 4 1 4 8 8 4 5 
range 1 3 5 9 3 1 3 3 4 1 8 7 
r_turn 7 2 6 8 6 8 2 9 5 7 7 8 
VCI_n 6 8 2 6 5 9 4 10 3 3 6 4 
v_max 2 1 10 5 4 2 8 2 6 2 9 10 
w_gap 8 5 1 1 9 6 7 8 9 4 10 6 
etta_fuel 5 10 7 4 8 7 10 1 1 5 3 9 
%_slope 3 9 8 7 2 10 6 7 7 6 1 3 
repairable 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.27 
susceptible 0.43 0.39 0.22 0.28 0.21 0.25 0.18 0.23 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.12 
vulnerable 0.43 0.44 0.63 0.58 0.66 0.62 0.64 0.58 0.54 0.54 0.49 0.61 
A_cross 4 3 8 3 5 3 5 7 6 5 10 10 
A_foot 8 4 7 7 6 6 6 6 7 6 2 9 
BPR 1 1 10 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 
E_comb 3 5 4 6 7 5 10 4 2 7 4 3 
e_m 5 8 1 5 9 4 4 8 8 9 7 7 
h_clear 10 6 2 4 4 7 3 9 3 10 8 4 
mass 9 9 3 3 3 8 8 1 5 3 3 8 
modular 6 10 6 9 8 9 9 2 9 8 9 5 
RHA_eq 2 2 9 2 10 2 5 3 4 2 5 6 
v_hull 7 7 5 10 2 10 2 10 10 4 6 2 
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      subject 
criteria 
IS16 IS18 IS19 IS20 IS21 IS22 IS23 IS24 IS25 IS26 IS27 IS29 
A 0.44 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.45 0.49 0.46 0.48 0.44 0.46 
B 0.47 0.47 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.48 0.47 0.41 0.40 0.45 0.41 0.40 
C 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.22 
D 0.30 0.29 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.28 0.30 0.36 0.38 0.31 0.38 0.37 
E 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.19 
F 0.32 0.34 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.35 0.33 0.28 0.26 0.32 0.26 0.27 
from att…A 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
from att…B 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 
from att…C 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
from att…D 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 
from att…E 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
from att…F 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 
choice...A 3 3 4 4 6 5 4 3 6 1 2 4 
choice...B 5 6 1 5 5 6 2 4 5 2 5 5 
choice...C 1 5 6 6 4 3 2 6 4 3 3 3 
choice...D 4 1 2 1 1 2 3 1 2 4 4 2 
choice...E 6 2 3 2 3 4 6 5 3 5 6 6 
choice...F 2 4 5 3 2 1 1 2 1 6 1 1 
wting diff L 0.24 0.32 0.07 0.15 0.14 0.37 0.26 0.07 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.13 
wting diff M 0.06 0.16 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.06 0.02 
wting diff S 0.31 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.21 0.26 0.18 0.14 0.07 0.08 0.15 
sum 0.61 0.64 0.37 0.30 0.29 0.73 0.52 0.37 0.30 0.38 0.29 0.29 
rank 22 24 13 10 4 25 20 13 10 16 5 8 
IC A 1 2 3 3 5 4 2 2 5 0 1 3 
IC B 4 4 1 3 3 4 1 2 3 0 3 3 
IC C 4 0 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 2 2 
IC D 0 3 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 0 1 1 
IC E 0 4 3 4 3 2 0 1 3 1 0 0 
IC F 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 
sum 10 14 10 14 16 16 9 10 16 6 10 12 
IC rank 7 18 7 18 22 22 6 7 22 1 7 14 
EC1 A 2 2 3 3 5 4 3 2 5 0 1 3 
EC1 B 3 4 1 3 3 4 0 2 3 0 3 3 
EC1 C 4 0 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 2 2 
EC1 D 1 2 1 2 2 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 
EC1 E 0 4 3 4 3 2 0 1 3 1 0 0 
EC1 F 2 0 1 1 2 3 3 2 3 2 3 3 
sum 12 12 10 14 16 16 9 10 16 6 10 12 
EC1 rank 14 14 7 19 22 22 6 7 22 1 7 14 
EC2 A 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
EC2 B 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
EC2 C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC2 D 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
EC2 E 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC2 F 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
sum 4 2 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 2 0 0 
EC2 rank 24 17 1 1 1 17 24 1 1 17 1 1 
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Appendix 8: Group 2 GCV Attribute Weighting Survey Raw Data 
subject 
criteria IN01 IN02 IN03 IN04 IN05 IN06 IN07 IN08 IN09 IN10 IN11 IN12 
L 0.32 0.46 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.28 0.33 0.36 0.26 0.25 0.33 0.30 
M 0.22 0.22 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.26 0.12 
S 0.46 0.32 0.62 0.58 0.54 0.58 0.33 0.52 0.64 0.62 0.41 0.57 
TL 2 1 3 2 2 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 
OL 5 2 2 5 4 3 3 3 4 2 3 5 
SL 1 3 1 1 1 2 1 5 1 1 2 1 
TM 4 4 6 4 5 4 7 4 3 8 4 4 
OM 6 5 5 6 6 6 4 6 5 4 6 6 
SM 3 6 4 3 3 5 6 5 2 6 5 3 
TS 8 8 9 8 8 7 9 7 4 9 7 8 
OS 9 7 8 9 9 9 5 9 5 5 9 9 
SS 7 9 7 7 7 8 8 8 2 7 8 7 
EB 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.16 0.24 0.32 0.33 0.20 0.11 0.20 0.22 0.11 
IB 0.25 0.17 0.27 0.25 0.21 0.22 0.33 0.40 0.24 0.31 0.37 0.24 
TB 0.59 0.67 0.61 0.59 0.55 0.46 0.33 0.40 0.65 0.49 0.41 0.65 
BAD 10 10 7 9 10 5 10 6 10 9 10 10 
CAL 3 5 8 3 7 8 3 5 2 5 3 3 
F_recoil 8 6 9 7 1 7 8 7 7 6 5 8 
KE 5 4 1 2 9 4 7 2 9 1 4 5 
l_cannon 9 7 10 8 8 9 9 10 8 8 7 9 
MER 2 3 2 4 4 1 2 1 5 2 8 2 
P_kill 1 1 5 1 2 2 1 3 1 7 1 1 
t_flight 7 9 6 10 5 6 6 8 6 3 9 7 
t_reload 6 2 3 5 3 3 5 4 3 4 6 6 
tuneable 4 8 4 6 6 10 4 9 4 10 2 4 
cc 0.43 0.32 0.61 0.62 0.46 0.42 0.46 0.41 0.58 0.33 0.49 0.63 
road 0.14 0.22 0.12 0.13 0.29 0.13 0.22 0.22 0.13 0.26 0.20 0.19 
robust 0.43 0.46 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.46 0.32 0.37 0.28 0.41 0.31 0.17 
cg 3 6 4 1 10 7 7 1 1 1 3 3 
h_climb 9 7 3 6 6 1 8 10 3 8 10 9 
P/w 4 8 5 2 1 8 9 4 2 9 7 4 
range 1 5 2 4 9 5 3 2 8 2 1 1 
r_turn 7 4 9 7 4 2 10 7 7 5 2 7 
VCI_n 10 10 10 8 8 9 4 8 10 4 5 10 
v_max 2 3 1 5 3 6 1 3 4 10 4 2 
w_gap 8 9 8 10 5 3 2 9 6 6 6 8 
etta_fuel 5 1 6 3 7 10 5 5 9 7 8 5 
%_slope 6 2 7 9 2 4 6 6 5 3 9 6 
repairable 0.16 0.33 0.13 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.26 0.11 0.33 0.24 0.12 
susceptible 0.25 0.33 0.25 0.30 0.20 0.20 0.46 0.33 0.24 0.33 0.21 0.27 
vulnerable 0.59 0.33 0.62 0.54 0.60 0.60 0.32 0.41 0.65 0.33 0.55 0.61 
A_cross 4 10 9 1 3 4 2 1 8 5 7 4 
A_foot 7 7 1 8 4 9 7 4 9 8 8 7 
BPR 3 3 8 4 1 3 1 3 1 2 1 3 
E_comb 6 6 10 7 5 8 8 9 5 3 4 6 
e_m 2 8 7 3 2 2 5 8 7 6 6 2 
h_clear 8 4 2 9 7 7 9 7 6 9 10 8 
mass 9 5 3 5 6 6 10 6 3 10 5 9 
modular 10 9 4 10 9 10 6 2 10 7 9 10 
RHA_eq 1 2 6 2 8 1 3 5 2 4 2 1 
v_hull 5 1 5 6 10 5 4 10 4 1 3 5 
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IN01 IN02 IN03 IN04 IN05 IN06 IN07 IN08 IN09 IN10 IN11 IN12 
A 0.58 0.66 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.60 0.59 0.53 0.53 0.59 0.56 
B 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.41 
C 0.77 0.72 0.84 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.71 0.80 0.85 0.84 0.75 0.82 
D 0.54 0.59 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.60 0.51 0.46 0.47 0.56 0.48 
E 0.42 0.45 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.36 0.50 0.36 0.33 0.35 0.45 0.35 
F 0.66 0.58 0.71 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.64 0.65 0.71 0.71 0.65 0.68 
from att: A 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
from at: B 5 6 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 6 5 
from att: C 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
from att: D 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
from att: E 6 5 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 6 5 6 
from att: F 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
choice: A 2 5 3 4 6 2 3 4 5 2 3 2 
choice: B 3 6 2 2 5 5 5 3 4 6 6 5 
choice: C 1 4 1 2 4 1 1 5 1 3 1 1 
choice: D 4 3 4 1 1 4 2 6 6 1 4 3 
choice: E 6 1 5 6 3 6 6 2 3 5 5 6 
choice: F 5 2 6 3 2 3 4 1 2 4 2 4 
diff L 0.02 0.16 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.01 
diff M 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.15 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.06 
diff S 0.06 0.20 0.11 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.18 0.00 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.06 
sum 0.11 0.39 0.21 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.36 0.12 0.26 0.21 0.21 0.13 
rank 4 21 13 7 1 7 18 5 16 13 11 6 
IC A 1 3 0 1 3 1 0 1 2 1 0 1 
IC B 2 0 3 3 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 
IC C 0 3 0 1 3 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 
IC D 0 0 0 3 3 0 2 2 2 3 0 1 
IC E 0 4 1 0 3 0 1 4 3 1 0 0 
IC F 3 2 4 1 0 1 2 1 0 2 0 2 
sum 6 12 8 9 12 2 6 14 8 10 0 4 
IC rank 8 18 12 16 18 4 8 20 12 17 1 6 
EC1 A 1 2 0 1 3 1 0 1 2 1 0 1 
EC1 B 2 1 3 3 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 0 
EC1 C 0 3 0 1 3 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 
EC1 D 0 1 0 3 3 0 2 2 2 3 0 1 
EC1 E 0 5 1 0 3 0 0 4 3 1 1 0 
EC1 F 3 0 4 1 0 1 2 1 0 2 0 2 
sum 6 12 8 9 12 2 4 14 8 10 2 4 
EC1 rank 10 18 12 15 18 3 6 20 12 16 3 6 
EC2 A 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC2 B 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
EC2 C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC2 D 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC2 E 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
EC2 F 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
sum 0 6 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 





Appendix 8 (continued) 
 
      subject 
criteria IN12 IN13 IN14 IN15 IN16 IN17 IN18 IN19 IN20 IN21 
L 0.30 0.24 0.28 0.17 0.33 0.25 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.30 
M 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.33 0.16 0.14 0.26 0.33 0.16 
S 0.57 0.62 0.58 0.67 0.33 0.59 0.53 0.41 0.33 0.54 
TL 2 7 1 2 1 4 2 5 4 3 
OL 4 6 2 3 3 2 3 7 1 1 
SL 7 1 3 1 2 1 1 2 9 2 
TM 3 5 4 5 6 6 5 3 5 6 
OM 5 9 5 6 4 8 6 1 2 4 
SM 6 2 6 4 5 5 4 4 8 5 
TS 1 4 7 9 8 7 8 8 6 9 
OS 8 8 8 7 9 9 9 9 3 7 
SS 9 3 9 8 7 3 7 6 7 8 
EB 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.26 0.33 0.25 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.33 
IB 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.30 0.33 0.17 0.33 
TB 0.65 0.62 0.61 0.41 0.33 0.50 0.54 0.53 0.67 0.33 
BAD 10 8 10 3 10 8 10 2 8 10 
CAL 3 7 6 4 2 5 3 4 9 2 
F_recoil 9 9 9 8 3 9 9 8 7 7 
KE 7 3 7 9 1 7 6 7 4 5 
l_cannon 8 10 8 10 7 10 8 10 10 8 
MER 5 2 2 2 5 1 2 9 2 3 
P_kill 1 1 1 1 6 2 1 1 1 1 
t_flight 6 5 5 6 8 6 7 6 5 6 
t_reload 2 4 3 7 4 3 4 3 6 4 
tuneable 4 6 4 5 9 4 5 5 3 9 
cc 0.63 0.57 0.54 0.41 0.44 0.49 0.46 0.58 0.67 0.33 
roadworthy 0.19 0.12 0.16 0.26 0.17 0.20 0.32 0.18 0.17 0.26 
robust 0.17 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.39 0.31 0.22 0.23 0.17 0.41 
cg 1 5 2 10 5 4 7 2 3 5 
h_climb 4 10 8 2 4 3 5 6 7 6 
P/w 2 2 1 1 1 10 8 9 1 7 
range 5 1 3 6 6 9 1 1 2 1 
r_turn 3 6 7 3 7 8 6 3 8 10 
VCI_n 8 9 4 9 3 1 9 5 4 8 
v_max 6 3 6 7 8 5 2 7 5 2 
w_gap 9 7 9 5 10 7 10 10 10 9 
etta_fuel 10 4 10 4 2 6 4 4 6 3 
%_slope 7 8 5 8 9 2 3 8 9 4 
repairable 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.32 0.16 0.23 0.12 0.33 0.19 
susceptible 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.38 0.22 0.25 0.18 0.27 0.33 0.26 
vulnerable 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.47 0.46 0.59 0.58 0.61 0.33 0.55 
A_cross 5 4 5 4 9 2 7 9 4 4 
A_foot 10 5 6 7 10 8 5 4 3 5 
BPR 3 1 1 3 1 1 6 1 8 1 
E_comb 4 6 9 5 3 9 10 7 6 6 
e_m 7 8 10 6 6 6 9 6 10 8 
h_clear 8 9 8 8 8 4 4 5 2 7 
mass 9 10 3 10 7 10 2 10 1 2 
modular 6 7 7 9 2 7 8 3 5 10 
RHA_eq 2 2 2 2 5 5 1 8 9 9 
v_hull 1 3 4 1 4 3 3 2 7 3 
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      subject 
criteria IN12 IN13 IN14 IN15 IN16 IN17 IN18 IN19 IN20 IN21 
A 0.56 0.53 0.55 0.49 0.60 0.53 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.56 
B 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.44 0.41 
C 0.82 0.84 0.83 0.85 0.71 0.83 0.81 0.75 0.71 0.81 
D 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.46 0.60 0.48 0.50 0.56 0.60 0.50 
E 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.50 0.36 0.37 0.45 0.50 0.38 
F 0.68 0.71 0.69 0.74 0.64 0.70 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.68 
from att A 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
from att B 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 6 6 5 
from att C 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
from att D 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
from att E 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 5 5 6 
from att F 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
choice...A 2 5 4 3 4 3 4 6 4 3 
choice...B 5 4 5 5 3 5 3 5 6 2 
choice...C 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 
choice...D 3 2 3 4 5 4 5 3 5 4 
choice...E 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 1 6 
choice...F 4 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 3 5 
wting diff L 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 
wting diff M 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.15 0.02 
wting diff S 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.15 0.18 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.18 0.02 
sum 0.13 0.22 0.14 0.30 0.36 0.16 0.09 0.21 0.36 0.05 
rank 6 15 7 17 18 10 3 11 18 1 
IC A 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 3 1 0 
IC B 0 1 0 0 3 0 2 1 0 3 
IC C 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
IC D 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
IC E 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 0 
IC F 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 
sum 4 8 2 0 6 0 4 8 8 6 
IC rank 6 12 4 1 8 1 6 12 12 8 
EC1 A 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 3 1 0 
EC1 B 0 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 1 3 
EC1 C 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
EC1 D 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
EC1 E 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 0 
EC1 F 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 
sum 4 8 2 0 4 0 4 8 10 6 
EC1 rank 6 12 3 1 6 1 6 12 17 10 
EC2 A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC2 B 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
EC2 C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC2 D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC2 E 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
EC2 F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
sum 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 
EC2 rank 1 1 1 1 16 1 1 16 16 1 
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Appendix 9: Ground Combat Vehicle Mission Simulation Survey 
 
Modified Title: Ground Combat Vehicle Mission Simulation Survey 
IRB PROTOCOL # 2010090027 
Conducted By: Joshua M. Keena 
Of The University of Texas at Austin:   Department / Office;  ME/4.11126 Telephone: 
232-4471 
 
You are being asked to participate in a research study.  This form provides you with information 
about the study.  The person in charge of this research will also describe this study to you and 
answer all of your questions. Please read the information below and ask any questions you might 
have before deciding whether or not to take part. Your participation is entirely voluntary.  You 
can refuse to participate or stop participating at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to 
which you are otherwise entitled.  You can stop your participation at any time and your refusal 
will not impact current or future relationships with UT Austin or participating sites.  To do so 
simply tell the researcher you wish to stop participation.  The researcher will provide you with a 
copy of this consent for your records. 
 
The purpose of this study is to capture the performance of prototypic ground combat vehicles in 
a simulated environment. I intend to interview up to 20 ROTC cadets for this study.   
 
If you agree to be in this study, we will ask you to do the following things: 
 Participants will be oriented to the software title through a short presentation 
 Participants will conduct a series of user familiarization and training exercises using the 
aforementioned software  
 Participants will be asked to use a series of vehicle variants in a similar mission 
environment and record the performance of each vehicle at the completion of the exercise 
 
Total estimated time to participate in study is 4 hours (including 1 hour for lunch) 
 
Risks of being in the study are no greater than everyday life.   
 
Benefits of being in the study include exposure to the design process and requisite 
considerations for trade off analysis with respect to ground combat vehicles.   
 
Compensation: A lunch meal will be served from a local caterer. 
 
Confidentiality and Privacy Protections: 
The data resulting from your participation may be made available to other researchers in the 
future for research purposes not detailed within this consent form. In these cases, the data will 
contain no identifying information that could associate you with it, or with your participation in 
any study. 
 
The records of this study will be stored securely and kept confidential. Authorized persons from 
The University of Texas at Austin, members of the Institutional Review Board, and (study 
sponsors, if any) have the legal right to review your research records and will protect the  
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confidentiality of those records to the extent permitted by law.  All publications will exclude any 
information that will make it possible to identify you as a subject. Throughout the study, the 
researchers will notify you of new information that may become available and that might affect 
your decision to remain in the study. 
 
Contacts and Questions: 
 
If you have any questions about the study please ask now.  If you have questions later, want 
additional information, or wish to withdraw your participation call the researchers conducting the 
study.  Their names, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses are at the top of this page.   
 
If you would like to obtain information about the research study, have questions, concerns, 
complaints or wish to discuss problems about a research study with someone unaffiliated with the 
study, please contact the IRB Office at (512) 471-8871 or Jody Jensen, Ph.D., Chair, The 
University of Texas at Austin Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects at 
(512) 232-2685. Anonymity, if desired, will be protected to the extent possible. As an alternative 
method of contact, an email may be sent to orsc@uts.cc.utexas.edu or a letter sent to IRB 
Administrator, P.O. Box 7426, Mail Code A 3200, Austin, TX 78713. 
You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records.
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Statement of Consent: 
 
I have read the above information and have sufficient information to make a decision about 
participating in this study.  I consent to participate in the study. 
 




___________________________________________________ Date: ___________________ 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent / Investigator 
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Appendix 10: IRB Study Amendment for Combat Vehicle Simulations 
 
IRB Amendment to Study 2010090027 
Attribute Weighting Survey Questionnaire for Ground Combat Vehicle Design and 
Selection Considerations   
Joshua M. Keena 
PhD Candidate, Mechanical Engineering 
University of Texas at Austin 
  
VII. Modified Title: Ground Combat Vehicle Mission Simulation Survey  
 
VIII. Investigators (co-investigators): Joshua M. Keena  no change 
 
IX. Hypothesis,  Research Questions, or Goals of the Project: The goal of this project 
is to capture the quantitative results of prototypic ground combat vehicle design 
performance in a simulated game environment as controlled by soldiers and ROTC 
cadets. 
 
X. Background and Significance:  no change 
 
The design and/or selection of a ground combat vehicle is often an exercise in 
trade-offs enabled by appropriate decision support tools.  In order to aid in the 
compilation and distillation of performance data, measurable attributes are often 
weighted appropriately (Saaty, 1977).  By querying a statistical sample of the 
user population with questions focused on capturing the subjective weightings 
each places on the various performance aspects of a ground combat vehicle 
candidate, these weightings can subsequently be used either to guide design 
efforts and resources or to streamline selection processes.   
 
XI. Research Method, Design, and Proposed Statistical Analysis: 
 
I will present the participants with a short presentation about the software title to 
be used in the exercise.  This is essentially a game where the user navigates a 
ground combat vehicle through an urban environment in order to conduct a 
notional mission to seek and destroy a peer threat vehicle.  After conducting an 
orientation to the software and hardware, e.g. joystick, the participants will 
conduct a familiarization mission to gain basic experience and proficiency with 
the game.  Upon completion of the training mission, the users will be asked to 
deploy vehicle variants through the same mission scenario. Users will be asked to 
record performance data for each vehicle.  This information appears on the 
closing screen after a simulation, and this screenshot includes data regarding 
mission success, time for mission, and vehicle health rating for friend and foe.  
Since the variants have been designed using a DOE methodology, the variant 
performance can be subsequently analyzed to elicit attribute weighting 
significance and possible interactions between these attributes. 
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XII. Human Subject Interactions 
 
A. The potential participants will be members of the University of Texas ROTC 
Program that includes transitioning service members as well as newly assessed 
cadets.  The population will be both male and female cadets, aged approximately 
from 20-40.  The total population of participants will number approximately 20 
subjects.  In accordance with military regulations and standards, all participants 
will be in good health.  Given the fact that the population will be composed of 
cadets in training to become leaders and military officers, it is unlikely that any 
of the participants are apt to be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence.  All 
students enrolled in the ROTC Program meet screening criteria and are eligible 
for inclusion in the study.  Participation will of course be voluntary, and there 
will be an alternate activity available for those not wishing to contribute to this 
research project.  I expect human subject involvement in this project to begin in 
January 2011 and to end in February 2011.   
 
B. I am currently in discourse with the Professor of Military Science for the 
ROTC Program at the University of Texas regarding this survey.  If he agrees to 
make his cadets available for this study, and if this amendment is approved, then 
we will use a period of discretionary time to conduct this exercise.  As members 
of the ROTC program, all subjects have been prescreened and are fully qualified, 
both professionally and academically, to participate in this study.  
 
C. I will present all participants with a consent form and maintain copies with my 
confidential research archives.  Additionally, each participant will be given a 
copy of the signed consent form.   
 
D.  Research Protocol.  I will present the participants with a short 
presentation about the software title to be used in the exercise.  This is 
essentially a game where the user navigates a ground combat vehicle 
through an urban environment in order to conduct a notional mission to 
seek and destroy a peer threat vehicle.  After conducting an orientation to 
the software and hardware, e.g. joystick, the participants will conduct a 
familiarization mission to gain basic experience and proficiency with the 
game.  Upon completion of the training mission, the users will be asked to 
deploy vehicle variants through the same mission scenario. Users will be 
asked to record performance data for each vehicle.  This information 
appears on the closing screen after a simulation, and this screenshot 
includes data regarding mission success, time for mission, and vehicle 
health rating for friend and foe.   
 
E.  I will protect and observe the privacy of each participant by only contacting 
them with follow up questions using methods they have agreed to on the 
questionnaire.  Furthermore, I will contact them during times that they have 
indicated are acceptable (e.g., a professional email account ‘army knowledge 
online’ or ‘ako’).   
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F.  I will protect the confidentiality of participants by maintaining strict control 
of all questionnaires in a locked file cabinet maintained in my office at the IAT, 
room 4.11126.  I will not divulge to others any data that is inconsistent with the 
understanding of the original disclosure.  The names will only be recorded on the 
original survey.  All digital entries and subsequent analysis will rely on a code 
generated for confidentiality purposes. I will destroy this data within 12 months, 
no later than August 31, 2011. 
 
H. The IQC coordinator has afforded me access to the course population during 
a period of discretionary time.  We will conduct the survey in an established 
conference room.   
 
VII.  I rate this survey exercise as low risk.  If, for unforeseen circumstances, I lose 
confidentiality of the participants’ responses, I will notify the participants of this 
through established contact methods.   
 
VIII. The participants could benefit from contributing to this project because they will be 
exposed to an organizational framework for cataloging and weighting the various 
principal and derivative metrics used to quantify the relative merit of a ground 
combat system.  Since the participants are training to become leaders in the military, 
this subject is apropos for the range of specialists I anticipate engaging with.  The 
benefits of participation heavily outweigh the risks.   
 
IX.  No other sites or agencies are involved in this research project.   
 
XI. This project will not receive review from another IRB.   
 
Respectfully, 




Appendix 11: GCV Simulation Survey  
Part I:  Introduction 
 
In support of the construction of a decision support tool being used in both the 
design and selection of the next Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) candidate, you have 
been asked to deploy a prototypic vehicle in a simulated environment to collect 
performance data for this effort. At this early stage, consider the GCV as the successor to 
the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (M2A3 IFV). Your contribution to this study 
should be a reflection of your past military experiences, present duty position, and, 
perhaps toughest of all to predict, what you foresee to be the needs and capabilities of our 
future armed forces.  Undoubtedly, the potential combat scenarios for future warfighters 
include a mix of both conventional (e.g. Desert Storm) and irregular warfare (e.g. OIF, 
OEF). 
 
In the context of this exercise, you are going to focus strictly on combat platform 
performance.  Cost and schedule considerations are being addressed in a subsequent 
forum.  Moreover, with respect to performance, consider the worth of a ground combat 
vehicle to be a function of its principal attributes of Lethality, Survivability and Mobility. 
These three principal attributes can be further broken down into secondary traits and 
tertiary metrics. 
 
While the GCV is clearly a platform that will operate as a tactical level asset, one 
should also consider the operational and strategic implications of the principal metrics.  
Some of these are easy to conceptualize (e.g. Strategic Mobility, like intertheater 
transportability), and others are more abstract notions (e.g. Operational Lethality, like 
collateral damage incurred).  For tactical assets, it is normally easier to envision the 
negative operational and strategic implications of the principal attributes.  In any case, 
use your best judgment when providing your rankings and feedback. 
 




Prior Service (MOS, Service) _____________________________________ 
 
Combat Experience (if applicable) ________________________________ 
 
Gaming Experience (on a scale of 1-5 with a 1 being inexperienced and a 5 is an 
expert)___________ 
 
Gaming Participation (hours per week) ____________________________ 
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Amended Script for Ground Combat Vehicle Simulation Survey 
 
In support of the construction of a decision support tool being used in both the 
design and selection of the next Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) candidate, you have 
been asked to deploy a prototypic vehicle in a simulated environment to collect 
performance data for this effort. At this early stage, consider the GCV as the successor to 
the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (M2A3 IFV). Your contribution to this study 
should be a reflection of your past military experiences, present duty position, and, 
perhaps toughest of all to predict, what you foresee to be the needs and capabilities of our 
future armed forces.  Undoubtedly, the potential combat scenarios for future warfighters 
include a mix of both conventional (e.g. Desert Storm) and irregular warfare (e.g. OIF, 
OEF). 
 
In the context of this exercise, you are going to focus strictly on combat platform 
performance.  Cost and schedule considerations are being addressed in a subsequent 
forum.  Moreover, with respect to performance, consider the worth of a ground combat 
vehicle to be a function of its principal attributes of Lethality, Survivability and Mobility. 
These three principal attributes can be further broken down into secondary traits and 
tertiary metrics. 
 
While the GCV is clearly a platform that will operate as a tactical level asset, one 
should also consider the operational and strategic implications of the principal metrics.  
Some of these are easy to conceptualize (e.g. Strategic Mobility, like intertheater 
transportability), and others are more abstract notions (e.g. Operational Lethality, like 
collateral damage incurred).  For tactical assets, it is normally easier to envision the 
negative operational and strategic implications of the principal attributes.  In any case, 
use your best judgment when providing your rankings and feedback. 
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Appendix 13: Workstation Assignment Matrix 
 
Tracked Vehicle Matrix (XTVs 1-8) 
 
workstation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
0-20 min 3 5 2 8 4 5 6 1 2 6 1 4 8 5 3 7 
20–40 min 5 6 8 1 3 2 4 7 6 1 5 7 4 2 8 3 
40-60 min 6 2 5 3 7 8 1 4 4 8 3 6 2 7 5 1 
60-80 min 8 1 3 5 6 4 7 2 8 3 7 1 6 4 2 5 
 
 
Wheeled Vehicle Matrix (XWVs 1-8) 
 
workstation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
0-20 min 8 1 5 7 4 2 6 3 5 2 3 1 4 7 6 8 
20–40 min 6 4 2 5 3 8 1 7 3 1 8 7 2 4 5 6 
40-60 min 4 5 1 3 7 6 2 8 1 6 7 5 8 3 2 4 
60-80 min 1 7 6 8 5 3 4 2 6 3 4 2 5 8 7 1 
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Vehicle ____________          Work Station_____________ 
 
Win / Loss 







    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
 
Vehicle ____________          Work Station_____________ 
 
 
Win / Loss 
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win % blue % red % time % timeout % 1-5 win % 
XTV1 
− − − 
s l m 
40% 85% 38% 73% 20% 29% 
XTV2 
+ − − 
S l m 
27% 81% 52% 76% 28% 20% 
XTV3 
− + − 
s L m 
74% 88% 22% 54% 7% 73% 
XTV4 
+ + − 
S L m 
68% 92% 27% 55% 6% 63% 
XTV5 
− − + 
s l M 
76% 84% 16% 64% 10% 70% 
XTV6 
+ − + 
S l M 
52% 80% 38% 62% 6% 50% 
XTV7 
− + + 
s L M 
77% 93% 19% 45% 2% 73% 
XTV8 
+ + + 
S L M 









win % blue % red % time % timeout % 1-5 win % 
XWV1 
− − − 
s l m 
68% 84% 19% 42% 1% 66% 
XWV2 
+ − − 
S l m 
49% 84% 31% 57% 5% 44% 
XWV3 
− + − 
s L m 
79% 92% 13% 26% 0% 74% 
XWV4 
+ + − 
S L m 
70% 88% 21% 41% 4% 73% 
XWV5 
− − + 
s l M 
79% 88% 12% 38% 0% 84% 
XWV6 
+ − + 
S l M 
77% 75% 12% 41% 0% 77% 
XWV7 
− + + 
s L M 
72% 86% 16% 31% 2% 70% 
XWV8 
+ + + 
S L M 
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